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Preface to “Second Generation General System Theory: 
Perspectives in Philosophy and Approaches in Complex 
Systems” 
Following the classical work of Norbert Wiener, Ross Ashby, Ludwig von Bertalanffy and many 
others, the concept of System has been elaborated in different disciplinary fields, allowing 
interdisciplinary approaches in areas such as Physics, Biology, Chemistry, Cognitive Science, 
Economics, Education, Engineering, Social Sciences, Mathematics, Medicine, Artificial Intelligence, 
Philosophy, and Simulation Science. 
The new challenge of Complexity and Emergence has made the concept of System even more 
relevant to the study of systemic aspects with high contextuality. 
This conceptual shift in System concepts runs through the entire area of natural philosophy and 
epistemology, and leads to the questioning of old and new science words in a new conceptual 
archipelago. 
In his essay entitled American Lessons (1985), the Italian writer Italo Calvino proposed six key 







We think that these words, with others emerging from the contributions in this book, can 
conceptually represent significant, fresh approaches to systems research dealing with complexity. 
This Special Issue focuses on the nature of new problems arising from the study and modelling 
of complexity, their eventual common aspects, properties and approaches—already partially 
considered by different disciplines—as well as focusing on new, possibly unitary, theoretical 
frameworks. In particular, this issue is also devoted to the philosophical and structural aspects of the 
complexity and emergence theories. 
Research is based on two crucial requirements: the introduction of new approaches and results, 
in addition to problems and proposals that are non-linearly deducible from previously available 
knowledge. The robustness of approaches and results makes them pillars of science. Problems and 
proposals should be innovative rather than simply correct. Too often, non-questionability relates to 
obviousness and guarantees the publication of very well documented articles. This is the case for 
Systems science too. This Special Issue, as well a previous one entitled Towards a Second Generation 
General System Theory (Editors: Gianfranco Minati, Eliano Pessa, 2014) http://www.mdpi.com/ 
journal/systems/special_issues/second-generation-general-system-theory, and other publications aim 
to introduce fresh impetus into systems research when the possible detection and correction of 
mistakes require the development of new knowledge—not just the detection of inconsistencies with 
previously available knowledge. This book contains contributions presenting new approaches and 
results, problems and proposals. The context is an interdisciplinary framework dealing, in order, with 
electronic engineering problems; the problem of the observer; transdisciplinarity; problems of 
organised complexity; theoretical incompleteness; design of digital systems in a user-centred way; 
reaction networks as a framework for systems modelling; emergence of a stable system in reaction 
networks; emergence at the fundamental systems level; behavioural realization of memoryless 
functions. 
Gianfranco Minati, Eliano Pessa and Ignazio Licata 
Special Issue Editors 
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Abstract: Approaches for the design of fault tolerant Network-on-Chip (NoC) for use in System-on-Chip
(SoC) reconfigurable technology using Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) technology are
challenging, especially in Multiprocessor System-on-Chip (MPSoC) design. To achieve this, the use of
rigorous formal approaches, based on incremental design and proof theory, has become an essential step
in the validation process. The Event-B method is a promising formal approach that can be used to
develop, model and prove accurately SoC and MPSoC architectures. This paper proposes a formal
verification approach for NoC architecture including the dependability constraints relating to the
choice of the path routing of data packets and the strategy imposed for diversion when faulty routers
are detected. The formalization process is incremental and validated by correct-by-construction
development of the NoC architecture. Using the concepts of graph colouring and B-event formalism,
the results obtained have demonstrated its efficiency for determining the bugs, and a solution to
ensure a fast and reliable operation of the network when compared to existing similar methods.
Keywords: network on chip; switch and adaptive-routing; event-B formalism; formal proof;
correct-by-construction
1. Introduction and Related Work
The growing chip complexity and the need to integrate more and more components on the
chip (e.g., processors, DSP cores or memories) imposes the trend for embedded systems moving
towards Multiprocessor System-on-Chip (MPSoC). Consequently, in the new SoC paradigm, the
network centric approaches, called Networks-on-chip (NoCs), are progressively becoming the main
on-chip communication mediums and are the major issue in MPSoC. Indeed, integrating a NoC in
the SoC provides an effective way to interconnect several Processor Elements (PEs) or Intellectual
Properties (IPs) (processors, memory controllers, etc.) [1], with high levels of modularity, flexibility,
and throughput. Generally, a NoC consists of routers and interconnections allowing communications
between PEs and/or IPs. Communication on NoC relies on data packet exchanges. The paths used by
the data packets between a source and a destination through the routers are defined by the routing
algorithm. Hence, on-chip communications must have a high degree of availability; that is, a high
probability of correct and timely provision of requested services. To achieve this, correctness of such
communicating structure should be ensured. Formal methods can be used to verify complex MPSoC
in order to ensure that these systems satisfy their functional and communication requirements [2].
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Indeed, the application of formal methods helps increase confidence to building correct hardware
systems. Therefore, formal methods are of essential importance to the development of such novel
and complex platforms. Consequently, several previous studies propose new system formalisms
based on generic and hierarchical connectors for handling the complexity of on-chip communications
and data flows [3–9]. However, few previous studies have focused on fault tolerant communicating
systems, in particular for proof validation of the on-chip communication reliabilities [10–14]. With an
increasing complexity and reliability evolution of MPSoC, where NoCs are becoming more sensitive
to phenomena generating permanent, transient, or intermittent faults, several solutions have been
proposed and formalized [15,16]. The aim is to define mechanisms allowing the bypasses of the faulty
nodes or regions to achieve reliability of NoC performing on-chip communications of the designed
SoC. Generally, such routing schemes, before being designed, are behaviourally verified by simulation
with created stimuli. This allows quick detection of the coarse errors. However, simulations cannot
find all possible errors to ensure reliable functionalities before their design, and are often considered
insufficient for improving the dependability of NoCs [1]. Indeed, unlike formal verification, simulations
arouse a computer model by input stimuli, which is, unfortunately, not exhaustive because no extensive
testing can ensure a large error coverage. Furthermore, experience has shown that if half of the errors
come from carelessness during the design, the other half are from the level of the specifications.
Formal methods have the ability to produce critical systems for large industrial projects through
the generation of original mathematical models that can be formally refined at various levels until the
final refinement containing accurate implementation and verification details. Typically, verification by
simulation does not allow the detection of all possible design errors [17]. In this paper, we propose
to use the Event-B formal method, especially the correct-by-construction paradigm [18], to specify
hardware systems. This paradigm offers an alternative approach to prove and define correct systems
and architectures, for the reconstruction of a target system using progressive refinement through
validated methodological techniques [19]. Our goal is to complete the simulation time in the design
flow with a formal proof method. The preconditions for the formal development of microelectronic
architectures lead to the description and/or the design of the architecture.
A large body of works has focused on the use of formal methods to verify communication systems
and protocols, and model-checking methods or its composition with proving theorems are the most
widely used. The work of Clarke et al. described in [20] proposed checking the temporal properties of
parameterized ring networks and binary trees. A first step consists of using a free-context grammar
to model the network communication systems while temporal properties are verified using a model
checker. In [21], Amjad used a model checker implemented in HOL to verify AMBAAHB protocols
and PDB. Bharadwaj et al. [22] proposed a broadcast protocol in a binary tree network using the SPIN
model checker demonstrator. In [23], Curzon developed a structural model for Fairisle ATM switch
and compared its behavioural specification using HOL. The free deadlock in the network was verified
by Gebre Michael et al. using the PVS tool [24]. Some works, which are based on semi-formal methods,
were also proposed to detect and debug failures. For example, Chenard et al. proposed assertion
listeners PSL [25,26] which were synthesized using NGC tool [27] in a NoC. Analytical approaches do
not cover the dynamic behaviour and performance of a system, but rather analyse it statically. Model
checking, which has been adopted in this paper, is an automated technique to verify each model of a
system satisfies its specifications [28]. The model is described as a state machine and the specification
is described in a temporal logic. A model control algorithm uses the transition function associated with
the state machine to explore the state space and define the states that do not meet the specifications.
If a state is found, its traces leading to this state are reported. If such a state is not found, the system is
proved correct. Model checking is widely adopted by academic and industry communities, mainly
because it is a fully automatic model. The major problem is its combinatorial blow-up of the number of
states that have to be explored, usually called state space explosion. This severely limits the scalability
of model checking. Theorem proving is a technique where the evidence of a mathematical theorem is
2
Systems 2017, 5, 17
formalized so that a computer program can guarantee its accuracy. The main advantage of the theorem
is the ability to deal with the parametric systems.
The verification of SoC communications [29] describes the main challenges in the design of
NoCs [1] and discusses some aspects of audit networks where formal methods are useful. Dynamic
reconfigurable NoCs are adequate for FPGA-based systems, where the main problem arises when IP
components must be defined dynamically at run time. Given the rapidly changing and highly complex
MPSoCs, the constraints related to the complexity and the increasing number of interconnected
modules or IP such as the cost and performance must be resolved. Current communications of NoCs
implement the data transmission between the interconnected nodes. Sometimes the communication of
this kind of networks is difficult or even impossible. This is the main reason why XY fault-tolerant
routing algorithms have been developed [30]. These algorithms allow bypassing faulty or unavailable
regions through the error detectors introduced inside the network in order to ensure that the data
packets are not loss. Routers can control the miss-routing of previous detectors (e.g., packet on the
path XY, etc.). In addition, new techniques and adaptive fault-tolerance routing with error detection
and path routing based on the well-known XY turn model have been introduced. In the case of these
algorithms, zones corresponding to already detected faulty nodes or unavailable regions in the NoC
are defined. As routers can control if previous switches have performed routing errors (e.g., packet out
of the XY path, etc.), the neighbour routers of these zones must not send data packets toward these
faulty routers or unavailable regions. To achieve this, chains or rings around the adjacent faulty nodes
or regions are formed in order to delimit rectangular parts in the NoC covering all the faulty nodes or
unavailable regions. In these chains or rings of switches, the routing tables are modified and differ
from the standard tables related to the XY routing algorithm. These specific switches integrate in their
tables additional routing rules allowing to bypass the faulty zones or regions dedicated to dynamic
IP/PE instantiations, while avoiding starvation, deadlock, and livelock situations [19]. On the other
hand, formal studies have only focused on NoC performance [31,32], latency [33], bandwidth [34],
estimation of consumption [34], error detection and correction [35,36], and required and used logic
area. Others propose methods of free-deadlock routing [37,38] to characterize the traffic.
This paper aims to investigate event-B concept and its application to specify and verify formally
the correctness of the SoC communications. The contributions are twofold: to demonstrate the NoC
behaviour; and to prove the dependability of a proposed fault tolerant routing algorithm used in
a specific NoC. More precisely, in our formal approach, by considering the architecture of routers and
the defined communication rules of the specific routing algorithm under normal and fault conditions,
we ensure a correct transmission of data in the network and a reliable functionality. This is done from
the checking criteria being invariants of behavioural of logic and communication blocks constituting
the routers, and designed for bypassing faulty or unavailable regions in the NoC. We also aim to
demonstrate the step-wise construction of the adaptive NoC, which can be useful for a pre-silicon
verification by testing the behaviour of the NoC architecture in a virtual environment with a formal
verification tool.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the event-B
method showing the NoC architecture studied with the audit results of the formal verification. In this
section, the behavioural modelling of the NoC with its basic element switches are detailed by describing
the architecture of the fault tolerance and the model description. This section also details the proofs of
the proposed fault tolerant modified XY routing algorithm associated to the modelled NoC to overcome
some faulty events encountered in the network in order to maintain the dependability during the
communication operations. Section 3 discusses the results obtained from the various levels of formal
modelling detailed in Section 2. Finally, Section 4 concludes this paper along with the future work.
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2. Stepwise Specification of the System Using Event-B
2.1. Definition of Event-Band and Proof Obligations
The main reason for selecting Event-B as the modelling language is its the refinement feature
which allows a progressive development of models. Moreover, Event B is also supported by a complete
RODIN toolset [38] providing features including refinement, proof obligations generation, proof
assistants and model-checking facilities. The Event B modelling language can express theorems or
safety properties, which are invariants, in a machine corresponding to the system [39]. Event B allows
a progressive development of models through refinements. The two main structures available in
Event-B are:
- Contexts, which express the static information about the model.
- Machines, which express dynamic information about the model, invariants, safety properties,
and events.
An Event B model is defined either as a context or as a machine. A machine organizes events
(or actions), which modify the state variables and uses static information defined in a context.
The refinement of models provides a mechanism for relating an abstract model and a concrete model
by adding new events or variables. This feature allows to develop gradually Event-B models and to
validate each decision step using the proof tool. The refinement relationship should be expressed as
follows: a model M is refined by a model P, when P simulates M. Thus, from a given model M, a new
model P can be built and asserted to be a refinement of M describing the architecture. Model M is an
abstraction of P, and model P is a refinement (concrete version) of M. Likewise, context C, seen by a
model M, can be refined to a context D, which may be seen by P (see Figure 1). The final concrete model
is close to the behaviour of the real system that executes events using real source code. The refinement
of a formal model allows us to enrich the model via a step-by-step approach and is the foundation of
our proposed correct-by-construction approach. Refinement provides a way to strengthen invariants
and to add details to a model. It is also used to transform an abstract model to a more concrete (real)
version by modifying the state description. This is done by extending the list of state variables (possibly
suppressing some of them) and by refining each abstract event to a set of possible concrete versions,






see refine refine 
Figure 1. Illustration of machine and context relationships.
The proofs obligation defines what is to be proved for an Event-B model. These proofs are
automatically generated and concern Invariant, Preservation, Feasibility, Fusion, and so on. The RODIN
Platform tool [40], called Proof Obligation Generator, decides what is to be proved in order to ensure
the correctness of the model. Therefore, just to check contexts and machine texts and to decide what is
to prove in these texts, there are eleven rules for the proof obligation all defined and labelled within
the Robin platform. Actually, the refinement-based development of Event B requires a very careful
derivation process, integrating possible tough interactive proofs for discharging generated proof
obligations, at each step of development. The automatic prover is designed in order to drive the heart’s
mode in which the evidence Prove (pr) command is tried on each proof obligation. An automatic
4
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mode simply stores the maximum tempted strength for each obligation, which is the level of automatic
proof obligation. On the other hand, the interactive demonstration allows the operator to decide
him/her self what proof commands are applied. The sequence of commands that a user has chosen to
demonstrate an obligation is stored along with the state of proof.
2.2. NoC Architecture Description and Modeling
The network transmission is realized through routers constituting the network, and by using
switching techniques of data packets constituted of messages and routing rules [1]. Usually, the
network has a grid-like form and is built with on-chip routers characterized by a 2D mesh topology,
Ack/Nack flow control, and store-and-forward buffering strategy, which avoid deadlock situations.
Figure 2 illustrates the mesh-network (4 × 4 mesh topology) where peripheral switches are associated
to a PE. Therefore, boundary switches are connected to one PE and with two or three neighbours,
whereas other nodes are connected to four neighbours. Each NoC element (PE or router) possesses a
specific address but only PEs act as emitter and receiver of messages through the network. Thus, in a
n × n 2D mesh, a node or switch K is identified by a two element vector (kx and ky), 1 ≤ kx, ky ≤ n,
where kx and ky are the coordinates of dimension x and y, respectively. The routers communicate
with other neighbours in the four possible directions through a fixed number of packets. For this
purpose, each switch has four incoming and outgoing ports from which it can receive and send the
packets (see Figure 1). Four pairs of ports towards other adjacent nodes are named, respectively,
West, North, East and South. In our case study, we consider a Quality-of-Service NoC (QNoC) switch
(see Figure 2b) [1] which consists of routing logic and control logic with inputs/outputs for each
direction. This microelectronic architecture communicates with four neighbouring elements.
(a) (b) 
Figure 2. (a) Mesh topology; and (b) general structure of the QNoC switch architecture.
The computing elements associated with the NoC network communicate through messages.
A message consists of a fixed number of packets and is based on a wormhole flow control. The number
of packets Np in a message is not fixed by the network (Np ≥ 1). The format of a packet is shown
in Figure 3. The first field denotes the destination address whose size depends on the total number
of units constituting the NoC communication network. The second field contains the information
about the size of the packet, while the third field contains the (user-ID) identification number of the
packet. We consider the size of the ID field to be less than or equal to the size of the message, and it is
never zero. The last field contains the data to be transmitted. Packets can flow in different directions
depending on the status of the router (free busy or failed) but the communication units in a single
packet (conflicts) must follow the same path.
5
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Figure 3. Format of a packet used in NoC.
In the next subsections, we detail the formal specification that has been validated from the
RODIN Event-B software. The refinements of the formal proof demonstrating the dependability of
the proposed fault tolerant routing algorithm suitable for adaptive NoC is also given. Therefore, we
give the axioms and invariant express results obtained under RODIN toolset environment proving the
efficiency of the proposed fault-tolerant adaptive routing algorithm based on the XY and turn model
routing schemes.
2.3. NoC Formal Development and Discharge Obligations
An incremental development of a NoC architecture using the Event-B formalism [41] and the
formalization of the architecture is presented from an abstract level down to a more concrete level in a
hierarchical way (see Figure 4).
Figure 4. Step-by-step Modelling of NoC Architecture.
- The first model xyM0 is an abstract description of the service offered by the NoC architecture (see
Figure 5): the sending of a packet (p) by a source switch and the receiving of (p) by a destination switch.
Figure 5. Abstraction Level.
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A set of switches (NODES); a set of packets (MSG); a function src, associating packets and their
sources; and a function dst, coupling packets and their destinations, are defined in the context xyC0.
The machine xyM0 uses (sees) the contents of context xyC0, and with these, describes an abstract view
of the service provided by the NoC architecture:
• An event SEND presents the sending of a packet (m), by its source (s), to a switch destination (d).
• An event RECEIVE depicts the receiving of a sent packet (m) by its destination (d).
Moreover, the model xyM0 allows us to express some properties and invariants:
ran(received) ⊆ran(sent)
This invariant ensures that each packet received by a destination switch has been sent by a
source switch.
- The machine xyM1 refines xyM0 and introduces a network (agraph) between the sources and
destinations of packets (see Figure 6). Some properties on the graph are defined in context xyC1: graph
is non-empty, non-transitive and is symmetrical.
Figure 6. Adding Network.
The events in xyM0 are refined:
• Event SEND: When a source sends a packet, it is put in the network.
• Event RECEIVE: A packet is received by its destination, if it has reached the destination.
New events are also introduced by xyM0:
Event FORWARD (see Figure 7): in the network, a packet (p) transits from a node (x) to another
node (y), until the destination (d) of packet (p) is reached.
Figure 7. Transfer of a Packet (p) between Switches.
• Event DISABLE: A node is disabled. The node is not allowed to communicate with its neighbours
(failure, etc.). During the disabling of some nodes, we ensure that the packets transiting in the
network will eventually reach their destinations (either after a reconfiguration of the network or
by always keeping a path to destinations available).
• Event RELINK: This event models the reconfiguration of the network. Disabled nodes are re-enabled:
the links between them and their neighbours are restored, therefore allowing communications
and packets transfers. The reconfiguration of the network helps in demonstrating the safety of
data transmission between a source switch and a destination switch.
The machine xyM1 also presents some properties of the system:
ran(received) ∩ ran(store) = ∅
This invariant demonstrates that a packet (p) sent by a source is either traveling in the network
(store) or is received by a destination.
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- The second refinement decomposes the event FORWARD of xyM1 into two events:
• A refinement of the event FORWARD depicts the passing of a packet (p) from a switch (x) to a
channel (ch), leading to a neighbour (y) (see Figure 8).
• An event FROM_CHANNEL_TO_NODE models the transfer of a packet (p) from a channel (ch)
to a connected switch (n) (see Figure 8). The machine xyM12 also defines some properties:
ran(c) ∩ran(switch) = ∅
Figure 8. Channel Introduction.
The invariant expresses that each transmitted packet is either in a channel or in a switch. A sent
packet cannot be in a channel and in a switch at the same time.
- The third refinement allows us to introduce the structure of a switch gradually. We express, in
xyM13, that the switches possess output ports (see Figure 9). The abstract event FORWARD is
further decomposed:
• The refinement of event FORWARD adds the fact that a packet (p), which is leaving a switch (x)
and heading for a neighbour (y), first enters the output logic (op) of the switch (x) leading to (y).
• A new event OUTPUT_BUFFER_TO_CHANNEL models the transition of a packet (p) from an
output port (op) to a channel (ch) leading to a target switch (n).
Figure 9. Adding Output Ports.
Moreover, new properties and invariants are defined in xyM13:
inv1 : ran(chan) ⊆ ran(sent)
inv2 : ran(outputbuffer) ⊆ ran(sent)
inv3 : ran(outputbuffer) ∩ ran(chan) = ∅
The invariant inv1 expresses that each packet transiting in a channel (ch) has been sent by a source
(s); inv2 demonstrates that each packet transiting in an output port (ch) has been sent by a source (s);
and inv3 presents the fact that a packet is either in an output port or in a channel, the packet cannot be
in an output port and a channel between two switches at the same time.
- The fourth refinement (xyM14) adds input ports to the structure of a switch (see Figure 10).
 
Figure 10. Adding Input Ports.
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The event SEND is refined: when a switch source (s) sends a packet (p), the packet (p) is put in an
input port (ip) of the switch (s). The actions described by the abstract event FORWARD are decomposed:
• The event SWITCH_CONTROL, a refinement of FORWARD, models the passing of a packet (p),
from an input port (ip) of a switch (x), to an output port (op) leading to a switch (y).
• The event OUTPUT_BUFFER_TO_CHANNEL presents the transition of a packet (p), from an
output port (op), to a channel (ch) leading to a target switch (n).
• The event FROM_CHANNEL_TO_INPUT_BUFFER demonstrates the transition of a packet (p)
from a channel (ch) to an input port (ip) of a target switch (n).
The machine xyM14 also presents properties and invariants:
inv1 : ran(inputbuffer) ⊆ ran(sent)
inv2 : ran(outputbuffer) ∩ ran(inputbuffer) = ∅
inv3 : ran(inputbuffer) ∩ ran(chan) = ∅
The invariant expresses that each packet transiting in an input port (ip) has been sent by a source
(s); inv2 demonstrates that each packet is transiting either in an output port (op) or an in input port
(ip); and inv3 presents the fact that a packet is either in an input port or in a channel: the packet cannot
be in an input port and a channel between two switches at the same time.
- The fifth refinement introduces the storage of packets in a switch: each output port of a switch
can store a number of packets up to a limit (outputplaces) of three messages. Packets can be
blocked in a switch, because of the “wait” or “occupation” signals from the neighbours. The event
SWITCH_CONTROL is refined, and adds the fact that, following the transition of a packet from an
input port of a switch (x) to an output port, if the switch (x) is not busy anymore, it sends a release
signal to the previous switch linked to the input port. A new event RECEIVE_BUFFER_CREDIT
models the receiving of a release signal by a switch (n).
- The last model xyM16 describes the architecture of the network (graph): the graph has a mesh
topology (see Figure 11). A numerical limit (nsize) is introduced to bound the number of routers
in the dimensions x and y of the network topology; the network will be a regular 2D-Mesh, with a
size of (nsize × nsize); each switch is coupled with unique coordinates (x; y), with x 2 [0..nsize − 1]
and y 2 [0..nsize − 1].
 
Figure 11. A regular Mesh with 2D-coordinates.
This coordinate system allows it to be more precise on the neighbours of each switch, as shown in
Figure 11. This model also gives a fine-grained description of the structure of a switch (see Figure 12):
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Figure 12. Switches: Structure and Links.
A switch generally has four output ports and four input ports (usually labelled N, S, E and W),
used for communication with neighbours. However, two more cases are distinguished:
– Boundary switches at the corners only have two output ports and two input ports (N-E, N-W,
S-E, and S-W).
– Other boundary switches have three output ports and three input ports (N-S-E, and N-S-W).
Moreover, this model also introduces the XY routing algorithm:
D: destination. Coordinates (Dx, Dy)
C: current node. Coordinates (Cx, Cy)
if (Cx>Dx) :
return W; (Case 1)
if (Cx<Dx) :
return E; (Case 2)
if ((Cx = Dx) ∨((Cx>Dx) ∧W is blocked) ∨
((Cx<Dx) ∧E is blocked)):
if (Cy <Dy):
return N; (Case 3)
if (Cy >Dy):
return S; (Case 4)
The cases of the XY routing algorithm are matched with refinements of event SWITCH_CONTROL:
• SWITCH_CONTROL_LEFT models Case 1: A packet (p) is transmitted from an input port of a
switch (x) to an output port, resulting in a neighbour (y) located at W. This event is triggered if the
x-coordinate of the destination (d) (of the packet (p)) is inferior to the x-coordinate of the current
node (x).
• SWITCH_CONTROL_RIGHT models Case 2: A packet (p) is transmitted, from an input port of
a switch (x), to an output port, leading to a neighbour (y), located at E. This event is triggered
if the x-coordinate of the destination (d) (of the packet (p)) is superior to the x-coordinate of the
current node (x).
• SWITCH_CONTROL_UP models Case 3: A packet (p) is transmitted, from an input port of
a switch (x), to an output port, leading to a neighbour (y), located at N. This event is triggered if
the y-coordinate of the destination (d) (of the packet (p)) is superior to the y-coordinate of the
current node (x), and either, if the x-coordinate of the destination (d) is equal to the x-coordinate
of the current node (x), or if the packet (p) cannot transit along the x-axis.
• SWITCH_CONTROL_DOWN models Case 4: A packet (p) is transmitted, from an input port of
a switch (x), to an output port, leading to a neighbour (y), located at S. This event is triggered
if the y-coordinate of the destination (d) (of the packet (p)) is inferior to the y-coordinate of the
current node (x), and either, if the x-coordinate of the destination (d) is equal to the x-coordinate
of the current node (x), or if the packet (p) cannot transit along the x-axis.
Table 1 gives the number of proofs obligations which are automatically discharged proving the
checking of criteria for each considered level of abstraction and step by step. It can be noted that for
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context xyC15 and machine xyM14, there are more interactive proofs that automatic counterparts.
This is explained by the fact that a majority of these interactive proofs are quasi-automatic: the proofs
do not require significant efforts (no importing hypotheses, simplifying goals, etc.).
Table 1. Summary of proof obligations and discharged obligations.
Model Total Auto Interactive
xyC0 3 3 100% 0 0%
xyC1 6 6 100% 0 0%
xyC12 0 0 100% 0 0%
xyC13 0 0 100% 0 0%
xyC14 1 1 100% 0 0%
xyC15 5 0 0% 5 100%
xyM0 26 25 96.15% 1 3.85%
xyM1 38 28 73.68% 10 26.32%
xyM12 72 45 62.5% 27 37.5%
xyM13 74 37 50% 37 50%
xyM14 67 23 34.33% 44 65.67%
xyM15 24 14 58.33% 10 41.67%
xyM16 26 18 69.23% 8 30.77%
Total 342 200 58.48% 142 41.52%
2.4. Formal Devlopement of the Proposed Fault Tolerant Routing Algorithm and Discharge Obligations
In our case study, we consider an algorithm [1] that is a partially adaptive routing algorithm
allowing both routing of messages in networks incorporating regions that are not necessarily rectangular,
and all nodes, which are not completely blocked by faulty nodes. The considered routing scheme
designed for a 2D mesh topology and based on the turn model and XY routing algorithm allows the
handling of faulty nodes and regions of the chip [1]. More precisely, the switch uses a routing algorithm
based on the classical XY algorithm that can be used initially in the network and which relies on the
fact that the packets are routed according to X axis, and then to the Y axis of the array. If the routing
packets encounter faulty nodes or regions that prevent them from going through XY paths, then the
proposed routing algorithm allows circumvention of the faulty area(s) of the network. To achieve this
sort of bypassing, modified routing rules are performed by the nodes surrounding network’s faulty
areas according to the strategy detailed below.
Definition 1. In a 2D mesh, a node is called an even (respectively, odd) node if the sum of its coordinates
(x and y dimensions) is an even (respectively, odd) number.
The regular placement of even and odd nodes in the network is depicted in Figure 12. Each type
of node is surrounded by elements of other types, even nodes by odds and vice versa. We distinguish
two types of functioning of each node, activated and deactivated modes, which define activated and
deactivated areas of a network as follows:
Definition 2. One of the activated area of a network is a minimal rectangular area which envelops all faulty
nodes or regions in the network.
If a network does not have faulty nodes or regions, there is no activated area. Otherwise, a
network can contain only one activated area. All nodes (except faulty nodes or regions) belonging to
an activated area are activated. An activated area cannot have at the same time an odd (even) node at
its top right-hand corner and an even (odd) node at its bottom left-hand corner.
Definition 3. One of the deactivated areas of a network is the rest of the network which does not belong to
the activated area.
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If a network does not have an activated area (no faulty nodes or regions), the whole network is
deactivated. All nodes belonging to a deactivated area are deactivated. Figure 13 presents a network with
an activated area formed around a faulty node. In this case, only the nodes wrapping the faulty node
become activated. The nodes belonging to the rest of the network do not change their mode, and remain
deactivated. A deactivated node routes a data packet according to the XY algorithm. Firstly, it routes
along the X dimension and then along the Y dimension until the packet reaches its final destination. If a
packet, before reaching its final destination, reaches the activated area’s boundary, new routing rules
are applied.
Figure 13. Example of an activated area.
Accurately, the activated nodes (boundary nodes of an activated zone) do not obey the same set
of rules as deactivated nodes. These rules are presented in the following:
Rule 1. All packets in the active region can be routed only along the X-axis.
Rule 2. An activated node cannot route a packet from North to East side and vice versa.
Rule 3. An activated node cannot route a packet from South to West side and vice versa.
Rule 4. All activated nodes cannot route a packet from North to South and vice versa.
Each node can communicate directly with four neighbouring nodes on the network, which means
that there are sixteen (24 = 16) possible pathways from one node in a mesh to other neighbouring
nodes. To avoid routing loops, data packets cannot return to the sender node, hence the number of
pathways left is twelve (24 − 4 = 12). To avoid livelock situation, it is necessary to eliminate the packets
going in opposite direction of the authorized one, (Figure 14a) which leaves only eight possible routes.
To route packets towards their final destination in an active zone, four paths are allowed and the others
are blocked (see Figure 14b).
Figure 14. Authorized (a); and Prohibited (b) turns and directions in activated nodes.
The network is scanned regularly in order to detect online the occurred faulty nodes. If a new faulty
node or region is detected, the activated node’s routing tables are updated with the new information
about the positions of new faulty nodes or regions. More precisely, to achieve these routing decisions
from the modified routing rule tables, each switch holds one input register in each of its ports (see
Figure 1). Therefore, all packets pass through the input registers. Once the packets have arrived and
are stored in the input registers, the routing logic block specifies the next direction (according to
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their authorized turns and directions) of the packets which are transmitted to the associated logic
output port of the output direction. Consequently, the information contained in the routing tables help
activated nodes to take routing decisions. For example, an activated area with the minimal number
of active nodes, which forms a ring around faulty nodes, does not route the packets the same way as
an activated area having more activated nodes. In the latter case, the packet not only uses the ring
of activated nodes to get around the faulty nodes or regions, it can also use other activated nodes to
route its packets. Before specifying and verifying the bypass algorithm, we propose a specification
of conduct of event defining the bypass active zone around faulty nodes (knowing that there may be
several faulty nodes in the network, thus more active zones can be constructed), it is proposed to use a
colouring algorithm.
2.4.1. Vertex Colouring Algorithms
Symmetry breaking has always been a central problem in distributed systems. Several techniques
have been developed for graph colouring algorithms including Maximal Independence Set (MIS).
An algorithm for vertex colouring is a process of marking a graph [42] where the goal is to assign
labels to the vertices of the graph. Labels are often treated as colours. Therefore, it is called coloured
graph algorithm. Colouring/labelling is designed so that no two adjacent vertices share the same
colour/label: an appropriate colouring of a graph G = V, E (with V the set of vertices of G and E the set
of its edges), using a set of colours (N | COLOURS = 1 .. N) is a function f such that (F: V 3 COLOURS
| f (i) = f 3 (j) where j, i ∈ E). The minimum for N is satisfied if it is called the chromatic number of G.
These rules are generally applied to simple graphs (connected, reflexive, undirected, and unweighted).
Several algorithms have been developed to colour a chart. As described in [43], the vertex colouring
algorithms can be classified into two categories:
- Centralized algorithms [44,45]: The word “central” implies that there is at least one “administrator”
who decides to graph colouring.
- Distributed algorithms [42–45]: These new algorithms involve all vertices of the graph that is
coloured and the tops have their own “intelligence”. Usually, they choose their own colours using
random probabilities when they have chosen the same colour as their neighbours, and, when
they have a good colour, in this case, they withdrew from the uncoloured curve [42–45]. In this
work, we focus on the development of algorithms using distributed techniques. In fact, there is
little or no verification of the accuracy of previous algorithms [42–45] considering some random
numbers to define the process of secure coloration.
There are many practical applications of colourful graph algorithms that include:
- Planning graph colouring [46] can be used to control a set of nodes. Two nodes are considered
adjacent when they may occur simultaneously. The aim is to prevent adjacent nodes occurring at
the same time. However, in our case, there may be two nodes that have the same job but two test
nodes cannot fix the failed node at the same time.
- Each correct node must be coloured in green; a correct node is a node that can send and
receive packets.
- Each failed node must be coloured in red; a failed node is a node that cannot send or receive
packets or one of the two.
- Each active node must be coloured in blue; an active node is a neighbouring node to a failed node.
2.4.2. Formal Specification of the System
Abstract level: We start with an abstract specification of the problem by defining the role of
the network send and receive packets (See Figure 15). Thereby, two sets will be defined in this level;
existing nodes (NODES) and packets (PACKETS) sent by a single source (src) and received by a single
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destination (dst). Sources are different from destinations. The following axioms are described in the
context of the abstract level as follows:
 
axm1  :   NODES ≠  
axm2  :   PACKETS ≠  
axm3  :   src  PACKETS → NODES  
axm4  :  dst  PACKETS → NODES 
axm5 :  p·p  PACKETS  src(p) ≠ dst(p) 
Figure 15. Abstract level.
We define the variable rcvd, which allows us to perform the SEND and RECEIVE actions.
The following invariants are described in the abstract level of the machine as follows:
inv1  :   sent  NODES ↔ PACKETS 
inv2  :   rcvd  NODES ↔ PACKETS  
inv3  : ran(rcvd)  ran(sent) 
inv4  :    s,p·s NODES  p  PACKETS  s p  sent  s = src(p) 
inv5  :    d,p·d NODES  p  PACKETS  d p  rcvd  d = dst(p) 
inv6  :   
 s1, s2, p·s1 NODES s2 NODES  p PACKETS  s1 p  sent  s2 p sent  s1 = 
s2 
inv7  :   
 d1, d2, p·d1 NODES d2 NODES  p PACKETS  d1 p rcvd  d2 p rcvd  d1 
= d2 
The initial values of variables are empty:
INITIALISATION   
act1  : sent   
act2  :   rcvd   
The SEND event is action: act1: sen t 	→sent∪{s 	→p} and RECEIVE event is action: act2: rcvd :=
rcvd ∪{d 	→p}
- First refinement: We assume that the graph is given a set of nodes. Next, we define a set of colours
(Red_Colour, Green_Colour, and Blue_Colour), whose components are the colours selected by
the nodes during the execution of the algorithms of graph colouring. We specify some properties
of these constants GRAPH, Green_Colour, Red_Colour and Blue_Colour as follows:
- Axm5 axiom defines that all vertices belong to the GRAPH; they are not isolated.
- Axm6 axiom defines that the graph is irreflexive. The initial values of variables are empty:
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axm1  : GRAPH  NODES ↔ NODES 
axm2  : GRAPH ≠  
axm3  : COLOOR ≠  
axm4  : c·c COLOOR  c=Red_Colour  c=Green_Colour  c=Blue_Colour 
axm5  :  n·n  NODES  n dom(GRAPH) 
axm6  : NODES id ∩GRAPH =  
axm7  : GRAPH = GRAPH  
axm8  :  s·s  NODES  s ≠   GRAPH[s] s  NODES s 
- Axm7 axiom expresses that the graph is symmetric.
- Axm8 axiom expresses that the graph is connected.
In this refined level abstract of the machine, we will consider that all nodes can send and receive
packets, thus allowing them to be coloured in green (see Figure 16).
 
green_color   
WHERE 
grd1  : p  PACKETS 
grd2  : node  NODES 
grd3  : node  dom(GRAPH) 
grd4  : node = CorrectNode  
grd5  : Green_Colour  CCorrectNode[GRAPH[{node}]] 
grd6  : CorrectNode p  sent 
grd7  : CorrectNode p  rcvd 
THEN 
act1  : CCorrectNode(node)  Green_Colour 
END 
Figure 16. Colouring of correct nodes in the NoC with green.
The CCorrecteNode variable is defined with the following property:
inv1:ColouredCorrectNode∈ NODES  COLOUR
This property defines a node as a part of all coloured nodes. Therefore, the graph will be
coloured green.
- Second refinement: The question turns now about the red colour and we need to find an
inductive property which simulates the calculation of this function. Two variables will be added
at this level; FaultyNode and CFaultyNode which are defined with the following properties
where the FaultyNode is a failed node and coloured in red (see Figure 17):
- Third refinement: In this level, the calculation of the selection function of the active node (see
Figure 18) is specified in a simple way to break the complexity of the role of this node:
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red_colour   
WHERE 
grd1  : p  PACKETS 
grd2  : node  NODES 
grd3  : node  dom(GRAPH) 
grd4  : node = FaultyNode  
grd5  : Red_Colour  CFaultyNode[GRAPH[{node}]] 
grd6  : FaultyNode p sent 
grd7  : FaultyNode p rcvd 
THEN 
act1  : ColouredFaultyNode:  NODES  {Red_Colour } 
END 
Figure 17. Colouring of Faulty node in the NoC with red.
 
blue_colour   
WHERE 
grd1  : p  PACKETS 
grd2  : node  NODES 
grd3  : node  dom(GRAPH) 
grd4  : node = ActiveNode  
grd5  : Blue_Colour  CActiveNode[GRAPH[{node}]]  
grd8  : ActiveNode ≠ FaultyNode    
THEN 
act1  : ColouredActiveNode(node) Blue_Colour
END 
Figure 18. Colouring of active node in the NoC with blue.
Table 2 gives the number of proofs obligations for the colouring algorithms of nodes which are
automatically discharged proving the checking of criteria for considered abstraction level and step by
step. These obligation results show that current development focuses on Vertex colouring algorithms,
especially that they include possible errors in the choice of colours by the nodes. Thus, as the number
of faulty nodes is not accurate according to network size and specification step, we help to prove the
logical sequence of events.
Table 2. The proof obligations for the colouring algorithm of nodes.
Element Name Total Auto Manuel Reviewed Undischarged
ColourActiveZone 27 25 2 0 0
Test C00 1 1 0 0 0
Test C01 0 0 0 0 0
Test M00 16 14 2 0 0
Test M01 3 3 0 0 0
Test M02 3 3 0 0 0
Test M03 4 4 0 0 0
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2.4.3. Formal Development of the Bypassing Routing
This section presents the proposed formal development of the fault tolerant routing scheme of the
considered NoC architecture. This proven formalism is based on refinement, which allows breaking
the operation complexity of the routing algorithm and performing this formalization with different
levels of abstraction carried out step-by step. Figure 18 presents the step-by-step modelling of the
proposed fault tolerant routing scheme (see Figure 19).
Figure 19. Step-by-step Modelling of fault tolerant routing algorithm suitable for NoC.
a. Abstract specification level: xyC00
The abstract level defines the role of the network to send an infinite number of messages which
are packetized and encapsulate (Flitization) into sequence of packets from a source (s) to a destination
(d) (see Figure 20).
Figure 20. Abstract level.
A set of switches (NODES), a set of packets (PACKETS), a function src, associating packets (p)
and their sources, a function dst, coupling packets (p) and their destinations, are defined in context
xyC00. The machine xyM00 uses (sees) the contents of context xyC00, and describes an abstract view
of the service provided by the NoC. An event SEND presents the sending of a packet (p), by its source
(s), to a switch destination (d). An event RECEIVE depicts the receiving of a sent packet (p) by its
destination (d).
The first model xyC00 is an abstract description, which specifies the packet nodes, sources
(src), destinations (dst) of each packet (p). The following axioms describe how the source (src), and
destination (dst) have been defined for a package (p). Each packet has a single source and single
destination that are different:
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axm3 : src ∈ PACKETS → NODES
axm4 : dst ∈ PACKETS → NODES
axm5 : ∀ p · p ∈ PACKETS ⇒ src(p) = dst(p)
The machine xyM00 specifies the sending (sent) and receiving (rcvd) packets (p) in the abstract
way. Thereby, the send is set to the action:
sent sent ∪ {s 	→ p}
The reception is set with the following action:
rcvd rcvd∪ {d 	→ p}
b. The first refinement: cutting packets on flits (Flitization)
The machine xyM01 refines xyM00 and introduces scutting packets on flits.
xyC01: FLITS is a new set introduced by this context by cutting each packet on flits (axm1), and the
flits of each packet are different from those of other packets (axm2).
axm1 : flits ∈ PACKETS → 1(FLITS)
axm2 : ∀ p1, p2 · p1 ∈ PACKETS ∧ p2 ∈ PACKETS ∧ p1 = p2 ⇒ flits(p1) ∩ flits(p2) = ∅
xyM01: Instead of sending (act1) a whole package, this sends packet flits (see Figure 21) and can be
received only when all the flits that were sent up (grd6);
Figure 21. Sends a packet as flits.
The SEND_FLIT event is defined at this level by the action:
WHERE
grd6 : f f_sent[{s}]
THEN
act1 : f_sent f_sent ∪ {s 	→ f}
c. The second refinement: adding LocCopy variable
xyC02: The copy of the package in node (axm7) is in the original sources (axm8) and in the sources of
these packages. Theorem (axm10) states that the local copy is originally in one place on the network.
axm7 : InitLocCopy ∈ NODES ↔ PACKETS
axm8 : ∀ p · p ∈ PACKETS ⇒ src(p) 	→ p ∈ InitLocCopy
axm9 : ∀ n, p · n ∈ NODES ∧ p ∈ PACKETS ∧ n 	→ p ∈ InitLocCopy ⇒ n = src(p)
axm10 : ∀ n1, n2, p · n1 ∈ NODES ∧ n2 ∈ NODES ∧ p ∈ PACKETS ∧ n1 	→ p ∈InitLocCopy∧
n2 	→ p ∈InitLocCopy ⇒ n1 = n2
xyM02: In this machine, refinement adds RECEIVE_FLIT to indicate when we can get a package (view
the context xyC01).
WHERE
grd7 : flits(p) ⊆ f_sent[{s}]
THEN
act1 : f_rcvd f_rcvd ∪ {d 	→ f}
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d. Third refinement: Faulty node
xyM03: It is a refinement of the behaviour of a node if it is broken and/or when it returns to normal
as expressed in both disable and enable events. This level also allows us to create the variable locCopy
(see Figure 22, case (02)) to ensure flit sends of a packet without loss.
Figure 22. Routing flits keeping the local copy.
The following invariants are used to show how the model has been specified:
inv1 : gr ⊆ NODES × NODES
inv2 : str ∈ NODES ↔ FLITS
inv3 : ran(str) ⊆ ran(f_sent)
inv4 : ∀f· f ran (f_rcvd) ∧ f ∈ ran(f_sent) ⇒ f ∈ ran(str)
inv5 : locCopy ∈ NODES ↔ PACKETS
inv9 : gr = gr∼
inv10 : gr ⊆ g
The invariant inv1 expresses that graph (gr) is set of NODES related between them in the current
network. In inv2, str is a variable which contains the current position of a flit in the network. inv3 is a
flit circulating in the network was sent by a source. inv4 is a flit sent but not received and starved in
the network. In inv5, locCopy is a packet in node. inv9 indicates that graph (gr) is symmetric while
in inv10 graph gr is always an amendment contained in the original graph g. Those are important
invariants which represented in our graph.
Disable: a node n becomes faulty/off. It can no longer receive or route messages of its neighbours.
The new graph new_gr will be the current without bidirectional links between the node n and its
neighbours (grd4). grd6 expresses that the new_gr is symmetric and not-empty (grd6), and the action
updating of the current graph with the new graph.
WHERE
grd1 : n ∈ NODES
grd2 : n ∈dom(gr)
grd3 : n ew_gr⊆ NODES × NODES
grd4 : new_gr = gr \ (({n} × gr[{n}]) ∪ (gr[{n}] × {n}))
grd5 : new_gr∼ = new_gr
grd6 : new_gr = ∅
THEN
act1 : gr new_gr
END
Enable: A node n becomes active. It can receive and route messages from its neighbours when n is
no longer part of the current graph. It gives n in the current graph with bidirectional links with his
former neighbours.
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WHERE
grd1 : n ∈ NODES
grd2 : n dom(gr)
grd3 : n ∈ dom(g)
THEN
act1 : gr gr ∪ (({n}×g[{n}])∪(g[{n}]×{n}))
END
e. Fourth refinement:
xyC03: The environment has allowed us to break the xyC04 context to simplify the proof with the
RODIN tool.
• Extension of the definition of the initial graph by adding the concept of square graph. g is the
initial graph in which all nodes are connected together since their coordinates (prj1(c), prj2(c)) are
neighbours. This is a graph that is part of the eligible graphs.
∀ n1, n2, c1, c2 ·n1 	→ c1 ∈posnd∧ n2 	→ c2 ∈ posnd∧ n1 = n2 ∧
(
(prj1(c1) = prj1(c2)−1 ∧ prj2(c1) = prj2(c2)) ∨
(prj2(c1) = prj2(c2)−1 ∧ prj1(c1) = prj1(c2)) ∨
(prj1(c1) = prj1(c2)+1 ∧ prj2(c1) = prj2(c2)) ∨
(prj2(c1) = prj2(c2)+1 ∧ prj1(c1) = prj1(c2))
)
⇒ n1 	→ n2 ∈ g)
• Let x be a node x with coordinates cx (posnd(x)). If there is another node with coordinates cd as
the axis of the coordinate but which smaller then it can be moved on the x-axis to the left from x.
∀ x, cx · x ∈ NODES ∧ cx = posnd(x) ∧
(∃ d, cd · d ∈ NODES ∧ cd = posnd(d) ∧ prj1(cx) > prj1(cd))
⇒
(prj1(cx)−1 	→ prj2(cx)) ∈ ran(posnd)
• Let x be a node with coordinates cx. If there is a node with coordinates cd as the axis of the
coordinate but which are larger than that of the x-axis, then it can be moved to the right from x.
∀ x, cx · x ∈ NODES ∧ cx = posnd(x) ∧
(∃ d, cd · d ∈ NODES ∧ cd = posnd(d) ∧ prj1(cx) < prj1(cd))
⇒
(prj1(cx)+1 	→ prj2(cx)) ∈ ran(posnd)
• g is an initial graph in which all nodes are interconnected in pairs of adjacent coordinates of x and
y. This is a graph that is part of the eligible graphs.
(∀ n1, n2, c1, c2 ·n1 	→ c1 ∈posnd∧ n2 	→ c2 ∈posnd∧ n1 = n2 ∧ n1 	→ n2 ∈ g
⇒ (
(prj1(c1) = prj1(c2)−1 ∧ prj2(c1) = prj2(c2)) ∨
(prj2(c1) = prj2(c2)−1 ∧ prj1(c1) = prj1(c2)) ∨
(prj1(c1) = prj1(c2)+1 ∧ prj2(c1) = prj2(c2)) ∨
(prj2(c1) = prj2(c2)+1 ∧ prj1(c1) = prj1(c2))
)
)
• We give the “neighbours” (ind_nbg) diagonal “distance 1” node:
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ind_nbg ∈ NODES → (NODES)
• If a node n is part of the faulty area and a node fails new_f_nodef_node, the set_of_f_nodes set is
a direct neighbour or diagonal n. Thus, it is part of failing zone around new_f_node.
∀ n, r, nod, nd · n 	→ r ∈dom(zn) ∧ nod ∈ r ∧ nd∈ zn(n 	→ r) ∧ (nod 	→nd ∈ g ∨nd ∈ ind_nbg(nod)) ⇒ nod ∈ zn(n 	→ r)
• Theorem: If a node fails f_nodeset_of_f_nodes, all nodes are direct neighbours or diagonal
new_f_node. Then, it is part of the defective area new_f_node.
∀ n, r, nod · n 	→ r ∈ dom(zn) ∧ nod ∈ r ∧ (n 	→ nod ∈ g ∨ nod ∈ ind_nbg(n)) ⇒ nod ∈ zn(n 	→ r)
xyC04: Introduces the operators for calculating the active zone surrounding a node near a faulty zone.
The step of the construction rectangular shape of an active zone za is as follows:
- Xmin(b) contains the minimum X coordinate found in b:
∀ a, b · b ⊆ NODES ∧ b = ∅∧ a ∈ b ⇒ (∃ c · c ∈ b ∧ prj1(posnd(c)) ≤ prj1(posnd(a)) ∧Xmin(b) = prj1(posnd(c)))
- XMax(b) contains the maximum X coordinate found in b:
∀ a, b · b ⊆ NODES ∧ b = ∅∧ a ∈ b ⇒ (∃ c · c ∈ b ∧ prj1(posnd(c)) ≥ prj1(posnd(a)) ∧Xmax(b) = prj1(posnd(c)))
- Ymin(b) contains the minimum Y coordinate found in b:
∀ a, b · b ⊆ NODES ∧ b = ∅∧ a ∈ b ⇒ (∃ c · c ∈ b ∧ prj2(posnd(c)) ≤ prj2(posnd(a)) ∧Ymin(b) = prj2(posnd(c)))
- YMax(b) contains the maximum Y coordinate found in b:
∀ a, b · b ⊆ NODES ∧ b = ∅∧ a ∈ b ⇒ (∃ c · c ∈ b ∧ prj2(posnd(c)) ≥ prj2(posnd(a)) ∧Ymax(b) = prj2(posnd(c)))
- Lim Xmin(a) contains less than the X coordinate of the bounding rectangle and has Xmin(a) -1
within the graph g:
∀ a · a ⊆ NODES ∧ a = ∅∧Xmin(a)−1 > 0 ⇒LimXmin(a) = Xmin(a)−1
- Lim max (a) contains the coordinate of the upper X bounding rectangle and has Xmax (a) if one
within the graph g:
∀ a · a⊆ NODES ∧ a = ∅∧Xmax(a)+1 < nsize−1 ⇒LimXmax(a) = Xmax(a)+1
- Lim Ymin (a) contains the Y coordinate of the bounding rectangle and has lower Xmin (a) -1
within the graph g:
∀ a · a ⊆ NODES ∧ a = ∅ ∧ Ymin(a)−1 > 0 ⇒LimYmin(a) = Ymin(a)−1
- Lim Ymax (a) contains the coordinate of upper rectangle encompassing a Y. Ymax (a) if one
within the graph g:
∀ a · a ⊆ NODES ∧ a = ∅ ∧ Ymax(a)+1 < nsize−1 ⇒LimYmax(a) = Ymax(a)+1
- The rectangle given by za(a) and including a contains n nodes whose coordinates (x, y) are
defined as:
LimXmin(a) ≤ x ≤ LimXmax(a) and LimYmin(a) ≤ y ≤ LimYmax(a)
axm24 : ∀ a · a ⊆ NODES ∧ a = ∅
⇒za(a) = {nd| (prj1(posnd(nd)) ≥ LimXmin(a) ∧ prj1(posnd(nd)) ≤ LimXmax(a) ∧ prj2(posnd(nd)) ≥ LimYmin(a) ∧
prj2(posnd(nd)) ≤ LimYmax(a))}
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We build the rectangle of the active area after forcing the evidence and limit the active node in
NoC inside the network size limit. Thus, we add a rule to the firewall rule sets as follows:
Rules 5: The active zone has the option to occasionally disable unauthorized cases (see Figure 14b) for
routing flits of a packet that has no possibility to arrive at the destination.
xyM04: This machine contains a refinement of two events:
• The routing flits in different directions depending on the destination. If after a node (s) is transmitted
flit (f) to the node (y), (x) still has flits of (f), the local copy (LocCopy) does not change and x no
longer has flits of (f). The local copy (LocCopy) of packet (p) changes from x to y. This is expressed
in the following warning:
flits(p) ⊆ (str[{y}] ∪ {f}) ⇒ newLocCopy = locCopy
flits(p) ⊆ (str[{y}] ∪ {f}) ⇒ newLocCopy = (locCopy\ {x 	→ p}) ∪ {y 	→ p}
The cases of the XY routing algorithm are matched with refinements of event FORWARD:
- Case 01: (FORWAD-W) It forwards a flit (f) of a pack (P) to a neighbouring node (y)
located W. This event is raised if x-coordinated destination (d) (the flit (f)) is inferior to
x-coordinated the current node (s).
- Case 02: (FORWARD-E) It forwards a flit (f) of a pack (P) to a neighbouring node (y)
located E. This event is raised if x-coordinated destination (d) (the flit (f)) is superior to
x-ordinated the current node (s).
- Case 03: (FORWARD-N) It forwards a flit (f) of a pack (P) to a neighbouring node
(y) located in N. This event is triggered if y-coordinated destinations (d) (the flit (f))
is superior to y-coordinated current (x) and x-coordinated the destination node (d) is equal
to x-ordinated the current node (s), or if conflicts cannot pass along the x-axis.
- Case 04: (FORWARD-S) It forwards a flit (f) of a pack (P) to a neighbouring node (y)
situated S. This event is triggered if y-coordinated destination (d) (the flit (f)) is less than
y-coordinated to the current (x) and x-ordinated the destination node (d) is equal to
x-ordinated the current node (s), or if conflicts cannot pass along the x-axis.
• The delivery of a flit (f) of the packet (p) from the node (s) in an active zone.
- FORWARD_AUTH1: Can forward a flit (f) a packet (p) to a neighbouring node (y) to the east of
the current node (x) knowing that the source node (b) in the south compared to the current node
(x) and headed to a destination (d) to the east. With RODIN, this case is expressed as follows:
grd14 : b ∈ NODES
grd15 : d ∈ NODES
grd16 : x = d
grd17 : x ∈ z_a
grd18 : prj1(posnd(x))< prj1(posnd(d))
grd19 : prj2(posnd(y)) = prj2(posnd(x))
grd20 : prj1(posnd(y)) = prj1(posnd(x))+1
grd21 : prj2(posnd(b))< prj2(posnd(x))
grd22 : prj1(posnd(x)) = prj1(posnd(b))
grd23 : b=src(p)
- FORWARD_AUTH2: Can forward a flit (f) and a packet (p) to a neighbouring node (y) to the
right of the current (x) node knowing the source node (b) to the West relative to the current node
(x) and headed to a destination (d) to the east. With RODIN, this case is expressed as as follows:
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grd20 : prj1(posnd(y)) = prj1(posnd(x))+1
grd21 : prj2(posnd(b))= prj2(posnd(x))
grd22 : prj1(posnd(b)) = prj1(posnd(x)) -1
- FORWARD_AUTH3: Can forward a flit (f) and a packet (p) to a neighbouring node (y) to the
West of the current (x) node knowing the source node (b) is located in relation to node current (x)
and headed to a destination (d) to the west. With RODIN, this case is expressed as follows:
grd18 : prj1(posnd(x))> prj1(posnd(d))
grd19 : prj2(posnd(y)) = prj2(posnd(x))
grd20 : prj1(posnd(y)) = prj1(posnd(x))-1
grd21 : prj2(posnd(b))= prj2(posnd(x))
grd22 : prj1(posnd(b)) = prj1(posnd(x)) +1
- FORWARD_AUTH4: Can forward a flit (f) and a packet (p) to a neighbouring node (y) to the
West of the current (x) node knowing the source node (b) to the east from the node current (x)
and headed to a destination (d) to the west. With RODIN, this case is expressed as follows:
grd18 : prj1(posnd(x))> prj1(posnd(d))
grd19 : prj2(posnd(y)) = prj2(posnd(x))
grd20 : prj1(posnd(y)) = prj1(posnd(x))-1
grd21 : prj2(posnd(b))> prj2(posnd(x))
grd22 : prj1(posnd(b)) = prj1(posnd(x))
Table 3 gives the number of proofs obligations for the refinements development of the bypassing
routing which are automatically discharged proving the checking of criteria for each considered levels
of abstraction and step by step. The proposed incremental formal verification of a fault tolerant routing
scheme of the NoC-switch strategy has been performed using RODIN environment. The number
of proof obligations measures the complexity of the development that are automatically/manually
discharged. Note that, in the case of M03 Machine, there is more evidence than interactive machines,
which explains that the goal was simplified (semi-automatic). By cons in the context C03, we needed
more assumptions in order to find more evidence that a automatically discharged.
Table 3. Results of proof obligations for the bypassing routing models.
Element Name Total Auto Manuel Reviewed Undischarged
ActiveZone 27 25 2 0 0
xyC00 1 1 0 0 0
xyC01 0 0 0 0 0
xyC02 16 14 2 0 0
xyC03 3 3 0 0 0
xyC04 3 3 0 0 0
xyM00 0 0 0 0 0
xyM01 0 0 0 0 0
xyM02 13 9 4 0 0
xyM03 41 33 8 0 0
xyM04 22 10 12 0 0
3. Discussion
We have given a formal verification of a bypassing routing algorithm for the design of reliable
NoC by using the Event-B methodology. The main originality of the proposed routing algorithm based
on the bypass rules is that the routing is performed in the activated area depending on the number
of faulty nodes or regions where, in the case of a rectangular region (or a group of faults forming a
rectangular shape), the activated nodes form a ring around the region and the routing in activated
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area is reduced to route along the formed ring. Therefore, a formal proof on the bypassing operations
inside NoC and the dependability problems are related to the choice of path routing of data packets
and strategies imposed for diversion in the case of detected faulty routers. The formalization process
is based on an incremental and validated correct-by-construction development of the adaptive NoC
architecture. We have considered the event B refinement as stepwise validation. Indeed, the Event B
modelling language can express safety properties, which are invariants, theorems or safety properties in
a machine corresponding to the system. Thereby, Event B allows a progressive development of models
through refinements by considering two main structures available in Event B which are Contexts
expressing static information about the model and Machines expressing dynamic information about
the model, invariants, safety properties, and events. The mere usage/running of provers (provided
by the RODIN platform) allowed us to discharge these obligations (see Tables 2 and 3). These proof
operators can be used to improve the NoC architecture specified using Event-B models through refined
models while to get out all the bugs during the creation of hardware architecture which cannot found
with simulations or analytic methods. Indeed, contrary to verification by simulation only, our work
provides a framework for developing the Network-on-Chip Architecture based XY algorithm. Thus,
this demonstration is comprehensive in order to detect problems even for configurations that designers
have not yet considered. The purpose is to develop a dependable routing algorithm using essential
safety properties together with a formal proof that asserts its correctness. This will allow proving the
functionality of the associated hardware architecture by replacing the time consuming simulations in
the design flow by a formal proof method.
4. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have proposed a formal method using Event-B to specify, verify and prove the
behaviour of fault tolerant routing scheme suitable for design reliable or adaptive NoC architectures.
More precisely, we have considered the correct-by-construction paradigm for specifying the behaviour
hardware systems. The correct-by-construction paradigm offers an alternative approach to prove and
derive correct systems and architectures, through the reconstruction of a target system using stepwise
refinement and validated methodological techniques. Our goal is to complement the time consuming
simulations in the design flow with a formal proof method. This formal verification [28] can either
compare the computer data that will enable the realization of a future NoC Switch with its specification,
or verify that the circuit obeys certain constraints characterizing its proper functioning. The novelty
of our proposed design approach for the NoC routing associated with error detectors is that it can
prove the dependability of the routing of the data packets to get around the faulty switches or regions
(zone bypass decision) which is adapted for the design of fault tolerant NoCs. We have formalized
and proven that our proposed algorithm allows the routing of packets in the networks incorporating
faulty nodes and regions. Our approach relies on an incremental development of routing operations of
the Network-on-Chip Architecture, using the Event B formalism. The formalization of the architecture
is presented from an abstract level to a more concrete level in a hierarchical way. We have proved
our incremental formal verification of our proposed fault tolerant routing scheme of the NoC witch
strategy with environmental RODIN, where the number of proof obligations measures the complexity
of the development, which have been automatically/manually discharged. This approach will develop
the general process of modelling with Event-B which makes the notion of refinement intuitive.
A framework for developing NoC Architectures and the XY routing algorithm using essential
safety properties together with a formal proof that asserts its correctness has been developed. As a
part of our future efforts, we have considered the translation of the most concrete (detailed and close
to algorithmic form) model into an intermediate language, from which hardware description (e.g.,
in VHDL) can be extracted. Moreover, it is noted that the first levels of the Event-B design of the
NoC Architecture express general cases of routing methodologies and fall in the interesting domain
of reusable and generic refinement based structures. We plan to investigate further this domain of
generic and reusable proof-based models.
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Abstract: Human beings do not observe the world from the outside, but rather are fully embedded
in it. The sciences, however, often give the observer both a “god’s eye” perspective and substantial
a priori knowledge. Motivated by W. Ross Ashby’s statement, “the theory of the Black Box is merely
the theory of real objects or systems, when close attention is given to the question, relating object
and observer, about what information comes from the object, and how it is obtained” (Introduction to
Cybernetics, 1956, p. 110), I develop here an alternate picture of the world as a black box to which the
observer is coupled. Within this framework I prove purely-classical analogs of the “no-go” theorems
of quantum theory. Focussing on the question of identifying macroscopic objects, such as laboratory
apparatus or even other observers, I show that the standard quantum formalism of superposition
is required to adequately represent the classical information that an observer can obtain. I relate
these results to supporting considerations from evolutionary biology, cognitive and developmental
psychology, and artificial intelligence.
Keywords: black box; classicality; environment as witness; Landauer’s principle; pragmatic
information; quantum Darwinism; separability; superposition; time
The theory of the Black Box is merely the theory of real objects or systems, when close
attention is given to the question, relating object and observer, about what information
comes from the object, and how it is obtained.
— W. Ross Ashby, 1956 ([1], p. 110)
1. Introduction
Modern science is built on two far-reaching ideas: that there is a way that the world works,
and that we human beings are not separate from but are rather part of the world. The first idea
matured in the 17th and 18th centuries, reaching its full expression—but by no means widespread
acceptance—in Laplace’s concept of a mechanical, fully-deterministic universe. The maturation of the
second idea did not begin until the birth of modern biology and psychology in the mid-19th century,
and it is not yet complete. While both biology and psychology firmly place human beings and other
organisms within the world, and while the enormous progress made in these disciplines during the
past 50 years allows the construction of increasingly-sophisticated models of human beings and other
organisms as systems that acquire information from their environments and use that information to
act on their environments, “the observer” and her alter ego, “the experimenter” still stand outside of
our most basic physical theories.
The fundamental fact required to incorporate the observer/experimenter (hereafter, in keeping
with tradition, simply “the observer”) into physical theory has, however, been recognized for well over
a century. It was first formally elucidated by Boltzmann in the 1880s: reducing uncertainty by acquiring
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information requires the expenditure of energy. The minimal energetic cost of acquiring and recording
one bit, i.e., the answer to one yes/no question, is known: it is ln2 kT, where k is Boltzmann’s constant
and T is temperature [2–4]. However, k is small, k ∼ 1.38 × 10−23 J/K in SI units, so at physiological
temperature, T = 310 K, the minimal per-bit energetic cost ln2 kT ∼ 3 × 10−21 J is vastly smaller than
typical macroscopic energies. This tiny value for the per-bit energetic cost of observation justified the
traditional ideal, implicit in classical physics, of the “detached” observer whose observational activities
had no impact on the observed world.
When, almost 50 years after Boltzmann’s discovery, the early development of quantum theory
introduced a formalism in which observation did impact the world—collapsing wave functions and
even determining whether entities would behave as waves or particles—this violation of the ideal of
detachment quickly assumed metaphysical proportions. From the remarkable Solvay Conference of
1927 [5] onwards, debates about the physical meaning of the quantum formalism have remained largely
metaphysical (for synoptic reviews, see [6,7]; for recent surveys of interpretative positions, see [8–10]).
Physicists regularly deplore this situation, with Fuchs, for example, likening interpretative stances
to religions [11] and Cabello labelling the entire interpretative landscape a “map of madness” [12].
Nonetheless, substantial numbers of physicists—perhaps most famously, Bell [13]—maintain that the
observer and the process of observation can play no role in any theory, and in particular no role in any
physical theory, describing a world that worked in whatever way it worked long before humans existed
and will continue to work in that way long after humans are gone. Even physicists who embrace some
form of what Fuchs [14] has called, following Wheeler [15], “participatory realism” may insist, as Fuchs
himself has done, that physics can provide no theory of the observer [11]. If physics can offer no theory
of the observer, however, the observer still stands outside of physics, whether as a “participant” or not.
We know, however, what observers do. Observers acquire information and, in their complementary
role as actors on their environments, they create information. Biology and psychology tell us, in ever
increasing detail, how they acquire information and how they act to create more of it. Hence observation,
together with its complement, experimentation, is a process of information exchange between an
observer and that observer’s environment. Both the observer and the observer’s environment are
parts of the world, and if the “environment” is expanded to become the observer’s complement, the
two together constitute the world. Boltzmann’s insight then tells us that any exchange of information
between observer and environment involves an exchange of energy, and hence a physical interaction,
between observer and environment. This simple consideration renders the detached observer a mere
approximation, one that may be expected sometimes—and possibly always—to fail.
That the idealization of the detached observer must be rejected even on classical-physics
grounds is, of course, not a new idea: it is a cornerstone of second-order cybernetics. von Uexküll [16],
von Foerster [17], Kampis [18], Koenderink [19] and many others have argued for it explicitly. Rössler’s
concept of endophysics [20] is based on it. The critical question in any theoretical framework that
rejects the detached observer is that of how the “epistemic cut” [21] separating the observer from the
observed environment is defined, and in particular, whether it is defined in a way that truly places
the observer within the world. As Kampis puts it, “what endophysics aspires for is the study of the
encompassing big black box of which the observer and his epistemology are a part...an enclosed
observer is bound to the same laws as those of the system observed” ([18], p. 265). As von Neumann
recognized [21], the observer being “bound by the same laws” is assured if the position of the cut is
arbitrary (cf. Pattee, “The cut itself is an epistemic necessity, not an ontological condition” [22], p. 13).
If the observer is “special” in some way, so that the observer-environment boundary cannot be “erased”
within the theory without affecting the behavior of the world—as it appears to be the case, for example,
in the endophysical framework of Kauffman and Gare [23]—then the observer remains in an important
sense outside of the theory.
Classical cybernetics provides us with a simple formal model of the information exchange between
the observer and the observed environment: the theory of the Black Box. My goal in this paper is
to take seriously both the Black Box model and the requirement that the epistemic cut be arbitrary
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and to see where these assumptions jointly lead. What is offered here is, therefore, not a new model
of observation, but rather an exploration in some depth of an old model of observation conjoined
with an even-older general constraint on model construction. After reviewing the Black Box model
and the associated epistemic cut in the next section, I show that conjoining the Black Box model
with an arbitrarily-movable cut leads to “no-go” theorems, i.e., theorems limiting the inferences that
may be drawn from either theoretical considerations or observational outcomes, that are classical
analogs of no-go theorems familiar from quantum information theory. I then show that if a classical
black-box world is assumed, by hypothesis, to comprise a collection of bounded, causally-independent
“objects”, finite observations can only identify superpositions of such objects. The classical Black
Box model with an arbitrary epistemic cut thus requires us to view even a classical world in
quantum-theoretic terms. The traditional “classical worldview” of bounded, independently-observable
and independently-manipulable objects only emerges when we ignore the constraints of the Black
Box model and assume that observers have a priori knowledge and local causal power that the
Black Box model—and indeed, the formalisms of both quantum and classical physics—tell us that
observers cannot obtain. To place this result in a larger context, I briefly discuss ideas and observations
from evolutionary biology, cognitive and developmental psychology, computer science and artificial
intelligence that point toward this same conclusion. I close by suggesting that if observers and
observation are placed firmly within the world, its theory of the world is the only theory of the
observer that physics needs. The observer only steps out of physical theory—and indeed, out of the
physical world—when physics contradicts itself, granting to the observer knowledge and causal power
that physics itself tells us no worldly observer can have.
2. The Black Box Model
The Black Box model is a formal representation of the interaction between an observer and
the system being observed. This section reviews the informal notion of a “system” with particular
emphasis on the assumption of separability. It then presents the Black Box model and provides reasons
for believing that it accurately describes the interactions between observers and physical systems.
It briefly discusses the relation between the sense of observer dependence entailed by the Black Box
model and the informal notion of “subjectivity” with which it is sometimes associated.
2.1. Systems and Separability
The terms ‘universe’ and ‘world’ are here used interchangeably to denote the maximal closed
system containing all possible observers and all possible observed systems as components. Here ‘closed’
has the usual meaning of not interacting with any other system. As observation requires interaction,
any closed system is unobservable; the universe, as a closed system, is therefore unobservable.
Setting special relativity aside for simplicity, the ‘observed world’ or ‘environment’ of any observer
can be regarded as the complement of that observer within the world. In this case, given any arbitrary
choice of observer, that observer together with that observer’s environment jointly compose the world
(taking special relativity into account converts this complement into a light cone).
The terms ‘system’ and ‘physical system’ are here used interchangeably to denote a component of
the world, not a mathematical or other formal model of such a component as is sometimes intended by
other authors. A “system” in the latter, formal-model sense can be stipulated. A system in the sense
employed here can only be observed and/or acted upon, after which a model of that system may be
constructed or stipulated. The term ‘component’ is here used informally; it can be made precise by
stipulating a physical model of the universe which is then decomposed. If the universe is represented
by a classical configuration (or phase) space, decomposition is implemented by the Cartesian product
operator ×, while if the universe is represented by a Hilbert space, decomposition is implemented
by the tensor product operator ⊗. In either case, the factors into which the universe is decomposed
represent systems as defined here. The Black Box model is a model of the interaction between observers
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and systems, i.e., a model of the interaction between two components of the world, an observer (which
is always itself a system) and a system (which may itself also qualify as an observer).
The usage employed here may be compared to that recently employed by Kitto [24]. It is consistent
with the idea that a system is “a set of entities that are interacting via a set of relationships” ([24], p. 542),
provided that the entities and relationships referred to are components and characteristics, respectively,
of the world, as opposed to models, approximations, or simplifications of such components or
characteristics. The current usage differs, however, from that of Kitto in that it does not assume
that a system is “separate from its surroundings” ([24], p. 541). In particular, it does not assume that a
system is separable from its surroundings as this term is employed in physics, i.e., it does not assume
that a system occupies or can be assigned a state independently of the state occupied by or assigned
to its surroundings. As discussed in detail below, this latter provision allows the observer-system
boundary to be moved arbitrarily without altering the composition or the behavior of the world, i.e.,
of the composite system comprising the observer plus the observed system.
Separability is an intuitively appealing and quite natural assumption; hence rejecting it from the
outset can be regarded as radical. Separability is, however, despite its intuitive appeal an assumption,
indeed (as will be shown below) a very strong one. While failures of separability are typically
identified (by definition) with entanglement in the quantum theory literature, moreover, they can
arise in multiple formal and interpretative contexts. Tipler, for example, has shown that requiring
classical dynamics to be strictly deterministic reproduces the formalism of unitary quantum theory
and hence entails non-separability [25]; indeed he shows that the “quantum potential” required for
strict classical determinism is identical to the “guiding field” of Bohmian quantum mechanics [26].
While Bohm interpreted this guiding field as non-local, however, Tipler interprets it as strictly local.
In a similar vein, Rosen [27] formalizes the notion of a constraint hierarchy in classical complex systems
proposed by Polanyi [28], showing that it can be represented as an arbitrarily extended hierarchy of
potential functions. Rosen concludes, “a complex system requires an infinite mathematical object for its
description ... it is quite clear that there is no such thing as a set of states, assignable to such a system
once and for all” ([27], p. 190, emphasis in original). Here again we have a failure of separability in a
classical context, one to which the quantum-theoretic concept of entanglement would ordinarily be
thought irrelevant.
Separability is closely associated with contextuality, i.e., with the potential dependence of system
behavior on how, in what setting, or with what preparations measurements are made. Kitto [24]
distinguishes three kinds of contextuality: dependencies of system components on each other,
dependencies of system behavior on how it is measured, and dependencies of system behavior
on the environmental setting. The distinctions between these types of contextuality depend, however,
on the assumption of separability. If the components of a separable system are non-separable, the first
kind of contextuality appears as Kitto describes ([24], p. 551); similarly if a system S is not separable
from the apparatus employed to measure its state, but the joint system S′ comprising S plus the
apparatus is separable from its environment, the second kind of contextuality appears. If, however,
the assumption of separability is dropped altogether, all three kinds of contextuality can appear
and they cannot be distinguished. As shown in detail in §3 below, if a system cannot be bounded,
its components cannot be identified; ipso facto they cannot be distinguished from components of
the apparatus, the environment, or for that matter, the observer. Here the distinction between the
identification of components—something that must be accomplished by observation—and the stipulation
of components within an hypothesized model (and hence the fundamental distinction between systems
and models) is clearly essential.
By not assuming separability as an a priori condition on systems, the present analysis permits
arbitrary contextuality. As shown in §3 below, an arbitrarily-movable epistemic cut renders the
possibility of such contextuality inescapable. Potential effects of contextuality may in practice be ignored,
i.e., simply assumed not to exist as they often are, but the consequences of doing so cannot be predicted
and may be severe.
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2.2. Definition of the Black Box
A black box as described by classical cybernetics [1] is a system to which observers have only
exterior access. They can form hypotheses about what is going on inside the box, they can formulate
and test by further observation models of what is going on inside the box, but they cannot disassemble
the box, examine its interior workings, and determine by such observations the dynamics that the
box executes.
An observer interacts with a black box by sending it strings of bits; traditionally this interaction is
considered to involve turning dials, pushing buttons, and so forth. The black box, in turn, sends the
observer strings of bits, e.g., by moving pointers on dials or changing the numbers in a digital display.
The observer-box interaction is considered to take place in episodes, i.e., the observer does something
to the box, waits for a certain period for the box to respond, and then does something else. The box
may respond by doing nothing. The observer may also do nothing, in hopes of observing spontaneous
behavior on the part of the box.
The observer is assumed to be a finite system with finite energy resources. The finite energetic
cost of encoding each bit limits the observer to sending only a finite number of bits to the box, and to
recording only a finite number of bits from the box, in each of a finite number of episodes of interaction.
The lengths of these “input” and “output” bit strings can be considered the “resolution” of the inputs
to and outputs from the box. For simplicity, the input and output resolutions are considered to be
identical. In this case, the information exchange between observer and box can be considered a classical
information channel [29] with a fixed capacity equal to the resolution. Again for simplicity, this classical
information channel can be considered to be noise-free. The consequences of relaxing the restriction to
finite communication through this classical channel is discussed in Section 3.3 below.
Nothing prevents the observer from sending the same input to the box multiple times; similarly,
nothing prevents the box from sending the same output to the observer multiple times. If the channel
capacity and hence the resolution of the inputs and outputs is small and the number of episodes of
interaction is large, such repetitive behavior is inevitable.
The observer is assumed to be capable of observing her own inputs to the box, and to have
a memory on which both the input sent and the output received in each episode are both written.
Because the number of interaction episodes is finite, this memory is finite. It is assumed for simplicity
that the observer’s memory is sufficient to record all of the interaction episodes; this assumption is
discussed further in Section 3.3 below. The observer can be considered to consult the memory in
order to frame hypotheses about the box’s behavior and to freely choose, based on these hypotheses,
what input to send to the box in the next episode. The meaning of “freedom” in this context is also
discussed in Section 3.3 below.
These descriptions, characterizations and assumptions can be formalized with the following:
Definition 1. A black box is a system about which no observer can have more (non-hypothetical) information
than is contained in a finite list of finite-length bit strings representing observed input-output transitions.
The interaction between the observer and the box can be represented as in Figure 1a. The observer
collects finite data about the behavior of the box “from the outside” and uses these data—the only
data that are available—to understand and frame hypotheses about the box’s internal structure and
dynamics and to use these hypotheses to predict the output that will be produced by the box in
response to each input.
2.3. The Black Box as a Model of Physical Systems
As indicated by the opening quotation, Ashby considered all “real objects or systems” to be
black boxes, or at least to become black boxes as their structures and behaviors were probed at finer and
finer resolutions. Opening the case of a laptop computer—or increasingly, even the engine compartment
of an automobile—reveals within merely an arrangement of fully-encapsulated parts, “components”
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with internal structures hidden from the user. Such components are black boxes by design, meant
to be installed within the larger system without modification and to be fully interchangable with
replacements having the same input-output behavior without affecting the performance of the larger
system. Further investigation of such components reveals that they too contain components. Even when
a component is easily recognizable and “simple”—perhaps it is a machine screw or a wire—it is still
possible to ask what internal structure explains its properties or behavior. However, at some point such
questioning stops, leaving whatever components that remain black boxes.
Figure 1. The Black Box model and two related concepts. (a) An observer interacts with a black
box by exchanging information with the box through a classical channel of fixed, finite capacity;
(b) The “environment as witness” formulation of decoherence permits observers to access information
about a physical system only via the mediation of a surrounding environment; (c) Decompositional
equivalence requires an observer’s interactions with a composite system to be independent of the
placement of subsystem boundaries within that system.
Probing any physical system deeply enough reveals structure and behavior only adequately
describable using quantum theory. It is here that the black-box nature of physical systems becomes explicit.
As Bohr repeatedly emphasized, in making measurements of the behavior of a quantum system
one is inevitably forced to make use of macroscopic instruments. One must interact, in other words,
with a macroscopic composite system comprising the quantum system of interest together with the
apparatus used to measure its behavior. No independent access to the quantum system is possible.
This lack of independent access renders the quantum system a black box. In addition, the physical
coupling of the quantum system of interest to the apparatus blurs the boundary between the two, a
blurring that is formalized as entanglement by the unitary time evolution of the Schrödinger equation.
As Bohr put it, “it is no longer possible sharply to distinguish between the autonomous behavior of
a physical object and its inevitable interaction with other bodies serving as measuring instruments,
the direct consideration of which is excluded by the very nature of the concept of observation in
itself” ([30], p. 290).
It is important here to emphasize that characterizing a quantum system—or any system—as
a black box is making a statement about observational access to that system. It is straightforward to
write down precise formal models of many quantum systems in either mixed or pure states and to
claim, on the basis of such a model, that a system is well understood. Observing a model, however, is
not the same thing as observing a system. Arbitrarily precise models can be constructed for any black
box, and they can accurately predict some finite number of observations or not. The existence of such
a model, however, has no bearing on whether the system being modelled is a black box. A system is a
black box if and only if it satisfies the definition given above, i.e., if and only if it is a system about
which no observer can have more (non-hypothetical) information than is contained in a finite list of
finite-length bit strings representing observed input-output transitions. The statements of Ashby and
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Bohr quoted above are statements about observational access, not statements about the possibility of
model construction.
In the Copenhagen interpretation of Bohr and Heisenberg that became the standby of “textbook”
quantum theory (e.g., [31]; see also [32]), it is the amplification of signals indicating the presence of
quantum phenomena by a directly coupled macroscopic apparatus that converts the fragile information
contained in quantum states into the robust, recordable classical information of observational outcomes.
The more modern, though by now almost 50 years old, version of this view is the theory of environmental
decoherence [33–40], in which exposure to and hence entanglement with any macroscopic environment,
intentional or not, converts quantum information into classical information. Ollivier, Poulin and
Zurek introduced the “environment as witness” formulation of environmental decoherence [41,42],
later elaborated as the theory of “quantum Darwinism” [43–47] or “quantum state information
broadcasting” [48–51] in recognition of the fact that observers typically obtain information about physical
systems by interacting with the surrounding environment, typically the surrounding ambient photon
field. This more recent formulation of environmental decoherence makes it explicit that observers are
not directly coupled to the systems that their observational outcomes purport to describe, but are rather
directly coupled to an intervening environment—effectively a very large apparatus—comprising vast
numbers of unobserved degrees of freedom.
Central to the environment as witness formulation and quantum Darwinism is the requirement
that environmental encodings of quantum states be redundant in the sense that many observers
at different locations can each obtain the same information about the system of interest without
disturbing either the interaction of the system with its environment or the information accessed by
the other observers (cf. [42], Figure 1 and surrounding discussion). This redundancy requirement
prevents observers from accessing information about the system by any means other than through the
environment, as any such access would disturb the system and hence destroy the redundancy of the
encoding [52,53]. The redundancy requirement, in other words, makes the environment a black box,
a container that prevents direct observational access to any systems contained in its interior (Figure 1b).
If observations of quantum systems satisfy the constraints imposed by the environment as witness
formulation of decoherence, therefore, they can be characterized as interactions with a black box.
The theoretical framework of environmental decoherence assumes “no-collapse” or unitary
quantum theory, i.e., quantum theory in which there is no physical process of quantum state collapse
and hence no physical violation of unitarity [54]. Unitary quantum theory applies, however, only to
closed systems. As first explicitly recognized by Everett [55], this restriction of unitary evolution to
closed systems has two important consequences: (1) the universe, being a closed system, must evolve
unitarily; and (2) the universe can contain no closed systems, as the absence of interactions between
such systems and their surroundings would permit violations of unitarity. The environmental
decoherence framework is explicitly designed to cope with the openness of all possible systems
to interaction—and hence to observation—that is implied by point # 2. Schlosshauer, for example,
remarks when introducing the decoherence framework that “over the past three or so decades it has
been slowly realized that the isolated-system assumption—which, as we have described above, had
proved so useful in classical physics and had simply been taken over to quantum physics—had in fact
been the crucial obstacle to an understanding of the quantum-to-classical transition” ([40], p. 3–4).
If unitary quantum theory is correct, then there are no physically classical systems, only apparently
or “for all practical purposes” (FAPP; terminology due to Bell [13]) classical systems. Alternative theories
in which unitarity is physically violated have been proposed, and are sometimes (incorrectly) regarded
as “interpretations” of quantum theory as opposed to alternative theories; examples include the
theories of Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber [56], Penrose [57] or Weinberg [58]. In such theories, there
are physically classical systems. However, these theories have at present no empirical support
(e.g., [54,59,60]) and are increasingly challenged by theoretical approaches such as holography that
invoke quantum theory at very large scales (e.g., [61–63]) and by derivations of quantum theory from
purely information-theoretic foundations (see Section 3.4 below). This situation presents at least a prima
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facie challenge to any theoretical approach that assumes or implies the existence of physically-classical
systems. Kitto, for example, remarks that in at least some cases “measurement merely records reality; it
does not influence what is found during that measurement” while cautioning that “such assumptions,
while sometimes correct, can be markedly dangerous” ([24], p. 547). If unitary quantum theory is
correct, such assumptions maybe useful in some circumstances, but they are never correct in the strong
sense of accurately describing reality. If the universe indeed exhibits large-scale entanglement as
unitary quantum theory would imply, regarding “the notion of separability to be key to the definition
of a system” ([24], p. 542) results in a universe without systems.
2.4. The Epistemic Cut and Decompositional Equivalence
The universality of the Black Box model for physical systems is, however, also supported by
theoretical considerations far more fundamental than decoherence. As noted earlier, both classical
and quantum physics represent the states of physical systems as vectors in state spaces, the real
configuration (or phase) space in classical physics and the complex Hilbert space in quantum physics.
The product operators that implement state-space factorization and its inverse, state-space combination
are in each case associative, i.e., A × B × C = (A × B) × C = A × (B × C) in classical physics
and A ⊗ B ⊗ C = (A ⊗ B) ⊗ C = A ⊗ (B ⊗ C) in quantum physics. Both theories, moreover,
represent interactions between systems by linear operators, specifically Hamiltonians. These operators
are additive, i.e., H(A×B) = HA + HB + HAB in classical physics and H(A⊗B) = HA + HB + HAB
in quantum physics, where in each case the final term HAB represents the A − B interaction.
In both theories, therefore, decomposing a system into two or more components makes no difference to
the composite system’s structure or behavior. The epistemic cut between components is, in this case,
purely epistemic as Pattee [22] requires; where it is placed makes no difference to the composite system.
An observer interacting with the composite system cannot tell, either by characterizing its state space
or by measuring its dynamics, that it has been decomposed into components. Both the boundaries
between the internal components and the interactions defined at these internal boundaries are invisible
to an outside observer. The composite system is, from the outside observer’s perspective, a black box
within which its components are fully contained (Figure 1c). In describing quantum Bayesianism,
Fuchs employs phenomenological language to make this point, referring to the “hermetically sealed”
character of a black-box world as “interiority” and attributing an inviolable interiority to all systems,
large and small ([11], p. 20).
The invisibility of internal component boundaries to outside observers, previously termed
decompositional equivalence [64], has significant consequences for decoherence and particularly for
quantum Darwinism [65–67]. If the classical information acquired by outside observers of a composite
system does not depend on the placement of subsystem boundaries within that system, then it
cannot depend on interactions defined at those boundaries. Observers of an environment cannot,
therefore, determine the boundaries of systems embedded within that environment given only classical
information encoded by that environment. Any such encoding is arbitrarily ambiguous about the
boundaries of embedded systems. Multiple observers can interact with the same, redundant encoding,
hypothesize radically different system-environment boundaries, and infer radically different system
states as a result. They can agree completely about the observational outcomes they have obtained,
but disagree about both the system and the system-environment interaction that produced them.
This principled ambiguity about the states of internal systems extends even to whether they
are coherent, i.e., entangled, or environmentally decohered, a phenomenon termed “entanglement
relativity” [68–75].
The goal of observation is to determine the state space and the dynamics, i.e., the self-Hamiltonian,
of the system being observed. The classical Black Box model, the environment as witness formulation
of decoherence, and the formal constraints imposed on either quantum or classical physics by
decompositional equivalence all locate the physical interaction that implements observation at a
single boundary: the boundary between the observer and the observed composite environment, i.e.,
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between the observer and the entire rest of that observer’s observable universe. The physical interaction
at this boundary implements the classical information channel between the observer and the composite
environment that is that observer’s observed world. Only information that flows through this classical
channel contributes to observational outcomes. The observer can hypothesize, on the basis of these
observational outcomes, the existence of internal boundaries within the composite environment and
hence internal structure and interactions within the observed world. These hypotheses can only be
tested, however, by examining their consequences for the observed world as a composite whole,
because the observed world as a whole is the only system with which the observer directly interacts.
2.5. Observer Dependence and “Subjectivity”
A Black Box model of the observer-environment interaction entails a precise sense of observer
dependence: each decomposition of the universe into an observer and that observer’s environment
is unique, so each observer observes a unique environment. It thus extends the observer-relativity
of quantum states common to Everett’s “relative state” interpretation [55], Rovelli’s “relational”
interpretation [76] and Fuch’s quantum Bayesianism [11] to an observer-relativity of quantum
systems (cf. Zanardi [68] where observer-relative systems are already taken for granted and
Dugić and Jeknić-Dugić [70,71] where they are discussed explicitly). Moreover, each observer’s
observational capabilities—in quantum-theoretic language, the observables that each observer is
capable of deploying—are exactly specified by the observer-environment interaction Hamiltonian.
Decompositional equivalence entails that this sense of observer dependence is shared by classical and
quantum physics. Many authors from von Uexküll [16] onwards have emphasized that observation is,
by its very nature, observer-dependent in this way.
The sense of observer dependence implied by the Black Box model, and hence the model itself,
is often criticized as subjectivist or even solipsist. Fuchs responds to the charge of solipsism with
characteristic vigor: “No agent, no outcome for sure, but that’s not solipsism: For, no system, no outcome
either!” ([11], p. 19, Figure 5 caption). What the observer is capable of observing is determined by
the observer-environment interaction (i.e., the Hamiltonian HOE), and in the limit of a very large
environment, primarily by the internal dynamics of the observer (i.e., by HO). However, what the
observer actually observes at any given instant—the output delivered by the black box in response to
any given input—is determined by the environment (i.e., by HE). This is “subjectivity” in the sense
that an observer can only observe what she is capable of observing, but it is not “subjectivity” in the
(typically pejorative) sense of an observer that observes only what she expects to observe or, worse yet,
only what she wants to observe. As Moore [77] so clearly emphasized, the essence of the Black Box
model is the ever-present possibility of surprise.
“Subjectivity” in the sense entailed by the Black Box model is, moreover, consistent with FAPP
intersubjectivity and hence FAPP objectivity. Two very similar observers embedded in a very large world
in such a way as to make their respective environments and hence their respective observer-environment
interactions very similar can be expected to record very similar observational outcomes. If the
bandwidths of their respective information channels and hence their effective measurement resolutions
are small, their outcomes as recorded may even be identical. Observer dependence does not mean
that agreement about outcomes is impossible. It rather means, as discussed in more detail in §3 and
§4 below, that such agreement can carry no ontological weight. Nothing the observers can do can
guarantee that their observations are caused by the same system; indeed the Black box model entails
that their observations are caused by different systems, by their own unique and distinct, albeit very
similar, environments. Each observer has, by definition, her own personal umwelt [16], and every
observation she makes is constrained by it.
3. No-Go Theorems for Black Boxes
“No-go” theorems restrict the inferences that observers can make from either theory or observations.
If the Black Box model indeed provides a general description of observational interactions with physical
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systems, it should provide no-go theorems that impose the same restrictions on inferences from theory
or observations that the familiar no-go theorems of quantum information theory impose. This section
shows that this is indeed the case.
3.1. Moore’s Theorem (1956)
Edward Moore proved, in 1956, the fundamental no-go theorem for observers of black boxes ([77],
Theorem 2):
Theorem 1 (Moore, 1956). Finite observations of a black box are insufficient to determine its machine table.
The “machine table” of a black box is the list of all possible input-output transitions of the black box.
The finite list of observed input-output transitions accumulated by an observer of some black box B is
at least a partial machine table of B. Moore’s theorem shows that no such partial machine table can
be demonstrated to be complete. Hence it prohibits the inference of a complete machine table from
any finite list of observed input-output transitions, and hence from any model based on such a list,
no matter how long this list may be.
Proof (Moore, 1956). Given any partial machine table T obtained by finite observation of some
black box B, it is possible to construct arbitrarily many hypothetical machine tables that contain T.
These constructed machine tables correspond to black boxes with larger state spaces than the minimal
black box BT required to generate T. Because any of these larger black boxes could have generated T,
nothing about T is sufficient to determine that the observed black box B is BT, i.e., nothing about T is
sufficient to determine that T is the complete machine table of B.
Moore’s theorem shows that the very next output from any black box can be a complete surprise.
Any black box could, for example, contain a clock that counts to some large number, after which it
enables the execution of a qualitatively different dynamics than that executed previously; alarm clocks,
time bombs, commonplace computer programs and many biological systems are obvious examples.
A significant special case to which this applies is that of “tests for contextuality” such as discussed
by Kitto [24]; no finite sequence of observations during which a system appears to behave in a
non-contextual way provides any guarantee that the system will not behave in a contextual way in
the future. One can appeal to Occam’s razor and hypothesize that the behavior that has already been
observed is the only behavior of which a black box is capable, but Moore’s theorem reminds us that
this is always merely an hypothesis. The very next observation could prove it wrong.
Moore’s theorem gives hypotheses about the behavior of a black box, whether framed as
input-output “laws” or as proposed internal mechanisms, exactly the status that Popper [78] gives
scientific hypotheses in general: they are candidates for empirical falsification. They are at best satisficing,
not optimal. To borrow Bell’s [13] somewhat pejorative term, they may be true FAPP, but they can
never be considered true simpliciter. They cannot, therefore, support the weight of metaphysical or
ontological claims. As noted above, ontological claims about physical boundaries and hence physical
structure inside a black box fall immediately afoul of decompositional equivalence. Moore’s theorem
generalizes this prohibition of ontology to internal structures described in any language. Explicitly
hypothetical claims—models—of course suffer no such prohibition. Provisional or FAPP “knowledge”
of the workings of a black box—the kind of knowledge represented by not-yet-disconfirmed models,
is allowed by Moore as it is by Popper; it is certain or god’s-eye knowledge that is prohibited.
3.2. A Black Box Cannot Be Bounded
Moore’s theorem provides the basis from which to prove the principle result of this paper: that a black
box cannot be bounded. The informal “picture” of a black box found in the classical cybernetics literature
(e.g., [1,77]) or in Figure 1 places the observer outside the box. The box is, in the canonical example, a
device captured from an enemy and given to an engineer to investigate, or in a design example, a device
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about which only the input-output interface is known. In either case, the box is bounded, clearly separate
from and causally independent of the other items in the laboratory or workshop. The following
theorem shows that this traditional, intuitively-appealing picture is seriously misleading.
Theorem 2 (no-boundary). If the observable world contains a black box, it is a black box.
To prove this theorem, it is useful to introduce the following:
Definition 2. Let B be a black box and ξ be an arbitrarily-chosen observable degree of freedom. The degree of
freedom ξ is separable from B if and only every state of B is independent of the state of ξ.
This is the definition of separability familiar from physics (cf. Section 2.1), phrased from the
perspective of B. The proof is now simple: Moore’s Theorem shows that knowing that ξ is separable
from B is knowing more than can be known.
Proof. If the observable world contains a black box B, but is not itself a black box, it must contain at
least one observable degree of freedom ξ that is separable from B. If this is the case, all states of B and
therefore the complete machine table of B must be independent of the state of ξ. This, however, is by
Moore’s theorem information about B that cannot be obtained by finite observation, contradicting the
assumption that B is a black box.
This no-boundary theorem confirms in general—taking it as obvious that the world contains
at least one black box—the conclusion reached above from the observer as witness formulation and
from decompositional equivalence: each observer obtains information only at her boundary with the
surrounding “environment”, i.e., the rest of her observable universe. This environment is a black box.
The systems it contains, if any, are not accessible for direct observation.
The no-boundary theorem appears radical, but it is not. Indeed it rests not on a strong underlying
assumption, but on the absence of one: the proof would not go through if it were permitted to assume,
a priori, that systems are separable. In this case B could be assumed, a priori, to be separable from
its environment and hence from ξ. The traditional picture of a black box as a device resting on an
engineer’s workbench implicitly makes this assumption; the engineer in this traditional picture does
not need to worry about the box being dynamically coupled to his heartbeat or to the phases of
the Moon. Removing the assumption of separability turns these worries, however far-fetched they
may be, into real possibilities. If they are to be removed from consideration definitively, not just
FAPP, they must be removed by observational evidence. Moore’s Theorem shows that definitive
observational evidence of independence cannot be obtained by finite means.
The no-boundary theorem moves each observer into an all-encompassing black box, the rest of
that observer’s observable universe (Figure 2). It denies observers independent access to “systems”
embedded within their observable universes; the physical interaction by which an observer obtains
information is defined at the observer—observable universe boundary, and all information obtained
by the observer must cross this boundary. The “source” of the information within the box cannot be
identified, as doing so would require access to the interior of the box, access that no observer can have.
An immediate consequence of the no-boundary theorem is that the composite observer-box system
is, from the observer’s point of view, a closed system. The observer cannot, in particular, detect anything
else that interacts with the box; the box is all she sees. The closure of the composite observer-box system
is only a fact FAPP, but it is, for the observer, a conclusion that no observation can falsify.
The no-boundary theorem does not, of course, limit the observer’s ability to hypothesize the
existence of distinct “systems” within the black box that constitutes her observable universe. Nor does
it imply that such hypotheses cannot be useful FAPP for choosing what inputs to give the box
or for predicting what outputs to expect from the box. It merely establishes the Popperian point
that while such hypotheses can be supported by observation, they can never be confirmed by
observation. They cannot, therefore, support ontological claims. In particular, they cannot be regarded
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as “self-evident truths” and accorded the status of axioms. “Systems exist” is sometimes regarded
as an axiom of quantum theory [39,79]. As discussed in more detail below, the apparent existence of
distinct physical systems should instead be regarded as an explanadum of quantum theory.
Figure 2. The observer within the black box. (a) The observer is embedded within “the rest of the
observable universe”, which by Theorem 2 is a black box; (b) The observer is embedded within the
environment postulated by the environment as witness formulation of decoherence, from which any
information about systems embedded within that environment must be obtained; (c) The observer
is embedded within an observable universe that satisfies decompositional equivalence. Subsystem
boundaries (other than the observer’s) within that universe have no effect on the information that the
observer can obtain.
3.3. Corollaries
The no-boundary theorem shows that separability between any two observable degrees
of freedom, i.e., between any two components of the state(s) of one or more systems, is at best a
FAPP assumption. Separability is, however, the fundamental enabling assumption of the “classical
worldview” of independently-observable, independently-manipulable physical objects. Einstein put it
this way: “Without such an assumption of the mutually independent existence (the “being-thus”) of
spatially distant things, an assumption which originates in everyday thought, physical thought in the
sense familiar to us would not be possible”. (quoted in [79], p. 6). Separability underpins the concept
of statistical independence and, therefore, Bell’s [80] inequality. If the observable universe is a black
box, the idea that any two observable degrees of freedom would satisfy Bell’s inequality is at best a
FAPP assumption. There is no reason for it to be true, and no justifications beyond FAPP utility and
convenience for assuming that it is true. The no-boundary theorem tells us, indeed, to expect Bell’s
inequality to be violated, the surprise elicited in fact by experimental confirmations of its violation by
Aspect, Dalibard and Roger [81] and now many others notwithstanding. It is important to emphasize
that this expectation follows purely and solely from classical cybernetics. No “quantum” assumptions
are needed. If “physical thought in the sense familiar to us” is not possible without separability, then it
is not possible even in classical physics.
As shown previously [82], the restrictions on inferences from observational outcomes imposed
by Bell’s theorem [80], the Kochen-Specker theorem [83] and the no-cloning theorem [84] can also
be derived from Moore’s theorem; they therefore characterize any observations of a black box.
The no-boundary theorem shows that the restrictions imposed by these theorems characterize
observations across the board. In every case, these restrictions follow from the inability of observers to
identify the particular collection of degrees of freedom within the black box under observation—the
particular embedded “system”—that produced a given observational outcome. If the sources of
observational outcomes cannot be singled out, i.e., if separability fails, then outcomes that appear to
come from two distinct systems cannot be assumed to be independent (Bell’s theorem), outcomes that
appear to come from a single system cannot be assumed to be independent of the order in which they
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are obtained (Kochen-Specker), and identical outcomes do not indicate the presence of identical systems
(no cloning). This last result is simply a special case of Moore’s theorem: no two finite sequences of
observational outcomes obtained from two black boxes can demonstrate that the two black boxes
have the same machine table, i.e., no two such sequences of observational outcomes can demonstrate
that two black boxes are clones. This and the other results are, once again, consequences of classical
cybernetics alone. That they were discovered in the context of quantum systems, and that they are still
often regarded as “intrinsically quantum” (e.g., [85] where Bell’s theorem is regarded as “intrinsically
quantum” although the Kochen-Specker and no-cloning theorems are not), indicate the depth with
which the view that the observable universe cannot be a black box pervades “classical” thinking, i.e.,
the extent to which the decompositional equivalence of the classical formalism is ignored.
Several additional corollaries follow immediately from the no-boundary theorem.
Corollary 1 (no-communication). Two or more observers cannot employ their shared environment as a
classical communication channel.
Proof. By the no-boundary theorem, the environment shared by two or more observers is a black box.
No observer of this black box can determine the internal source or causal history of any output received
from the box. Therefore, no observer can distinguish states of the box that result from inputs from
other observers from states of the box that have no dependence on inputs from the other observers.
It cannot, in other words, be determined by finite observation that an output from a black box
is a “message” from another observer. Indeed from the point of view of any one observer, all other
observers are inside that observer’s observable universe and hence inside a black box (Figure 3).
Figure 3. (a) Two observers, Alice and Bob, interact with a black box; (b) It is equivalent to regard
Alice as interacting with a black box that contains Bob, and Bob as interacting with a black box that
contains Alice. It is clear in this latter picture that Alice cannot determine by observation that an output
from her box is a message from Bob, nor can Bob determine by observation that an output from his box
is a message from Alice.
The no-communication corollary is analogous to the no-communication theorem for shared
quantum systems [86], which shows that the local measurement outcomes obtained from a quantum
system by one observer cannot depend on the activities of another observer, located somewhere
else, who also interacts with the system. This latter result is generally interpreted as a limitation on
instantaneous information transfer between observers via the shared quantum system, i.e., as showing
that entanglement cannot be used for super-luminal communication. However, spacelike-separated
observers can obtain no direct observational evidence that they are manipulating the same system;
it is for this reason that local observations must be supplemented with classical communication via a
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separate classical channel in communication protocols (local observations, classical communication or
“LOCC” protocols [87]) that depend on shared quantum systems and hence entanglement as a resource.
If only a quantum system is shared, classical communication is impossible and no information can be
exchanged, i.e., entanglement ceases to be a resource.
If observers cannot exchange classical information through a shared black box, they clearly cannot
exchange physical systems either. Physical systems such as clocks, meter sticks and gyroscopes are,
however, the reference frames with respect to which measurements are made [88]. Hence we have:
Corollary 2 (no-external-reference). Observers have no access to external reference frames.
Proof. By the no-boundary theorem, any external reference frame is inside a black box and
therefore inaccessible.
In particular, observers cannot specifically and exclusively consult external clocks, spatial reference
frames, or items of laboratory apparatus, as all of these are internal to the black box with which each
observer interacts. Information from such devices can only be obtained if it is “packaged” into an output
from the black box. By the definition of a black box, this packaging process precludes observational
access to the source(s) of the packaged information.
The no-external-reference corollary seems radical, but in fact has a simple interpretation:
the reference frames employed by observers to make sense of their observations must be internal. Without
an internal representation of time, for example, the motion of a clock hand has no temporal meaning;
without an internal memory and an internal means of comparing current and remembered events, even
the motion itself is undetectable. Observers, in other words, cannot be “blank slates” that just record data
if they are to obtain what Roederer has called “pragmatic information”, information that enables doing
something [89,90]. An observer’s internal reference frames determine what kinds of outputs from a black
box that observer can observe. They allow the interpretation of observed outputs in terms of hypotheses
about the box’s states and dynamics. Without such internal reference frames, the observer cannot do
science, indeed the observer cannot do anything at all. It was assumed earlier that observers could
choose what to do next; this assumption can now be re-stated as the assumption that all observers of
interest have internal reference frames, including in particular an internal time reference frame, that
enable them to obtain and act on pragmatic information (cf. [64]).
If observers have internal structure, it is natural to ask if that internal structure is accessible to
other observers. The no-boundary theorem restricts this question to one case only: the case in which the
“other observer” in question is the black box with which the observer of interest interacts. In this case,
however, the answer has already been decided: the black box obtains only a finite sequence of finite
bits strings from the observer. The situation shown in Figure 1a is, therefore, completely symmetrical:
the black box can “know” no more about the observer than the observer can know about the black box.
Hence we have:
Corollary 3 (observer-box equivalence). Observers are black boxes and vice-versa.
Proof. Consider an observer (Alice) interacting with a black box B that contains another observer
(Bob) as shown in Figure 3b. Because Bob’s presence within B is undetectable by Alice, this situation is
completely general. By the no-boundary theorem, the outputs from B cannot depend on Bob’s boundary,
therefore it can expand arbitrarily within B (Figure 4). In the limit, Bob and B are identical.
This observer-box equivalence corollary extends Ashby’s remark about “real objects or systems” to
include observers, an extension that comports well with Ashby’s lifelong commitment to understanding
biological intelligence in terms of adaptive information processing [91]. It removes, in particular,
any justification for assuming that observers are made out of a different kind of “stuff” or have an
intrinsically different structure from the environments in which they are embedded. It allows the
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boundary around an observer embedded in a black box to be erased; i.e., it recognizes that a black box
containing an observer satisfies decompositional equivalence.
Figure 4. (a) Alice interacts with a black box containing Bob, as in Figure 3b; (b) Bob’s boundary
within the box can expand arbitrarily without affecting the box’s interaction with Alice; (c) In the limit,
Bob and the box are identical.
The observer-box equivalence corollary allows us to re-conceptualize the observer-box interaction
as an interaction between two observers or, equivalently, between two black boxes (Figure 5).
The observers/boxes together comprise a closed system, a “universe” in which each observer/box
is the other observer/box’s “environment” or observable universe. Classical information exchanged
by the observers flows through an inter-observer boundary S, which plays the role of a classical
information channel. As this boundary is an oriented surface separating the observers, both the
information sent and the information received by each observer can be viewed as “written on” the
side of this surface facing that observer. Sending and receiving are symmetric, so each observer “sees”
exactly the same information on their own side of the surface; they differ only in the labelling of what
bits have been “sent” and what bits have been “received”. As there is no process by which to “unsend”
or “unreceive” a message, this “writing” on S is permanent. Indeed the “memories” of both Alice and
Bob can, without loss of generality, be regarded as implemented by their shared boundary.
If two observers/boxes, e.g., Alice and Bob in Figure 5, are allowed to interact indefinitely,
the amount of information encoded on the inter-observer boundary S will increase, limited only by the
assumed-finite energy resources of the observers. Let EMax(O) be the maximum energy available to
an observer O for information exchange.
Definition 3. Let A and B be interacting black boxes that together comprise a closed system, and suppose
they are allowed to interact indefinitely. The observable machine tables of A and B are then the exactly
complementary sequences of inputs and outputs exchanged by A and B prior to the smaller of EMax(A) and
EMax(B) being exhausted.
The observable machine table of a black box can clearly be its complete machine table if its number
of states is small. If energy resources are unlimited, the observable machine table of a finite black box is
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the complete machine table. If both black boxes are infinite and can access infinite energy, completeness
is approached only as a limit.
Figure 5. Alice and Bob exchange classical information through an inter-observer boundary S.
Corollary 4 (holographic-encoding). If a black box is a component of a closed system, its observable machine
table can be written on its boundary.
Proof. Let B be the black box in question. If B is itself a closed system, it has no boundary but also
no inputs or outputs, so it has no observable machine table. If B together with one other black box
compose a closed system, the result follows by definition of the observable machine table. If B interacts
with more than one other black box, the no-boundary theorem allows their union to be considered a
single black box, so the previous case applies.
The holographic-encoding corollary provides an alternative way of thinking about the
“inaccessible interior” of a black box: to say that the interior of a black box is inaccessible is just to say
that all available information about the box can be “read off” from its exterior. Physical systems
for which this is true are obviously familiar: they are black holes. In the case of a black hole,
the information written on the horizon S is proportional to its mass [92]. In the case of a black box,
the information written on the horizon S is proportional to its available energy (and hence its mass) or
to its behavioral and hence computational complexity, whichever is less. The connection between mass,
horizon-encoded information and computational complexity has been noted previously in the case of
black holes [63,93]; it is interesting to see it re-appear here in the purely-classical case of black boxes.
While in the black-hole case the computational complexity in question is the computational complexity
faced by an observer stationed near the horizon who must analyze Hawking radiation from the
black hole before it evaporates, in the black box case the computational complexity in question is the
computational complexity of the procedure with which the box chooses outputs in response to inputs.
It can be conjectured that the two cases are in fact fully analogous: that the computational complexity
of an observer’s analysis of Hawking radiation mirrors the computational complexity of the black
hole’s “choice” of what Hawking radiation to emit.
The holographic-encoding corollary holds for black boxes, or by the observer-box equivalence
corollary, observers that are components of closed systems. As noted earlier, a system being closed can
only be a fact FAPP. All systems appear, however, to be closed to observers embedded in them. Hence all
observers appear, to themselves, to have their observable machine tables encoded as memories on
their boundaries.
It was remarked in the Introduction that modern science assumes that “there is a way that the
world works”. This assumption is naturally interpreted, and historically has been interpreted, as an
assumption of determinism. Standard quantum theory with no physical “collapse” process is fully
unitary and therefore strictly deterministic. As noted earlier, Tipler has shown that the “quantum
potential” that the Schrödinger equation adds to the classical Hamilton-Jacobi equation is exactly
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the potential required to make classical physics strictly deterministic [25]. Let us assume, therefore,
that the dynamics of any closed system is strictly deterministic. Even in this case, the following holds:
Corollary 5 (free-will). In a closed system comprising two interacting black boxes, neither box determines the
other’s behavior.
Proof. For one box to determine the other’s behavior, it must have information specifying the other’s
state and dynamics. However, such information cannot be obtained for any black box.
This free-will corollary is an analog for black boxes of the Conway-Kochen free-will theorem,
which states that the behavior of a quantum system cannot be determined by the information available
in its own past lightcone [94]. While quantum theory can be globally deterministic, no local information
can be determinative for any system. It is in this sense of local non-determinism that any observer/box
can be said to “freely choose” its next output (cf. [95]). Note that this freedom also applies to each
observer’s own local information: as each observer’s memory contains only its own observable
machine table, no observer “knows” its own current state or dynamics and hence no observer can
locally determine its own next output. Observers are free and appear autonomous, but they are not
autonomous in the literal sense of locally self-determining; local non-determinism includes local
non-self -determinism. Local non-determinism prevents strict “objective” autonomy for any bounded
system, including any observer, but requires apparent autonomy for all observed systems, including all
observers. Local non-determinism can be stated in terms of decompositional equivalence: any system’s
action on its observed world, including any observer’s action on her observed world, remains the
same when the boundary around the system/observer is erased, rendering the action no longer
the system’s/observer’s action on the observed world but rather the entire world’s action on itself. Within a
black-box based theory, these two actions are indistinguishable.
3.4. What Is Physics about?
The no-go results demonstrated here, whether in their current classical cybernetic form or in their
more traditional quantum-information form, naturally raise the question of what physics is about.
This question has traditionally been debated in realist-versus-instrumentalist terms, with the added twist
of realists about the “quantum world” typically being instrumentalists about the “classical world” and
vice-versa (e.g., [6] or for a more recent survey of competing positions, [12]). The no-boundary theorem
and the no-communication corollary add a further issue to this debate: that of observations being
intrinsically personal. This individuality and principled non-redundancy of observations has previously
been emphasized by Fuchs as a central feature of quantum Bayesianism [11]. If communications
from other observers are regarded as “observations” like any others and accorded no special,
epistemically-privileged status, the usual notion of objectivity based on inter-subjective agreement
breaks down. It becomes impossible for the agreeing agents to establish unambiguously what they are
agreeing about (cf. [66]). They can agree FAPP, but they can do no better than this.
The concept of classical information—information that can be irreversibly encoded as a bit string on
some physical medium—is taken as a primitive in classical cybernetics and in the current discussion. Bits
are discrete “quanta” of information; hence classical information is itself “quantized”. As noted above,
any observer able to obtain classical information and use it to make predictions must have an internal
time reference frame, i.e., an internal clock. No generality is lost in assuming that the observer’s internal
clock “ticks” whenever an outcome is received from the system being observed; the unit time interval of
the observer’s internal clock can, therefore, be set to Δt = 1. As the observer must expend a minimum
energy EMin = ln2 kT to record each bit, the observer’s minimal action per recorded outcome is
EMinΔt. Hence the observer’s action is quantized even in classical physics. Boltzmann’s recognition that
obtaining information requires expending energy is thus the fundamental idea needed to develop
quantum theory. The quantization EMinΔt = Constant fixes the value of the minimal action; at human
physiological temperature, T = 310 K, for example, and Δt ∼ 200 ns, the response time of rhodopsin to
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light at physiological temperature [96], EMinΔt ∼ 6.0 × 10−34 J · s, a value remarkably close to Planck’s
h ∼ 6.6 × 10−34 J · s.
As Jennings and Leifer have shown [85], the quantization of the observer’s action is
sufficient to understand the non-commutativity of position and momentum measurements and the
position-momentum uncertainty principle, as well as no-cloning, Kochen-Specker contextuality, and other
“quantum” effects. While Jennings and Leifer do not ask what additional assumptions are needed to
obtain all of quantum theory within a classical setting, others have done so. As Tipler shows, requiring
time evolution to be strictly deterministic is sufficient [25]; Bohmian mechanics provides a similar
demonstration from a different starting point, that of preserving quantum behavior while assuming an
ontology of classical “particles” [26]. Motivated in part by Wheeler’s provocative “it from bit” proposal
[97], a number of information-theoretic [98–103] or more generally, operational [104–106] axiomatizations
of quantum theory have been proposed. Within these formulations, “physical” interactions become
transformations of bits, typically with qubits as “inside the box” intermediaries. Hence physics in these
formulations is “about” computation, typically quantum computation. Reviewing “device-independent”
operational methods originating in quantum cryptography, which disallow assumptions about the
degrees of freedom or dynamics of the systems from which observational outcomes are obtained,
Grinbaum goes even farther, concluding that physics is “about languages” ([107], p. 14), specifically,
languages as formal entities without imposed semantics.
Physics being about information, computation or languages is a far cry from the more traditional,
and far more common, view that physics is about the everyday objects of ordinary human experience,
even if its theories tend toward the abstruse and postulate non-ordinary objects that are not
directly observed. Effectively embedding the human observer into the theory requires explaining,
within the theory, why the everyday observations made by human observers can be described so readily
in terms of bounded, causally-independent objects. The next section makes a step in this direction by
showing that “objects” can be considered to be collections of outcome values that are held fixed while
making measurements. “Objects” are thus internal reference frames. It is then shown in Section 5 that
objects construed in this way are the natural external referents of the “object tokens” that have been
proposed as components of human episodic memories [108,109].
4. “Objects” within a Black Box
The world may be a black box, but when human observers look at it, they see discrete objects.
The “environment” in which these objects are embedded is effectively invisible, a condition that
has obtained, cosmologically, since photons decoupled from matter [110]. Hence while human observers
physically interact with the environment, predominately the ambient photon field, they see objects.
From the present perspective, the question of interest is how to describe these objects in a way that is
consistent with the Black Box model.
4.1. Object Identification in Practice
The almost-automatic human assumption that distinct objects exist in an observer-independent
“objective” way within the world diverts attention away from a question that is critical for understanding
observation: how does an observer identify the object being observed? How, for example, does one
identify a familiar object like a coffee cup? Such objects do not appear to us in isolation; they must be
picked out from scenes that contain many other objects. The only incoming information available for
doing so is that contained in the observational outcomes obtained from the scene as a whole.
As will be discussed further in Section 5 below, answering this system-identification question is
non-trivial [111]. For the present purposes, however, the most important part of the answer is that
observers must dedicate some of the observational outcomes that they associate with an object to
its identification, leaving the rest to indicate its state. A coffee cup, for example, may be identified
by its fixed size, shape and color, while its location and whether it is filled with coffee are allowed
to vary, i.e., to be state variables. What is critical is that not all observables associated with an object can
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simultaneously be state variables; some must be set aside for object identification. Coffee cups are in this
sense like electrons: some observable properties must be regarded as definitional and hence invariant
in order for system identification to succeed.
Recognizing that system identification requires a designated collection of observables that are
fixed and invariant destroys a key component of the “classical worldview”. Ollivier, Poulin and Zurek,
for example, operationally define objectivity thus ([42], p. 3):
“A property of a physical system is objective when it is:
1. simultaneously accessible to many observers,
2. who are able to find out what it is without prior knowledge about the system of
interest, and
3. who can arrive at a consensus about it without prior agreement.”
This definition clearly applies to no systems at all, as observers “without prior knowledge
about the system” would have no designated observables with which to identify it and observers
“without prior agreement” about a designated collection of identifying observables would have no
basis for any subsequent agreement. The no-external-reference corollary shows that the reference
frames required to characterize system states must be included within the “prior knowledge” of
observers; inter-observer agreement about reference frames must, similarly, be included among the
“prior agreements” between observers. Shared conceptual schemes and shared category hierarchies are
examples of such prior agreements. As discussed in more detail below, the collection of observable
properties that are regarded as defining an object can be considered a reference frame for characterizing
that object: without agreement about which observables constitute a reference frame for identifying
an object, multiple observers cannot agree unambiguously about object identification. As noted earlier,
a critically important special case is the collection of reference frames that observers use to identify
each other, including their prior agreements about how they will communicate.
4.2. Superpositions Encode the Unresolvable Ambiguity of Object Identification
The role of observational outcomes in identifying objects can be illustrated with a simple
thought experiment. Consider an observer equipped with a single reference frame, a vertically-oriented
meter stick, who is embedded in a world containing multiple objects, some of which have some linear
dimension equal, within the resolution of the meter stick, to 1 m while others do not (Figure 6).
The meter stick registers a “1” outcome if it comes into contact with an object having a vertical
dimension of 1 m and registers a “0” outcome if it comes into contact with an object having a different
vertical dimension; it registers no outcome if it is not in contact with an object. An unseen mechanism
occasionally puts one of the objects in contact with the meter stick. The observer receives no information
other than the “1” and “0” outcomes from the meter stick; in particular, the observer is unable to
observe the size, shape, orientation, or anything else about the objects other than the vertical linear
dimension reported by the meter stick. The world of this observer is clearly a black box.
With what system does the observer interact when an outcome value of “1” is received? The observed
state of that system is known: it is whatever state yields an outcome value of “1.” Call this state “|1〉” and
call its complement, the state that yields an outcome value of “0”, “|0〉.” What, however, is the system
that occupies these states? While the no-boundary theorem gives the precise answer that the “system”
is the black-box world as a whole, the human tendency to associate distinct observational outcomes
with distinct systems suggests an answer postulating two systems, an “object” S1 perpetually in, and
hence identified by |1〉 and a second “object” S2 perpetually in and identified by |0〉. These two
alternatives are operationally equivalent: interacting with a single system that can occupy two states is
indistinguishable from interacting with two systems, each of which permanently occupies a single state.
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Figure 6. (a) An observer equipped with a meter stick and embedded in a world of multiple objects.
The meter stick reports an outcome of “1” whenever an object with a linear dimension of 1 m is placed
in contact with it. The observer has no ability to observe any features of the objects other than the linear
dimension reported by the meter stick; (b) The meter stick reports an outcome of “0” whenever an
object with a linear dimension other than 1 m is placed in contact with it; (c) A mechanism that places
successive objects in contact with the meter stick produces a stream of binary outcome values.
From the “god’s eye” perspective of Figure 6, one can associate multiple distinct objects
distinguished by the unobserved and hence “hidden” variable of geometric shape with both S1 and S2.
Providing the observer in Figure 6 with a shape detector would allow a choice between identifying
objects by size and treating shape as a state variable or identifying objects by shape and treating size as a
state variable. These descriptions are, once again, operationally equivalent, and both are equivalent to a
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description in which there is only one object—the black box—and both size and shape are state variables.
The only basis for predictions in any of these descriptions is the sequence of bit strings observed so far,
a sequence that provides no information beyond a lower bound on complexity about the mechanism
that selects objects to put in contact with the meter stick. In particular, the observations provide no basis
for deciding whether the mechanism selects “objects” for presentation at random or by following a
deterministic algorithm.
It is natural for an observer who knows no more about what is being observed than the
observational outcomes obtained thus far to represent the source of these outcomes, whatever it is,
by a linear superposition of the observed outcomes. As distinct outcomes can indicate either distinct
states or distinct systems, this representation can be interpreted as either a superposition of states or as
a superposition of systems; the two interpretations are entirely equivalent [67]. While the former is
by far the more familiar, the latter is implicit in Feynman diagrams and is even more evident in more
abstract representations, such as the amplituhedron [112], in which particles and even spacetime are
elided altogether.
4.3. Objects as Internal Reference Frames
It is increasingly recognized that the reference frames employed to make physical measurements
are not mere abstracta but rather are physical objects [88]. Successfully employing a LOCC protocol
with entangled photons, for example, requires sharing not just a description of the measurement
conditions at the two spatially-separated sites, but also a physical orientation reference frame such as
the Earth’s gravitational field. The physicality of reference frames forces the physicality of instrument
calibration procedures to be taken explicitly into account; when this is done, the standard “quantum”
uncertainty relations emerge even for purely classical measurements [113]. The complementarity
between system-identifying observables and state observables makes it clear why this must be the
case across the board: one or the other set of observables must be measured first, and the finite time
required for measurement is time during which the unmeasured observables are free to undergo
unpredictable dynamic evolution.
The no-external-reference corollary shows, however, that reference frames cannot be external
physical objects; they must be internal to the observer. Even an external calibration standard
requires identification by observation: from the observer’s perspective, it is merely a collection of
observational outcomes. Calibration itself is a process of comparing observational outcomes that identify
and characterize the state of the “standard” to observational outcomes that identify and characterize
the state of the “instrument” being calibrated. This comparison is an operation on bit strings carried out
by the observer; it is a computation. It is essential to the meaning of this computation that the outcomes
that identify both the calibration standard and the instrument remain invariant during the calibration
process. As with the fixed size, shape and color of a coffee cup that enable reaching for it, grasping it,
and filling it with coffee, it is the invariance of outcomes that identify objects with respect to outcomes
that indicate changes of state that allow state changes to be recognized as such.
If all objects, including objects that function as calibration standards and reference frames,
are identified by sets of observational outcomes that remain invariant while other relevant observational
outcomes change, it is natural to consider these sets of invariant outcomes to be the internal
reference frames that the no-external-reference corollary requires. These internal reference frames are
information-bearing structures—effectively, data structures—that encode the observer’s expectations
about the objects present “within” the black box under observation. In Bayesian predictive-coding [114]
terms, they are prior probability distributions. Without such priors, the observer cannot identify objects,
and hence cannot recognize state changes in objects.
There is, however, no need to postulate the real existence of external objects at all; the no-boundary
theorem guarantees that their existence cannot be revealed by observation. Any observer’s observational
outcomes are generated by that observer’s impenetrable black box. The observer encoding a set
of internal reference frames that identify objects is all that is required to explain the appearance, to
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the observer, of objects within the box (von Foerster [17] refers to such internal reference frames as
“eigenforms”; see also [115,116]). Hence the observer encoding a set of internal reference frames is
all that physics needs postulate. Internal reference frames are necessary for object perception in a
black-box world; they are also sufficient.
5. The Black Box as a Cross-Disciplinary Paradigm
The assumption that the sources, within the world, of observational outcomes can be spatially
localized and bounded is central to the classical worldview. It goes hand-in-hand with the assumption
that specific states of spatially localized, bounded systems can be “prepared” by local manipulations.
The classical cybernetics of the mid-20th century was by no means the first or the only intellectual
movement to question these assumptions. Philosophers have criticized them at least since Heraclitus.
The 20th century saw, however, an explosion of criticism of these assumptions that ranged across
scientific disciplines. As science requires replicable experiments performed on shareable apparatus
and reported on shareable media, this burst of criticism of the assumptions on which these conditions
rest indicate that the logic of science itself is at most paraconsistent [117].
5.1. Formal Semantics, Device Independence and Virtual Machines
By the 1930s, Wittgenstein’s essentially 19th-century conception of propositions in natural or
formal languages “picturing” unique relations between independently-existing objects [118] had been
largely replaced, in no small part due to Wittgenstein’s own efforts, by a radically different conception
of languages and of symbol systems generally as supporting arbitrarily many distinct interpretations.
This view reached maturity in Tarski’s development of formal model theory as a general approach
to semantics [119]; however, it is evident in the Turing machine [120] and in the work of Gödel,
Church and others. Via the later work of Quine and others, the disconnection of semantics from syntax
imposed by formal model theory informs all recent thinking about natural languages. The implications
of this break for ontology have not gone unnoticed. Quine, for example, points out that with this
disconnection, “physical objects are postulated entities which round out, and simplify our account of
the flux of experience ... the conceptual scheme of physical objects is a convenient myth, simpler than
the literal truth” ([121], p. 32). Physical objects are, in other words, for Quine just semantic interpretations
of the observational outcomes that constitute “the flux of experience.” Experience itself is experience
of a black box.
The most powerful practical impact of the idea that symbols could support arbitrarily many
distinct interpretations was in computer science; indeed it can be argued that the disconnection
of syntax and hence implementation from semantics is the foundational idea of computer science.
It enables the two defining characteristics of post-1950s computing: device independence (the same
software can run on arbitrarily many distinct hardware platforms) and virtual machines (a single
hardware system, appropriately programmed, can exhibit the input-output behaviors of arbitrarily
many distinct devices). These two concepts are closely coupled: virtual machines, in the form
of interpreters and compilers, enable device independence, while device independence is what
makes virtual machines so useful and valuable [122,123]. Without these concepts, we would still
be programming special-purpose computers by re-arranging their hardware. With them, we are able
to regard a device that fits comfortably in a shirt pocket as performing the specialized functions of
hundreds to thousands of different tools.
Despite its everyday familiarity within computer science, the virtual machine concept has yet to
penetrate the disciplinary discourse of physics. “Device-independent methods,” however, are virtual
machine methods. An experimenter who “prepares” the state of a quantum system is in fact preparing
the state of a virtual machine, often literally in a computer-controlled laboratory. “Experimental
data” are, similarly, outputs of virtual machines, again often literally. From the experimenter’s point of
view, these virtual machines are black boxes, in many cases black boxes that are literally functionally
interchangeable, and in practice regularly interchanged, with other black boxes that offer the same
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functionality FAPP. What goes on in the interiors of these black boxes is unknown, and in many cases
arguably unknowable, even in principle, by human beings [124]. To do an experiment is, therefore,
to undertake an extended exercise in semantic interpretation of observational outcomes obtained from
unknown and (at least FAPP but very possibly in principle) unknowable sources. While some “physical
reality” or other must be postulated for the exercise to make sense, the observational outcomes obtained
leave this reality arbitrarily underspecified. All of physics, in other words, is device-independent by its
very nature. Experimentally-accessible “physical systems” are bits of semantics, or as Grinbaum [107]
puts it, bits of language.
5.2. Cognitive Science and AI
The 1960s “cognitive revolution” in psychology reintroduced the idea that understanding
what is going on inside the subject’s—i.e., the observer’s—head is important for understanding
the subject’s behavior. Mere stimulus-response laws are not sufficient [125]. Cognitive subjects are,
however, notoriously black boxes: the observational tools available to experimental psychology and
neuroscience do not directly reveal either the contents of cognition or the processes that manipulate
those contents. In particular, they do not reveal the relationship between cognitive states and states
of the external world. The question of whether this semantic relationship can be considered fixed
by causal processes and hence unique underlies the “symbol grounding problem” (SGP) [126,127] in
cognitive science and AI. As “grounding” a symbol in the external world requires identifying the object,
event, or class of objects or events to which it refers, the external SGP is equivalent to the problem of
object or system identification [128]. Responses to the SGP range from treating the observer’s world as
a black box, at least methodologically [129], to considering essentially arbitrary components of the state
of the world as components of the observer’s cognitive state [130]. The former response replicates the
conceptual structure of Figure 5; the latter reinforces the arbitrariness with which the observer-world
boundary is drawn.
While symbol grounding can be viewed as a purely theoretical or even philosophical problem
in cognitive science, it becomes a practical problem in AI, particularly for “embodied” and “situated”
systems such as mobile robots [131]. In “open” task environments in which not all objects can be identified
using a priori knowledge, object identification criteria and hence the “grounds” for object-specifying
symbols must be learned. How such criteria can be learned, even just FAPP, is a central problem in both
developmental robotics [132] and developmental psychology [111]. Internally grounding object symbols
in object-appropriate, context-relative perceptual-motor associations provides a FAPP solution to the
SGP; this solution effectively replicates the embedding relationship between object tokens [108] and
event files [133] or episodic memories [134] in theories of human object recognition [109]. The external
or ontological version of the SGP is widely regarded as both unsolvable and irrelevant to practical
robotics [135]. Rejecting the external SGP as a problem for robotics is considering the world in which a
robot behaves to be a black box.
5.3. Evolution and Development
Cognitive scientists who reject a black-box view of the observer-world interaction often appeal
to biological evolution as a mechanism for enforcing a causal connection between world states
and cognitive states. Mark, Marion and Hoffman have, however, shown using evolutionary game
simulations that agents responsive only to fitness payoffs out-compete agents responsive to the actual
distribution of resources in a simulated world [136]. This result motivates the “interface theory of
perception” (ITP), which conceptualizes perceptual systems as providing finite-resolution information
about the fitness consequences of actions in a black-box world [137]. Within ITP, the semantic
relation between the agent’s internal representations and the world states or structures to which
fitness consequences are associated is essentially arbitrary, as expected within a model-theoretic or
virtual-machine formulation of the semantics. The principle of “conscious realism” of Hoffman and
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Prakash [138], which treats an agent’s world as another agent and hence treats agent-world games as
two-agent games, replicates the symmetric structure of Figure 5 within ITP.
While ITP is explicit in conceptualizing perception and hence cognition as interaction with a
black box, it is not alone in making this assumption. The Bayesian predictive coding framework [114]
provides an organizing principle for not only neurocognitive architecture [139], but for the evolution and
development of complex biological structures in general [140]. As Friston et al. point out, the predictive
coding framework “only make(s) one assumption; namely, that the world can be described as a random
dynamical system” ([140], p. 9). The world is, in other words, from the observer’s perspective a black
box. The boundary of the box in this formalism is the “Markov blanket” of the observer; the observer
effectively perceives and acts on only the inside surface of this blanket [141], making it an “interface” in
the sense employed by ITP. The interactions of the observer with the blanket are highly dependent on the
observer’s Bayesian priors, i.e., on the observer’s conceptual and categorical structures; hence they display
significant contextuality of the second kind identified by Kitto [24]. Theoretical approaches to conditions
such as autism within the predictive coding framework (e.g., [142]) emphasize this contextuality.
6. Conclusions
As shown here, the over 60-year-old concept of the Black Box provides a powerful basis
for conceptualizing observer-system interactions. While traditional discussions of the Black Box
placed the observer outside the box, the no-boundary theorem moves the observer inside the box.
Moving the observer inside the box, and then recognizing that the observer-box boundary is
itself arbitrarily movable, leads immediately to no-go theorems of the type familiar from quantum
information theory. The observer-box equivalence corollary then shows that observers are themselves
black boxes, while the holographic-encoding corollary shows that both observers and their observed
worlds are analogous, from an information-theoretic perspective, to black holes. Physics, therefore,
already has a detailed and well established theory of the observer: the theory of the black hole.
Conceptualizing the observer as a black hole forces observer-observer interactions to be regarded
as physical interactions occurring at a defined interface between otherwise mutually-inaccessible
systems. It forces us to acknowledge that we do not know what Schrödinger saw when he opened
his infamous box and looked for his cat. We only know what he reported seeing. Indeed we each only
know our own interpretation, based on our own physical interaction with his physically-tokened report,
of what he reported seeing. As Fuchs has pointed out, with this level of epistemic personalization
the usual “measurement problem” of quantum theory simply disappears [11]. It is no longer unclear
why observers report classical outcomes: only classical outcomes—outcomes encodable by classical bit
strings—are recordable in a thermodynamically-irreversible way, and hence only classical outcomes are
reportable. It is no longer unclear how the measurement basis is chosen: observers deploy the observables
they are able to deploy, represented in the measurement bases they are able to deploy. The traditional
measurement problem is replaced, however, by an even deeper problem: a deep and in-principle
unresolvable ambiguity about both the ontological structure and the state of the world. This deep
ambiguity is not a “quantum” phenomenon. It follows solely from classical physics, the classical physics
of the Black Box. Had Moore’s theorem been proved 20 years before the development of quantum theory
instead of 20 years after, this deeper problem may have been considered the “measurement problem”
all along.
Taking the Black Box seriously as a model of observation not only clarifies the relation between
classical and quantum physics; it also clarifies the relation between physics and computer science,
cognitive science and even biology. It forces physics to view semantics in model-theoretic terms,
and thereby enables physics to view physical systems in virtual-machine terms. While this view
is implicit in computational conceptualizations of physical dynamics, it typically only appears
explicitly in speculations about simulated worlds (e.g., [143]). The simulation assumption is, however,
not required for the conclusion that any observer’s observed world is a virtual world. This conclusion
requires only that the world itself, the world in which the observer is embedded, is a black box.
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Abstract: The main message of this paper is that systemism is best suited for transdisciplinary studies.
A description of disciplinary sciences, transdisciplinary sciences and systems sciences is given,
along with their different definitions of aims, scope and tools. The rationale for transdisciplinarity
is global challenges, which are complex. The rationale for systemism is the concretization of
understanding complexity. Drawing upon Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s intention of a General System
Theory, three items deserve attention—the world-view of a synergistic systems technology, the world
picture of an emergentist systems theory, and the way of thinking of an integrationist systems method.
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1. Introduction
Since we live in an age of global challenges, the responsibility of the members of the scientific
community is a topical issue. The trend towards transdisciplinary studies can be seen in that context.
Many researchers devoted to transdisciplinarity use systems terms but may fail in a sound usage of
the terms. The further development of systems thinking, systems sciences and systems practice should
address that demand. The paper at hand offers three clear-cut specifications of the systems paradigm
that might support the transdisciplinary impetus.
2. Aims, Scope, and Tools of Science
From a philosophy of science perspective, sciences can be classified according to three dimensions
of knowledge: the technological (praxiological), the theoretical (ontological), and the methodological
(epistemological) dimension.
Technology is objectivated knowledge about objects for objectives. Theory is objectivated knowledge
about objects. Methodology is knowledge of how to objectivate knowledge, that is, to process it in a
social procedure such that it is not only subjective but might be used as an objective basis for knowledge
about objects, which is required for fulfilling objectives.
Technology incorporates the aims of scientific studies; it directs theory towards practical application.
Applications intervene in the real world so as to help solve problems. Problems stand at the beginning
of any science because they form ends for any science. Problems are, in the last resort, social. Sciences
provide the means to reach a goal, given a point of departure.
Theory embraces the scope of scientific studies; it gives deep insights in the functioning of the
real world—insights that can be functionalised for the solution of problems, by informing the practice
about the way to a goal from a point of departure.
Methodology provides the tools of scientific studies; it is a framework through which understanding
of the functioning of the real world can be generated to serve its function during problem-solving.
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3. Transcending the Disciplines
Scientific disciplines are determined by specific aims, by a specific scope and by specific tools.
The objective is a determinate problem solution, the object of study is a determinate piece of reality,
and the objectivation is guided by a determinate mixture of methods.
However, given the rise of complex problems, monodisciplinary approaches do not fit the situation
any more. Multi-, inter- and transdisciplinary approaches are needed. Transdisciplinarity has been
gaining considerable attention since. It differs from monodisciplinarity in aims, scope, and tools.
As to the aims, disciplines shall be transcended by the inclusion of stakeholders through
participation in the processes of research and development as well as through diffusion of innovations,
which allows them to co-determine what shall be regarded as a problem and what shall be regarded
as a solution. By doing so, technological knowledge shall be constructed for solving problems that
are complex.
As to the scope, disciplines shall be transcended by the inclusion of interdependencies between
factors across space (long-range effects), time (long-term effects), and matter (side effects) in the focus
of the study. By doing so, theoretical knowledge shall be enabled to depict a bigger picture than mere
isolated pieces of reality to underpin complex problem-solving.
As to the tools, disciplines shall be transcended by the inclusion of a common code that shall perform
the translation of concepts of one domain to those of other domains. By doing so, methodological
knowledge shall orient towards the identification of similarities across domains to gain a deeper
understanding of complex problems.
4. The Systems Paradigm
So far, mainstream disciplines have been regarding systems practice, systems sciences, systems
thinking—subsumed here under the term “systemism” (Mario Bunge)—as a determinate approach
that aims at managing, intervening in, transforming, engineering or designing systems (systems
technologies), which presupposes real-world systems, their dynamics and structures, or their elements
as in the scope of sciences (systems theories), which, in turn, presupposes tools that frame empirical
data as systems phenomena (systems methods). As such, systemism might or might not be the means
of choice.
Figure 1 gives a sketch of systemism that is inspired by Robert Rosen’s conception of the modelling
relation. His drawing shows the natural system, that is, the object to be modelled, on the left side and
the formal system, that is, the model, on the right side. From the left side to the right side, there is
an encoding arrow, and from the right back to the left, a decoding arrow. After Rosen, the model is
an attempt to formalise causations in the object to be modelled as inferences, whereas the encoding
and decoding processes cannot be formalised themselves but make modelling “as much an art, as it
is a methodology” [1] (p. 54). In Figure 1 the natural system is specified as a real-world system of any
kind, and the formal system as those sciences that follow a systems approach. Rosen’s encoding
process is turned into a framing process and his decoding process into a designing process, both of
which involve creative acts. Inside the systems, sciences layers are added to represent aims, scope
and tools. The arrows between those layers do not represent entailment operations but operations
that involve creative acts as well in order to accomplish the jumps between systems methods, theories
and technologies.
However, systemism is not merely an option that can be taken up according to the researchers’
predilection. It is far more a well-founded approach best suited for cases in which transdisciplinarity
is needed. This holds not only for particular projects. It has the potential to give the whole edifice of
sciences a new shape.
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Figure 1. Modelling Systems.
The customary description of sciences involves (see Figure 2)
(a) philosophy on the uppermost general level;
(b) formal sciences, real-world sciences, and applied sciences on a next level and
(c) subgroups of the former—as logic and mathematics in the case of formal sciences, as natural
sciences such as physics, etc., and social and human sciences such as sociology, etc., in the case
of real-world sciences, and as engineering science (that develops technological innovations)
such as computer science, etc., and management science and science of arts (that develop social
innovations) in the case of applied sciences—and
(d) their sub-disciplines and sub-sub-disciplines, and so forth, on ever more specific levels.
Figure 2. The Edifice of Sciences from a positivistic perspective.
Those sciences are imagined to have well-defined boundaries and to interact at best without
undergoing fundamental changes themselves. Thus is the image of positivist sciences.
Systemism comes with a new understanding of sciences (see Figure 3). The systemist conception
of sciences assumes semi-permeable boundaries and upward and downward interactions across
the levels between all sciences. This is substantiated through defining any science in the context of
discovering, describing and dealing with an overall systemic interconnectedness. Accordingly, formal
sciences become part of a systems methodology that embraces formal and non-formal methods to
understand systems features; real-world sciences turn into a science of different real-world systems
that can be categorised as material systems, living (material) systems and social (living) systems, and
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applied sciences turn out to be a science of the artificial design of those systems. Any science is open to
further specifications of subsystems, sub-subsystems and so on.
Figure 3. The Edifice of Sciences from a systems perspective.
Thus a lively body of scientific knowledge can be considered as growing and developing along
the feed-forward and feedback cycles in the direction of new generalisations (upward) and new
specifications (downward), while consistency is taken care of and the silos of the disciplines in the
positivist perspective are broken up for the benefit of a convergent whole of science.
Systemism has been effecting a paradigm shift that can transform positivist disciplines into parts
of an overarching transdisciplinary endeavour. Of course, there have been drawbacks: the resistance
of the positivist science establishment has proven strong; systemism has itself branched into a plethora
of different schools. Though systems terms have flooded the disciplines, the meaning of the terms is
heterogeneous. So the paradigm shift is far from being completed.
The need for science and technology responses to global challenges in an intelligent way has been
supporting the attraction of transdisciplinarity among the scientific community.
Drawing on Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s intention to form a General System Theory [2], as well
as several other compatible insights revolving around issues such as complexity, emergence,
and self-organisation, can help sharpen transdisciplinary efforts. In particular, it is these features
that play an innovative part in supporting the transdisciplinary agenda: systems technologies can be
characterised by a new world view, systems theories by a new world picture, and systems methods by
a new way of thinking.
The discussion of these issues here will follow the systems modelling processes sketched in
Figure 1 and start at the bottom level with framing systems.
4.1. A New, Systemic Way of Thinking for Transdisciplinarity: Integrationism
Complex problems need an epistemological approach that does justice to the complexity of reality
from which systems phenomena emanate. In many cases, if not in any case, an assumption has to be
made about which is the interrelation of phenomena of different degrees of complexity: how does the
lower-complexity phenomenon relate to the higher-complexity phenomenon (and vice versa)?
This is a question of the way of thinking. There are, in principle, three (or four) possibilities [3]
(see Table 1).
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Table 1. Ways of thinking.
Complexities Identity and Differences
universalism
reductionism levelling downhigher complexity
identity at the cost of differences
(uniformity not diversity)
projectionism levelling up lower complexity identity for the benefit of one difference(uniformity not diversity)
particularism: disjunctionism segregating degreesof complexity
any difference at the cost of identity
(singularity or duality/plurality not unity)
systemic framing: integrationism
conjoining complexity degrees
of several levels through
integration and differentiation
identity and differences united
(dialectic of unity through diversity,
including as less unity as necessary and as
much diversity as possible)
First, there is a universalist way of thinking that gives priority to uniformity over diversity.
It comes in two varieties:
(a) the levelling down of phenomena of higher complexity to phenomena of lower complexity;
identity of the phenomena is established at the cost of differences; this is known as reductionism;
(b) the levelling up of phenomena of lower complexity to phenomena of higher complexity; identity
of the phenomena is established for the benefit of one difference; this is called “projectionism”;
higher complexity is erroneously conceptualised at a level where it does not exist.
The second way of thinking is a particularist one. Priority is given to the singularity of a difference
or the plurality of all differences over unity. The disjoining of phenomena of different degrees of
complexity establishes the identity of a particular difference or identities of any difference, thus an
equivalence of differences—indifference—at the cost of an identity common to the phenomena. That is
called “disjunctionism”.
A third option is that way of thinking that inheres in systemism. It negates universalism and
particularism as well and interrelates phenomena to each other through integration and differentiation
of their complexity degrees. The union of identity and differences yields unity through diversity.
That is the meaning of integrationism here. That is, the phenomenon with a lower degree of complexity
shares with the phenomenon with a higher degree of complexity at least one property, which makes
both of them, to a certain extent, identical, but the latter phenomenon is in the exclusive possession
of at least another property, which makes it, to a certain extent, distinct from the former. So both
phenomena are identical and different at the same time.
The method of transdisciplinarity can take advantage of bringing this new systems method to
bear: framing the phenomena through the equilibration of integration and differentiation during the
processes of conceptualisation in order to rule out reductionist, projectionist, and disjunctionist ways
of thinking.
Example. Let us take the relationship of social science and engineering science as an example for
how to transcend the borders of both disciplines by making use of a systemic framing and transform
their relationship into a true transdisciplinary one (see Table 2).
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Table 2. Ways of thinking in society and technology.
Complexities Identity and Differences
technomorphism man is deemed a machine the conception of the artificial is sufficientfor comprehending social forms
anthropo-socio-morphism the machine isdeemed man-like
the conception of social forms is necessary
for comprehending the artificial
hetero-morphism
socio-centrism man is deemed exclusive social forms are construed as distinctiveover and against the artificial
techno-centrism the machine isdeemed exclusive
the artificial is construed as distinctive over
and against social forms
relativism man and machine aredeemed apart
both social and artificial forms are
construed side by side
systemic framing:
techno-social systems
man and machine are
deemed nested
the understandings of social and artificial
forms join into the understanding of
techno-social systems
In order to combine social science with engineering science, representatives of the latter might
be inclined to reduce that which is human to that which is engineerable: man is deemed a machine.
Operation Research, Cybernetics, Robotics, Mechatronics, the fields of Artificial Intelligence and
so-called Autonomous Systems, among others, are liable to cut the understanding of man who is a
social being free from the understanding of social relations; the conception of the human body free
from the conception of individual actors; and conceiving of mechanics free from conceiving of the
organism. Mechanical architectures and functioning that are constituents among others of human
life structures and processes are analysed and hypostatised as sufficient for the comprehension of
man (“technomorphism”).
Or representatives of social sciences—not unlike those of other disciplines—might share
a predilection to understand the whole world, including artifactual mechanics, by projecting
characteristics of the social world onto the former: the machine is deemed man-like. Actor-Network
Theory, Deep Ecology, New Materialism, Info-Computationalism and others are prone to blur the
boundaries between the social sciences and the sciences of living things, between the latter and the
sciences of physical things and, eventually, between the sciences of physical things and engineering
sciences by attributing human features to any of those non-social disciplines. The conception of social
forms is thought necessary for the comprehension of everything. That is blunt anthroposociomorphism.
Segregation might be made for the sake of either the identity of social science or that of engineering
science: anthropocentric or, better, sociocentric positions traditionally distinguish the investigation of
man as exclusive and belittle engineering undertakings, whereas trans- and post-humanistic positions
argue for an imminent advent of a technological singularity that will make machines outperform man
and thus the human race obsolescent. However, segregation might also promote the juxtaposition
of social science and engineering science: they co-exist, any of them is worth as much as the other,
and there are no grounds for giving supremacy to what counts as social forms or what counts as
technological forms (relativism). Both are conceived as reciprocally exclusive (“heteromorphism”).
No one of these options does establish true transdisciplinarity. In the case of technomorphism,
social science gives up any autonomy and is invaded by engineering science. In the case of
anthroposociomorphism, any autonomy of engineering science is forfeited, as social science projects
its autonomy onto engineering science. In the case of heteromorphism, each discipline claims full
autonomy over its own, self-contained area. A way out can be seen through an approach that assumes
an interrelation of both disciplines in a systemic framework that grants (relative) autonomy to each of
them according to their place in the overall framework. Both disciplines complement each other
for the sake of a greater whole. That greater whole is achieved by framing both disciplines in
a systems perspective, that is, by framing them as part of systems science. As such, social and
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engineering sciences combine for a common understanding of the systemic relationship of society
and technology—of emerging techno-social systems. They make use of systems methodologies for
empirically studying social systems and the artifactual in the context of technological applications
implemented by social systems design. By doing so, they can form a never-ending cycle in which each
of them has a determinate place: social systems science can inform engineering systems science by
providing facts about social functions in the social system that might be supported with technological
means; engineering systems science can provide technological options that fit the social functions in
the envisaged techno-social system; social systems science can, in turn, investigate the social impact of
the applied technological option in the techno-social system and provide facts about the working of
technology. The social and the engineering parts of techno-social systems science are coupled so as to
promote an integrated technology assessment and technology design cycle in a transdisciplinary sense.
4.2. A New, Systemic Picture of the World for Transdisciplinarity: Emergentism
Systems theories provide an ontology in which complex problems are pictured as complex because
they take part in an overall interconnectedness of processes and structures that are constituted by
self-organising real-world systems. Those systems bring about evolution and nestedness as emergent
features of reality.
The world is pictured according to a multi-stage model of evolutionary systems [4] (see Figure 4).
Figure 4. The multi-stage model of evolutionary systems.
Systems evolve during a phase n. Spontaneously, at a certain point in time, a leap in complexity
emerges and one possibility out of the space of possibilities that are rooted in the reality of the systems
during the phase n (which form the necessary condition for the transition to phase n + 1) is realised
such that new organisational relations emerge. Those organisational relations realise a higher order in
that they nest the old systems n as elements n + 1 of the new systems n + 1 during the phase n + 1.
Thus they form another level n + 1 above the level n that is being reontologised, reworked, reshaped.
Emergence of new systems in the course of evolution (differentiation) entails dominance of higher
levels through the reconfiguration of what is taken over from the old (integration).
Emergentism (another term coined by Bunge) is an important ingredient of systems theories. It helps
understand events and entities that function as less than strict deterministically. Transdisciplinarity must
take into consideration less-than-strict determinism, which means that the mechanisms of the real world
are not machine-like.
Emergentism provides an ontological superstructure for epistemological integrationism.
Integrationism can integrate because evolution lets new features emerge.
Example. Let us consider the issue of anthroposociogenesis [5] as an example for the transcendence
of natural and cultural science towards a true transdiscipline of anthropology by a systemic image of
the evolutionary formation of society and humans.
In naturalistic accounts, the advent of human culture is owed to the development of nature.
The former is the necessary result of the latter. Anatomic features such as cerebral growth, the descent
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of the larynx, bipedalism and the opposable thumb and the fingers, among others, are named as
biological traits that seem to have caused psychic functions such as thought, the ability to speak and
the ability to devise and manufacture artefacts, in particular tools.
One variety of culturalism would conflate the distinction between nature and culture as well,
postulating that cultural features occur in pre-human life and overemphasising the continuity from
natural to cultural evolution.
Another variety of culturalism would postulate a discontinuity between nature and culture and
deny any comparability. Both spheres are considered to be ontologically independent of each other,
and therefore, on that basis they might interact.
In contradistinction, emergentism sees nature as the necessary condition upon which culture as
an evolutionary contingency could emerge. In turn, culture, as a supra-system, began to dominate via
the higher-order structure from which it had taken its departure (see Figure 5). The key idea is that
it is possibilities of co-operation that, when realised, made the difference in evolution. Evolutionary
pressure unfolded a ratchet effect that yielded ever higher complex cooperation. Michael Tomasello
characterises the life of our great ape ancestors as “mostly individualistic and competitive” [6] (p. 4).
The ancestors were “individually intentional and instrumentally rational” [6] (p. 30) as great apes
are still today. It was not before taking advantage of going beyond “individual intentionality” and
adopting “more complex forms of cooperative sociality” [6] (p. 31) that early humans began to speciate.
This brought about “shared intentionality” and enabled them to achieve shared goals. In particular,
Tomasello hypothesises two steps towards a differentiated shared intentionality. A first step occurred
“in the context of collaborative foraging” [6] (p. 33) around two million years ago with a culmination
400,000 years ago. This was a step from individual intentionality to joint intentionality, from the
competitive sociality of great ape ancestors to ad hoc dyadic relationships with a “significant other”
(G. H. Mead). Multiple and vanishing dyadic relationships formed in which early humans shared a
joint goal. A second step led from early to modern humans some 200,000 years ago. They became
“thoroughly group-minded individuals” [6] (p. 80) in larger groups, in which they “had to be prepared
to coordinate with anyone from the group, with some kind of generic other” [6] (p. 81). This was
a step from joint intentionality to collective intentionality, a step to the co-operation within a larger
group organisation (culture) as the “generalised other” (Mead). Every step was a step of emergence
of social systems in a new quality owed to the contingent realisation of possible social relations that
represent a higher order of cooperation and reconfigure the old system. By accepting the interplay of
emergence and dominance, the objects of natural science and cultural science reveal their systemic
interrelationship and give way to a true transdisciplinary theory of the origins (and evolution) of
human, social systems.
Figure 5. The emergence of cultural systems from natural systems through relations of joint cooperation
and collective cooperation.
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4.3. A New, Systemic World View for Transdisciplinarity: Synergism
Acting in the face of complex problems is based on praxiological assumptions about the interference
with self-organising systems. Known mechanisms can be furthered or dampened according to what the
goal shall be.
In the course of evolution, systems move on trajectories on which bifurcations occur. Bifurcations
come up with a variety of possible future trajectories. Systems might not be in the position to avert
devolution (a path that leads to the breakdown of the system) or they might be able to achieve a
leap from the previous level of evolution on which they could enjoy a steady state onto a higher
level which forms part of a successful mega-evolution (a breakthrough to a path that transforms the
system) [7] (p. 314) [8] (pp. 103–104). Amplified fluctuations of parameters indicate possible and
necessary punctuations (see Figure 6).
Figure 6. Bifurcations in systems evolution.
Self-organising systems have as raison d’etre the provision and production of synergetic effects [9].
If the organisational relations are not able any more to provide and help the elements produce synergy,
the system will break down. Hindrances of letting synergy emerge are called frictions. Any social
system is a social system by virtue of organisational relations of production and provision of the
common good, that is, the commons are the social manifestation of synergy [10]. Hindrances of the
commons supply are frictions that are systemic dysfunctions due to the suboptimal organisation of the
synergetic effects. Any meaningful technology is oriented towards the alleviation of frictions and the
advancement of synergy.
Thus systems technologies can help orient transdisciplinarity. Meaningful technology is
technology endowed with meaning by
(1) the participation of those affected in an integrated technology assessment and design process
(that is, design builds upon assessment);
(2) for the reflection of the expected and actual usage of technology: the assessment and design
criterion is social usefulness, that is, the reflection of both;
(a) the adequacy to the purpose (utility; operational knowledge: know-how) and
(b) the purpose itself (the function technology serves; orientational knowledge: know why
and what for).
The purpose is advancing the commons.
Synergism, the orientation towards synergy for every real-world system and towards the human
value of the commons in the case of social systems—which is a world-view (weltanschauung) because
it is value-laden—is the praxiological superstructure for emergentism. Synergy emerges, emergence
brings about synergy.
Example. Let us turn to the crises that manifest themselves in the tension between social systems
on the level of today’s nation states as well as within every such social system regarding their
65
Systems 2017, 5, 15
subsystems such as, in particular, the cultural, the political, the economic, the ecological (eco-social) and
the technological (techno-social) subsystems, which means that several branches of social sciences are
challenged. The critical situation might be complicated or complex to analyse. Sometimes it is said that
complicatedness—the presence of many factors that influence each other —is not an obstacle that we
would not be able to overcome. However, the opposite might be true. The huge amount of options of
interventions—proposed by different disciplines—might actually pose a practical difficulty. However,
on the other hand, the situation we face nowadays is rather complex. In addition, if complexity enters
the stage, problem-solving is also possible despite opposite views—in a true transdisciplinary effort.
Today, enclosures of the commons have been aggravated to such a degree that all of them
morphed into global challenges. Global challenges drive an accumulation of crises that mark a decisive
bifurcation. A Great Bifurcation lies ahead of humanity (see Figure 7) [11].
Figure 7. The Great Bifurcation in social systems evolution.
On the one hand, a possible change never seen before might be imminent—a transformation of
the current state of civilisation into a new state that brings about a peaceful, environmentally sound
and socially and economically just and inclusive world society by the integration of differentiated
interdependent social systems. That rise in complexity is possible. If there is a mismatch between the
complexity of a system and the complexity of the problems faced by the system, that system can catch
up. It can solve the problem by activating the collective intelligence of the co-systems it is made up
of and raise the complexity of its organisational relations or by activating the collective intelligence
of co-systems of its own and raise the complexity of that supra-system in which they are nested in
order to match or surpass the complexity faced. Intelligence is the capability of self-organising systems
to generate that information which contributes in the best way to solving problems. The better their
collective intelligence, that is, the better their problem-solving capacity and the better their capability
to generate information, the better their handling of the crisis and the order they can reach. Higher
complexity not only signifies a higher degree of differentiation. At least as importantly, it signifies
a new quality of integration. Only a new level of integration can deal with an intensification of
differentiation. The new system would disclose the commons. “It would be a Global Sustainable
Information Society (GSIS).
GSIS requires,
(1) for the first time in the history of our planet, on a higher social level—that is, globally—
(2) a reorganisation of the social relations within and in between the interdependent social
systems such that sociogenic dysfunctions with respect to the social, the social-ecological and
the socio-technological realms can be contained—that is, a transformation into sustainable
development—
(3) through conscious and conscientious actors that are not only self- but also community-concerned—
that is, under well-determined informational conditions.” [11] (15)
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On the other hand, a decline in complexity might be imminent, eventually leading to
disintegration of allegedly independent social systems. Civilisation would fall apart.
Systemism is key to tackling complex problems such as the reciprocal influences of varying kinds
of factors dealt with on the basis of varying disciplinary backgrounds within the social sciences in
a transdisciplinary way. It is thus key to tackling global challenges and guiding the transformation
of our social systems onto the next level of cooperation through a social systems design based upon
social systems technologies.
5. Conclusions
In summary, systemic transdisciplinarity
(1) aims—by a systems world-view—at providing scientific knowledge for solving problems of
frictions in the functioning of real-world systems, in particular in processes of the provision and
production of the commons in social systems through meaningful systems technologies that
support the re-organisation of social systems in order to safeguard sustainable development and
rule out self-inflicted breakdowns;
(2) has as its scope the functioning of emergent real-world systems in the interconnectedness of their
evolution and their nestedness, the scientific knowledge of which is a theoretical systems world
picture needed for alleviating frictions;
(3) uses tools that generate scientific knowledge through a systems way of thinking by the method of
equilibrating integration and differentiation for a proper understanding of how complexity grows.
Systemism has the power to transform the disciplines.
Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.
References
1. Rosen, R. Life Itself ; Columbia University Press: New York, NY, USA, 1991.
2. Bertalanffy, L.V. General System Theory; With a Foreword by Wolfgang Hofkirchner & David Rousseau;
George Braziller: New York, NY, USA, 2015.
3. Hofkirchner, W. Four ways of thinking in information. Triple-C: J. Glob. Sustain. Infor. Soc. 2011, 9, 322–331.
4. Hofkirchner, W. Emergent Information, a Unified Theory of Information Framework; World Scientific:
Singapore, 2013.
5. Hofkirchner, W. Ethics from Systems: Origin, Development and Current State of Normativity. In Morphogenesis
and the Crisis of Normativity; Archer, M.S., Ed.; Springer: Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 2016; pp. 279–295.
6. Tomasello, M. A Natural History of Human Thinking; Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, USA, 2014.
7. Haefner, K. Information Processing at the Sociotechnical Level. In Evolution of Information Processing Systems;
Haefner, K., Ed.; Springer: Berlin, Germany, 1992; pp. 307–319.
8. Oeser, E. Mega-Evolution of Information Processing Systems. In Evolution of Information Processing Systems;
Haefner, K., Ed.; Springer: Berlin, Germany, 1992; pp. 103–111.
9. Corning, P. The Synergism Hypothesis; McGraw-Hill: New York, NY, USA, 1983.
10. Hofkirchner, W. Creating Common Good. The Global Sustainable Information Society as the Good Society.
In Morphogenesis and Human Flourishing; Archer, M.S., Ed.; Springer: Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 2017;
in print.
11. Hofkirchner, W. Information for a Global Sustainable Information Society. In The Future Information Society,
Social and Technological Problems; Hofkirchner, W., Burgin, M., Eds.; Wolrd Scientific: Singapore, 2017;
pp. 11–33.
© 2017 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution




From Systems to Organisations
Maurício V. Kritz
National Laboratory for Scientific Computation, Av. Getúlio Vargas, 333, 25651-075 Petrópolis, RJ, Brazil;
kritz@lncc.br; Tel.: +55-24-2233-6007
Academic Editors: Gianfranco Minati, Eliano Pessa and Ignazio Licata
Received: 31 October 2016; Accepted: 10 February 2017; Published: 6 March 2017
Abstract: Warren Weaver, writing about the function that science should have in mankind’s developing
future, ideas and ideals, proposed to classify scientific problems into ‘problems of simplicity’, ‘problems
of disorganised complexity’, and ‘problems of organised complexity’—the huge complementary
class to which all biological, human, and social problems belong. Problems of simplicity have few
components and variables and have been extensively addressed in the last 400 years. Problems of
disorganised complexity have a huge number of individually erratic components and variables, but
possess collective regularities that can be analysed by resourcing to stochastic methods. Yet, ‘problems
of organised complexity’ do not yield easily to classical or statistical treatment. Interrelations among
phenomenon elements change during its evolution alongside commonly used state variables.
This invalidates independence and additivity assumptions that support reductionism and affect
behaviour and outcome. Moreover, organisation, the focal point in this complementary class, is still
an elusive concept despite gigantic efforts undertaken since a century ago to tame it. This paper
addresses the description, representation and study of phenomena in the ‘problems of organised
complexity’ class, arguing that they should be treated as a collection of interacting organisations.
Furthermore, grounded on relational mathematical constructs, a formal theoretical framework that
provides operational definitions, schemes for representing organisations and their changes, as well
as interactions of organisations is introduced. Organisations formally extend the general systems
concept and suggest a novel perspective for addressing organised complexity phenomena as a
collection of interacting organisations.
Keywords: system structure; organised complexity; organisation; models of organisation; whole-part
graphs; synexions; organised sets; organisation interaction; information
1. Introduction
Natural phenomena stem from a collection of things that interact and, while interacting, change the
aspects we observe in them. No change, no phenomenon. No interaction, no change. This observation
can be used to make explicit who interacts and what is exchanged in the interactions that give rise to a
phenomenon. This line of reasoning allows for classifying different phenomena by means of different
concepts in an integrated manner [1–3]. Warren Weaver in 1948 [1] classified natural phenomena
yielding to scientific investigation into three groups grounded on characteristics of ‘things’ and their
interactions, but also on methods used to investigate them: ‘problems of simplicity’, ‘problems of
disorganised complexity’ and ‘problems of organised complexity’.
Phenomena in the first class have a small number of determinable things and variables.
The motion of two or three balls on a billiard table, oscillations of two interacting pendulums, the
motion of planets around the sun are typical examples of those. If the number of things and observable
aspects increase, these problems become intractable not because of theoretical hindrances but due to
computational or operational difficulties. For instance, when considering a large number of pendulums,
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billiard balls, or many planets simultaneously. Note that, even in these latter cases, understanding
have been achieved by considering just two things at a time, in all sensible combinations.
Phenomena in the second class possess a huge number of erratic things and variables that interact
in the same manner or whose interactions cannot be distinguished through changes in the observed
aspects. Like in the first class, there is no restriction on who interacts with whom and the interaction
possibilities remain unchanged throughout the course of the phenomena. These problems present
collective regularities that can be investigated employing stochastic and statistical methods. Typical
examples include: the motion of atoms in a volume of matter or gas, the motion of stars in the Universe,
heredity, thermal behaviour, and traffic. In them, there are observable aspects, like temperature,
pressure, vorticity, or birth-rates that only make sense for collectivities. While concerning motions and
exchanges of energy and momenta, problems in these first two classes and methods for solving them
have been the subject of physics.
In the ‘organised complexity’ class, not only the attributes of things change but also the number
of interacting things and the nature and possibilities of their interactions change; what affects the
dimension of the state-space and the description of the interactions [4–7]. Following Weaver, the
singular characteristic of phenomena in the last class lies in the fact that they show the essential
feature of organisation in both: components and interactions. To date, there are but a few definitions of
organisation; none widely accepted nor used to explain life phenomena, the quintessence of ‘organised
complexity problems’. Organisation is something easily recognised but difficult to grasp. Perusing
available examples in Weaver’s ‘organised complexity’ class, some characteristics show up:
1. The number of variables is moderate but it is not possible to hold all but two or three variables
with fixed values;
2. There are fundamental aspects that are non-quantitative or elude identification and measurement;
3. Aspects observed are entangled, invalidating assumptions about superposition and independence;
4. A collection of things interrelated in a stable and individuated manner may act as an aggregate
thing, a whole, interacting with other things at the same or at different aggregation levels;
5. Interrelations and possible channels of interaction among elements change, affecting the
phenomenon propensities or behaviour; and
6. Units of interaction ‘adapt’, ‘learn’, and ‘fabricate’ [8,9] other units of interaction adding new
factors, aspects and variables, to the phenomenon description.
The ‘problems of organised complexity’ class encompass virtually all biological, health and
social problems, extending to any phenomena that involve living-things as components [10].
Franklin Harold [11] distinguishes living from non-living through their capacity of maintaining,
reproducing and multiplying “states of matter characterised by an extreme degree of organisation”
(see also [12]). The characterisation of this class, though, does not primarily depend on the number of
things or variable aspects involved. In his own words and emphasis [1]:
They are problems which involve dealing simultaneously with a seizable number of factors
which are interrelated into an organic whole.
This happens in a manner similar to composite systems and their collective dynamics, which
leads to self-organisation, but involves also forbidden interactions, channels of interaction that change,
and factors that are entangled and interdependent. These entangled factors encapsulate into units,
adapt themselves and integrate several dynamic scales [6,8,13–17], leading to the picture described by
Harold [11,14].
Quite a number of the problems enrolled as examples of phenomena in this class have been
more or less successfully addressed nowadays. To this date, their mathematical description and
treatment, that originated through associations with complex systems [18,19], employ methods akin to
those used in the investigation of problems in Weaver’s ‘disorganised complexity’ class, centring on
formalisms of thermodynamics, state transitions and critical phenomena [20]. Note that, as a state of
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matter, living things are as organised as a crystal, as fluid as a liquid, but in no case aleatory as a gas or
plasma. Properly re-phrasing several approaches employed to study living and ‘organised complexity’
phenomena, things in them may be rightly named organised matter and living phenomena considered
as the interplay and dynamics of (material) organisations.
Despite their utter beauty and usefulness in explaining the appearance of organisation, the
compatibility of organised matter dynamics with physical laws of out-of-equilibrium systems, the
tendency of physical phenomena to self-organise, and what happens at the border of the (extended)
“criticality zone” [20], these methods are of limited utility to describe entailments and what happens
within ‘organised complexity’ phenomena—that is, to explain how organised-matter maintains, entails
and evolves organisation.
In scientific enquiries, we primevally choose to describe interacting things in a phenomenon
as members of some archetypical thing-class, most of which are associated with formalisms that
support representing (modelling) the phenomenon and reasoning about it. Depending on which
aspects are observed, on what is exchanged in interactions, and on what is being asked, typical
thing-classes may be particles, fields, substances, bodies, fluids, molecules, organisms, individuals,
populations, firms, organisations (e.g., social entities and human associations), ecosystems, or a mixture
of them. Thing-classes highlight characteristics considered important in studying a phenomenon and
for its explanation, based on correlates of it and previous experience. Thing-classes act as spectacles
we use to observe, model and understand a phenomenon. Concomitantly, they constrain which
aspects make sense, what can be observed, which questions can be posed, as well as what can be
referred to and studied [3,21]. Nevertheless, it is well acknowledged that general systems theory and
methodology [22,23] provide a way of formally representing and handling phenomena independently
of the thing-classes chosen or the application domain.
Choosing a thing-class implies making hypotheses about the behaviour of things and their
interactions and about which aspects are relevant to understand a phenomenon. Treating molecules as
particles, we hypothesise that their geometric attributes like form, volume etc, plus chemical-affinity
are not relevant to understand what is being observed. These choices constrain and freeze the way
we look into Nature. Thus, one should use several perspectives wisely for the same phenomenon,
adjusting them to our evolving questions and observation procedures in order to enlarge our
perception. For instance, billiard balls over a table can be a collection of particles or of spherical
bodies. The phenomenon is the same, the stand varies. Each perspective highlights and enlightens
different facets of what is observed in their moving. Each stand moulds the set of questions that can be
posed and answered under the point-of-view imposed by its choice. Different things in a phenomenon
may be represented by elements of different thing-classes. A collection of interacting things can be
considered to be of more than one thing-class bringing new enlightenment to a phenomenon, as in the
case of the interplay between thermodynamics and statistical mechanics ([24] section 4.4). That these
visions are related in certain situations, however restrictive, is a real wonder.
In this paper, I contend that to develop a more extensive, integrated, and encompassing attack to
‘problems of organised complexity’, earning a less ad hoc knowledge about the underlying phenomena,
we need to enlarge our present collection of thing-classes with thing-classes that conform to Weaver’s
characterisation above and go beyond it; by interpreting phenomena as a collection of interacting
organisations that alter the organisation of the things themselves and the connections between things
(channels of allowed interactions) in a phenomenon while interacting. To accomplish this, organisation
is approached from a novel and complementary stand that does not involve dynamics. Its definition
and analysis employ relational mathematical tools grounded on ‘sizeable numbers’ and highlighting
the role of interrelationships in the constitution of organisations, with no presuppositions about or
reference to behaviour, context, and ‘function’.
The purpose of this writing is to propose a generalisation for the concept of systems that could
better aid taming the inherent complexity of ‘organised complexity’ problems, introducing a concept
of organisation as a candidate for such thing-class. From the formal point of view, organisations
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are obtained from general systems apposing hierarchy and encapsulation to them. This provides a
mathematical definition and model for the “systems of systems” idea, allowing to treat “systems of
systems” as units of interaction [25]. Consequently, it also suggests an enhanced general systems
perspective, the organisation perspective. This perspective hypothesises that things in a phenomenon are
organisations, rather than particles, substances, individuals etc, that interact predominantly exchanging
signals and a specific kind of in-formation (see Sections 3.2 and 5) that pictures in(side)formation. In this
way, living things and phenomena may be seen as a fifth state of matter (organised-matter), that
maintains, reproduces, multiplies, and enchains organisations [3], as proposed by F. Harold [11,14]
and R. Rosen [8] (see also [3])
The investigation wherefrom this ideas emanate was initially inspired and driven by difficulties
encountered while modelling ecological and biological systems with variable structure [4–7,13] whose
extreme values, possible factors, or domain cannot be established in advance. Thus, examples and
illustrations in this text are mostly centred on living subjects, despite being true that the idea of systems
is subjacent to phenomena in all three Weaver classes, the ‘organised complexity’ class has an embracing
character, and the concepts presented here have a wider application. Even with this restriction, the
related literature is extremely vast. To keep bibliographic referring manageable, citations to work that
focus on behaviour and analyse organisation and information from a dynamical stand were kept to a
minimum. The historical account presented in Section 2 aims just to contextualise the present proposal
and put bounds on what will be discussed rather than to picture past achievements. References
supporting arguments are employed parsimoniously. Frequently, not all pertinent references were
included in a citation. Finally, relations between dynamics and interaction graphs, a simple form of
organisation as here addressed, were analysed in a previous writing of ours [26] and the references
within this work should be accessed through it.
This work is structured as follows: (1) purpose, described in this introduction; (2) a short and far
from exhaustive overview of occurrence of terms organisation and information in the literature of life
systems and sciences with little reference to behaviour, in the next section; (3) the organisation concept
and the accompanying framework, in the third section; (4) ontological considerations, justifications
and exemplifications, in the fourth section; (5) seeing phenomena as interacting organisations,
the organisation perspective, in the fifth section; (6) closing remarks, in the last.
2. Organisation and Information in Life Systems and Sciences
One of the most conspicuous characteristics of life phenomena is alternatively named architectural
structure or organisation [11,12,27–29]. Both terms refer to the same idea—the relative position, connection,
or interaction channel of things and thing components with respect to one another, that become
hierarchically arranged as a consequence of encapsulation into wholes or units [30]. Organisation is a
central characteristic of biological entities and biological phenomena [1,11,14,27,28,31,32]. Organisation
appears everywhere. It may be a collective aspect, as in simple oscillatory chemical reactions, consensus
bio-chemical setups of cells [33], and “self-organising” phenomena; or a structural, individual-centred
aspect present in macro-molecules, cell compartments, and cellular functional modules [14,34,35].
Organisation is generally associated with material instances of biological entities: modules,
organelles, vacuoles, tissues etc [32]. Nevertheless, biological processes manifest organisation as
well, e.g., the cytoskeleton [36], network activation-deactivation assemblies [37], chromatin, chaperones
complexes [38], dynamic self-assembly processes [14], etc. Organisations expand beyond organelles and
cell inner structures into tissues and organs of multicellular organisms and further on into populations,
societies and cultures. Despite this ubiquitousness, instantiation of analogous organisations at different
scales present seemingly uncorrelated forms [2,39]. Organisation is also frequently associated with
complexity in biological entities [1,27,40–42]. Despite its importance and the bridge it launches with
the study of more general complex systems [43], this subject shall not be pursued here beyond the
contents of Section 4.2. Organising, the process of arranging and evolving organisations, shall not be
addressed either.
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Organisation configurations in living systems are credited to affect interactions, outcomes, and
properties such as stability, reactiveness, capture, infection, (organelle) multiplication, stasis and
mitosis [11,14,44], as well as their own existence [29], even by those that approach the living from a
molecular scale, without reference to scale integration. Cell components, like the cytoskeleton and
its variants, encompass dynamical organisations that are continuously reassembled. That is, their
elements and their stable relative positions and dependencies result from a well orchestrated collection
of movements and rearrangements that continuously relocate components and substitute missing
parts or create new organelles and structures, like vacuoles, lysosomes, filopodia, micro-tubules, or
centroids [14,36,45,46].
Organisation, in its variegated though ill-defined to-be concepts, has been considered a
distinctive characteristic of life entities and phenomena at least since the beginnings of last
century [2,11,12,21,29,44,47]. Notwithstanding the impreciseness of the concept [48,49] organisation
is central while considering quaternary structure of proteins, protein conformations and their
effects on protein interactions [50], protein aggregates, motifs, and cellular functional units. It is
helpful when considering spatial effects in biochemical networks and in many biological enquiries
and explanations ([51], last sections), along with efforts to build a theoretical framework for
biology [8,52–57] and chemistry [58].
An enormous amount of work has been produced in the last 100 years to refine the idea and
identification of biological organisation, to understand its onset and to justify its possibility on
physico-chemical grounds [2,21,22,37,39,40,44,59]. Explanatory efforts search to dissect organisation
from several standpoints like being a consequence of self-organising dynamics [59,60], resulting from
regulatory processes [52] or bursting out from information [40,61–63]. Only a handful of these efforts
address organisation directly, trying to tame the concept by considering questions akin to “what
is organisation?”, by searching models for organisation, or by constructing models and arguments
based directly on its properties [8,27–30,52,62–72]. Albeit, none of them provides a clear concept or
definition of organisation [16,48,73]. In the present text, I take for granted that organisation is a fact of
Nature, present a working definition and a mathematical model for organisation, and discuss some
consequences of this approach. This is a variant of Niels Bohr suggestion of taking life, like quanta, as
a given fact of Nature [74], unexplainable in terms of other natural facts.
Another idea tightly intertwined with life phenomena since its earliest developments is
information. Information, in Shannon-Brillouin sense [51], has dominated biological discourse, being
considered a central characteristic of living systems and associated phenomena [52]. Nevertheless, it is
not as conspicuous, directly observable, and recognizable as organisation. Despite this, information
has been considered the key observable attribute of the living albeit always recognised only during the
analysis of a phenomenon and its interpretation.
Ontologically, information in biological phenomena has been associated with transmission
of hereditary characters [75,76], regulatory (feedback) assemblages [52], immunology [77], and
ecology [13,78]. Theoretically, it has been associated with biological structure and function as well as
their adaptation to various stimuli [8,52,65], among other phenomena.
When associated to structure and function, it reflects the ability of organisms to perform tasks
in response to environmental stimuli, which is allegedly characterised by the information contend
of its organisations [61]. Recently, information is being credited as the main vehicle of biological
interactions [79,80] and can be observed operating at the cellular scale [81].
Information is employed while searching for explanations concerning the appearance and
resilience of biological organisation [40], for defining it formally [65], for defining life [61,82,83],
and the consequent efforts to build biological theories (see [41] for a more detailed and critical survey).
Moreover, information intervenes directly or indirectly in all essays to explain the living through
computational metaphors [41,61,84–86].
In its commonly used sense, the employ of information in biological explanations is highly
debatable [87,88] and information is erroneously taken as the key biological observable [51]. This is
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due to the persistence of using the term information with different, non-commutable meanings [30]
and the misleading association between organisation, information, complexity, and computation that
this overloading in meaning induces [51]. The definition of in-formation presented in Section 3.2 is
non-numeric, grounded on the organisation concept introduced in Section 3.1, and inspired by the
inner workings of the cell.
3. Theoretical Framework: The Organisation Perspective
Abiding to the view about natural phenomena delineated earlier, where phenomena stem from a
collection of interacting things that alter what is observed, this section introduces things (organisations)
and discusses what is exchanged in their interactions (in-formation). The framework to be presented in
this section supports the representation of phenomena as a collection of interacting organisations that
interact exchanging in-formation and changing their own organisation.
Aligning with the spirit of this special issue, this section shortens technical details in favour of
examples and clarifications. The presentation of this framework will employ less formal and more
illustrative arguments, in the hope of throwing light on basal concepts, letting the reader more at easy
with a new form of seeing natural phenomena. Profiting from discrete and relational mathematical
constructs, formal elements will be often introduced with the aid of figures, less formally but no less
rigourously. Figures are symbols that may be more easily accessed by a multi-disciplinary audience.
3.1. Biological Organisation: A Minimalist Snapshot
As argued in Section 2, organisation is an important and widely used concept that has nevertheless
no consensual definition. Organisation is recognised through patterns that appear among Weaver’s
sizable number of factors and are believed to form what he called organic wholes. Representations of this
sort of phenomena are often called composite systems even when they behave linearly ([89] chapter 9)
and do not present the aggregate behaviour and patterns that may be taken as “organic wholes”.
At the beginnings of (general) system theory, organisation was mostly attached to the systems
structure [10,23,30], conspicuous in its reaction term, slowly drifting to their dynamical behaviour with
the maturation of concepts like attractors, basins of attraction, slow and center manifolds, homeostasis,
homeomorphic indexes, perturbations, fluctuations etc [49,59,70,90]. That is, organisation came to be
associated with self-organisation and emergent patterns in the dynamical behaviour of many-particle or
many-component composite systems and, by extension, with complexity ([19] preface, [49] chapters 6
and 7). Collaterally and supported by the maturation of these concepts, a wealth of methods to analyse
and illuminate these systems form various perspectives have been developed [19].
This approach, however, cannot easily handle hierarchical systems of variable structure so common
in biology, ecology and other domains [4–7,66,91], that adapt to stimuli by changing the number of
their state-variables, the quality and nature of their interactions, and where properties within a level
cannot be observed or explained from information rooted in its lower-levels. These characteristics are
the essence of Weaver’s ‘problems of organised complexity’, underlying and justifying the approach
presented in the sequel.
The organisation concept advanced below (Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2) is not a consequence of
dynamics nor is it associated with the idea of function (biological or ecological) in any manner.
It supports reasoning about organisations on their own, independently of any correlated phenomenon,
accommodating organisation transformation and comparison (Sections 3.1.4 and 4.2). Nevertheless,
organisations are tightly associated with dynamics, having the usual (dynamic) systems as special cases
(see Section 3.1.3 below).
3.1.1. Organisations
Consider a large enough heap of bricks indistinguishable with respect to all relevant attributes,
characteristics and factors. The bricks are thus identical although not the same. This heap constitutes
a set of bricks. Choose 20 of these bricks at random. These 20 chosen bricks are still a set of bricks.
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They form a subset of the heap, if you don’t take them apart from the heap. If you do, there will be
two heaps (sets) and their connection may have become imperceptible.
Ensuite, pick all bricks in this heap and build a house. The house has 6 pieces: a living room,
a dining room, two bedrooms, a bathroom and a kitchen. In the middle, there is a hall giving access to
the bedrooms and the bathroom. The kitchen is accessed from the dining room that is accessed from
the living room. Walls, made with the bricks, divide and delimit each piece. Some walls have doors,
some other have windows, a few may have both. After the house is built, there are no more bricks but
walls and rooms. Is a house a set of bricks? Is a brick in a wall identical to a brick in another wall or to
another brick somewhere else in the same wall?
Consider any of the walls of the house. Mark 20 bricks in it at random. Are these bricks as
indistinguishable as before? They may be side by side and taking them out will make a hole in the wall;
luckily the hole may become a window or a door, depending on its height, shape, and localisation.
They may also be scattered throughout the wall; what may be a refreshing strategy. Or they may
concentrate in a junction of two walls, weakening its structure and ruining the house. The bricks are
in consequence not indistinguishable anymore. They are interchangeable (any two bricks may be
swapped) but not indistinguishable; the effect of taking any (or a collection) of them out of the walls is
not anymore the same. They became parts of a wall, which in turn became a part of the pieces of the
house, and these latter parts of the house.
Organisation is what distinguishes a house from a set of bricks. It may be informally defined
in the following way. An atom here refers to an epistemological or cognitive atom—something we
cannot, or do not want to, inspect or subdivide.
Definition 1. An Organisation is one of the following:
• an atom;
• a set of organisations;
• a group of organisations put somehow in relation to one another;
• nothing else.
This definition purposefully lacks a better clarification of the expression somehow in relation with one
another, since this may be instantiated in several ways. Notwithstanding, it includes as organisations
sets of atoms, organisations, or both. In the case of the above example, for instance, bricks are atoms.
Even if one is taken apart in the building process, we do not want to describe or analyse of what
and how they are made of, independently of the relevance of their attributes. Nevertheless, we may
consider them associated in many ways. A brick may be associated to another if they are in contact,
sharing a face or a portion of a face, if they belong to the same wall, or yet to a specified region of
a wall.
This idea of organisation may be applied even to the heap itself. A brick may be associated to
another brick if they are close enough together and groups of bricks may be considered separately.
The ones at the top of the heap or at its base, for instance. In this case, however, shaking the heap a
little could provoke a complete upheaval in this organisation. In terms of organisation, the heap is not
as stable as a house, although the heap is pretty stable as a set.
Note that this concept of organisation can distinguish facts which are difficult to be traced by
current descriptions.
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Figure 1. Two distinct houses obtained from exactly the same bricks. Due to a minimal position change,
the yellow door connects the living and dining rooms in (a) and the hall and the dining room in (b).
The two houses depicted in Figure 1 differ only by the placement of a door in two distinct walls
which are in contact. The number of bricks that occupy the volumes of the doors is the same, assuming
that they have the same form and size. Moreover, their relative positions with respect to the walls of
the house are very close to each other. Differences like these are difficult to be distinguished by either
dynamical or statistical approaches. The energy and (statistical) information required to build either of
the houses is the same. Moreover, the same set of bricks may have gone to one or another wall to erase
the would-be door. The trajectories undergone by each brick from the heap to the walls can be traced
by dynamical systems. Small perturbations in their dynamics led them from the same initial condition,
the bricks heap, to different final conditions, the two houses.
Although similar, the organisation of both houses, given by the connectivity between rooms, is
different; making one better suited for certain purposes than the other. For instance, the house in
Figure 1a could be more easily used as a restaurant than the other one due to the accessibility of the
kitchen from the dining room and of the dining room from the entrance via the living room, what
clearly appears in the diagrams of Figure 2. Furthermore, the living-room may also be used to attend








Figure 2. The ground access organisation of the two houses in Figure 1, respectively graphs (a,b).
The new position of the door substantially changed their basic organisation.
3.1.2. A Mathematical Model for Organisations
Molecules, the ground stuff of living entities and processes [39], possess the characteristics of
Weaver’s ‘organised complexity’ class. Simple molecules may be understood through a small number
of parameters and variables but not proteins nor any of the large biochemical molecules intervening in
life phenomena. Protein molecules act as wholes when catalysing reactions, regulating biochemical
processes, or chaperoning protein-folding although their parts are exchanged in protein construction
and degradation processes. Spatial and chemical interrelations are crucial non-quantitative aspects
of molecules. Protein dynamics (Vinson, 2009; Blanchoin et al., 2014) describe conformal changes
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in molecules that affect how a molecule interacts with other molecules or respond to stimuli from
its environment.
Molecules are one of the simplest instances of organisation in Nature and fully conform to
Definition 1, where chemical atoms are organisational atoms while chemical bonds instantiate the
property ‘in relation to one another’, as hinted in Figure 3. Mathematically, molecules are depicted
as graphs since long [92,93]; where nodes stand for chemical atoms and arcs for chemical bonds.
Notwithstanding, we often describe molecules not by their atoms but in terms of other molecules,
atom-groups or ions, to highlight chemical and structural properties, the way they interact chemically,
or how they fit in a context. We refer to the hydroxyl group in alcohols, the carboxyl group in amino
and other carboxylic acids, amino-acids in proteins and so on, treating them as units. This mode
of describing molecules (Figure 3) is the essence of whole-part graphs (wp-graphs), the model for
organisations described below.
To make these terms more precise, we need to restrain what may be considered as organisational
atoms in modelling phenomena. Atoms in wp-graphs are required to be elements of a finite admissible
set [94], U, established in advance. Admissible sets allow for treating certain sets as atomic organisations
more conveniently [95]. Sets in U are not meant to be ‘inspected’ and differ from sets constructed by
clause 2 of Definition 1. For instance, a brick as a set of clay particles is an element of U and as single
element (atomic) organisation it is a member of the set ‘heap of bricks’, a trivial organisation under the
definition that is being introduced here.
The U set need not to be the same in different representations, unless the organisations being
represented interact or are related. U may also be typed; that is, its elements may be of different types,
as when considering chemical substances like carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, etc. There is no
restriction on the number of elements in U, or of one of its types. For instance, U may contain all
(chemical) atoms in the Universe, letters of an alphabet, parts of a car, modules [96] and organelles
of a cell etc. One may consider also an U consisting of both letters and chemical atoms if this helps
understanding the phenomena in hand.
As hinted in Figures 3 and 4b, associations will be represented by hyper-graphs [97,98]. Arcs of
graphs can connect at most two nodes. Edges of hyper-graphs may connect any number of nodes.
The choice for hyper-graphs is justified for two reasons at least. First, it provides a simple and uniform
description of delocalised bonds, or electron bonds embracing more than two atoms. For instance,
the benzene ring is representable as a hyper-graph with 12 nodes {C1, · · · , C6, H1, · · · , H6}, 6 carbons
and 6 hydrogens and 13 edges: six binding hydrogens to carbons {Hi, Ci}, six binding subsequent
carbons {Ci−1, Ci}, i = 1, . . . , 6, where {C0 = C6}, in the ring and one connecting all six carbon atoms






























Figure 3. Molecular hyper-graphs: (a) the benzene ring (nodes, arcs, hyper-edge); (b) acetone
(hyper-nodes, arcs); (c) a (bio)chemical reaction (hyper-nodes, 1 hyper-edge).
Second, chemical reactions are typical hyper-edge candidates, since they in general transform several
substrates into several products. A minimal reaction takes 2 substrates into one product or vice-versa
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(Figure 3c) due to mass conservation, unless conformal changes occur during chemical reactions.
The enchainment of biochemical reactions results in networks that are indeed hyper-graphs [99].
Mathematically, a hyper-graph h is a pair of sets {N, A} where N is the set of nodes and A the
edge-set. The edge-set A = {ai, i ∈ I, I = ∅} is a collection of subsets of N, that is, A ⊂ ℘(N) where
℘(S) denotes the power set of the set S, satisfying:
ai = aj, (i = j) ,
ai = ∅, (∀i ∈ I) ,⋃
i∈I ai = N .
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭ (1)
Hypergraphs generalize graphs, in the sense that graphs are hypergraphs which edges have
just 2 incident nodes, that is: (∀i ∈ I)[#(ai) = 2] [97]. To establish the framework this and all other
definitions will be as generic and encompassing as possible. Restrictions, if any, shall be imposed in
their instantiations at each phenomenon being modelled.
Hyper-graphs can be depicted with Venn diagrams, with hyper-edges, or as bi-partite graphs h̄,
as indicated in Figure 4. Bi-partite graphs have two groups of nodes and arcs connect nodes from one
group to nodes of the other. When expressing hyper-graphs, one group of nodes is the hyper-graph
node-set and the other the names of the hyper-edges.
H1 C1 H2 C2 H3 C3 H4 C4 H5 C5 H6 C6





nodes bonds (edges)8 9 10 11 1213
Figure 4. (a) The same hyper-graph drawn: as a Venn diagram (a1); with type I Hyper-edges (a2); with
type II Hyper-edges (a3); as a bipartite graph (a4); (b) the benzene ring (Figure 3a) shown as a bipartite
graph. Its strict sense hyper-edge is shown in blue.
To handle wholes and parts and the recursion of Definition 1, we will need some meta-elements
besides U and (hyper)graphs: an enumerable set of meta-variables V = {v0, v1, v2, . . .} and a collection
of special undistinguished elements . Meta-variables represent voids: places where organisations may
grow, associate with other organisations, or detail their representation. For instance, docking sites in
proteins, ion-binding sites, or polymerisation sites at the tip of filopodia [36] should be voids. Elements
 are unreachable constructive elements. They are hidden-names or ‘hooks’ of organisations that
may become part of organisations with voids. Naming an organisation transforms it into a whole.
Wholes being unreachable allows for swapping indistinguishable sub-organisations while preserving
the overall organisation. Like when replacing bricks in a wall or when repairing DNA, proteins
and organelles.
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Figure 5. Extending hyper-graphs: the hyper-graph shown in (a) both with hyper-edges and as a
bipartite graph is extended (b) by adding a ‘hook’ and some meta-variables (voids).
Hence, nodes will now be taken from the extended universal set U = U ∪ V ∪ {}. They may
be organisational atoms, meta-variables (voids) or the  element (hook). Hyper-graphs with nodes
from U will be called extended hyper-graphs. Any hyper-graph may become extended by adding at
least a meta-variable or a hook to it, as in Figure 5. The collection of all hyper-graphs will be denoted
byH, while the collection of extended hyper-graphs by H. That is,
H = {h = {N, A} | N ⊂ U ∧ #(N) < ∞ ∧ A ⊂ ℘(N)} , (2)
H = {h = {N, A} | N ⊂ U ∧ #(N) < ∞ ∧ A ⊂ ℘(N)} . (3)
Clearly,H ⊂H.
Whole-part graphs are constructed by binding extended hyper-graphs with hooks or hidden-names
to voids. This is achieved by “assigning” the generic  element of a hyper-graph hp to a meta-variable
(void) in another hyper-graph hw. This construction starts from the following operator prototype
(see Figure 6):
←↩ : H ×H◦ 	−→ {h′ = hw←↩hp},
hw ni v “=”  in hp
}
(4)
where H denotes the class of all extended hyper-graphs that have meta-variables v as nodes, H◦
denotes the class of all extended hyper-graphs that have the special meta-element  as a node, and ni
is the mirror writing of u in h, a predicate identifying an element u ∈ U as a node of h.
An extended hyper-graph has just one  element as node (one hidden-name) but may have
many meta-variables vi as nodes. Moreover, if several hyper-graphs are to be bound to hw, there is in
principle no special reason to privilege any binding order. Thus, the binding operator should be taken
as a collateral binding of hyper-graphs hpi to h
w:
mhw←↩ < hp1 , . . . , h
p
n > . (5)
where m is the number of meta-variables in hw, n ≤ m is the number of extended hyper-graphs to be
bound to hw. Without loss of generality, it is supposed that hpi binds to vi.
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Using the representation of hyper-graphs as bipartite graphs [98,100], binding hyper-graphs may
be depicted pictorially, as in Figure 6.
Figure 6. Binding extended hyper-graphs: extended hyper-graphs become “nodes” of extended
hyper-graphs.
The binding operator has two possible interpretations suggested by common usage: as an




Figure 7. Binding Operator: as a hierarchy constructor and as an encapsulator.
To complete the construction of wp-graphs observe that, while there are still unbound meta-variables
as nodes of any hyper-graph in the assemblage resulting from binding extended hyper-graphs to one
another, it is possible to continue binding other hyper-graphs to them. These assemblages are the
wp-graphs and are formalised by the following recursive definition:
Definition 2. An object γ is a wp-graph, that is, γ ∈ Γ if and only if:
1. γ ∈H,
2. γ .= mh←↩ < γ◦1 , . . . , γ◦n >,
3. nothing else.
where γ◦ means that its “upmost” hyper-graph mh of γ has a ‘hook’ as node; that is, root(γ◦) ∈H◦. And the
symbol .= reads is build as or is given by and has a double interpretation: as a programming assignment
during construction of wp-graphs and as a mathematical equality in Γ [95].
The fact thatH ⊂H ⊂ Γ and a fixed point theorem for structures [101] warrant that Γ is non-void
and well defined [95]. Note that Definition 2 makes no reference to sets nor atoms. The following
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lemma shows that Definition 2 indeed consider both, taking into account that atoms in Γ should be
elements of U. For the arguments it will be convenient to denote as ℘k(S) the collection of all subsets
of S with exactly k elements, that is, ℘k(S) = {s ⊂ S | #(s) = k}.
Lemma 1. Γ has the following properties:
1. U ⊂ Γ
2. ℘k(Γ◦) ⊂ Γ, (∀k ∈ N) [k < ∞]
where Γ◦ = {γ ∈ Γ◦ | [root(γ) ∈H◦]}.
Proof. (Ideas used in proofing case (1) intersperse the reasoning in (2).)
1. Note that since U ⊂ U then ℘(U) ⊂ ℘(U). Moreover, U can be identified with ℘1(U) and
U with ℘1(U) through the following injection
U −→ ℘1(U)
u 	−→ {u} (6)
and the immersion
℘1(U) −→ H
{u} 	−→ {{u}, {{u}}} (7)
shows that U ⊂ H ⊂H ⊂ Γ.
2. If gset ∈ ℘k(Γ◦), then gset = {γ◦1 , . . . , γ◦k}. Let vset = {v1, . . . , vk} ⊂ V be a set of k meta-variables




= kh←↩ < γ◦1 , . . . , γ◦k > (8)
is an element of Γ.
Moreover, γset and gset are identified by arguments analogous to those of step 1.
The possibility of binding indefinitely new wp-graphs to meta-variables and the extensibility of
any h ∈H means that wp-graphs may grow forever and that adding details is unbounded in principle.





Figure 8. Typical wp-graph: localisation of associations and the part of relations in elements of Γ.
3.1.3. Synexions
The elements of U can be a variety of things: letters, chemical atoms, molecules, forms, objects,
concepts, ideas etc. Whole-part graphs from Definition 2 may represent organisations whose atoms
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may be concrete, abstract or imaginary: words and paragraphs, molecules and macro-molecules,
cultural entities, sketches, cognitive maps, pictures, mythological beings, ideas, etc. Otherwise,
synexions are meant to represent organisations having existence reflected in terms of physical aspects.
Straightforwardly, if a whole-part graph represents a molecule, a corresponding synexion would
represent it with all volumes, angles, energy and vibrations possessed or defined by its parts and
atoms. This intuition will guide the initial presentation of the concept. Nevertheless, it will be seen at
the end of this section that usual dynamical systems are instances of synexions.
It is worth noting that the same object may be represented by way of different organisations,
different elements of Γ (see Section 4.2), depending on what should be distinguished and on the
questions addressed. For instance, the common organisation of a text is grounded on sequences of letters,
words, phrases, sentences, paragraphs, sections etc. This organisation is fine for reading a text. However,
if we are interested in mining key ideas in the text and associations among them, a better organisation
could be as a cognitive map or a hypertext. The cell is another example. Its organisation may be based
on its compartments and topological space-time relations among them or as a superposition of several
bio-chemical networks grounded exclusively on chemical affinity. Molecules provide outstanding
examples about organising an object in different ways, by grouping its atoms differently (Figure 3b).
The same subject of study may be seen as different organisations concurrently. Emotions may be
concomitantly abstract and concrete—abstract while described in words or concrete if we consider the
bio-chemical alterations and oscillations entailed with them. The organisations that may be associated
with these two aspects of emotions are profoundly different.
Molecules, and all concrete organisations, occupy volumes in space and recognition of their
organisation is moulded by our perception of spatial arrangements, dynamical stabilities-instabilities,
and functional dependencies. Concrete organisations also vibrate and oscillate around a stable state,
which means that they have extension in time as well as in space, being cylinders in space-time.
Moreover, fluctuations in physico-chemical attributes may prevent, hamper, or facilitate the existence
of certain organisations in favour of others (see Section 4.1.2). Therefore, we need means to represent
organisations “embodied” in physical spaces. This will be achieved by associating volumes with





Figure 9. Synexions or Organised Sets (the relation partOf is defined in Section 3.1.4).
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The results of these associations are the synexions (This term synthesises the key features of
organised volumes. It is formed from the Greek verb συνεξω, which means to hold or maintain as
a whole, and the particle ιoν, that means occurrence, instance. An alternative terminology could be
syntheions, from συνθετoζ, that means composed by the union of parts, and ιoν, see [41,102].) or
organised volumes. Synexions are associations between a γ ∈ Γ and volumes or subsets of a “physical”
space where set inclusion preserve whole-part relations. That is, if γ1 is a sub-organisation of γ2 then
the volume associated with γ1 is contained in the volume associated with γ2.
Mathematically, let P be a collection of physical attributes including space and time that is
endowed with the classical space-time structure [103]. That is, a space where molecules or any physical
structure will not suffer conformal deformations when rotated or displaced. Synexions, denoted by
V(γ), are recursive associations between volumes V ⊂ P and sub-organisations γ◦ of γ .= mh←↩ <
γ◦1 , . . . , γ
◦
n > such that
V(γ) ⊂ P if γ ∈H,
V(γ) = ⋃ki=1 V(γi) if γ = {γ1, . . . , γk},
V(γ) ⊃ ⋃ni=1 V(γi) if γ ∼= mh ←↩ s,






where n ≤ m.
Note that V(γ) is a one-to-many relation. To each γ ∈ Γ, there are many families of subsets of
P that may be associated with it satisfying the constraint enforced by Equation (9). Any family of
sets associated with γ may be uniformly expanded (fattened) or contracted (shrank) and still satisfy
constraint (9), for instance, by changing temperature (vibration of parts), or by coherently displacing
and deforming them in space-time, while preserving γ. The synexion space, B, is the class of all
associations between γ ∈ Γ and subsets of P , for any γ ∈ Γ. That is,
B : Γ ←→ ℘(P)
γ ←→ V (10)
Synexions are not sets in the usual sense. Subsets of V(γ) must also conform to conditions
established by (9) and be formed from subsets of V(β), where β is a part of γ. Thus, we may have
V(γ)1 ∩ V(γ)2 = ∅ as organised volumes, even though V1 ∩ V2 = ∅ as usual subsets of P .
This property of synexions allows them to represent movements and deformations of organised
things more effectively because it is possible to impose a kinematic behaviour to points in V(γ) that
is constrained by Equation (9) to conform to the whole-part relation inherent to γ. This kinematic
behaviour selectively changes and moves the volumes associated with parts of γ while preserving its
organisational identity. That is, if β1, β2 are two parts of γ, (∀t)[Vt(γ) ⊃ Vt(βi)], i = 1, 2. Moreover,
if β1 partOf β2 then (∀t)[Vt(β1) ⊂ Vt(β2)] and, conversely, if β2 partOf β1 then (∀t)[Vt(β2) ⊂ Vt(β1)].
Otherwise, (∀t)[Vt(β2) ∩ Vt(β1) = ∅]. Cell-motion [45,104] is a good example of this feature, since
organelles and cell-parts deform and move with the cell and within the cell without intercepting
themselves, nor destroying the inner organisation of the cell. Synexions support the disentanglement
of physical from organisational changes, which has far reaching consequences. They provide a bridge
between organisation and (usual) physico-chemical dynamics. They enforce dynamical coherence:
characteristic times and distances of parts are smaller than those of wholes. A cell cannot undergo
mitosis before all its parts are duplicated, including the nucleus and the outer membrane [14].
Remark 1 (Elements of B). This rather informal and rigourless note presents some of the simplest elements of
B. The association between dynamical systems and interaction graphs is discussed in detail and with the due
rigour in [26]. As discussed in this work, any dynamical system
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dx
dt (t) = F(x(t)),
F : Rn −→ Rn,
}
(11)
can be associated with a graph gF ∈ Gn, the set of all graphs with n nodes. Since Gn ⊂ H ⊂H ⊂ Γ for any
atom-set U containing the names of variables in the dynamical system given by (11), gF ∈ Γ. Furthermore, the
collection of orbits of a dynamical system of the class (11) is a subset OF of P whenever the dynamical system
represents a natural phenomenon. The specific nature of OF is intimately dependent on F but is often a variety
or a set of chronicles [8], and is tightly related to properties of gF [26].
From another stand, the mapping that associates a dynamical system F with its interaction graph gF is not




OF∗ , ∀F∗ such that gF∗ = gF (12)
is an element of B, since gF ∈H and O(gF) ⊂ P , satisfying the first case of Equation (9). Clearly, OF(gF)
also belongs to B, for any dynamical system given by (11). That is, interaction graphs are (simple) organisations
and the orbits of dynamical systems associated with it are P -volumes in the sense considered above.
If F depends on a parameter τ, O(gFτ ) is an “orbit” in B and exemplifies transformations of synexions.
However, parameter dependency in dynamical systems do not in general affect its dimension n. When it
does, it does in general by reducing the value of n while trapping orbits into sub-varieties of OFτ . Generic
transformations T :B −→ B are not subject to this constrain and systems of variable structure [4–7,66,91] can
be straightforwardly represented with the concourse of transformations in B.
3.1.4. Further Basic Constructions
Spaces Γ and B have interesting properties. Synexions are material organisations but not the
only “concrete” organisations. Special organisations like sets, lists, trees, S-expressions and other
data-structures can be identified as sub-classes of Γ [105]. Transformations, operations and relations
can be defined in Γ and B. Albeit a proper discussion about mathematical operations, predicates and
properties of Γ and B being outside the scope of this writing, developing a few of them here will
better illustrate the wp-graph and synexion constructs. Those below are restricted to Γ and support
arguments in some of the following sections. Analogous transformations can be defined in B. Two of
them are illustrated in Figure 10.
T(·) : Γ−→ Γ
recursive skeleton
root(·)
Figure 10. Transformations in Γ: the root(·) and the recursive skeleton Skt(·) of γ.
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Definition 2 implicitly defines a mapping in Γ, root(·) (see Figure 10). The operator root : Γ −→H
is properly defined as:
root(γ) = γ, if γ ∈H.
root(γ) = mh, if γ
.
= mh←↩ < γ◦1 , . . . , γ◦n >, n ≤ m.
}
(13)
To define equality, observe first that if h1, h2 ∈ H, or h1, h2 ∈ H, h1 = h2 in the set-theoretical
sense, that is, N(h1) = N(h2) and A(h1) = A(h2) as sets.
Definition 3 ((Equality)). Two wp-graphs γ1, γ2 ∈ Γ are equal (γ1 = γ2) iff:
1. γ1, γ2 ∈H and γ1 = γ2, as elements of H;
2. γ1, γ2 ∈ Γ\H and
• root(γ1) = root(γ2),
• (∀1 ≤ i ≤ n)[γ◦1i = γ◦2i],
where, as in Logic, [s] means that s is true.





2←↩ < γ◦21 . . . γ◦2n2 >. Furthermore, root(γ1) = root(γ2) implies that n1 = n2, m1 = m2, and
mh1 = mh

2 as elements of H.
An important thing to remark about Definition 2 is that it induces a whole-part relationship in Γ,
which is highlighted by the predicate partOf : Γ× Γ −→ {T, F}, where the token partOf should be taken
as a single stropped (mathematical) symbol denoting this predicate. This naming method, common in
the theory of programming languages, shall be used for creating symbols suggestive of their semantics
for uncommon mathematical entities defined in Γ and B. The relation partOf is recursively defined as:
Definition 4. The values of γ partOf β = partOf(γ, β) for (γ, β) ∈ Γ× Γ are given by:
1. If γ, β ∈H, then partOf(γ, β) = [γ = β], as elements of H.
2. If γ, β ∈ Γ\H then partOf(γ, β) = T if either condition holds:
• (∃1 ≤ i ≤ n2) [γ = β◦i ] or
• (∃1 ≤ i ≤ n2)[partOf(γ, β◦i ) = T].
3. Else, partOf(γ, β) = F.
Hierarchy is one of the most conspicuous characteristics of organisation. It was intentionally
left out while developing Definition 1 and its mathematical model (Definition 2). Nevertheless,
as suggested in Figures 8–10, hierarchy is an intrinsic characteristic of any wp-graph induced by its
recursive construction and attached to the whole-part relationship inherent in Γ-elements. The operator
Skt : Γ −→ rT, where rT is the class of recursive trees in Γ [105], points it out. To define it, let M(γ) ⊂
U\U = V ∪ {} be the set of all meta-variables (meta-nodes) used to construct γ (Definition 2). It is
important to note that meta-variables in root(γ) and in any γ′, such that [γ′ partOf γ], are different even
thought the notation may be duplicated to make the reading more intuitive.
Definition 5. The recursive skeleton function of a wp-graph (Skt) is given by:
1. If γ = h ∈H, Skt(γ) = {N, A}, where N = N(h) ∩M and A = {N};
2. if γ ∈ Γ\H, then
Skt(γ) = Skt(mh)←↩ < Skt(γ◦1), . . . ,Skt(γ◦n) >,
3. nothing else.
84
Systems 2017, 5, 23
That is, Skt(γ) is a replica of γ where all nodes from U and related associations have been erased.
The last Γ-transformation to be introduced here is the connection network. It is in a certain
sense a counterpart for Skt, since it erases the meta-elements M(γ) from γ leaving only nodes
from U and the associations relative to them. This is achieved by substituting the binding
vi“=” in h◦i , vi ∈ N(mh), defined in Equation (4), by a normal node hci ∈ U mimicking this
hierarchical connection. For the sake of simplicity, the definition presented here will be restricted
to organisations which hierarchies have at most two levels, that is organisations such that Skt(γ)
is a tree of just one or two levels, by omitting the final recursion step. If n < m in Definition 2,
there are in root(γ) meta-variables vj, n < j ≤ m that are not bound to any γ◦j . Likewise for
any root(γ′), such that [γ′ partOf γ]. Let M(γ),M f r(γ) and Mbd(γ) denote respectively the set of
all meta-variables, unbounded meta-variables and bounded meta-variables in γ. For γ ∈ H,
M(γ) = N(γ)\U and, in general, M(γ) = M f r(γ) ∪Mbd(γ). Furthermore, let Aj(h) denote the
set {a ∈ A(h) | vj ∈ a, where vj ∈ M} and A(h) the set of all {a ∈ A(h) | [ ∈ a]}.
Definition 6. The values of the connective network function, Cnt : Γ −→ H, under the restrictions above,
are given by:
1. If γ ∈H, then Cnt(γ) = h = {N, A}, where
N = N(γ)\M f r(γ) and A = {a\M f r(γ) | a ∈ A(γ)}.
2. If γ .= mh←↩ <h◦1, . . . , h◦n >, h◦i ∈H, n ≤ m, then Cnt(γ) = {N, A}, where
N = ((∪nj=1N(h◦j ) ∪N(mh))\M(γ)) ∪ {hc1, . . . , hcn}, (14)
A = Aup ∪ (∪ni=1Aloi ), (15)
and the latter are modifications of A(mh) and A(h◦i ) given, respectively, by:
Aup = {a′ | a′ = (a\M(γ)) ∪ (∪j∈{k|[vk∈a]}{hcj})}, and (16)
Aloi = {a′ | a′ = {hci} ∪ (a\M(h◦i )), ∀a ∈ A(h◦i )}. (17)
Cnt is non-injective. A rough idea of the set Cnt−1 can be obtained for organisations with a
two-level hierarchy through the following reasoning. A given hyper-graph represent the channels of
possible interactions in a phenomenon. Any hyper-graph (network) can be organised in several ways by
partitioning the network into sub-networks and encapsulating these as aggregate units of interaction.
Network-partitions interact with other nodes as composite nodes by means of collective aspects
(like temperature or pressure) and channels of interaction encompassing all possible interactions of
encapsulated nodes with nodes “external” to it, i.e., nodes in other partitions. Network partitions are
obtained by partitioning their node-sets and rearranging its arcs accordingly. This stand will be used
in Section 4.2 to estimate the size of Cnt−1.
Lastly, the following observation will be supportive of several examples and arguments. A process
is a collection of ‘states’ (enchainments or entailments of natural events) that cohere the enchainments
with ordered temporal moments when instantiated into a physical space [106]. When life phenomena
is described in B, life processes are a collection of enchainments in B with a condition about their
immersion in the time axis, e.g., biochemical pathways. Hence, life processes naturally include actual
organisations as part of their states. That is, spaces Γ and B allow for considering and handling
organisations of processes which states can contain organisations as components [3]. This is of great
relevance for biological phenomena since chemical processes, as entailments of chemical reactions and
substrates, are processes in this sense. Organisations of (bio-)chemical processes arise by considering
two chemical processes to be associated whenever they exchange substrates or influence each other.
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Processes can be considered as wholes whenever they present homeostasis, or any other form of
permanence or recurrence, and have a distinctive functional character.
3.2. In-formation
Organisations convey information. This is clear when organisations are texts or pictures and
their information-content is conveyed to humans. But even microorganisms have memory, process
information, anticipate, coordinate tasks and make decisions [33,107–109]. Thus, information-driven
interactions are a distinctive feature of biological systems at all scales, as discussed in [79,80], from
distinct standpoints. They provoke changes in internal organisations and behaviour of a thing, that is,
they provoke in(side)formations.
Existing information concepts focus on transmission of information, having a statistical nature
and requiring a large enough set of messages, known in advance. Therefore, their application to
scales or contexts where the number of intervening “things” and factors is at most moderate and far
from homogeneous or isotropic is delicate, ad hoc, and can only provide hints about the phenomenon
propensities. The widespread employ of the term information has introduced overload and bias in its
meaning since long (see [30], footnote 1 on p. 194) and its utilisation is often inadequate [51].
From a basal point of view, information need not be quantifiable [80,110,111], despite the usefulness
of measures in comparing things and in describing natural phenomena. A novel, non-quantitative,
concept of in-formation is introduced in the sequel. It can be employed at all (biological) scales [2] in
an integrated manner and is related to how organisations change. Being grounded on synexions, it
is ontologically bounded to biological interpreters and observers. In this sense, in-formation is closer
to molecular processes and changes at the molecular scale that instantiate signal processing, memory,
reactiveness and anticipation in cells and tissues; and covers most relevant aspects of information in
biological phenomena. It also accommodates information exchange at the sub- and supra-cellular
levels, being useable in other domains as well. Exchanged in-formation in (biological) interactions is
retrospectively observed and identified thanks to changes in organisations and behaviour.
Information in the sense to be presented is not a measure, measurable, or quantifiable. It targets
the etymological roots of the word information: in-formare, or “to form inside.” From an organisational
stand, it addresses information at Level B (meaning) and C (effectiveness) of Shannon’s Communication
Theory more directly than at the commonly addressed Level A (transmission) ([112] chapter 1).
Moreover, transmission of in-formation does not require identifiable senders nor a fixed number of
messages. Nor is it constrained by the pre-definition of a set of signals and messages. Notwithstanding,
usual measures of information-transmission can be recast from the in-formation concept below once
there is a sender besides a receiver and the set of messages can be determined a priori. In the sequel
it will be assumed that any biological entity is represented as a ‘synexion’ or organised set (volume),
V(γ), for a properly chosen atom set U and γ ∈ Γ.
3.2.1. Perceptions
The concept of in-formation to be presented is grounded on an ontological hypothesis. Namely, that
all biological entities ‘perceive’ and, by extension, so do organisations that represent them. The purpose
of this section is to clarify the use of this term since it has here a rather specific meaning.
Perceptions are strongly intertwined with signals. Biological entities often have a living boundary
that filters and transduces incoming signals. Let us call this kind of boundary skin. In individual
organisms, ‘skins’ occupy a connected physical region and are part of its organisation, dividing the
world in two regions: inside and outside the entity [8,113]. They also help the maintenance of particular
homeostatic internal conditions. The “outside” region immediately around, together with anything
it contains that may interact with the entity itself, is the entity’s environment. Cell membranes are
straightforward examples of ‘skins’. Notwithstanding, there are organisations inside cells, in cellular
matrices, in the mucosa-epidermis complex of multi-cellular organisms and in collective entities that
are ‘skins’ in the above sense and not easily recognised as such.
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Definition 7. A signal is any perturbation (sudden variation) in the environment conditions, concentrated in
time and space, that propagates eventually encountering a biological entity or another appropriate receiver.
Encounters have the usual meaning of two or more things being at the same neighbourhood
in space at the same moment. This definition includes as signals: travelling molecules or bodies,
local variations in pressure, temperature and concentrations, waves etc. Due to space-time continuity,
whenever a signal encounters an entity it reaches its outer boundary (skin) first.
In biological and ‘organised complexity’ phenomena, signals are expected to provoke drastic
and disruptive changes in the structure of the systems involved, since this is how their organisations
are altered; changes that eventually rend them them unrecognisable. Indeed, biological systems are
signal-amplifiers par excellence [74]. Perceptions are effects that a signal has upon the biological
organisation or organised receiver it encounters.
Definition 8. Perception is a two stage process: it has an imprint moment and a recall moment:
 Imprint
Any signal σ encountering sensory apparatuses (in the skin) of a biological entity V(γ) at time tσ and
transmitted into it provokes (localised) changes in its organisation.
 Recall
Moreover, if another signal σ′ encounters the same biological entity at time t ≥ tσ and tends to provoke
the same change in the organisation of V(γ) as signal σ, σ′ is recognised as being the same signal as σ.
Hence, perception is an action rather than an entity, organisation or fact and results in imprints
(see Figure 11). Imprints, that are organisational alterations, may decay over a short time, remain for
longer periods, or become part of the organisation. Signals σ and σ′ need not be exactly the same
perturbations of the environment, taking all attributes into account. With respect to the perception
process of a synexion V(γ), however, σ and σ′ will be considered to be the “same” signal, whenever
they provoke the same imprint. This is dependent on the complexity of V(γ) and of the signals in the
imprint class associated with the same alteration in V(γ).





Figure 11. Perception: imprint (a), recall (b).
This sharpens the idea of similarity of signals (see Remark 2). Mistaking strictly different signals
related to a sole imprint as the same signal is part of the perception process. Therefore, we say that a
long lasting imprint is a model for σ and its similarity class.
3.2.2. In(side)formation and Interpretation
Imprints are changes in the organisation of a synexion V(γ) but do not enforce alterations in
behaviour. Modifications in V(γ) may affect only the associated volumes V(γ) 	→ V′(γ), only its
organisation γ 	→ γ′, or both V(γ) 	→ V′(γ′). Generally, signals provoke initial changes in volumes
V(·) (physico-chemical processes) that eventually migrate to changes in its organisation γ. In brains,
the first relate to the electro-magnetic activity and are likely to decay; while the second and third
involve synaptic and organisational changes and are long lasting. Depending on the level of detail,
changes in organisation imply changes in the organised volumes as well. Good examples of this
are the cellular signalling system and the sensory-nervous-brain systems in multi-cellular organisms
(see Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2). Imprints that do not provoke changes cannot be detected.
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Imprints that change the behaviour of biological entities will be called in-formation. The definition
below employs observers, that are biological entities themselves. The role of observers, notwithstanding,
is primarily to acknowledge that some change has happened. They are needed to detect and compare
changes. Thus, any artefact that make special observations and compare them is an observer. Their role
will be greatly clarified while refining our understanding of what is in-formation.
The definition of in-formation below relies on the following ontological hypothesis that is suggested
by living phenomena and entities:
Hypothesis 1.
A: Any biological entity or process may be represented in B.
B: All biological and life-related entities or processes perceive.
C: Perceptions are unique for a given biological entity or process—same signal, same imprint;
D: Biological organisations emit signals that uniquely characterise them, that is, they may be recognised by
means of the signals they emit.
Hypothesis 1C and 1D are not strictly necessary to define in-formation. They are relevant though
while considering information-exchange in biological interactions, for rendering in-formation as a
usable concept, and for clearly understanding its biological consequences.
Hypothesis 1A is the kernel of the organisation perspective. Notwithstanding, the representation
of biological elements and processes as synexions is not unique, nor coerced in any manner.
Any biological entity A may be represented by synexions B(γ) and B′(γ′) reflecting different
organisations, levels of detail or perspectives of study. Changing the synexions that retract A enriches
our perspective in the same way as seeing matter distinctly as a cloud of particles, a body, or a substance
does. Proteins may be seen as two organisations at least: a sequence of amino-acids while studying
folding or as an assemblage of secondary domains and docks while studying function. Even so, one
representation as a synexion is enough to discuss about exchange and interpretation of signals.
The imprint, iprtB(γ)(σ) of a signal σ in B(γ) may be different from its imprint in synexions B(γ′)
or B(γ′)′, even when all these synexions retract the same entity A. In consequence, the similarity
classes of σ may be distinct in each representation of a biological entity as a synexion. This multiplicity
accommodates the representation of different levels of detail and different dynamical states. Our ability
to understand information-driven interactions will depend on how coherently organisational changes
ascribed to perceptions are represented and this can only be solved by reference to the signal itself or
its source. The organisation framework makes this subtle point explicit but there will always exist a
compromise between the complexity of synexions and their reliability as representations of things in
natural phenomena.
Furthermore, it is well accepted nowadays that cells perceive and remember [107,108]. There is
a clear association between conditions in the environment and activation-deactivation patterns of
biochemical switches in the cell nucleus, maintained by the signalling cell system [15,114]. Hypothesis 1B,
however, goes beyond that extending the perception concept down towards the sub-cellular scale
and above towards the non-organismic entities and collectivities scale. The synexions framework
accommodates in-formation other than that processed by neural systems or DNA transcription and
intergeneration transmission, that are the only forms of biological information generally considered until
recently [80].
Before advancing further, it is worth making the following observations:
• A signal σ reaching two different biological entities a and b, represented by B1(γ1)a and B2(γ2)b
may provoke different imprints in their organisations, even if B1, B2 and γ1, γ2 are similar.
However, if the collection of signals associated with imprints iprtB1(γ1)(σ) and iprtB2(γ2)(σ) is
the same, that is, if any signal leading to the first imprint will also lead to the second imprint, the
perception should be considered same for B1(γ1)a and B2(γ2)b;
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• Stabilised imprints are models for signals or collections of signals;
• A travelling molecule is a signal, because it is a localised variation in density, mass and other
aspects concentrated in time and space;
• Pressure and concentration variations, being more diffuse and collective perturbations of
environment attributes, may not be always taken as signals. This suggests that environmental
variations depend on scale sensitivities as well as the complexity of the perturbation and the
perceiver to be considered as signals. Signal and perception are thus relative concepts;
• Encountering is always due to relative motion. Either the signal propagates or the organism is
moving and reaches a resting obstacle that acts as a perturbation in the perceived environment.
What is important is that signal and organism approach each other in space and time for an
encounter to occur.
Besides signals and perception, two or more special biological entities will be required to specify
in-formation. One shall be termed interpreter, the others will be observers.
Definition 9. Given a signal σ and at least two biological entities I and O in B, σ will be termed an
in-formation if the following occurs conjointly:
Signal σ reaches I at time tσ and I perceives it; (18)
O perceives both I and σ, before, at, and after time tσ; (19)
At a latter time, t′ ≥ tσ,
iprtO(I t′) differs from iprtO(I t) for t ≤ tσ.
(20)
That is, if O perceives changes in I , after its encounter and interaction with σ.
Thence, O says that σ is an in-formation for I and that I has interpreted σ. The observer O
acknowledges changes and the interpretation of σ by I . The observer O is not needed otherwise and
I may be the observer itself if it is complex enough to perceive its own perceptions, that is, create
a model for them, and maintain a model of itself. Since O is in B, so are its perceptions (models) of
I and σ. Both perceptions are sub-synexions of O and have extensions in time as much as it does.
The perceptions of I and σ, though, need to extend beyond t′ ≥ tσ for O be able to detect differences


















Figure 12. in-formation: Observing a signal perception (a); recognizing σ as in-formation (b).
Figure 12 portrays the information-interpretation arrangement, highlighting observers (named
Bi in the figure), models of I and σ, and its dependence in time. The fact that in-formation causes
changes in organisations is crucial for the organisation perspective (see Section 5), that also relies on
the following premiss:
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Hypothesis 2. Every whole is an interpreter of its parts.
It should be noted though that Definition 9 does not, strictly speaking, describe information.
Instead, it describes how to recognise that a signal is in-formation—through changes provoked by the
signal in an organisation whose behaviour changes with respect to what was anticipated [8,115] with
respect to it—suggesting a procedure to observe it.
This is somewhat analogous to energy which is a property attached to configurations in fields and
can only be observed indirectly, through its effects in the components of a P -phenomenon. In-formation,
likewise, is essentially immaterial and intangible and can only be acknowledged through its effects in
4-dimensional (i.e., extending in (x, t)) P -organisations.
4. Ontological Considerations
Subsections of this section contain arguments and discussions relative to employing the
organisation-information theoretical framework to understand natural phenomena, as well as
justifications for modelling decisions inspired by their observation as a collection of interacting
organisations.
4.1. Space, Time and In(side)formation
The definition of in-formation provided above requires the immersion of organisations in
space-time, and makes explicit use of space-time events and models immersed in space-time. In the
sequel, arguments supporting the dependence of in-formation on space, time and I are presented at
several scales and domains. The examples below are simple and far from extensive. Their aim is to
justify modelling decisions and clarify the constructs. Recently, though, a wealth of biological and
biomedical scientific investigations provided many examples of the spatial and temporal nature and
dependence of living components and phenomena (see, for instance, the last two sections of [51]).
4.1.1. Cognitive Domain
Talking about issues of cognition and models starts with humans; bringing the analysis closer to
our usual sense of information. Cognition, seen as the acquisition and incorporation of in-formation
and perceptions in the sense of previous definitions, is not restricted to humans. In multi-cellular
organisms, a part of their organisation is specialised as a signal processing system. It also handles
imprints resulting from perception process and any response or reaction to them. Complex signals,
coming out of complex organisations, are processed by the sensorial-signal systems. Imprints are
mostly associated with the brain and nervous system in multi-cellular organisms, although not being
restricted to them. In cells, an elaborated and complex network of reactions centred around DNA, the
chromatin, and nucleotides adapt and respond to variegated signals, recording them and changing
gene-expression as well as behaviour [11,15,108,116]. The examples in this section nevertheless refer
to human cognition.
Signals are apparently affected by the organisation of their sources. The organisation of sources
seems to be reflected in imprints associated with signals emanating from them, at least partially. In the
following discussion, association of parts is mainly given by topological proximity (neighbourhood),
while the whole-part hierarchy by encapsulation of groups into unities.
In texts, that are sequential objects, the vicinity is given by collaterality, grouping letters into words.
Words side by side form phrases. Phrases side by side, with punctuation marks interspersed, form
sentences, and so on. However, parenthesis, notes and footnotes relief a bit texts from dependence
on sequential vicinity, by enclosing their contents into units. Technical texts have other forms of
encapsulating and naming text unities that may be referred later or earlier in the text, thus indirectly
re-appearing at several points of the text.
The same coalescent mechanism appears in figures and pictures, although their inherent two or
three dimensions (2D or 3D) make the idea of neighbourhood much richer from a practical point of
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view. To exemplify how neighbouring associate things, let’s consider two simple geometrical objects,
here taken as wholes and as logical atoms in the universe U: a circle (©) and a line segment (|).
The circle can be rotated at will without appearing to be modified but the line segment will present
different inclinations if rotated. Bringing the circle and line segment together (see Figure 13) in different
manners will reveal important characteristics of information.
circle line segment gluing by contact
(a) (b)
Figure 13. Geometrical objects (a); joining them by contact into a whole (b).
The line segment may remain tangent to the circle after joining or may transect it and that the
circumference of the circle may touch or cross the line segment at different distances form its centre.
These different possibilities of contact will result in different tokens, symbols and signs that may
convey different meanings, if they convey information at all. Each circle-glued-with-segment forms
now a visual unit (Figure 14), a whole in the sense of both Γ and B.
(b)(a) (c)
Figure 14. Circle-line-segment visual unit (a); a mirrored circle-line-segment visual unit (b); and a
collection of them (c).
Not all wholes convey information, but there are cases where a whole may not convey information,
or convey a different information, due to the manner it relates to its surroundings. For instance, it may
be difficult to recognise anything or associate a meaning to the circle-segment wholes as they appear in
Figure 14. There is no easy clue in the visual units of images in Figure 14a,b or in those in the the heap
of the image in Figure 14c that help us recognizing them. What, by Definition 8, means associating
these units with previous imprints (known signals).
Considering Figure 14a,b together as unique image, it becomes possible to vaguely identify this
new whole as a pair of (angry) eyes... if one has seen lots of animations. But what if we straight these
units and line them up like in Figure 15?
Figure 15. Letters.
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Don’t they become immediately recognizable as letters {p,q,d,b}? Implicit subliminal visual
references to the borders of the paper, that provide a sense of verticality, and from one whole to the
other enforce their identification as letters. Anyhow, a group of letters like a syllable can be rotated to
any degree and be severely distorted remaining recognizable, similarly to a group of chemical atoms
forming a molecule. This observation and Hypothesis 2 suggest why molecules often have different
functions in cells.
Relative distances between letters are strong topological clues enforcing the recognition of
letter-groups as units or wholes, reducing the relevance of clues related to the environment. Similar
phenomena occur in time when considering sounds and music. Groups of sounds or musical notes are
more stable signals to our perception than scattered individual sounds or notes. It is more difficult
to make known music or meaningful words unrecognizable than individual sounds or uncorrelated
sound sequences.
Other visual units can be formed out of a circle and a line segment, as shown in Figure 16.
(a) lollipop (b) pulley... (c) Saturn (d) Saturn?
Figure 16. Non-letter visual units out of a circle and line segment. See text for details.
Some will be easily recognised like those in Figure 16a–c; while others like Figure 16d will not,
even if the sketches in (c) and (d) differ due to very small relative displacements of one part in relation
to the other. Possible meanings for the resulting symbols are indicated by labels within the picture.
From another stand, there are visual units that defy interpretation no matter what is done with
them, like the image of Figure 17a in two dimensions.
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 17. Visual circle-segment wholes difficult to recognise. (a) non-sensical image; (b) purposeless
thing; (c) swinging b. See text for details.
The image of Figure 17b may initially defy recognition. However, shaking or moving it a little
bit, as indicated in Figure 17c will make them recognizable as the sketch of a see-saw. This recalls
the importance of movement and the time-component in models and imprints, while recognizing
many things and phenomena, particularly life-phenomena. Synexions are space-time objects and tubes
resulting from the displacement of any spatially organised volume along time is a synexion. Hence,
Definitions 8 and 9 contemplate cases where the recognition and interpretation of objects can only be
made along time, while moving. The fact that certain changes are anticipated help the recognition of
changes by observers O in Definition 2.
Visual assemblages that form wholes and have been recognised may be associated in distinct
forms resulting in new units or wholes, as suggested in Figure 18.
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(b) anemometer?(a) binoculars? (c) trolley?
Figure 18. More complex (made from previous units) visual wholes difficult to recognise. Images (a)
and (b) are composed exclusively from units in Figure 14a–b, while (c) adds a rectangle-like visual unit.
This process may be carried out indefinitely resulting in visual units composed of other visual
units which recognition helps the recognition of the whole unit. Abstracting from top-down or
bottom-up stands, the explicit recursion in Definition 2 and Equation (9), inherited by Definitions 8
and 9, allows for the appearance of however complex organisations, signals, imprints and information.
Cells present several space-time organisations that conform to these definitions, but their biological
function, including molecules, motifs, or modules, may change depending on their localisation in the
cell, their conformation and their motion.
4.1.2. Molecular Scale
Simple molecules are straightforwardly represented in Γ (Section 3.1.2) and B (Section 3.1.3).
Following the same procedure, proteins and other large molecules can also be represented in Γ
and B as huge, difficult to comprehend, plain hyper-graphs. Notwithstanding, using the now
established hierarchical structure of proteins (see, for instance, [104] and the articles at http://www.
proteinspotlight.org), proteins may be easily represented in Γ. Given that the basic constituent parts of a
protein are amino-acids rather than atoms, a protein can be depicted as a sequence of the hyper-graphs
representing amino-acids. Sequences of hyper-graphs belong to Γ [105]. Thus, proteins have at least
two representations in Γ.
Yet, proteins are often depicted in terms of secondary structures and other familiar molecular
components. Considering secondary and ancillary protein structures as nodes and the chemical bonds
holding together these molecular structures as arcs, proteins may be represented Γ in several ways,
where connectivity always reflects chemical bonds and hierarchy isolates identifiable protein domains
and sub-units. The nodes of this hyper-graph are hyper-graphs themselves retracting (sub)molecules
and by Definition 2 this assemblage belongs to Γ. Therefore, any assemblage of secondary protein
structures is also straightforwardly modelled in Γ.
Their representation in B is also immediate, since volumes occupied by atoms in space do not
interpenetrate and their nearby positions unite the atom-volumes into molecule-volumes respecting
constraint (9). Apart from that, protein components vibrate coherently, extending these volumes
into space-time. The space-time volumes of the atoms of a protein and the partial union of them
by amino-acids and subdomains provide the required volumes of V(γ) letting synexions represent
proteins. It is also clear from the previous discussion that any macro-molecule has many different
representations γ ∈ Γ, depending on which sub-units are being considered as wholes. Consequently,
they also have multiple representations in B. Anyway, protein folding is a transformation from Γ, or B,
into itself.
At any point in time, a protein may be activated or deactivated by a signal reaching it. Activation
and deactivation are due to changes in protein organisation either in Γ, if new chemical bonds are
formed or small molecules become attached to the protein, or just in B, due to a re-arrangement
in the tertiary structure caused by changes in the relative positions of its constituent parts. These
organisational changes modify their “function”, that is, the manner a protein chemically behaves and
reacts to external stimuli. Therefore, a perturbation in the environment, be it a travelling molecule or
variations in distribution of energy or mass concentrations, may cause an alteration in the organisation
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of a protein and change its behaviour. Under Definitions 8 and 9, the (chemical) perturbation is a
signal that provokes a re-organisation of the protein changing its chemical behaviour. Therefore, the
perturbation is an in-formation for the protein.
An example of organisation alteration due sole to changes in space and not in Γ, is the
pigmentation protein chameleonine. Chameleonine is the name given to the protein that change
the colour of certain spots down the spine of Chamaeleo differensis individuals when temperature
changes and is apparently present only on them [117]. Changes in environmental conditions, in this
case temperature variations, provoke a change in the colour of the tissue where it resides. Temperature
variations really change only the energy of its components that reside in the vibrations of the protein’s
atoms. Chameleonine responds to this variation with a deformation in its spatial configuration due
to structural stresses. As a result of this new (spatial) organisation, it changes behaviour reflecting,
or re-emitting, a different light frequency. The signal in this case is temperature variation that, at the
molecular scale, means a change in the mean number of molecules hitting a chameleonine molecule per
time slice, and the consequent amplification of the vibration of its parts. This example conspicuously
shows the need to include space and time in the conceptualisation of in-formation.
Chiral isomers further highlight spatial dependence of perception and information. This rich
subject will not be discussed here, but a few observations illustrate important aspects of perception
and information. Chiral isomers commonly respond equally to simple stimuli like temperature or to
simple substrates in chemical reactions. However, depending on the complexity of molecules involved,
on the environment where they are immersed or on the complexity of the signals reaching them, the
effect in the organisation of wholes of which they are parts may be dramatically distinct, provoking
deforming developmental diseases in humans, like the infamous thalidomide, particularly when chiral
isomers are the signals [118,119]. Effective life phenomena is strongly dependent on essentially one of
the chiral isomers.
From another stand, many biochemical organisations and structures in cells are not static. They are
grounded on interacting homeostatic chemical processes, particularly when cycling. Hence, biological
phenomena are really build on organisations of processes. A now canonic example of this character
of theirs are the bacteria molecular motors. There are pictures of these ingenious engines available.
However, these “structures” do not appear in engine snapshots at fixed moments in time. They arise
from the superimposition of several snapshots at distinct times ([45] Figure 2), meaning that a flux
of chemical substrates cooperate to give existence to these “motors”. In terms of organisations and
synexions, notwithstanding, fluxes are naturally represented as process-organisations and may be
considered either as observers or interpreters of signals that revert turning and “swimming” directions,
for instance.
4.1.3. Cellular Scale
At the cellular scale, organisations are more conspicuous in eukaryotes than prokaryotes, despite
the complex organisation of biochemical processes existing in the latter. The preferred reference to
organisations in eukaryotes in the sequel, though, is just a matter of explanatory simplification.
Looking into the internal organisation of cells, there are organelles, special “tissues” like the
endoplasmic reticulum and the variegated membranes, recurrent and stable molecular agglomerates,
as well as a plethora of sustained biochemical processes that serve a variety of purposes in the cell.
Among them we find transportation systems that using vacuoles protect substrates from reacting
with chemicals existing in the cell before they reach a certain place or organelle in the cell. Signalling
systems, extending from plasmatic to nucleus membranes, are responsible to transmit changes in
the state of chemical switches in the cell membrane, that act as sensors, to the nucleus. There, the
nucleotide-DNA-chromatin-nucleosome system retains the conditions of membrane-switches in the form
of genetic inhibition-activation patterns [116] and more elaborated settings, like the CRIPSP-Cas systems,
even alter DNA loci [108,120]. These nuclear reorganisations are imprints following Definition 8.
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This travelling-wave system changes the switching status of a collection of molecules that
surrounds the DNA and maintains some portions of the genes active while inhibiting others. Besides
messenger RNA, that transports in-formation, there are also signalling pathways from the nucleus to the
cytoplasm that activate or deactivate protein synthesis, that are determined by the inhibition-enhancing
patterns of DNA sites. Therefore, it is not DNA that really controls cell activities but a complex formed
by DNA and nucleotides that “switch” genes on and off. The messenger and transcriptions systems
transmit these patterns of free DNA to appropriate sites in the cell. Also in this case, environmental
perturbations that change the status of membrane sensors are signals as in Definition 7, while the
DNA-nucleotide complex acts, in turn or concomitantly, as a memory (the organisation that concentrate
imprints), a decider, or a transducer and may affect cell behaviour, that is, DNA-nucleotide-chromatin
complex interprets (Definition 9) changes in the state of membrane-switches.
To see biotic-interactions as exchange of in-formation, we need to understand the effects of
differences in time propagation between two wholes. In prokaryotes, transportation is due mainly
to diffusion in heterogeneous media. Diffusion takes little time to bring molecules from one extreme
of the cell to another, due to the small volume of the latter. Eukaryotes are about 10 times as lager
as prokaryotes. To get equivalent transfer and reaction rates and characteristic times in larger cells,
there must be some facility to accelerate and “direct” diffusion to the proper places. This “facility” is
organisation. More precisely, dynamical organisations.
4.1.4. Physiology and Behaviour
Comments in this subsection refer to multi-cellular organisms. Toward larger scales, the
organisation of multi-cellular organisms pretty resembles that of eukaryotes and prokaryotes from
the right perspective. Following J. G. Miller [2], living systems are composed of nineteen systems,
independently of scale. For instance, there is the nervous (electrical signaling) system, the immune
(repair) system, the digestive system, the motor system, the boundary (environmental interface) system,
the memory and learning systems. In spite of being analogous, they may however appear in completely
distinct forms from one scale to another.
Anyhow, there are systems in larger organisms that are not as easily paired among scales as those
enrolled above, like the endocrine system (chemical signaling?) or boundary systems in ecosystems
and societies. Moreover, the categorisation in nineteen systems is somewhat arbitrary, since some
of them may be considered as one single thing while others further subdivided. Also, focusing on
the nervous and endocrine systems, we see that two signaling systems with remarkably different
characteristic propagation times co-exist, one based on electro-chemical wave propagation and the
other on diffusion and transport. Nonetheless, phenomena occurring within the limits of these systems
are much richer and complex in multi-cellular organisms than in cells and, by extrapolation, in
phenomena at larger scales.
In contrast to systems, multi-cellular and more complex organisms are better represented as a
collection of superimposed organisations symbiotically cooperating by exchanging matter, energy and
in-formation, particularly the latter. The characterisation of which organisations should be used in a
representation will always be arbitrary to a certain extent, as in the case of systems. Finding (biologically)
sound heuristics to support this task will greatly enhance our knowledge about phenomena involving
living things. Clearly the macroscopic size of multi-cellular and more complex organisms impose a
strong dependence on space and time for any exchange within and among the organisations representing
living systems. Therefore, a mandatory guideline is the rendering of categorised organisations
compatible in terms of characteristic times, volumes and frequencies while discovering organisations.
Equation (9) proposes a possible guideline with respect to these concerns.
When we acknowledge exchange of information as a distinguishing characteristic of living
matter, the necessity of this compatibility greatly promotes the use of space and time in the definition
of in-formation.
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4.1.5. Cultural Domain
Contrary to knowledge that may be individual, culture is a collective phenomenon.
Notwithstanding, human purposeful collectivities (like enterprises, firms, industries, households,
schools, communities etc), collective phenomena (like person-to-person contacts that propagate
diseases, gossips, information and matter; or like cultural centers and cultural networks attracting
and educating people) and human creations (like science, music, art and literature) are all founded on
organisations and information as pictured in Sections 3.1 and 3.2.
Purposeful human collectivities are formed by a collection of people that associate with each
other with a (pre-)determined objective. Some organisations, like firms, industries, enterprises and
(big) households, spontaneously or not organise themselves by having a hierarchy where smaller
groups report to and/or are commanded by others. Such organisations are the basic action units in
a cultural domain and have been extensively studied since long [121]. Most of them comply at least
approximatively if not strictly to Definition 1.
Knowledge may be represented by classes of signals and their imprints organised as a consequence
of associations and abstractions which are formed out of multiple interpretations and experiences, in
the lines suggested by the discussion of Section 4.1.1. Culture also may be viewed as an organisation
(in the sense of Definition 1) composed of concepts, ideas, taboos, individual knowledge, the imprints
of a man or population etc. For instance, in a piece of music, art or literature there are often references,
usually implicit, to another work in the same class or even in another class. There is music inspired by
literature and folkloric wisdom, literature that refers to lyrics and so on. Literature is itself a web of
veiled references to pieces of other literature.
In science, referencing is made explicitly; and this differentiates it from the other cultural
expressions. Books, although sequentially arranged, may be as tortuous as any folding molecule
due to backward and forward cross-referencing [8, Note to the reader]. In science, literature or music,
one can only appreciate the beauty and depth of a piece of work if one has good acquaintance with
a large number of other pieces of work, at least in the same cultural class or domain of discourse.
Even within the explicit referential system of science, one has to know and understand the referred
material to properly perceive and understand the work that referred to them.
Culture, however, differs from individual knowledge in two important ways. Instead of residing
in the memory of a person, it is registered in books, writings, unspoken cultural premisses, “learning
by seeing” or by “experiencing” and many other extra-organic media and conveyors. Furthermore,
the interpretation of this collection of signals and imprints is not made by an individual in particular
but, instead, by the whole community that produces and retains the culture. This means that many of
the writings and extra-organic, non-individual, media contain ideas and discussion about elements of
the culture itself, being self-reflexive and self-referential to a much higher extent than knowledge.
The nature of science is not much different from culture. Its findings (atoms in U) are also
organised in the manner of Definition 1 and its interpretation is a collective enterprise. The distinctions
reside primarily on rules, methods and underlying paradigms about how to collectively develop
scientific knowledge and the relying on observation as a conflict resolver. The language of science,
even when it doesn’t use mathematics, for instance, is developed in such a manner that differences
in interpretation are minimised, and arguing procedures are standardised and their rules accessible
to everyone. In this sense, the collective doing of science is more self-conscious than that of culture.
Culture is produced more instinctively and intuitively than science. In Science, there are a more
definite and explicit purpose to be followed and methodological rules to abide to.
4.2. Organisation and Complexity
The intertwining among living phenomena, organisation, information, language and complexity
has been acknowledged since long [52,61,122–126], as well as the importance of innumerous
concepts introduced by system thinking to deal with them [52,54,56,124]. Nevertheless, a consensual
concept of complexity, whilst important, is still elusive [43]. Until now, there is no widely accepted
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definition of complexity, which meaning depends on the domain of inquiry. Those more widely
used resort to concepts in computation, Shannon-Brillouin information or code-interpretation for
their definition [41,51,127]; not to systems or organisation concepts. A few largely neglected efforts
to connect information and organisation do, however, exist: the work of H. Atlan [40,62,65,77] and
I. Walker [63]. This section discusses how complexity inserts itself in the organisation framework
introduced above (Section 3).
The first thing to note is that there is no single way to represent things that compose phenomena
in Γ or B. Different representations may reflect different emphasis, different details, or distinct
perspectives, standpoints, purpose, and questioning. To see this, consider again the example of the
house (Section 3.1). A possible organisation for the house in Figure 1a, oc, is given by the graph
in Figure 2a and belongs to Γ, since undirected graphs are special cases of hyper-graphs [97] and
hyper-graphs belong to Γ (Definition 2, case 1). In oc ∈ Γ, the house-rooms and entrance are atomic
elements and are the only nodes, i.e., U = {L,D,K,H,B,R1,R2, Ent}. The graph oc is such that:
N(h) = U
A(h) = {{Ent, L}, {L,D}, {D,K}, {L,H}, {H,B}, {H,R1}, {H,R2}}
}
(21)
The arcs of A(oc) represent the access (doors) between the rooms and the external access.
Other organisations for this same house can be constructed by resourcing to meta-variables and















Figure 19. Two alternative organisations of house in Figure 1a with different levels of detail: (a) has
two levels and (b) has three. Objects represented are the same, but the perception of what is primary or
secondary is different.
The first is a two-level organisation and the second a three-level organisation. Their expressions
in Γ refer to the universal set U of Equation (21) and are given in the sequel. The formal specification
for organisation oa, pictured in Figure 19a, is:
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U = U\{Ent} ∪ {, vr, vpv},
ha = {{, L, vr, vpv}, {{, L}, {L, vr}, {L, vpv}},
h◦r = {{,D,K}, {{,D}, {D,K}},
h◦pv = {{,H,B,R1,R2}, {{,H}, {H,B}, {H,R1}, {H,R2}},
vr “=”  in h◦r , vr in h,




while for organisation ob, of Figure 19b, it is:
U = U ∪ {, vr, ve},
hb = {{,H,B,R1,R2, ve}, {{,H}, {H,B}, {H,R1}, {H,R2}, {H, ve}},
h◦e = {{, Ent, L, vr}, {{, L}, {L, vr}, {L, Ent}},
h◦r = {{,D,K}, {{,D}, {D,K}},
ve “=”  in h◦e , ve in h,




Any of the three organisations oa, ob and oc can be further detailed by adding more levels.
For instance, any room ρ in U\{Ent} can be turned into a meta-variable vρ and bound to copies
hρ of the hyper-graph h4w below that describes four connected walls, one of which has a door. Its nodes
and arcs are given by:
N(h4w) = {, W1, W2, W3, W4},
A(h4w) = {{, Wp}, {W1, W2}, {W2, W3}, {W3, W4}, {W4, W1}}
}
(24)
where Wi represent the walls, and the arcs represent their bindings at the corners. The wall
Wp, 1 ≤ p ≤ 4, with the door is associated with .
It is important to note that while creating this new level of detail the walls are duplicated in each
room as part of the organisation. The concrete instances of organisations may collapse distinct parts of
them in one object. This highlights the fact that there is a lot of freedom in the immersion of wp-graphs
in the physical reality, or else, in B. Otherwise, walls in Figure 1 may be double-walls, with an air
cushion in-between, or even be separated by larger spaces, the organisation of the house remaining the
same, although not its instantiation in B.
Another important thing to note is that, except for the intermediate nodes hcpv, hcr and hc3, which
can be erased from Cnt(·) without loss of connectivity,
Cnt(oa) = Cnt(ob) = oc.
This illustrates that the mapping Cnt (Definition 6) is non-injective and there is always more than
one multi-level (hierarchical) organisation which can be associated with a given network under no
matter which heuristics. Hence, network topology is largely insufficient to determine the organisation
of bio-chemical networks or of connection-diagrams of other complex phenomena.
This observation leads to considering the question: “How many ways are there to hierarchically
organise a network?”. Or else, what is the size of Cnt−1(h), for h ∈ H? A more in-depth discussion of
this problem is outside the scope of this text. However, a hint about its magnitude can be obtained by
inspecting Definition 6, even if it is constrictive and considers only a two-level hierarchy.
From Equations (14)–(17), it is clear that N(Cnt(γ)) and A(Cnt(γ)) are constructed respectively
as unions of the node-sets and arc-sets of root(γ) and parts of γ and that neither nodes nor arcs can
appear concomitantly at more than one level or more than one part of γ. If they do appear, like
the walls in the example above, they are different instances of the same organisation and must be
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considered distinct in Γ; that is, a γ1 can never be equal to, or the same as, a copy of it that is part of
another wp-graph γ ∈ Γ. Furthermore, from the definition of hyper-graph [41,97],
N(h) = ∪a∈A(h) a
and it is always possible to recover N(h) from A(h), for all h ∈H.
On that account and from an inspection of case 2 of Definition 6, it is clear that, to construct
any γ ∈ Cnt−1(h): A(h) needs to be partitioned into νp subsets, 2 ≤ νp ≤ αh, αh = #(A(h)); νp − 1
meta-variables assigned to the partition that will be root(γ); and the assignments of Equation (4)
established. Since νp is a parameter and, for each partition, there is a circular choice about which





νp! P(νp, αh), (25)
where P(q, κ) is the number of ways the integer κ can be partitioned into q distinct integers [128].
Considering that, for any reasonably representative network h ∈ H, αh is anywhere in the range from
ν2h to 2
νh , νh = #(N(h)), #(Cnt−1(h)) is astronomically large for any useful set of nodes and arcs.
By weighting atoms and counting interrelations against maximum relevance and total number of
possible interconnections under variegated guidelines, a wealth of complexity measures can be defined
for organisations modelled in γ ∈ Γ, that help comparing the many γ ∈ Cnt−1(h). The family of
complexity measures presented in the sequel illustrates this. It has well defined, finite values for each
γ ∈ Γ, including self-referential ones. Self-referential wp-graphs can be obtained by, e.g., considering
the nodes of h4w as variables w1, . . . ,w4 and binding copies of h4w to them indefinitely but finitely [100].
The family of measures below is defined for organisations that may be constructed or observed.
It is thus computed over the observed organisations rather than metered directly in phenomena.
Despite being inherently non-determinant, it can be used to help choosing the best representation
of constituents of phenomena in terms of organisations, as indicated in the end of this section. It is
based on the following heuristics: (1) conformity to the whole-part relation (Definition 4), in the sense
that the complexity of a part should be smaller than that of the whole, (2) possibility of gauging
relative contributions of atoms and parts to the overall organisation without biases, and (3) sets of
organisations (Definition 1) should also have a complexity assigned to them.
The relative contributions may be dependent on external factors like the ‘purpose’ or ‘function’
of the organisation as well as in the domain of application of the model and, thus, are subject to
ontological guidelines. For instance, the rooms of the house in Section 3.1.1 may have different degrees
of importance (weighting) depending if it is intended to become a residence, an office, or a restaurant.
On top of that, organisations representing visual elements in Figure 17 may be used to discuss them
from a cognitive perspective (Section 4.1.1) or a cultural perspective (Section 4.1.5). It is likely that
the parts and atomic elements composing the visual units will have completely different degrees of
importance in each analysis.
So, let ω : U −→ [0, a] ⊂ R be a given weight-function defined for the elements of U, such that
(∀ γ ∈ Γ):
ω() = 0,
ω(v) = 1, if v ∈ M f r(γ),
ω(v) = λ, if v ∈ Mbd(γ),
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭ (26)
where λ relates to the inter-level significance and is such that ∑∞l=1 λ
l ≤ ∞. Contributions are generally
evaluated with respect to a single γ. Because of this, it is enough to consider a = 1 since there exits
several procedures to normalise ω in a way that it reflects only relative contributions of atoms within a
γ, due to the finiteness of node-sets in γ.
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The formulas for complexity measures Ξ : Γ −→ R+ in this family will be presented case by case
for the three classes of organisations induced by Definitions 1 and 2:
Ξ(h), if h ∈ H, (27)
Ξ(γ1, . . . , γl), if γ = {γ1, . . . , γl}, and (28)
Ξ(mh←↩ < γ◦1 , . . . , γ◦n >) if γ ∈ Γ\H. (29)












, n ∈ N(h). (32)
where #(S) is the cardinality of S and Cpk is the number of possible combinations of k elements in
groups with p elements. The value C(h) is an estimate of the connectivity of h and Ih,ω(n) of the
influence of node n on its neighbours. Moreover, v←↩ γ means that root(γ) ∈H◦ and γ is bound to







ω(n) + C(h) + ∑
n∈N(h)
Ih,ω(n), h ∈H. (33)








ω(v)Ξ(γ◦v) + C(h) + ∑
n∈N(h)
Ih,ω(n), (34)
where v←↩ γ◦v . For γ = {γ1, . . . , γl}, {Ξ(γ1), . . . , Ξ(γl)} is a set of positive real values and any
monotone statistics (sum, mean, max etc), for instance, provides a complexity measure that abide to the
properties below. That is, if E : Rl −→ R is monotone for each argument,
Ξ(γ) = E(Ξ(γ1), . . . , Ξ(γl)). (35)
Each measure Ξ in this family is such that:
• The more associations there are in a wp-graph, higher its complexity is;
• Ξ(γ) > Ξ(γ1), (∀γ1, γ ∈ Γ) | [γ1 partOf γ];
• The more detailed an organisation is, that is, deeper the hierarchical levels go or bigger the number
of its parts is, higher its complexity is;
• The finiteness of Ξ(γ) for all γ ∈ Γ and the existence of self-similar γ ∈ Γ, require that the
contribution of deeper levels in the hierarchy decays rapidly, e.g., ∑∞l=1 λ
l ≤ ∞.
Therefore, since the same natural object or entity may be associated with distinct organisations,
it is a fortiori possible that natural objects have several (organisational) complexities. Thence, complexity
in Γ is a concept associated with the description and representation of a phenomenon in terms of
organisations rather than with the phenomenon itself [41,129]. Moreover, Ξ(γ′), γ′ ∈ Cnt−1(h) can
be used as an indicator to find the “most convenient” representation (organisation) of some-thing in
Cnt−1(h), where h ∈H retract its raw connections.
Remark 2 (On the complexity of signals and imprints:).
The discussion about imprints just after Hypothesis 1 can be illuminated by the following observations
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1. By definition, Ξ(B(γ)) = Ξ(γ), ∀B(γ) ∈ B;
2. If Bprt(β) = iprtB(γ)(σ) then Ξ(β) ≤ Ξ(γ), since [β partOf γ];
3. iprtB(γ)(σ) = iprtB(γ)(σ′) does not imply that Ξ(σ) = Ξ(σ′) ;
4. It is possible that Bprt(β) = iprtB(γ)(σ) and Ξ(σ) > Ξ(β), or even that Ξ(σ) > Ξ(γ) .
4.3. Organisation Perspective in Action: Re-Thinking Flows
Thinking in terms of organisations and organisational changes can bring new approaches to
traditional scientific modelling. The investigation of cellular cytoskeleton, in particular flows and
mechanical effects in plasma-membrane protrusions, is an active field of experimentation [36,46,130]
and modelling [131]. These investigations focus on actin-polymerisation versus disassembly
determining the retrograde flow of actin-filaments, its stability and force through actin-binding
myosin motors. Mechanical and dynamical effects on the plasma-membrane result primarily from
these phenomena. Notably, the cytosol is considered as a backcloth substrate, although actin diffusion,
translation and sequestration in the cytosol may have important regulatory contributions to the actin
network dynamics. Filopodia are long membrane protrusions containing parallel bundles of F-actin
whose dynamics is governed by the regulation of polymerisation/disassembly processes. How the
required amounts of G-actin are delivered within the challenging filopodial structure is a fascinating
question. Existing models build on diffusion as the key actin-deliver mechanism [132,133].
In collaboration with A. Prokop and C.A. de Moura [134], we started to include a further
hypothesis, where a mixture of cytosol and G-actin circulates changing organisation at the tip and
bottom of the filopodium (Figure 20), from an incoming diluted solution into an outgoing tube formed
by cytosol trapped into the actin filament bundle. The tip polymerisation drives a steady back-flow of
the F-actin filament bundle at the core of the filopodium, with cytoplasm caught between the filaments
(Phase B). This volume “outflow” is replaced by a compensatory influx of a diluted solution of G-actin
molecules in the cytoplasm (Phase A) towards the tip of the filopodium, that occurs between the F-actin
filament bundle and the cell membrane. At the tip of the filament the flow of the diluted solution
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Figure 20. Filopodia: (a) Diffusion Flow, (b) Mixture Flow, (c) Re-organisation Diagram.
The latter hypothesis is suggested by the organisation perspective. However, the models and
observations needed to verify it are quite different from those under the diffusion view. Despite its
hydrodynamical elegance, this alternative cannot arise under the diffusion perspective because cytosol
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displacements are disregarded, and only diffusive movements represented. A new starting point,
the organisation perspective, is needed to suggest this alternative and the models and observations
required. This perspective also suggests that, at a second stage, the actin flow together with the
polymerisation and disassembling processes are to be considered as a biological organisation unit
responding to cellular regulatory processes and signals coming from both the cell’s interior and exterior.
5. Interacting Organisations: Biological and Complex Phenomena
What makes living phenomena so singular? Things in physical phenomena move and exchange
mass, momenta, and energy. When a cell phagocytes another cell, does it absorb just energy and
mass, or does it intake in-formation as well, as suggested in several recent publications about cell
immunology? When a firm “phagocytes” another (mergers & acquisitions), does it earns just material
and monetary assets, or does it income know-how and knowledge as well? Presently, self-organisation
and information help our understanding of systems out of equilibrium and sustain the perception
that organisation is a natural phenomenon. They do not, however, help our understanding about the
absorption of in-formation and knowledge suggested above, nor about the different effects of signals
and imprints.
Also, neither organisation nor information is thought to affect/effect exchanges or cause specific
behaviour [20,24,127]. Nor are they considered as possible and valid components of system states,
promoting propensities and patterns of behaviour. In chemical phenomena, new substances are created
when portions of molecules, organisations as well, are permuted among molecules, re-organising
them. Chemical reactions re-organise substances into other substances, that appear and disappear.
Molecular organisation determines which reactions are possible and which substances become which.
Nevertheless, substrates and products remain the same, as well as their possible interactions, and
organisation is but a parametric descriptive factor fixed once-for-all, as a natural law, in present day
theoretical efforts towards living and complex phenomena.
Notwithstanding, outcomes in living phenomena require specific types of matter-energy in
adequate amounts [32] that are properly interrelated and positioned [14]. Conformation states of
molecules change, changing the reactions its substance can perform. Another distinctive aspect of
living phenomena is that interactions exchange in-formation besides mass and energy [79,80]. Hence,
the network of possible interactions is altered by the in-formation exchanged and by dynamics itself,
as a consequence of conformal changes in molecules, changes protein activation states, the intensity of
regulatory reactions, and so on. The present framework naturally allows for considering organisations
as components of a system’s state by modelling a phenomenon in B instead of P .
Molecules are the simplest non-trivial organisations (see Section 3.1.2). At the molecular and
intra-cellular scales, modules [96] may be interchanged with organisations, as here understood. At higher,
more aggregate scales, it is not clear that observable aggregate modules [135] equate with organisations.
Nor is it sharply clear that that near decomposability [121,136] will be applicable at smaller scales.
Yet, organisations are aggregates of interrelated things that act as an unit at a higher, more aggregate
scale and whose aggregation affects and effects behaviour at the higher scale.
The organisation perspective hypothesises that living and general complex phenomena result
from a collection of interacting organisations, which interact exchanging in-formation, besides organised
mass-energy assemblages. Moreover, interactions change the interacting organisations what, in turn,
changes how organisations react as wholes. This is expressed by Definition 9. Hypothesis 2 realises
emergence. The following arguments further illustrates the soundness of these conjectures.
The organisation framework straightforwardly allows for considering a dynamics of organisations,
where changes in organisations (architectures) affect dynamical possibilities and propensities while
dynamical stresses induce changes in organisations. Let’s consider the smallest living unit—a cell.
An eukaryotic cell for explanatory reasons.
102






































Figure 21. Cellular Organisation: topology bound (a) and re-action bound (b). Both are synexions
(see Section 3.1.3).
Figure 21 displays sketches of two cell-views as organisations. One is grounded on space-topology
and A is hierarchically “below” B if A is contained or occurs inside B [104,137]. The other is based on
(chemical) affinity. The conspicuous incompleteness of each is due to very different reasons. It is easy to
grasp that the wp-graph in Figure 21a is indeed a synexion, since our perception of organelles include
their volumes in space and the partOf relation represented is induced by set inclusion. The number
of molecules in each unit depicted grows from bottom to top. This representation clearly conforms
to Equation (9) and is a synexion. Although there is no time, and things like vibrations, relative
displacements etc, depicted in the figure, they do exist and may become part of the model. As suggested
by this figure, synexions accommodate different levels of detail and some branches may reflect more
detail than others.
Figure 21b displays biochemical networks of the cell schematically, the metabolic one with a
little more detail. Cellular networks are hyper-graphs [99]. Although almost never made explicit,
they are also synexions since molecules occupy volumes in space and chemical reactions require time.
Or, at least, the sub-network that is “active” under any given conditions is a synexion, since they
spread in space and time. First, because chemical reactions have characteristic times that may be
regulated by interactions among cellular bio-chemical networks. Hence, each pathway or cycle has a
tunable characteristic time. Second, because reactions and substrates are localised in specific regions of
the cell. Unfortunately, information about frequencies, rates and localisation are still largely missing in
biochemical data-bases nowadays, even though this has been changing in the last years [114,138].
Many essays in literature investigate the organisation of cellular networks [100]. Explicitly or not,
they represent networks as bi-partite graphs [139] and their results are often in the form wp-graphs.
But their results are not synexions since in general they do not use information about space-time
localisation or characteristic times, distances and frequencies, even when available. Discarding this
sort of information may hamper our understanding of life’s liveness due to several reasons. To cite
one, molecules of substrates and residues of proteins need to fit the space-time niche where they are,
e.g., by adjusting vibrations. Besides that, connections between chemical reactions occurring in distinct
regions of a cell are often fake, since different molecules of the same substrate take part in each of them
and there is no real connection between the reactions [100,140].
This indicates how important it is to map the many networks in Figure 21b onto one another and
onto the organisation sketched in Figure 21a. The constraint given by Equation (9) is an important guide
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to obtain data that support more realistic biochemical networks. It is also an important designing clue
towards a coherent representation of living entities in Γ and B from the structural and dynamical stands.
From the organisation perspective, biological entities intake organisations, decompose them
into simpler organisations (catabolism), storing the energy released, and rearrange these simpler
organisations into parts of their own (anabolism) with little expenditure of energy, outputting matter
and energy that is not usable. Instead of being completely catabolised, assimilated organisations may
resonate with definite portions of the assimilating entity, being perceived and provoking imprints
that may eventually induce behavioural alterations [141]. A good example is the assimilation of
viruses by prokaryotic cells as immunological memories [108]. However, absorbed nucleic-acids
may distort the cell’s behaviour [142–144], often making it destroy itself. In both cases, which may
occur alongside, biological interactions entail organisational changes and in-formation exchange.
Hypotheses 1, particularly C and D, are necessary to make this description sound. This kind of
reasoning allows for addressing questions about the input of in-formation and knowledge during
phagocytosis or the merging of firms and other human organisations, as long as the complexity of
catabolic results is large enough to retain meaningful signals.
Two concepts in physics and chemistry are important to understand dynamics, stasis and stable
dynamical regimes—fluctuations and perturbation by virtual changes. The first is ontological and
effectively occur in phenomena inducing swiftness and ability to change. The second is methodological
and enables ideal inspection of alternative virtual behaviours, not observed but possible, and the
subsequent questioning about why Nature has chosen the path we observe. Fluctuations are ubiquitous
in living phenomena. Lively proteins flop between stable conformal states, altering interaction
possibilities [50]. Changes in population density are identified by quorum-sensing set-ups that
oscillate around chemical equilibrium points [33]. Complex oscillations between cellular modules and
processes that occur during cell division determine form and localisation [14], and so on. That is, they
manifest organisation-fluctuations.
Spaces Γ and B provide tools that allow for defining organisational difference and distance
between γ1, γ2 ∈ Γ as well as neighbourhoods around organisations in Γ, that may be processes like
the TCA cycle. Two points in Γ are close together if they differ only near the leaves of their recursive
skeletons; that is, near the bottom of the diagrams in Figures 9 or 10. Elements V(γ) of B present two
forms of fluctuation. They can oscillate around a state in P , which means that their instantiations
V ⊂ P (the “phase-space” retract) oscillate around a stable “set-value” in ℘(P) or γ cyclicly exchanges
some of its lower-complexity parts with elements available in its Γ-neighbourhood, like when a protein
docking-site is constantly being flip-flopped. One of the main features of the formalism underlying
this perspective is the ability to enforce distinguishing organisational fluctuations in a complex P from
dynamics [134]. Nevertheless, a would-be methodology of virtual behaviours (counterpart of virtual
displacements) needs to encompass evolutionary perspectives to be effective in explaining how the
actual organisation of ‘problems of complexity’ came to be.
6. Conclusions
This work addresses the description of organisation and suggests means to use organisation as a
tool to understand and explain living as well as other complex phenomena. Concomitantly, it enlarges
the general systems approach, sharpening systemic terms like: interacting parts, communication,
wholeness, modular organisation, whole-part relationship, hierarchical systems and so on. The elements
in U may be time-functions or space-time-functions that chronicle observable aspects of phenomena
[145] and compose system states ([8] chapter 4), offering other means to obtain immersions in B, that
do not necessarily comply with Equation (9). Thus, it also supports considering organisations that are
permanently being rebuilt by steady substitution of their hierarchically lower parts, as if the walls Wi of
Equation (24) were a collection of dynamical systems permanently substituting their bricks.
It introduces mathematical spaces for modelling organisations and defines in-formation grounded
on the organisation concept and the tools provided by these spaces. These spaces accommodate
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organisational fluctuations and the in-formation concept extends the usual Shannon-Brillouin
information; addressing the Shannon-Weaver levels of meaning and effectiveness [112] with no
a fortiori reference to senders, the pre-established set of messages or “intention”. Organisations and
in(side)formation augments our tools to address questions about the acquisition of imprints, know-how
and knowledge during interaction of organisations, phagocytosis and mergers included.
The complexity of organisation is central in these enquiries since an imprint, being part of an
organisation, is bound to have a complexity smaller than that of the organisation. Being dynamical
(like all elements in B), it is prone to oscillation and destabilisation. On the other side, any imprint is a
candidate to become a model and a model, knowledge; depending on relative complexities, stasis, and
dynamical relations.
Definition 9 looks anticipatory. Although only observers are required to anticipate the interpreter’s
behaviour to acknowledge change, the basic property enabling anticipation is the immersion of Γ in P ,
i.e., the space B, and thus any synexion with internal models may anticipate. Imprints in an interpreter
may be rock-stable, hampering change. Organisation fluctuations distort perceptions, destabilises and
fluidises imprints and models, perturbing interpretations. The organisation perspective thus support
investigations about the role of imprecision, fuzziness, adaptation, anticipation, emotion and moods
in adaptation, learning and cognition [115,146–148] during transfer of information at any scale and
encompasses all three Shannon-Weaver levels [112].
The introduced framework is able to represent (biological) organisations from a relational stand.
To define information in this context, organisations were immersed in a physical fabric endowed
with space-time, resulting in “concrete” organisations that associate structural organisation with
the dynamics of usual changes (Section 3.1.3). It presents examples and arguments supporting and
justifying this immersion and a statement about using the organisational perspective for studying living
phenomena. One advantage is that a mathematics can be developed in Γ (and B) that contemplates
transformations of organisations, relations among organisations and other mathematical tools, where
theorems can be proven and relational reasoning sharpened. It enables reasoning about organisations
independently of any ontological references or immersions in P , unveiling properties intrinsic to the
relational aspects of organisations (Sections 3.1.4 and 4.2). Furthermore, it supports the distinction and
identification of organisation changes amid dynamics in P . This text extends and improves previous
presentations of the above definitions [106,149,150].
Although inspired on life phenomena, the present concept of biological organisation extends
beyond life and may be used at the molecular and supra-organismic scales [10,14,28,66,121]. General
systems researchers think organisations as a collection of interacting components, alluding only
informally to hierarchy and treating organisation components as deciders [30]. On the other hand, the
definition of systems is meant to capture organisation [23,30,124]. General systems are special cases
of organisations as above, since a set of interacting components can be formalised as mathematical
relations [23], that are associated with hyper-graphs without isolated nodes [98] and, thus, are exactly
the organisations delineated in case 1 of Definition 2. Hence, the term organisation may be used
instead of the term system wherever it appears, providing a solid ground to handle systems of varying
structure [4], even with unknown bounds and domains for the structural variations.
Definition 2 formalises the hierarchy inherent in organisations, extending the former definitions in
many ways. It gives a formal meaning to terms like “system within a system” and “system composed
of systems”, so common in the literature. Mappings and relations can be defined in Γ, allowing for
comparing organisations, transforming them into one another, and considering organisations as the
same while portions of theirs vary (Sections 3.1.4 and 4.2). The concepts and tools here introduced,
therefore, add to the system thinking framework [124].
There are many ways of building bio-mathematical worlds, life-like universes and theoretical
explanations to study and understand life and richer phenomena, that develop along variegated
reasoning directives [10,41,53,55,57,60,65,82,151–154]. Some consider singular characteristics of life,
like organisation or reproduction, trying to explain them in terms of Shannon-Brillouin information,
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computational metaphors, bio-semiotics, or self-organising dynamical systems [8,41,60,84,155].
They draw on partial analogies, focus on the onset of life, or target the definition of life and organisation.
Many go beyond and aim towards a theoretical biology [8,56,152,156,157]. Of the latter, two stand out:
Rosen’s (M,R)-systems and Gánti’s Chemoton Theory [55].
It is not yet known whether these approaches relate to or can be rephrased in Γ and B. Probing
into possibilities, the following can be said about the last two. The Chemoton represents a would-be
pre-biotic living entity, being formed by three interconnected cyclic processes, represented by symbols
standing for unspecified molecules, enclosed by a boundary molecular circle plus a hypothesis about
diffusion of food and waste through the enclosing circle. Cyclic processes and the molecular circle can
be straightforwardly represented in Γ (see Section 3.1). The diffusion of waste and nutrients through
the boundary circle can be approximatively represented in B, even without the instantiation of the
Chemoton in B. Representing the Chemoton in B, however, requires the specification of physical and
chemical properties for each (molecular) node. Chemical properties will affect the relative position of
would-be molecules in the cycles, as well as the length and stabililty of the cycles. Physical properties
should determine which molecules compose the cycles. Thence, expressing the Chemoton in B
amounts to solving Gánti’s riddle.
Rosen addressed different questions. His formalism [8,68] is directed to express features that could
unquestionably identify and distinguish life, independently of how living entities are instantiated.
Despite both approaches being relational, it is unclear how to map his categorical diagrams into Γ or B.
Without resource to mathematical underpinnings, the following provides a possible interpretation of
Rosen’s ideas under the organisation perspective.
Block diagrams unite components into wholes. Their homologies in the organisation perspective
are thus the hyper-graphs at the root and forks of a γ’s recursive skeleton, Skt(γ), the root acting also
as a closure. Rosen’s basic components f : A → B, A f→ B, or H(A, B) [8, Section 5K]. may be atoms in
Γ or B, depending on how the sets A and B are constructed. The functors Φ and β are not in Γ but
could be transformations from Γ into Γ.
From a formalistic standpoint, Γ and B are closer to Rashevsky’s (1954) initial ideas, grounded on
graphs and discrete topology. Notwithstanding, the present approach departs from the majority of
existing approaches, perhaps radically, in what it abstracts from “biological function” or “origins of life”
phenomena and questions, instead of attempting to represent and answering them. Arcs and bindings
in whole-part graphs represent more directly observable and identifiable relations: spacial contiguity,
chemical bonds or affinity, preferences, channels of interaction, and so on; instead of function which is
a difficult observable [158], often only recognised a posteriori and in relation to external interactions
with elements of the organisation’s environment. Biological function is a many-to-many relationship.
This means that a biological entity may play several functional roles, while the same biological function
may be fulfilled by different entities. Having hyper-graphs as a fundamental building block, the
present perspective does support the organisation of pathways [100] and the identification functional
modules in a many-to-many fashion [34,35].
Complexity science, see [11, Chap 10] and [49], adaptive systems [153,159] and systems biology [160]
are revivals of the “general systems theory”, initiated by von Bertalanffy around the 1930s [52] to address
problems in biology [22,52], that were boosted by cybernetics concepts [136]. Organisations may be
employed in these fields in substitution of the systems concept, considering interactions among them
and adding the benefit of reasoning about systems while organisations globally, instead of in a case by
case, ad hoc, and behaviour centred manner.
For instance, with the tools offered by general systems theory, it is not possible to describe
a collection of interacting (eco)systems, maintaining their identity and internal dynamics while
considering interactions and dynamics among them, as it is not possible to consider a collection
of interacting organelles (biochemical systems) in a cell, maintaining their identities in the same way.
It is necessary to smash these phenomena into a huge and all-encompassing (dynamical) system
and be compelled to analyse the behaviour of the latter, loosing sight of the inherent hierarchy in
106
Systems 2017, 5, 23
the phenomena and the fact that organelles are often standalone entities encapsulated by permeable
membranes that modulate their interactions with rest of the cell. Organisations, synexions in particular,
help to keep behavioural levels separate and subsystems as units, studying each separately or in
conjunction in several ways.
It allows also for discussing organisations as such, independently of any dynamics, as when
discussing the relation of organisation and complexity in Section 4.2. Furthermore, techniques
already developed for composite systems can support the disentanglement of dynamics between
the various hierarchy levels of organisations and creation of aggregated states for sub-organisations.
Moreover, mathematical investigations about properties of Γ and B, may develop a coherent and
encompassing platform to address Weaver’s ‘problems of organised complexity’. It allows for
extending formalisations to chemistry [56], aligning with Gánti’s proposal of addressing questions of
how can raw materials and simple organisations assemble into larger organisations [161], maintain
themselves and evolve, addressing also more complex entities like communities, societies and
beyond [2], by using the concept of modules [135].
It is worth emphasising that the framework presented above adds but does not supersedes or
substitute any of the previous essays. Instead, it offers a formalism where they can possibly be rephrased
and brought together providing richer pictures of complex features and traits. Even communication
channels and Shannon-Brillouin information can be regained in Γ or B, if the sender is made explicit
and the set of exchangeable messages is known and fixed in advance. Yuri Lazebnik in 2002 [162]
ingeniously claimed for an unambiguous biological language. Such language is vital for biotechnology
[109] and for constructing (more fundamental) biological theories [17]. In physical and chemical
phenomena, only the attributes of ‘things’ change. Interactions and the possibilities of interaction
do not change, or change mildly and are considered fixed. In living and complex phenomena, on
the contrary, ‘interactions’ (or relations) change wildly, even more often than ‘things’. It is my hope
that the organisation framework and the perspective it introduces, bringing interactions and things
to the same level of attention, will serve as a basis for developing such language and help boosting
the description of inter-level relations [163] and the concomitant addressing of proximal and ultimate
explanations [164] by allowing the consideration of a dynamics of relations associated with the usual
dynamics, as discussed in [26]. If it comes to assist the establishment of a philosophy and basic
principles for the living and complex sciences [16,165] will be an added bonus. The importance of
having a consensual philosophy and well-established principles is addressed in [22,23,124] in an
unsurpassable manner.
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Abstract: After having outlined the essential differences between non-complex systems and complex
systems we briefly recall the conceptual approaches considered by the pre-complexity General
Systems Theory introduced by Von Bertalanffy in 1968 and those of the science of complexity and
post-Bertalanffy General Systems Theory. In this context, after outlining the concept of completeness,
we consider cases of incompleteness in various disciplines to arrive at theoretical incompleteness.
The latter is clarified through several cases of different natures and by approaches in the literature,
such as logical openness, the Dynamic Usage of Models (DYSAM), and the principle of uncertainty in
physics. The treatment and the contrast between completeness and incompleteness are introduced as
a conceptual and cultural context, as knowledge to manage the knowledge society in analogy,
for example, with the transition from the logic of certainty to that of uncertainty introduced
by De Finetti. The conceptual framework of completeness is not appropriate for dealing with
complexity. Conversely, the conceptual framework of incompleteness is consistent and appropriate
with interdisciplinary complexity.
Keywords: completeness; constructivism; decidability; openness; procedure; system; uniqueness
1. Introduction
This article introduces conceptual specifications regarding the concepts of completeness and
incompleteness. The latter concept is treated by distinguishing between (a) incompleteness of
a phenomenological nature (given, for instance, by non-proceduralizability; non-completability;
incompleteness of constraints, of degrees of freedom or representation; approximation; and by
indefiniteness) and (b) theoretical incompleteness (given, for instance, by non-decidability; principles
of uncertainty; non-computable uncertainty; non-complete, non-explicit and non-univocal modeling).
The theme of theoretical incompleteness has been treated in the literature in correspondence to, or
negation of, meanings of completeness in various disciplines [1], such as logic and mathematics, where
examples include Russell’s paradox [2] and the incompleteness theorems introduced by Gödel [3].
This paper focuses on concepts appropriate for modeling complex systems, such as social
systems [4–6]. It attempts to outline conceptual invariants relating to theoretical incompleteness
and its disciplinary transversality, therefore, being suitable for generalizations not based on genericity,
but being suitable for methodologies, approaches, and representations for problems, typically related
to complex systems [7,8], (see Section 2) represented, for instance, as networks [9].
Such problems and representations showing how incompleteness, or better, assumptions of
completeness, turn out to be completely or partially ineffective and inadequate [10] are explored.
This is done by using procedures and analytical models based on finite representations and logically
closed systems (see Section 6.1).
We emphasize the search for meaning, cross-usability of the philosophical concept of
incompleteness and of theoretical incompleteness. This should really be a cultural process involving
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all of the concepts of the post-Bertalanffy Theory of General Systems [11–13] such as logical openness
(see Section 6.1) as a multiplicity of modeling; coherence; emergence as continuous and unpredictable,
but coherent, acquisition of multiple properties; equivalence/non-equivalence of models and
evolutionary paths; theoretical principles of uncertainty and indeterminacy; individuality to break
equivalences; induction of properties, rather than prescriptions of solutions; overall conceptual
interdependence, non-separability from the environment; irreversibility as the price for uniqueness;
multiplicity, multiple systems set dynamically by the same components; observed in terms of the
observer; networks and properties of networks, such as small worldness and their topological properties;
simultaneity; and overlapping. These, considering the fact that properties and problems of complex
systems, particularly social systems, are still dealt with using the concepts of classical Bertalanffy
General Systems Theory [14], such as anticipation; openness as permeability of system barriers to
matter and energy; equilibrium; functioning, as for devices possessing and not acquiring properties;
optimal and computable organization; optimization always being possible and positive in principle;
predictability and repeatability; adjustability; feedback; and reversibility.
When dealing with social systems such a distinction, between Bertalanffy and post-Bertalanffy
General Systems Theory, is combined with, or even corresponds to, the knowledge to be used to
manage. That is, conceive, make emergent, and change properties, and induce processes in business,
culture, and economics, within cooperation and assimilation, fashion, food uses, interactions, professions,
customs, and general usage.
The post-industrial society [15], or knowledge society [16], is where examples of sources of
complexity are properties, such as knowledge-intensive products and services; delocalization and
globalization; duplicability; general highly-networked interconnections; high virtuality; importance
of individuality; coherences rather than equilibrium; interchangeability; online actions; reduced time
between design, implementation, and marketing; generally short product lifespan; technological
innovations and solutions rapidly creating new problems; non-linearity; and large amounts of data.
Conversely, social systems are often managed, i.e., conceived as non-complex systems, by still using
the knowledge of pre-complexity [17].
This is not simply to update methods, but to vary and structurally adapt the general culture.
This article is meant to be a contribution towards social development processes in areas such
as education and the management of enterprises and social institutions [18,19]. Here, the word
‘management’ takes for granted the directivity of social systems, in a pre-complexity systemic vision.
In reality, the aim is to induce the emergence of properties to be acquired by the Social Systems
(as complex systems) and not to adjust or impose them. Giving orders to a complex system is inadequate
and ineffective. Management of complex systems, which social systems are, requires multiple strategies
and approaches, such as action on the environment, adding suitable perturbations, making energetic
variations, acting upon the relations with the outside world and on learning processes by interacting
with other systems. It is to change constraints and provide perturbations to be processed by the system
to orient and not to decide. This could include changes in the use of resources, language, organizational
approaches, prices, or rates. Probably the word management is now misleading after years of being
synonymous with directive and invasive approaches.
The work objectives are based on considering theoretical incompleteness as one of the properties
characterizing complex systems amongst others well-known in the literature [20] (see Section 2).
Theoretical incompleteness should be suitably represented, modeled, used, activated or
de-activated, graduated, replicated, avoided, and combined in different forms. The assumption
of theoretical incompleteness as a negative property which must be reduced to incompleteness to be
completed as the only possible strategy is very ineffective when dealing with complex systems.
We may consider a possible analogy between the mesoscopic level of representation and
theoretical incompleteness. In physics, mesoscopic variables, when not relating to the quantum
level, relate to an intermediate level between the micro and the macro. At this level the micro is not
completely neglected as when adopting the macro levels (see, for instance, [21–24]).
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The approach based on considering mesoscopic variables relies on the philosophy of the ‘middle
way’ as introduced in [25].
Simple examples of mesoscopic variables are:
‚ In car traffic, when considering the instantaneous number of cars, or clusters, which cannot
accelerate. Simultaneously we consider cars blocked in a queue, cars which are decelerating, and
cars with constant speed;
‚ In a building, one can consider the instantaneous number of people, or clusters, using the elevator
or stairs, going either up or down; and
‚ In a flock we may consider the instantaneous number of birds, or clusters, having the same speed,
whatever their direction or altitude.
The mesoscopic level is the place of continuous negotiations between the micro and the macro,
where a large variety of mesoscopic representations are possible allowing an undefined number of
possible clusters.
On the other hand, the conceptual analogy of the mesoscopic case with theoretical incompleteness
lies in the fact that such incompleteness may apply in several different ways as the place of those
continuous negotiations between completeness and incompleteness. In this case, instead of clusters,
there are different levels, graduations, and approximations of completeness and incompleteness
referring to different variables describing the case.
Theoretical incompleteness may be intended as the place where phenomena are incomplete
enough to allow emergence [26] of dynamical coherences [27], e.g., multiple synchronizations [28],
as for the emergence of complex systems (see Section 2) rather than iterations of the same complete
rules and properties. This is the case of logically open systems, introduced in Section 6, of which their
evolution is not driven by the same complete rules, but by dynamically changing coherent rules.
One interesting future research issue relates to the possibility of considering theoretical
incompleteness as a necessary, or even, in specific cases, a sufficient condition for the establishment of
processes of emergence.
The purpose of this paper is to underline and support approaches for the usages of incompleteness
as a property rather than to avoid it as a negative property, in principle. This relates to complex systems
in general, with special attention to social systems.
We conclude by stressing the extreme interdisciplinary nature of this way of understanding
theoretical incompleteness to be elaborated by disciplines relevant for dealing with social systems
in their post-industrial phase, or knowledge societies intended as those based upon scientific and
theoretical knowledge as their main resource (see Section 7). Examples of such disciplines are
communication sciences; economics; education; political sciences; psychology; and sociology.
2. Non-Complex and Complex Systems
Non-complex systems are intended as those based on the properties cited in the Introduction
and which are related to classical Bertalanffy General Systems Theory. Non-complex systems acquire
over time the same property due to their functioning (such as the working of powered electronic
devices when, for instance, they are transformed from a structured set of components to a device
acquiring the property of being a radio or some other end-user device). Elementary examples include
machinery, electronic devices, and feedback-regulated devices, systems that do not learn, having
fixed rules, or otherwise low-parametric variability. It is a matter of decidable systems, represented
completely, whose evolutionary paths can reach a finite, or in any case, a numerable number of states.
Their possible openness involves finite and precise modalities to process external environmental
input [14]. Into this category fall systems that have probabilistic, but computable, evolutionary
behavioral paths (see the difference between computable and non-computable uncertainty [29] as
introduced below). Examples of such systems include automata (mechanical and electronic systems),
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transportation systems, housing systems, telecommunication systems, security systems, energy
management systems, and fuzzy systems [30].
Complex systems do not acquire, over time, the same systemic property, but comprise continuous
processes of structural changes (see Section 5.1, Section 5.4, and Section 5.8), such as phase
transition [31,32], with self-organization (when the sequence of new properties acquired in a phase
transition-like manner, has regularities and repetitiveness, for example a swarm around a light,
the formation of queues, or synchronizations [33–37] and emergence (when the sequence of new
properties is not regular, not repetitive, but coherent, i.e., having multiple different synchronisations
and correlations, for example a flock having multiple and changing shapes, density and direction
but maintaining scale invariance) [38–40] taking place, acquiring over time coherent sequences of new
properties [41,42]. Examples of complex systems without cognitive systems include cellular automata;
double pendulum; dissipative structures [43,44], e.g., whirlpools in fluid dynamics and chaotic systems
(see below). Examples include the climate system; protein chains and their withdrawal; cells and
bacteria; objects on vibrating surfaces that tend to make consistent variations; autonomous lighting
networks that tend to adopt coherent variations (such as communities of fireflies); and traffic signals
(Internet). We may consider examples of complex systems consisting of coherent communities of living
systems provided with cognitive systems, i.e., autonomous systems that are able to decide their behavior
not only in an algorithmic way. In these cases the decision of behaviors cannot be reduced to compute
optimizations, but it is a process of emergence from a wide variety of aspects. In a nutshell, a cognitive
system is to be understood as a system of interactions between activities such as those related to
attention, perception, language, the affective and emotional sphere, memory and inferential system,
logical activity. Examples include swarms; flocks; industrial clusters; industrial district networks;
markets; and social systems, such as cities, schools, hospitals, companies, families, and temporary
communities, such as passengers, audiences, and telephone networks.
Complex systems have characterizing properties. Some of them are listed below.
‚ Scale invariance when patterns, shapes, and morphological properties are independent of
dimensions (e.g., spatial properties, number of components) [45];
‚ Validity of power laws among variables characterizing the system. Power laws are given by a
special kind of mathematical relationship between two quantities. When the frequency of an
event varies as a power of some attribute of that event, e.g., its size, the frequency is said to follow
a power law [46].
‚ The evolutionary paths of the system fall within the basin of an attractor, see Figure 1 and
Section 5.7, [47–50]. Evolutionary paths are robust to perturbations. This is the case of chaotic
systems which are very sensitive to initial conditions, e.g., smoke diffusion and weather [51–53].
‚ Properties based on Network Science [54–58]. We consider properties of a network representing
a complex system, such as being scale-free (when the network has a high number of nodes
possessing few links, and a small number of nodes possessing a high number of links. In other
words, in scale-free networks the probability that a node selected at random will possess a
particular number of links follows a power law). Furthermore networks can have the property to
be small-world when most nodes are not neighbors of one another, but most nodes can be reached
from every other node via a small number of intermediate links. Other properties relate to the
degree of sequence distribution, cluster coefficient, topology of the network, and fitness (the way
the links between nodes change over time depends on the ability of nodes to attract links) [59–62].
Several representations of social systems based on networks are available in the literature (see, for
instance, [63,64]).
Other properties which may be considered include their explicit analytical intractability (their
behavior cannot be zipped nor exhaustively represented with analytical formulae). In such cases systems
are modeled using non-ideal models, such as neural networks and cellular automata.
We are considering here theoretical incompleteness as a candidate property of complex systems.
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For an overview on properties of complex systems see, for instance, [65–68].
Figure 1. Generic graphic representation of evolutionary paths around an attractor, a single point in
this case.
3. Meaning
Definitions are supposed to provide, at the highest levels of precision, formal descriptions of
properties and limits with the vocation for completeness or exhaustiveness. That is, we cannot add to
it. Examples in mathematics are geometrical axioms. Other generic examples relate to fiscal properties,
such as taxation or safety procedures in the workplace.
An incomplete definition is intended to overlook some aspects which would tend to make it only
partially usable.
Without going into theoretical specificity treated by semiotics and philosophy, we consider here
the meanings of terms as given at different levels of contextuality and sensitivity to usage, suitable
for different levels of generalization. The completeness of a definition is in these cases dampened by
metaphorical usage, analogies, and extrapolations accepting generic contextuality. For instance, this
occurs when one has to specify concepts which need to include all possible negations of a definition
(absolute incompleteness as opposed to completeness). This is the concept of incompleteness which is
not reducible to multiple negations of completeness.
4. Notes on the Concept of Completeness
Considering the topic of this article, there are several ways to indicate the meaning of completeness.
For instance, a list may be considered complete when it contains all, and possibly only, the references
to the entities under consideration. Of course, the number of elements is usually expected to be finite
and limited, even though the definition is conceptually extendable to different cases. The reference is
to be exhaustive, with complete information considered and without overlooking any detail that is
deemed to be significant.
“Complete” has the meaning of being the maximum, to finish, end, close, reaching the
purpose, considering even equi-finality starting from different initial conditions in open systems [14].
Completeness can refer to a process which, over time, reaches its final, possibly more than one, state,
equivalent or not.
Completeness may be understood as corresponding to the fact that a system or a process has
a finite number of degrees of freedom (fully described by a finite number of variables), and a finite
number of constraints (values of min and max which may be adopted by variables). An endless
completeness may be considered to correspond with incompleteness.
Completeness can also conceptually relate to processes and functionalities assumed as complete.
For example, as they are self-consistent and autonomous, able to find resources to maintain a property,
such as life, or to perform autopoietic reproduction. This is the case of systems which are incomplete
(for example, with a number of states being assumed as being undefined), but autonomous, that is
capable of reacting, for example in a stochastic manner or by learning, to specific inputs.
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A related concept is that of completability, in general; that is, the possibility of making complete
what is not yet complete. In general, in the non-complexity conceptual context, the assumption of
completability as potential is assumed valid.
In mathematics, completeness can refer to the properties of a mathematical entity to be contained
within another larger entity of the same type. Furthermore, in mathematical logic completeness refers
to the fact that a set of axioms is sufficient to prove all the truths of a theory. Based on this it is, therefore,
possible to decide the truth or falsity of any statement formulated in the language of the theory. In this
context, the conceptual space of completeness would be well defined by considering it as consisting of:
1. Decidability. As introduced by Alan Turing (1912–1954) a problem is decidable if there is an
algorithm that produces the corresponding solution in finite time for each instance of the
input data (the equivalent of having a complete, calculable model of the behavior of systems
having that problem and subjected to an external intervention). This is the concept of effective
computability [69].
A problem is “undecidable” if there is no algorithm which produces the corresponding solution
in finite time for each instance of the input data (equivalent to the fact that an algorithm cannot
produce the solution in finite time). In mathematical logic, the concept of undecidability refers
to the fact that a given formalized theory T is not decidable, i.e., there is no algorithm able to
mechanically determine for each formula whether or not it is a theorem of T (see Sections 5.1
and 5.7). The reference is to the Turing machine, an ideal finite states machine. This machine processes,
using a predetermined set of rules defined exhaustively by reading and writing symbols, the data
contained on an ideal tape for input and having potentially infinite length. The process of such an
abstract model defines computability, the concept of algorithm in general [69].
2. Deduction, instead of induction or abduction. Validity of deduction is assumed when, for example,
(a) this box contains red balls; (b) these balls are from that box; (c) the balls are all red. If the
premises are true, the conclusions cannot be that true. Whereas induction has a probabilistic
nature as in the case that (a) the balls are from that box; (b) these balls are red; (c) the more they
pull out and if they are all red one might conclude that all the balls in the box are red.
In the case of abduction, introduced by Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), it is matter of the invention
of hypotheses, which can also be understood as a choice amongst the most effective available.
For example, when observing facts of type B, a rule such as: if A then B may explain B. So, if at
the time no other hypothesis can explain B better, we may assume the validity of A [70]. This is
related to creativity, as in second order cybernetics, focusing upon inventing a new game rather
than playing an existing game [71].
3. Certainty. Essentially this is a matter of reducing, or even cancelling, uncertainty. In the logic
of certainty [72,73], it is not conceptually considered to maximize probabilities, but to have
computable levels of certainty. However, probabilities relate to configurations of events, conditional
probabilities as considered by the observer.
The assumption that events can be considered as isolated, separated by configurations to
which they belong should be considered as reductionist simplifications. On the other hand,
configurations are not objectivistic but rather depend upon the cognitive approach taken by
the observer.
These configurations are inalienably constructivist [74–79], created by the observer, the generator
of cognitive reality rather than of relativism, as introduced by De Finetti (1906–1985) [80]. The cognitive
strategy expressed by cognitivism is well-expressed through the distinction between:
‚ Trying to understand how something really is, and
‚ How it is more effective to think of it (which model to adopt).
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Note that the former is a particular case of the latter. Objectivism leads to the inevitable
phenomenological acceptance of becoming. From the moment we wonder what happened..., how it
happened ... by involving cognitive abilities, constructivism intervenes. We assume then descriptive
and interpretative models of the phenomena detected (detection needs a model itself...), generators, in
their turn, of new configurations to be modelled. Something happened in what our cognitive system
calls outside and we adopt a strategy to make models for acting, interacting, and abstracting using the
cognitive system we have. Science does this and cognitive science studies this process. There is a vast
literature on this subject (see, for instance, [81–84]). For example, is it more effective to think of a social
problem as being military or political, a mathematical problem as being geometrical or algebraic, the
problem of corruption as being cultural or legal (See Sections 5.2 and 5.3). Effectiveness may increase
by suitably considering options in combined and not only exclusive ways (assuming only the “or”
option), e.g., biological and psychological. Non-computable uncertainty refers to those contexts having,
as a component, the environment with its turbulence, processes of emergence, and autonomous
processes [85,86]. Section 5.5 covers incompleteness and non-predictability.
5. Incompleteness
Below is a partial list, in no specific order, illustrating concepts and cases related to incompleteness,
considered as constituting examples of dynamic and theoretically-incomplete sets (see Section 6) of
cases of phenomenological incompleteness.
The property of incompleteness may refer to one or more specific properties; may have different
levels or may be general; that is, valid for any properties in general or for any property of a specific
entity; may be intended as not yet complete or uncompletable or chronically not-completable, in principle.
The property of incompleteness should be considered in combination with one or more levels of
description and scales.
Section 6 shows how incompleteness refers to aspects of logical openness [10,87,88].
5.1. Non-Proceduralizable
The prototype of the concept of procedure is the concept of the algorithm intended as a program
for a Turing Machine as an ideal programmable machine (see Section 4 on decidability). The general
idea is to have approaches well-defined through step-by-step methods indicating what and when to do
something mechanically applicable to families of problems, such as those related to construction, health,
maintenance, and security. A procedure is intended as that being well-described in instruction manuals.
However, the plurality of degrees of freedom of complex systems; their structural change (change
of rules rather than of parameters of only the same rule, variability, and unpredictability) make
procedural approaches ineffective because they consider fixed and abstract variables in the face of
phenomena whose variables change, form, and combine in multiple and unpredictable ways, i.e., they
are emergent [89,90]. The procedures may cover areas, aspects of a problem, and provide, for example,
the basic behavioral claims in cases of emergency, e.g., health, and ensure legal cover for those who
carefully followed the prescribed procedure.
However, the procedures to deal with a problem can increase so much that it becomes impossible
or paralyze an appropriate intervention for situations with features of uniqueness (complex emergent
systems are made of coherent uniqueness). Such procedures often have as their purpose the prevention
of unauthorized actions or personal responsibilities. Examples include actions to tackle environmental
disasters or criminal acts, and interventions in the face of irrational, unexpected behavior with
predictable, nefarious outcomes.
There are also cases where complexity prevents the adoption of procedures to be considered
as exhaustive. For example, the management of safety at work is not reducible to rules, due to the
complexity inevitably introduced by the human operator [91].
In mathematics, this issue concerns the non-reducibility of general computation to Turing
computability as for emerging and natural computing [92]).
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5.2. Uncompletable
In geometry, an axiom of order introduced by David Hilbert (1862–1943) states that if A and C are
two points, then there always exists at least a point B on the line AC, such that C lies between A and B,
see Figure 2.
      A             C                   B 
      •               •                    •   
Figure 2. There always exists at least a point between two points.
It is a theoretical generator of points between two points.
In this case, a hypothetical list of points between two points is uncompletable (because of the
non-finite number).
In a metaphorical or conceptually similar way, the knowledge, i.e., representations and models, of
a complex problem is not limited to the formulation of lists having finite numbers of recommended
procedures to be followed (the classical instructions for use). Rather, in the case of social systems, it is
a question of cognitive, context-sensitive processing, always variable depending, for example, upon
experience, or new information or new knowledge, as considered by logical openness (see Section 6.1).
Since the classical instructions for use cannot exhaust the possibilities of actual use, modern
products and services are presented with appropriate designs to induce adequate but any usage by the
generic user.
In the management of public safety any procedure is uncompletable as any type of events can
change the context, such as the use of technologies, environmental impact, or unexpected situations,
in general.
5.3. Incompleteness and Uniqueness
Completeness can be understood to reflexively possess repeatability of the action of completing in
the face of the improbable uniqueness of the action of completing, for instance, by applying the same
procedure. The action of completing may be assumed to be identically repeatable, for example, because
of the sameness of what is to be completed: either a procedure or the mathematical fractal filling
curves of Peano and Hilbert [93]. There is conceptual negation of uniqueness, i.e., an assumption of
repeatability of the same procedure to deal with the same category of problems. Processes of completion
intended as unique, for one-off, non-repeatable, cases contrasts with the iterative, procedural aspect
of completion.
In a parallel way, incompleteness can be understood as the non-repeatability of any completion.
This may occur, for example, because what is to be completed is considered never equal to itself,
e.g., on suitably different scales, or because of the dependence of the process of completing based on
different initial conditions. There is conceptual correspondence with the concept of uniqueness.
Strategies and approaches to manage repeatability are inadequate for the possible uniqueness of
incompleteness; as for emergent properties, unique and incomplete, not completely definable in an
analytical way.
5.4. Undefined and Uncompleted
Indefiniteness can be considered as being due to insufficient levels of accuracy in defining (perhaps
as desired or possibly upgradeable until achieving definiteness). The vague lines of the impressionist
painters constructively leave the observer to mentally build his/her line at that time. Indefiniteness,
imprecision, and incompleteness can be understood to constitute a constructivist freedom.
In turn, it is possible to consider indefinability as being given, for example, by structural dynamics
for which entities or processes, on a suitable scale and level of description, change fundamental
structural properties and identity. For example, structural dynamics apply to the structural autonomy of
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processes of emergence which cannot be completely, explicitly, and univocally defined (they are logically
open, see Section 6.1). A flock is always different over time, but it keeps its identity as a flock in that it
maintains, for instance, sufficient levels of coherence and scale invariance. Furthermore, appropriate
levels of vagueness and incompleteness are areas of potentiality for processes which adopt corresponding
levels of uniqueness (e.g., oneness of people, fingerprints, medical patients, or snowflakes). Moreover,
there are various (even infinite) ways to comply with constraints. Variables considered as representing
a specific entity can take on different values while respecting the constraints, e.g., constantly close to
the minimum or maximum values of the constraints or oscillating in regular or stochastic ways.
Another example of indefiniteness and incompleteness is given in baroque music by the practice
of the basso continuo, a historically improvised accompaniment, so that the score does not completely
indicate the chords to play along with the low notes, but only numbers (or code words, as the word
BACH) which give clues on how the instrumentalist should improvise.
5.5. Incompleteness and Non-Predictability
It is possible to consider incompleteness as being combined with non-predictability. We distinguish
between at least two types of probabilities which represent predictability. Certain probability is
intended here as computable probability intended as identifying significant possible extremes e.g.,
maximum-minimum, to the phenomenological becoming of any process, which is free to happen
within these extremes, such as, for example, computed through the Bayes’ theorem. In short, the
theorem states that if P(A) and P(B) are the independent probabilities of A and B, and P(A | B) is
the probability (conditional probability) of observing event A given that B is true, than P(B | A) is
the probability of observing event B given that A is true, see also Section 4. Uncertain probability is
intended here as non-computable probability referring to the non-predictability of processes, for example,
of emergence which cannot be completely, explicitly, and uniquely defined.
The property of incompleteness of events or processes may be predictable or not, such as the
induction of a self-organizing process which could have non-predictable aspects, for example, in
producing the Belousov-Zhabotinski reaction [94,95] consisting of an oscillating chemical reaction
in which the periodic variation of concentrations is indicated by striking color variations and the
formation of convective patterns called Rayleigh-Bénard cells [96] in a liquid evenly heated from below.
The occurrence of such processes is predictable but in incomplete ways, e.g., details of patterns and
directions of convective patterns are not predictable. On the other hand, aspects of unpredictability,
as in processes of emergence, owe their unpredictability to their being constantly incomplete, which
makes them unique.
5.6. Multiple and Dynamic Incompleteness
Depending upon the level of description, incompleteness may relate to various aspects of a
phenomenon, such as completely owning a property, but at different times (both with and without
regularity); with different modes (e.g., intensity); or relating to different properties.
In the scientific literature, multiple and dynamic incompleteness may be intended as being
expressed by the concept of quasiness where, for example, quasicrystals are a particular solid form in
which the atoms are arranged in a deterministic but not repetitive structure, which is not periodic, as in
the case of normal crystals, honeycombs, and beehives. Quasicrystals have almost periodic patterns
for which the local arrangement of the material is fixed and regular, but not periodic throughout the
material, i.e., the property is incompletely respected in multiple possible ways [97].
5.7. Incompleteness and Undecidability
A typical problem of undecidability (see Section 4) is the classic halting problem for the Turing
machine. Turing showed [69] that a Turing machine which decides, i.e., stops in some state, whether
another Turing machine processing an input w will stop in some state or will continue indefinitely,
cannot exist.
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In this regard, in mathematical logic Kurt Gödel (1906–1978) proved two theorems about the
incompleteness of mathematics [3]. One of these states that, in any consistent formalization of mathematics,
sufficiently powerful to allow axiomatization of the elementary theory of natural numbers (that
is, define the structure of natural numbers with the operations of sum and product) it is possible
to construct a formally-correct proposition that can be neither proven nor disproved within the
same system.
This is logically equivalent to the construction of a logical formula that denies its own provability.
The second states that if one considers a coherent mathematical theory sufficient to contain arithmetic
(e.g., the arithmetic based on the Peano axioms: 1-there exists a natural number 0; 2-every natural
number has a natural number successor; 3-different numbers have different successors; 4-zero is not
the successor of any natural number; 5-each subset of natural numbers which contains 0 and the
successor of each element coincides with the entire set of natural numbers (axiom of induction), it is
not possible to prove the coherence of the theory within the theory itself. The result can be extended to
any theory that can be represented recursively (by recursive functions and predicates), and for which
it is possible to arithmetize the syntax of the theory. A generalization consists in the fact that it is not
possible to use a coherent system to demonstrate its own coherence.
Incompleteness concerns indecisiveness as a characteristic of a given problem; for example, the
non-theoretical availability of an algorithm able to answer questions related to the problem.
As will be shown below when dealing with theoretical incompleteness (see Section 6), incompleteness
as undecidability also concerns the conceptual impossibility of identifying solutions and, in particular,
optimal solutions to complex problems which require, instead, systems of dynamical and non-equivalent
approaches (as with DYSAM and logical openness as introduced in Sections 6.1 and 6.2) to intervene
effectively on properties acquired continuously rather than being possessed by complex systems.
Of the same nature is the concept of optimization which, for complex systems, does not concern the
acquisition of the best value, but of permissible values through the dynamics of variable configurations
within dynamic constraints ensuring coherence at least as synchronization (for example, in biology
ensuring sustainability and permissible values of vital parameters) or permissible evolutionary
trajectories in the vicinity of an attractor. In short sn attractor is a set of numerical values, e.g., a single
point or a finite set of points, a curve, and a manifold, toward which a dynamical system, starting
from any variety of initial conditions tends to evolve. Evolutionary paths of the system, when close
enough to the attractor, remain close even if perturbed (the Lorenz butterfly attractor is a celebrated
example, [52,53]).
5.8. Systemic Incompleteness
Systems can be considered as complete or incomplete.
For example, systems can be considered complete when they are fully described by a finite
number of variables and models (presumably the same throughout the entire developmental period).
Yet a system can be considered complete when all of the evolutionary-reachable states are of a finite
and limited number. This is the case of logical closure (see Section 6.1) as opposed to logic openness.
Systems can be considered incomplete when their complexity in acquiring properties and
their structural dynamics are such that a single model is not sufficient for their representation.
More non-equivalent models are needed, not only in an indefinite number, but variable in different
combinations to be abductively, constructively invented by the observer (as in the case of DYSAM
introduced in Section 6.2).
Moreover, a system can be considered incomplete when the set of reachable evolutionary states is
undefined or, better, its finiteness is undecidable.
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5.9. Incompleteness of Constraints
As mentioned in Section 5.9 the incompleteness of the constraints is the fact that nothing is said
about how to comply with such constraints and the actual use that a single system makes. Systems with
the same constraints may have had different evolutionary paths.
For example, as mentioned above in Section 5.4, the values between the maximum and minimum
constraints are all authorized, but they may be acquired by systems in different ways over time,
for example, close to the maximum or close to the minimum, or oscillating with regularity, or
randomly oscillating.
The mode of use of the constraints (that is, the modes respecting the constraints) allows systems
to be considered as structurally equivalent, but actually different, with regard to aspects of their
evolutionary process and whereby paths between the constraints represent specific trajectories having
specific properties.
The use of the constraints is not prescribable and in this aspect lays the incompleteness.
5.10. Incompleteness and Freedom
We only mention how the concept of freedom refers to the possibility of building new degrees of
freedom rather than the extension, both in number and for allowable values, of those already available.
6. Theoretical Incompleteness
The concept of theoretical incompleteness is typically studied in mathematics, as mentioned in
Sections 4 and 5.7. In general, the concept of theoretical incompleteness refers to incompleteness in
principle, intrinsically, as a possible property possessed by systems, theories, phenomena, or processes,
and their properties themselves. Regarding systems, this corresponds, for example, to the concept of
logical openness.
6.1. The Case of Logical Openness
We recall that closed systems refer to the fact of being isolated, without exchange of neither matter
nor energy with the outside world and reaching their final state uniquely determined by the initial
conditions. Examples are ideally thermally-insulated machines.
The concept of the logically closed model is suitable to describe the evolution of such thermodynamically
closed systems.
More precisely, we define a model as logically closed when:
1. a full, formal description of the relations between the state variables of the model is available;
2. a complete and explicit, i.e., analytically describable, description of the interaction between the
system and its environment is available; and
3. knowledge from the previous two points allows deduction of all possible states which the system
can take together with its structural characteristics.
For example, a simple temperature control system with a thermostat can be considered logically
closed and complete since the influence of the environment is reduced to its possible variations of
temperature to which the thermostat reacts.
A system is intended as logically open when there is violation of the three points above (see Table 1).
Logical openness [10,87,88,98], ([99], pp. 111–112) can be considered as the non-depleting or infinite
number of degrees of freedom when the system includes the environment (in principle independent),
thus making the system incomplete as regards the environment and its influence. In complex systems,
as introduced in Sections 1 and 2, the degrees of freedom (system variables) are not only in an imprecise
and variable number, but can be continuously acquired. In complex systems processes of emergence
occur for which the system acquires n-sequences of new non-equivalent properties to be dealt with
by adopting n-different levels of description to be treated with corresponding n-different models and
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combinations (as with DYSAM, introduced below). The n-levels of modeling are based on n-levels of
representation by:
‚ constructively creating suitable possible correspondences between levels,
‚ adopting a strategy to move between levels, and
‚ considering, simultaneously, more than one level.
The incompleteness of logical openness is given both by usage of a variable number of models
and by the indefiniteness of n due to the fact that models and representations are abductively and
constructively generated by the observer [99].
Table 1. A schematic comparison between aspects of logically closed systems and logically open systems.
Logically Closed Systems Logically Open Systems
Passive Active
Insensitive to the context Context-sensitive
Do not learn Learn
Object-oriented Process-oriented
Not flexible Flexible
Do not change the rules, at most the parameters Change the rules
Avoid contradictions They use the contradictions
Operate on the basis of mono-strategies Multi-use strategies, such as DYSAM
Deductive Deductive, inductive and abductive
Objectivist conceptual framework Use of objectivism and constructivism
Observer considered external, generator of relativism Observer is an integral part of the system and generator of its cognitive existence
It is possible to consider logical openness for autonomous systems provided with cognitive systems
which process input and decide case by case, each in a possibly different way from the other (a) the
behavior to be taken; (b) the degrees of freedom in unknown number, variable and continually acquired.
This is the case for human behavior where assumptions of rationality and optimization are simplistic
and inadequate (for example, to model the behavior of market customers by adopting decisions based
on optimizing the trade-off between price and quality) as is the assumption of complete respect for
procedures or repeatability over time.
In the case of logical openness for systems with cognitive systems, one may consider the following
examples of levels of logical openness.
1. A first level can be considered as being given by thermodynamic openness to which we have
referred, for which matter and energy are able to cross the boundaries of the system. For example,
the system is able to send and receive signals, but nothing is said about their processing or
attribution or the processing of their meaning. This is the case for two computers physically
exchanging “strings of bits” and for the moves of two opponents who are playing against each other.
2. A second level can be considered where received and transmitted signals are processed in the
hypothesis of an absolute semantics, predetermined, and equal for all. In this case there is the
assumption that the meaning of the messages is identical and constant between transmitter and
receiver, as with the formal language of operating systems for computers: in the interactions with
the user it is the latter which must adapt and understand the pre-established meanings.
3. A third level can be considered where one system generates a model of the other, and
communication takes place between the respective models. For example, two systems exchange
messages whose meanings are constructed by using each other’s models. The problem of
user modeling in computer science involves these issues. Moreover, mutual modeling takes place
through learning activities and it is refined over time, such as relations between teacher and pupil,
or between companions in a sports team and within families.
4. A fourth level can be considered where a system in the communication process sends not only
the message but also the context (as an extension, a completion, of the message itself) in which it
takes the meaning which the sender wants to transmit, providing the receiver with the ability
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to generate the context, inducing it (for example the relationship between two or more subjects
during a negotiation). In this process, the use of examples and redundancy can be expected
precisely to induce the generation of a certain meaning of that message.
5. A fifth level can be considered where a system can use the previous levels of openness and decide
how to act: either as a closed system or an open one at various levels. The ability to decide on
the level of openness can be understood as the maximum expression of openness. For example,
during a conversation, the system can decide to refuse to understand or pay attention, or be
active interacting with interlocutors; sending examples even without the guarantee they will be
used; or sending confusing, ambiguous examples, on purpose.
Logical closure is complete by definition (see above). Logical openness is incomplete on principle,
as negation of logical closure.
6.2. The Case of the DYnamic uSAge of Models (DYSAM)
Logical openness has resulted in approaches such as the use of Dynamic Usage of Models
(DYSAM) [99] (pp. 64–75), based on established approaches in the literature, such as ensemble
learning [100,101] and Evolutionary Game Theory [102].
From an objectivist conception the dynamics consist of the temporal representation through
a model which is expected to be the best existing one, in principle, and which should only be
implemented with an appropriate research activity. We distinguish here, however, between dynamic
models having time in their equations and the dynamics of models as methods and strategies to use
more models over time. This is to cope with the multitude of properties acquired by complex systems
over time.
Examples are given by considering and using non-equivalent models simultaneously as the
biochemical and psychological aspects in medicine; the economic, cultural, and religious aspect in
sociology; in childhood, where a child uses the five senses, not with the purpose of choosing the one
which feels best, but to learn how to use them simultaneously in a coherent manner; in physics, to
decide when it is more appropriate to use classical and quantum models.
However, the problem is not only to model dynamic systems which change their evolution over
time, but complex systems which change themselves by acquiring new properties. The dynamics refer
not only to how the same system changes parameters, but also to how the system acquires several
aspects simultaneously and non-equivalent properties (not linearly convertible one to another), and
continually transforms itself coherently, requiring models based on logical openness. This is the case,
for example, for Multiple Systems and Collective Beings [99] (pp. 97–134) constituted by the same
elements interacting in different ways to accommodate the acquisition of various diverse properties.
In Multiple Systems the same component elements (a) play interchangeable, multiple and
overlapping roles (that is, an action, a position, the value of a variable have different meanings
depending on the respective systems they establish); and (b) simultaneously or sequentially interact in
various ways, dynamically constituting sequences of different systems. Examples of Multiple Systems
are given, for example, by co-operative and multiple roles of programs and nodes of the Internet,
in electrical networks, by the values of sensors constituting, at one and the same time, safety and
regulatory systems.
Multiple Systems are called Collective Beings when the constituent elements are autonomous,
possessing cognitive systems which allow them to decide their behavior and mode of interaction.
Examples of Collective Beings are given, for example, by people and families who can simultaneously
form corporate systems, traffic, markets, and users of telephone networks.
DYSAM refers to the logically open use of multiple strategies and approaches not to solve, but to
induce, for instance, by using redundancies to confirm the same meaning of the intervention, but in
multiple coherent ways.
This can be done, for example, by acting on the environment, inserting suitable perturbations,
making energetic variations, acting on external relations, acting on communication processes, learning
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by interacting with other systems, and by inserting attractors of meaning with repetitions and
reformulations. Thus, perturbations are processed by the system to orient it and not to decide its destiny.
DYSAM makes sense in cases of incompleteness; otherwise there would be instructions for use.
6.3. Uncertainty Principles
Theoretical incompleteness is closely related to the uncertainty principles in physics for which,
in certain phenomena, the search for increasing accuracy in knowing the value of one variable
correspondingly involves reduction in knowing the value taken by another. It is the measurement of
homologous components, such as position and momentum (the product of the mass of an object and its
speed). This is the well-known Uncertainty Principle [103] introduced in 1927 by Werner Heisenberg
(1901–1976). One must also consider the related Complementarity Principle introduced by Neils Bohr
(1885–1962) in 1928 [104] for which the corpuscular and wave aspects of a physical phenomenon will
never occur simultaneously. The experimental observation of one prevents observation of the other.
Finally, from a generic point of view, the property of incompleteness can be general or refer
to a specific property or several properties; have different levels; mean not yet complete; mean
uncompletable or chronically uncompletable; and theoretically non-completable as for procedures
(see Section 5.1).
7. Handling Incompleteness
All of this should help us to recognize incompleteness situations against which approaches based
on negative extensions, or iterations, or combinations of those used for completeness are inadequate,
both theoretically and practically.
As outlined above, when it is not about abstract problems, as in mathematics, incompleteness
matches complexity as a property. This is true across disciplines.
In general, the issue concerns the inadequacy of dealing with problems and complex phenomena
using classical General Systems Theory, as mentioned in the introduction. An example of such
inadequacy is given by the management of properties of the post-industrial society (knowledge society)
using criteria and approaches typical of the industrial society instead of using the principles and
approaches of post-Bertalanffy General Systems Theory.
In particular, as outlined above, multiplicity, non-equivalence, concurrent and dynamic
contextualities, cognitive skills, such as abduction, coherence, and the ability to induce, have to be
used. Learning abilities are not considered for obtaining repeatability or the equilibrium of situations,
but for selecting and creating strategies, models, and approaches in the face of unpredictability and
non-repeatability of complexity. Examples include logical openness and DYSAM.
In social systems, this regards their formation, emergence, and management processes.
This requires modeling based on principles beyond classical ones moving, for example, from stratified
differentiation to functional differentiation [105,106], which leads to ineffectiveness when considering
roles and structures to be replaced with other functionals. One has to rethink the concept of management
and of value, for example, with respect to the independence of economics and finance. The management
of companies modeled as autopoietic, emerging, distributed, and incomplete has nothing to do with
that of companies considered as structurally stable, in which the non-emergent aspect is considered to
be absolutely dominant.
In social systems, it also involves their processes of education previously considered as dispensing
knowledge, divided into disciplines and focusing on events and places (school terms and places
like schools) when the environment was stable, as was the role of education. In the knowledge
society, education processes are multiple, interdisciplinary, non-explicit, non-complete, non-unique,
and non-equivalent, even with different and dynamic coherences (a typical situation of logical openness).
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8. Conclusions
The transition from the logic of certainty to the logic of uncertainty is a matter of transition
from research with the assumption of completeness to that of incompleteness; from equilibrium
and regulation to coherence; from the search for the solution to the inducement of the acquisition
of properties, as considered by post-Bertalanffy General Systems Theory. Incompleteness is not
formulated as a possibly temporary theoretical limit, but as the intrinsic foundations of logical openness.
We must face the balance between completeness and incompleteness, as limit and opportunity.
It is not simply to replace previously-accepted concepts and approaches relating to completeness
with others relating to incompleteness, but to use both of them properly, depending on the context, and
also simultaneously using a DYSAM-like approach. In the first case, related to replacing completeness,
there seems to be a reassuring relativism, able to make algorithmic processes of choice for the best
approach. In the second case, however, the possible simultaneous use of approaches of different natures
is dynamic, braided with incompleteness and completeness, suitable for complexity. Dealing with
complexity, the usage of algorithms, removing responsibilities and always tending to guarantee the
optimal objective choice, is inconceivable. Incompleteness represents this situation by making explicit
the responsibility of choosing between various currently equivalent possibilities, with particular regard
to various kinds of problems, such as social, medical and scientific for which choices are irreducible
to optimizations. The focus on incompleteness not only makes explicit the impossibility to choose
algorithmically, it also opens the way for various cultural reflections of a different nature, such as the
role of unintended effects [107] in social emergence [108] of social dynamics [109]. Such reflections should
be useful to move from considering complexity as “inaccurate machinery”, not fully understood (but
this is precisely the perspective), to carry out research, to represent the multiplicity of incompleteness
and dynamic coherence as an irreducible conceptual space (with its own properties), for which it is
theoretically impossible to zip them into complete, analytical representations.
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Abstract: Due to the increasing digitalization of all societal systems, informed design of services
and systems becomes pertinent for various stakeholders. This paper discusses the design of digital
systems in a user-centered way with the help of subject-oriented design. The approach follows a
communication-driven and network-centric perspective on a System-of-Systems, whereby system
specifications encapsulate behavior and exchange messages, including relevant data, such as business
objects. Systems can represent activities of human actors, as well as artefacts. Stakeholders can
be actively involved in their roles in the design of a System-of-Systems. In the course of design,
they identify and refine role-specific behavior, based on communication to other actors or systems.
A System-of-Systems specification evolves as a network of cooperating behavior entities. It develops
according to communication needs and system-specific capabilities, on the level of synchronized
execution agents, or as an overlay mechanism on existing applications or sub networks. Since
certain behavior sequences, such as decision-making procedures, are re-occurring in organizations or
eco-systems, the design of complex systems can be facilitated by behavior patterns stemming from
existing modeling experiences.
Keywords: System of Systems; design; subject-orientation; communication structures; collaboration
network; interaction; diagrammatic specification; design patterns; choreography
1. Introduction
Digitalization means the continuous penetration of IT applications into domains and areas of
economic and lifestyle concern. A typical example are calendars. Once becoming digital they have
been connected to other systems, like room and meeting management systems, even though there
exist diverse personal ecologies of calendar artifacts. As Dittmar et al. [1] could show “the changing
demands in daily life, the availability of new tools, and the participants’ knowledge about the costs
and benefits of their calendar work and about the consequences of potential failures influence their
tendency to explore and possibly integrate new calendar artifacts and appear implicated in the
deliberate non-use of new technology”. Such findings indicate that design of these artefacts need
to be reconsidered for the sake of their applicability and social acceptance once being embodied in
digital infrastructures.
One opportunity of digital artifacts to put potential users in control of design is their capability
to be increasingly editable, interactive, reprogrammable, and distributable [2]. This capability goes
beyond adding or visually arranging apps on a tablet or smartphone interfaces. Rather, it refers to
creating interactive digital environments involving various stakeholders, such as developers, consumers,
facilitators, brokers, etc. (cf. [3]). When looking for methodological support of stakeholder involvement
in system design, first inputs in terms of theories of design pop up (cf. [4]), while structured guidance
seems still to be lacking [5]. Hence, more attention needs to be drawn in investigating, creating the
design of digital systems in a stakeholder-sensitive way. It needs to go beyond user involvement
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as commonly pursued in software development, as already existing services or applications need to
be configured in a context-sensitive and adaptive way. In addition, different stakeholders may be
involved, as they may need to be represented by interaction or system features, e.g., when specifying
individualized alarm systems in healthcare (in the context of this paper, stakeholders denote persons
having interest or share in an active community, e.g., a societal sector or organization. They are involved
in, or affected by, some course of action of this community).
Co-creation of services and products is not only of relevance in consumer settings, but also in
industrial settings (cf. [6–8]). For instance, Tang et al. [7] address the co-creation of digital services
and applications in the Web 2.0 digital ecosystem where companies can co-create business with
their customers. However, the focus here is in combining product and technological capabilities,
rather than the process and method of co-creation. In a distributed product and service setting,
the process of design needs to be supported in a constructive and methodologically grounded way,
as digital innovations in vehicle maintenance reveal, at least following a layered architecture of digital
technology [9]. Feature or service layers provide the opportunity to various stakeholders to create,
manipulate, and store different systems, either as apps, functions, or services. For stakeholder-centered
development execution capabilities must exist independently, but still intertwined. The latter support
implementing designed artefacts and putting systems into operation [10].
According to these requirements we follow an ‘assemblage of systems’ approach in System-of-
Systems (SoS) design. This is one of the timely identified perspectives on SoS [11]. Thereby, we put the
stakeholders in control of the development process, aiming to integrate (existing) system behaviors to
achieve capabilities that cannot be achieved by the constituent systems. The resulting behavior forms
a collaborative network system. Methodologically, we follow Maier [12], as the definition of SoS as
“a collaborative assemblage captures a grouping distinctively different in terms of developing best
practices” (p. 3149). We leverage socio-technical equilibria according to the stakeholder perspective
without requesting upper layers in the hierarchy, as originally being superimposed for architecting
SoS (cf. [13]). However, in case a network node represents a complex system, e.g., providing access
to a module of an enterprise resource planning system, it can be considered as a hierarchical overlay
to existing system functions. In order to allow the execution of system models, we follow the idea
of providing communicating structures as inherent part of SoS specifications (ibid.). The proposed
subject-oriented SoS architecture encapsulates communication tasks with functional ones as elementary
specification structure. The triggered send- and receive-patterns involve the exchange of messages and
establish a choreographic flow of control in the collaborative assemblage.
The next section of this paper provides a review on the design of System-of-Systems (SoS),
in order to detail the selection of SoS type according to the objective of the work. Then, a framework,
corresponding methodological steps for SoS, and diagrammatic notational elements, stemming from
subject-oriented business process management, are introduced. We detail behavior modeling capabilities
designed for SoS stakeholders. We use those diagrammatic modeling capabilities to introduce
subject-oriented SoS thinking for designing and re-designing SoS from a stakeholder perspective.
Hence, both the diagrammatical manifestation of SoS design, and the automated execution of SoS model
representations can be considered a step towards interactive and dynamic SoS development. The final
section concludes the paper referring to these achievements.
2. System-of-Systems (SoS) Design
This section introduces System-of-Systems (SoS) as a design entity and reviews methodological
inputs capturing the process of SoS design. The first subsection deals with structural foundations,
the second subsection with behavior issues, including the emergence of SoS behavior.
2.1. System-of-Systems
System-of-Systems (SoS) has been conceptualized for engineering addressing the construction and
development of complex artefacts [14]. Due to the variety of application domains, a variety of definitions
133
Systems 2017, 5, 3
and explanations exists (cf. [15]). However, they consider a system as “a group of interacting elements
(or subsystems) having an internal structure which links them into a unified whole. The boundary
of a system is to be defined, as well as the nature of the internal structure linking its elements
(physical, logical, etc.). Its essential properties are autonomy, coherence, permanence, and organization”
(ibid., p. 1). Complex systems are constituted “by many components interacting in a network structure”,
with most often physically and functionally heterogeneous components, and organized in a hierarchy
of subsystems that contributes to the system function [13]. As Jaradat et al. [11] have shown, several
structures and categorization schemes have been used in the history of complex systems interpreted
as system-of systems, ranging from closed coupling (systems within systems) to loosely coupling
(assemblage of systems). In architectural terms, these properties correspond to embodied systems
cooperating in an interoperable way (cf. [16]), allowing for autonomous behavior of systems or
components while being part of a network collaborating with other systems and, thus, contributing to
the objective of the network [12].
Referring to structural and dynamic complexity, ‘structural complexity derives from (i) heterogeneity
of components across different technological domains due to increased integration among systems;
and (ii) scale and dimensionality of connectivity through a large number of components (nodes) highly
interconnected by dependences and interdependences. Dynamic complexity manifests through the
emergence of (unexpected) system behavior in response to changes in the environmental and operational
conditions of its components’ ([15], p. 1). The review of the Technical Committee of the IEEE-Reliability
Society concludes with considering a System-of-Systems (SoS) as a system that involves several systems
“that are operated independently but have to share the same space and somehow cooperate” (ibid., p. 2).
As such, they have several properties in common: operational and managerial independence, geographical
distribution, emergent behavior, evolutionary development, and heterogeneity of constituent systems
(ibid.). As Jaradat et al. [11] pointed out (p. 206), these properties affect setting the boundaries of SoS
and the internal behavior of SoS and, thus, influences methodological SoS developments. More concrete,
according to Jaradat et al. ([11], p. 206) SoS are distinct with respect to:
(1) autonomy, where constituent systems within the SoS can operate and function independently and
the capabilities of the SoS depends on this autonomy;
(2) belonging (integration), which implies that the constituent systems and their parts have the option
to integrate to enable SoS capabilities;
(3) connectivity between components and their environment;
(4) diversity (different perspectives and functions); and
(5) emergence (foreseen or unexpected).
A typical example are apps being available on a smartphone. They can be considered as systems.
When adjusting them along a workflow, e.g., to raise alerts and guide a patient to the doctor, in case
certain thresholds with respect to medical conditions are reached for a user, several systems, such as a
blood pressure app, calendar app, and navigation app, need to be coordinated and aligned for personal
healthcare. In this case, the smartphone serves as a SoS carrier, eventually supporting patient-oriented
redesign of the workflow and, thus, the SoS structure. The smartphone can still be used as a device to
talk to other people while serving as a communication infrastructure of medically relevant systems.
The latter identifies the smartphone a SoS component.
2.2. SoS Design as an Informed Process
As SoS thinking is grounded in recognizing the network-centric and knowledge-based nature of
systems [17], a realist perspective on developing them seems to be appropriate (cf. [18]). Its focus is
on adaptation and flexibility and, thus, on “local context and expressing findings as broad principles
of action and contingent approaches” (ibid., p. 424f.). Hence, any abstraction to describe and specify
needs to be adequate to the situation of use for its stakeholders (cf. [19] for process representations).
A system’s situatedness is awareness about its world, such as the organization, society, or other
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contingent systems, and its capability to induce changes in it (cf. [20]). ‘The essence of situation
awareness lies in the monitoring of various entities and the relations that occur among them. Since the
properties of relations, unlike the properties of objects, are not directly measurable, one needs to have
some background knowledge (such as ontologies and rules) to specify how to derive the existence and
meaning of particular relations’ [21].
Consequently, SoS development should lead to architectures allowing dynamic changes (cf. [22]).
Situatedness of behavior is a key issue in engineering support of communities (cf. [23]). Prescriptions
need to be adapted to the situation at hand, allowing for systems dynamics in the course of development.
Most important, we need to recognize that stakeholders and support systems, in particular when
considered from a system perspective, are an integral part of situations, as termed by cognitive scientists:
actors are considered as embodied and interactively situated in worlds [24]. When analyzing the
meanings attached to these terms a set of conditions for situatedness and embodiment can be derived,
based on the conclusive assumption that external representational schemas are required for adaptation.
While virtual actors in virtual worlds are neither considered situated nor embodied, awareness of
evolving goals, various modalities for interaction and task accomplishment procedures could lead to
a rich repertoire of interactions. Embedded actors could develop individual points of view, relative
to their starting position workspaces, and have a capacity to develop a dedicated interaction space.
None of these capabilities are possible without representational capacities, such as diagrammatic or
formal notations.
Hereby, system thinking plays a crucial role, as it is a way of looking at situations as an ecosystem.
A situation is analyzed in terms of how the different parts influence and relate to each other rather
than decomposing it into parts that are studied in isolation [11,25]. System thinking focuses on actors
in a mutually dependent setting. Their concern is how they work together and respond to each other
even following complex paths of behavior. Design is focused on development work of systems while
keeping the whole in mind. According to Frank [26] stakeholders creating systems through system
thinking need a variety of cognitive competencies. They need to “understand the whole system beyond
its elements, sub-systems, assemblies and components, and recognize how each element/sub-system/
assembly/component functions as part of the entire system. They are multifaceted, able to consider issues
from a wide range of perspectives and points of view and possess a generalist’s perspective” (p. 276).
They also need to “understand the interconnections and the mutual influences and interrelations among
system elements. Systems thinking involves thinking about the system’s interactions, interrelationships,
and interdependencies of a technical, social, socio-technical or multi-level nature” (ibid.).
In doing so, developers lay ground for emergent properties of systems, effecting perspectives
beyond engineering an isolated system, e.g., a navigation app. A systemic representation, such as
a SoS specification, enables one not to get stuck on details, and tolerate ambiguity and uncertainty.
From a methodological perspective, the “good (the right) questions” ([26], p. 277) need to be asked,
and given information needs to be questioned constantly. Moreover, these questions enable curiosity
and open-mindedness, in order to consider a system beyond the limited area of a certain expertise.
Without a sense of vision, novel system behavior might not emerge, neither when optimizing,
nor re-engineering existing systems.
3. Subject-Oriented Design of SoS
Subject-oriented SoS design seeks to assist system development by providing a methodology that
presents behavior-relevant information in a manner analogous to natural language features, namely,
subject, object, and predicate constructs from the stakeholder’s perspective [27]. These characteristics
enable stakeholders to be engaged more effectively via a simple and intuitive behavior representation
and via human-centered elicitation.
As informed design has the intention of reducing the time spent for, and complexity of,
modeling, development support should also include the execution of models. Having an easy to learn,
and deployable, behavior modeling tool intertwined with execution also enables other stakeholders
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to have a platform for probing with existing reference patterns or models when specifying their
mental representation. They could directly specify their behavior, e.g., in terms of a flow of activities,
to achieve a certain objective. In case behavior knowledge is not available in explicit representations so
far, probing supports stakeholders expressing themselves successively in terms of executable actions
or communication acts (cf. [28]). In contrast to explicit elicitation techniques, such as interviews,
stakeholders need not have to rely on information provided by analysts. In settings involving external
people, such as for interviewing, it cannot be assumed that analysts are familiar with the domain at
hand [29]. Moreover, stakeholders—in particular, experts—forget tasks to mention they assume to be
widely known, or have difficulties explaining what they do without actually doing it [30], as knowledge
is inseparable from doing (cf. [31]).
Putting situated cognition theory in the context of system modeling, generated models in a
natural and intuitive way should potentially have greater accuracy than what could traditionally be
achieved with common acquisition and analysis techniques (cf. [32]). Reducing the requirement of
involving external people enables a wider scope of application, as more stakeholders could participate
in organizational change and development. Subject-oriented design is focusing on parallel processes;
thus, stakeholders can detail their behavior specification individually and concurrently, after agreeing
on respective communication interfaces.
An underlying concept of behavior-based SoS design is agency: according to Himma [33] the
“idea of agency is conceptually associated with the idea of being capable of doing something that
counts as an act or action. As a conceptual matter, X is an agent if and only if X is capable of performing
action; breathing is something we do, but it does not count as an action. Typing these words is an
action, and it is in virtue of my ability to do this kind of thing that, as a conceptual matter, I am an agent.
...Agents are not merely capable of performing acts; they inevitably perform them (in the relevant
sense). ...The very concept of agency presupposes that agents are conscious.” (p. 19)
Reflecting this understanding reveals the manner of involvement in a situation when humans
are acting or interacting. It underpins the requirement to devote design effort to human-centered
behavior. Moreover, it enables paradigmatic shifts towards communication and interaction, in addition
to functional task accomplishment or functional role fulfilment. While traditional approaches to
modeling mostly rely primarily on an exclusive functional perspective on task accomplishment,
subject-oriented SoS design focuses initially on communication links between active components and,
thus, interactions between systems.
3.1. Specification Constituents and Models
In subject-oriented SoS design, systems are viewed as emerging from both the interaction between
systems (termed subjects) and their specific behaviors encapsulated within the individual subjects.
Like in reality, subjects (systems) operate in parallel and can exchange messages asynchronously or
synchronously. It is a view of SoS with operating systems as autonomous, concurrent behaviors of
distributed entities. A system (subject) is a behavioral role assumed by some “actor”, i.e., an entity
that is capable of performing actions. The entity can be a human, a piece of software, a machine
(e.g., a robot), a device (e.g., a sensor), or a combination of these. (SoS) Subjects can execute local
actions that do not involve interacting with other subjects (e.g., calculating a price and storing a postal
address), and communicative actions that are concerned with exchanging messages between SoS
subjects, i.e., sending and receiving messages.
SoS subjects are one of five core symbols used in specifying designs. Based on these symbols,
two types of diagrams can be produced to conjointly represent a system: subject interaction diagrams
(SIDs) and subject behavior diagrams (SBDs). SIDs provide a global view of a SoS, comprising the
subjects involved and the messages they exchange. The SID of a simple ordering process is shown in
Figure 1. Subject behavior diagrams (SBDs) provide a local view of the process from the perspective of
individual subjects. They include sequences of states representing local actions and communicative
136
Systems 2017, 5, 3
actions, including sending messages and receiving messages. State transitions are represented as
arrows, with labels indicating the outcome of the preceding state (see Figures 2 and 3).
Figure 1. Order handling—subject interaction diagram.
Figure 2. Diagrammatic elements in subject-oriented SoS design.
Figure 3. Order handling—Subject behavior diagrams “customer” and “order handling”.
Given these capabilities SoS designs are characterized by:
• A simple communication protocol (using SIDs) and, thus,
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• standardized behavior structures (enabled by SBDs), and
• scaling in terms of complexity and scope.
The approach allows meeting ad hoc, non-deterministic, and domain-specific requirements.
The ultimate stage of scalability could be reached through dynamic and situation-sensitive formation
of systems and their architecture beyond domains, referring to adaptability. As validated behavior
specifications can be executed without further transformation (see Figure 4), stakeholders guide the
implementation of their SoS specifications.
 
Figure 4. Execution of subject-oriented SoS behavior sequences.
3.2. Supporting Adaptive SoS Design
In design thinking workshops stakeholders work on subject-oriented models representing SoS
from a cognitive, social, and organizational/domain perspective. The workshops include ad hoc
models, presentations of pre-fabricated models, or user stories by stakeholders on their (work) situation,
their task implementations, and their mental models of a domain. In the course of the workshops,
both types of subject-oriented models, subject interaction diagrams (SIDs), and subject behavior
diagrams (SBDs), are developed, in order to achieve an interactional understanding and corresponding
SoS of the concerned organizational setting. Facilitators care about encapsulating system behavior and
the required SoS communication structures. In addition, they also support probing SoS models through
prototypical implementations. Since a group of stakeholders is usually affected by subject-oriented
SoS representations—each subject can be represented by a person or system—the models need to be
discussed and aligned according to the interaction patterns. In this way, the SoS models get validated.
Starting point for all activities is the SoS scope (universe of discourse), e.g., getting help in case of
an individual homecare emergency, handling customer orders once being processed, or revealing
decision-making on challenging production processes.
As subject-orientation has been created by Business Process Management (BPM) practitioners
for practitioners the approach has been applied in various (re-)design settings (cf. [34,35]). In the
course of the performed case studies behavior patterns, or even reference models, evolved, sometimes
guided by knowledge management methods (cf. [36]). In the tradition of the design thinking approach
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these behavior patterns need to undergo application and review cycles to allow learning for further
refinements and developments. They are offered not as a template, but rather as an opportunity for
thought simplifying reflection of experienced/ envisioned situations and a corresponding model for
SoS construction. In contrast to traditional pattern development, subject-oriented patterns focus on the
communication structures and, thus, likewise representation of functional and interactional behavior.
In the following we report on the patterns that could be revealed so far. We continue following the
order processing scenario aiming to capture dynamic customer and supplier behavior, as well as
product/service development.
Figure 5 shows patterns for proactive and reactive behaviors in subject-oriented notation. Reactive
behavior is based on temporal sequences of loosely coupled receive—do—send states. Proactive
behavior requires asking for inputs, namely sending requests, while performing regular tasks,
and awaiting response—see Figure 6 for the proactive order handling system. Utilizing such a
pattern, e.g., encapsulated by a system component “ensure re-confirmation”, proactive behavior
along a customer or supplier relation can be modelled in an effective way. The system component
can be activated in different contexts and activated at runtime, given running system components
by the instantiated subject. In one case the process request can be performed by an automated
decision-making component, e.g., checking the availability of goods, in another case process request
requires human-computer interaction.
Figure 5. Subject-oriented representation of proactive and reactive behavior patterns.
Figure 6. Proactive behavior pattern of order handling.
Of particular interest is the capability to combine pro- and reactive patterns. Consider a customer
relation that is driven by incomplete orders over a longer period of time. In such cases, a proactive
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reminder to complete the order could be effective for business operation, while the default could be a
reactive SoS, waiting for the customer to become active. In that context, further examples utilizing
that pattern are payment and supplier: consider traditional late providers and customers. They could
become more reliable with respect to timely delivery when the proactive SoS component is activated.
A pattern-based approach of this kind can be a first step towards representing adaptive behavior
of actors in self-organizing SoS. According to Sterling et al. [37], such systems should provide
several qualities:
• Purposefulness, pursuing a goal and determining paths of action accordingly;
• Controlled autonomy, as a system component is able to pursue its own goals seemingly
independently; and
• Situatedness of system components, i.e., being aware of the surrounding environment, being
capable of perceiving changes, and responding appropriately.
Subject-oriented models allow meeting these qualities when explicitly representing the
goal-relevant part of the SoS environment as subjects:
• A system component (subject) is a behavior abstraction for a specific purpose. It can stem from a
functional role, type of application, or intention to capture behavior on an abstract level;
• A subject as a system component has controlled autonomy, as it encapsulates behavior to pursue
a specific goal independently (while being interrelated through communication structures with
other system components); and
• A subject is situated in an environment of subjects, and, most importantly, it is aware of this
environment of the other subjects as it is exchanging messages within this environment (SoS).
This mechanism allows not only perceiving changes and responding appropriately, but acquiring
information about behavior of other subjects of the environment.
In particular, the latter property helps to proactively collect information of relevance to change
behavior. Each SBD captures all possible local states a subject can be in, namely in terms of sending,
receiving, and acting. They represent the actions it can perform, as well as the interfaces to other
subjects. The local protocol is given by triggering actions internally (do), or externally (send). In this
way the protocol for subject interaction is defined: receiving a message triggers an internal action of the
addressed subject. The inputs to subjects trigger the evolution procedure in terms of proceeding from
one local state to another depending on its own activities and the actions of other subjects (i.e., incoming
messages from other subjects).
For further explicating SoS intelligence, North et al. [38] propose rules based on theories of
individual rational behavior. Hereby, individuals collaborate with others when it is in their best
(economic) interest to do so. Decision-making should be based on simple rules, in order to let rule
structures evolve. In this way, bounded rationality can be taken into account. Reasoning regarding
goals is progressively refined by means of procedures accounting for the limited knowledge and
abilities of individual decision-makers (ibid.). In line with modular decision-making, patterns can
be introduced, as shown in Figure 7. Such structures help mapping a system component’s behavior
effectively to executable patterns. Since subject-oriented SoS models can be executed after validation
and in a concurrent way they allow for simulating behavior in complex situations.
A typical example is the aforementioned decision making on selecting the pro- or reactive pattern.
Checking the reliability of a customer paying the bill, or of a supplier delivering a part in a certain
period of time, requires applying a criteria-based selection. The pattern allows multiple criteria to be
checked which in turn triggers subject behavior, either through activating other subjects or immediate
acting (cf. considering a customer delaying payment of a good of high value which requires payment
of suppliers in due time). In this way, behavior in SoS can be controlled on multiple system properties
in a structured way.
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Figure 7. Decision-making patterns.
For adaptation subjects need to (i) become informed; and (ii) be selective with respect to their
behavior. Following Gero et al. [39,40], the subject’s “sensors” are monitor subjects that (actively) search
the environment for situation-relevant data and produce direct input for an acting subject. In addition, a
decision support subject can be invoked by an acting subject. It is provided with monitored information
and situation-sensitive data to identify mismatches between the current and desired situation. Based on
the results of the decision support process, the acting subject can decide which sequence of operations
to execute.
Figure 8 provides the corresponding interaction scheme. It reveals that an <acting subject> can
ask for both monitoring of the situation and decision support based on the monitored information.
An <acting subject> is any subject in a situation that requires some action to accomplish a task.
The monitor subject embodied in the environment either accepts requests to collect data on the current
situation or does automatically receive data as a sensor, before processing and delivering the monitored
data to the <acting subject>. The decision support subject is available for consultancy with respect to
selecting the next action. This requires all available information on a certain situation.
Figure 8. An <acting subject> can ask for monitoring a situation and decision support based on the
monitored information.
Figure 9 demonstrates the possible impact for processing orders. Customer service asks the
supply chain monitor subject for monitoring producing Part A. The monitored data of the supply
chain are sent to customer service which in turn sends them together with order processing data to the
decision support subject. Based on the results further handling of the order is triggered.
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Figure 9. A customer service subject asks for monitoring the supply chain and decision support based
on the monitored supply chain for changing order processing.
A monitoring subject can either receive and process environment data automatically or monitor
the behavior of other subjects. Figure 10 shows both types of monitors. The environment monitor is a
signal receiver processing them to deliver data, e.g., an event sensor indicating a delay in traffic due
to changing weather conditions. The social monitor actively requests data from other subjects, e.g.,
whether certain data values have changed. Both could iterate for refining results.
Figure 10. Push- and pull monitoring of a situation.
The communication of the <acting subject> can be conceptualized accordingly. Figure 11 details an
<acting subject> releasing a request and waiting for the result (case of social monitoring). The request
for monitoring can be modeled before any function state (action), thus providing for each critical
function a preprocessing sequence. It considers environmental data beyond subject interaction and
can also be captured in behavior descriptions. Once an <acting subject> has received monitor data it
can act in response to the situation it is part of. The input data from the monitor are then processed
along the subject’s behavior. In case a subject acts requires decision support, it needs to activate the
decision support subject.
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Figure 11. A <subject-in-charge> interacts with a monitor (encapsulating how the request is processed).
Referring to the running example, the supply chain is monitored by a social monitor. Once the
request is completed they can be transferred to customer service for further processing, in our case
asking for a decision based on order processing data.
The initial step hereby is requesting inference on situation-specific data, not only using the
monitored data, but also data created or processed by the <acting subject> itself. The input data
are sent to decision support as they describe the current situation of the <acting subject>. Processing the
request for decision support requires a business rule engine that holds for the situation and environment
(e.g., an organization) at hand. This concept can be cascaded for situation-relevant decision-making
according to the scope of the SoS. The received results are processed based on available sets of rules
and the situation data provided by the <acting subject>. The results are finally delivered to the <acting
subject>—see Figure 12.
Figure 12. Rule processing.
The evaluated results are checked and a decision pattern can be triggered to complete a work
task. In Figure 13 we exemplify a customer subject reflecting its order and deciding to opt for another
product while ordering. The monitor subject is activated to find out whether the other product is
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in stock. In order to avoid frustration in case it is not in stock, an alternative product is looked
up—a decision support subject with respect to consumer behavior is activated and checked whether it
is available, until the customer can be satisfied or informed about a lack of further alternatives.
Figure 13. Case involving product monitoring and decision support.
This example shows a developed network as a SoS for a given scope. The utilized patterns allow
composing a representation according to stakeholder needs and his/her understanding of a certain
situation. Although it contains all relevant functions required for ordering, it can be implemented in a
variety of ways, e.g., either by automated monitoring or manual observation.
Given monitoring and decision support, an acting subject (system) can perform in a reflexive
way, using input data from the environment, either preprocessed from interaction behavior from
other subjects or from observer components, such as sensors. Moreover, an acting subject can also
activate a decision support subject. In this case, monitored data from the environment can be enriched
with situation-sensitive data by the subject for further processing, e.g., according to general rules of
encoding behavior. The results lead to informed decision taking of the acting subject at hand.
4. Conclusions
The penetration of digitalization into the variety of societal systems requires informed design of
services and systems and involves stakeholders in the role of designers. Rather than looking for purely
task or functional support, digital system design could follow a communication-driven perspective.
In the presented work, system specifications encapsulate behavior of active entities (in terms of doing)
and their exchange of messages (sending, receiving). A System-of-Systems specification is a network
of self-contained behavior entities, developing according to communication needs and system-specific
capabilities. Reoccurring behavior patterns can be used for complex system design, as they form the
backbone of intelligent systems.
Once model elements, as well as contextual parameters, can be determined, a situation model
can be constructed that can be used to learn from previous modeling steps to predict future activities.
Such a model is also of particular use, in case reference or re-occurring behaviors are to be represented.
It could guide stakeholders when describing a situation. Dai et al. [41] reveal opportunities to predict
human activity and social links with greater accuracy, given human mobility data. As stakeholders
move, they might be tagged or their device can be tracked location-wise. Stakeholders, when moving
through their workspace, provide inputs to pattern mining and prediction opportunities according
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to their digital footprints, including fixing an object to represent it as a subject or business object,
annotating information, such as marking a piece of work incomplete, and digital media consumption
(video or audio).
This rich data can be used to analyze human behavior patterns, build networks of actors,
and predict future activities of individuals using their activity space. In particular, the predictions of
an individual’s future activity allow more relevant recommendations to be provided for modeling
individual behaviors. While previous research mainly focused on location prediction—location
prediction algorithms are based on the prior knowledge of the probability distribution of the mobile
velocity and/or direction of movement—recent work investigates human behavior prediction based
on only locations and GPS data obtained from smart phones [41].
Such prediction frameworks allow categorically quantifying upcoming target activity frequency
such as no activity, normal user activity, and high-frequency activity, or other more refined
categorization based on user (or business) data, e.g., referential role behavior or preferences. Hence,
not only the existence of an activity, but also frequency-related quantities, can be taken into account.
Recent prediction frameworks, as Dai et al.’s, tend to utilize the more general concept of partial
repetitive behavior (instead of the stronger periodicity condition), and work with landmark behaviors
in terms of representative user activity temporal patterns, where reference representations can be
derived from probing certain patterns. Future research will go beyond predicting series of mobile
phone features to modeling tool chain features, such as identifying an object, tagging it as a subject or
context, storing it, and relating it to the already stored model elements.
Chen et al. [42] have explored parameters like the duration of task accomplishment, the amount
of resources spent on tasks, etc., from cloud users to identify patterns for prediction. This mechanism
can be used in the context of stakeholder (user) modeling to capture the dynamics of the series of
incoming modeling data, in order provide an effective prediction towards the cognitive workload
(i.e., the interarrival time between objects to be processed), including resources/tools that can be
requested in terms of processing engines for pattern matching, validating, and processing models
based on the historical data.
In summary, besides content- or domain-specific issues, research questions with respect to
upcoming stakeholder behavior will be studied in future research.
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Abstract: Reaction Networks have been recently proposed as a framework for systems modeling due
to its capability to describe many entities interacting in contextual ways and leading to the emergence
of meta-structures. Since systems can be subjected to structural changes that not only alter their
inner functioning, but also their underlying ontological features, a crucial issue is how to address
these structural changes within a formal representational framework. When modeling systems using
reaction networks, we find that three fundamentally different types of structural change are possible.
The first corresponds to the usual notion of perturbation in dynamical systems, i.e., change in system’s
state. The second corresponds to behavioral changes, i.e., changes not in the state of the system
but on the properties of its behavioral rules. The third corresponds to radical structural changes,
i.e., changes in the state-set structure and/or in reaction-set structure. In this article, we describe
in detail the three types of structural changes that can occur in a reaction network, and how these
changes relate to changes in the systems observable within this reaction network. In particular, we
develop a decomposition theorem to partition a reaction network as a collection of dynamically
independent modules, and show how such decomposition allows for precisely identifying the parts
of the reaction network that are affected by a structural change.
Keywords: reaction networks; chemical organization theory; system theory; emergence; structural change
1. Introduction
The dynamics of a system, either modeled with a reaction network or any other representational
language (such as agent-based models, rule-based modeling, or systems of equations; for an overview,
see [1]) is generally examined by combining analytic and computational tools, in the so-called paradigm
of dynamical systems [2]. The dynamical systems approach aims at explaining the time evolution of a
system and how such evolution can be influenced by small but sudden changes in the system’s state,
known as perturbations. The theory of dynamical systems has produced various notions that describe
non-trivial aspects of a dynamical system (e.g., attractor), and has produced powerful mathematical
results to explain the evolution of a system after a perturbation (e.g., Lyapunov exponent), or subjected
to frequent perturbations in time [3].
However, since perturbations are conceived to occur within the state space (phase space) of
the system, external influences that qualitatively modify the state space of a system can hardly be
represented in this paradigm. In fact, little is known about how to represent external influences that
lead to structural transformations of the state space. The concept of qualitative change is a fundamental
notion for system theory and is at the core of important notions developed by system theorists such
as structural coupling [4] and change of code [5]. Therefore, a formal notion of qualitative changes
is crucial for improving our understanding of what constitutes the identity of a system, as well as
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for developing notions that might go beyond the traditional notion of perturbation such as resilience,
robustness, and adaptivity.
In [6], we have proposed using reaction networks (RN) as a language for modeling systems.
In particular, we showed that, by using Chemical Organization Theory (COT), we can compute
the set of possible observable systems from a reaction network universe. In COT, the notion of
organization is introduced in order to identify structurally closed and self-maintaining subnetworks of
the reaction network. The set of organizations of a reaction network can be proven to contain all of
the stationary regimes of the dynamics of the reaction network [7,8]. In the present article, we will
extend the formalism of COT and propose it as a framework for representing the qualitative changes
mentioned above.
Although most theoretical research in COT has been focused on the stoichiometric level of
representation (with the exception of a few attempts such as [8,9]), which lacks dynamical equations
for time-evolution, and thus is insufficient for the dynamical systems paradigm, COT is suited to model
qualitative changes by simply modifying the way in which species are transformed in the reaction
network universe. In particular, we identify two types of changes that go beyond the dynamical
system’s notion of perturbation. The first is the modification of the way in which reactions occur in the
network, and the second is the addition and/or elimination of species and reactions in the reaction
network. These changes will be called process-structure perturbation and topological-structure perturbation.
Since a change in the reaction network universe leads to changes in the set of organizations of the
reaction network, we have that a qualitative change in the reaction network shapes a new landscape of
observable systems. However, we will show that a deeper analysis in the organization’s structure and
in their self-maintaining processes allows for precisely identifying the influence of qualitative changes
in a system.
In Section 2, we recall the basics of the reaction network formalism and COT. In Section 3, we
introduce the notions of process-structure and topology-structure perturbation using the language
of reaction networks. In Section 4, we elaborate a decomposition Theorem that, later in Section 5,
is applied to formalize the structural perturbations and precisely identify their impact in the reaction
network. In Section 6, we present an example to illustrate the Definitions and results of this work, and,
finally, in Section 7, we present some general conclusions.
2. COT Summary
In COT, we consider three increasingly complex ways to represent a reaction network. In the
first, so-called relational description, reactions include information about which species are consumed
and produced, but no quantitative information about the production and consumption of reactions is
given. In the second, so-called stoichiometric description, quantitative information about the number of
species consumed and produced by each reaction is included. In the third, so-called kinetic level of
description, quantitative information about the number or concentration of species as well as rules for
the ways in which reactions occur are included. The core ideas of this work lie at the stoichiometric
level of representation. For a comprehensive introduction to COT, we refer to [6,7].
LetM = {s1, . . . , sm} be a finite set of m species reacting with each other according to a finite set
R = {r1, . . . , rn} of n reactions. Together, the set of species and the set of reactions is called the reaction
network (M,R). A reaction ri is represented by
ri = ai1s1 + ...aimsm → bi1s1 + ...bimsm, (1)
with aij, bij ∈ N0, for i = 1, ..., n.
Reactions describe what collections of species transform into what new collections. For a given
reaction ri ∈ R, the species sj to be transformed, i.e., such that aij > 0, are called reactants of r, and the
species to be created, such that bij > 0, are called products.
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In COT, we study subsets of species X ⊆M. Note that, for all X, there is a unique maximal set of
reactionsRX ⊆ R defined as the set of all reactions whose reactants are in X. Thus, each set X induces
a sub-network (X,RX).
Definition 1. X is structurally closed iff the products of every reaction inRX are in X [6].
A structurally closed set X entail a sub-network of the reaction network whose reactions do not
produce species outside X.
Definition 2. Two species sj, sk ∈ X are directly-connected in X if and only if there exist a reaction ri ∈ RX
such that both species are active in the reaction, i.e., sj and sk are either reactants or products of ri. We say sj and
sk are connected in X if and only if there exists a sequence of species s0, ..., sp ∈ X such that s0 = sj, sp = sk
and for all l = 0, ..., p− 1, we have that sl and sl+1 are directly-connected in X.
Connected species in X can be seen as potentially co-dependent species in the reaction network
because the consumption of one of them might affect the production of all the species connected
to it. In general, X can be decomposed into connected modules whose reactions are independent.
Identifying independent behavioral modules of a reaction network is useful from both computational
and mathematical perspectives because it provides resources for an algorithmic divide-and-conquer
strategy, and also can deepen the understanding of the structure of the reaction network.
The dynamics of the reaction network is determined by how often reactions occur. A particular
specification of the occurrence of reactions within the reaction network is called reaction process, or
simply process, and we denoted it by v. In reaction network modeling, v is usually called flux vector. We
are introducing a slightly more general notion because our aim lies beyond the modeling of biochemical
systems. Thus, a process corresponds to a non-negative vector v = (v[1], ..., v[n]), whose components
are natural or real numbers for representing discrete and continuous dynamics, respectively. We say a
process v can be applied to X if all the reactions in the process can be triggered by the species in the set
X. Hence, v can be applied to X only if v[i] > 0 implies ri ∈ RX , for i = 1, ..., n.
Definition 3. Let R∗ ⊆ RX and Π(R∗) be a set of processes such that v ∈ Π(R∗) implies v[i] > 0 for
ri ∈ R∗, and v[i] = 0. Otherwise, i = 1, ..., n.
Lemma 1. A process v can be applied to X if and only if there existR∗ ⊆ RX such that v ∈ R∗.
Corollary 1. X ⊂ X′ impliesRX ⊆ RX′ , which, in turn, implies that Π(RX) ⊆ Π(RX′).
In order to represent how species are globally transformed in the reaction network by the
application of a process, let us represent the state of a reaction network by a vector x of non-negative
coordinates such that x[j] corresponds to the number (or concentration) of species of type sj in the
reaction network, j = 1, ..., m. In addition, note that the numbers aij and bij in Equation (1) can be used
to encode the way in which species are consumed and produced by the reactions. Namely, we can
build a stoichiometric matrix S ∈ Nm×n0≥ such that S[j, i] = bij − aij.
From here, we can compute the state xv of the reaction network associated to a state x and
a process v by the following equation:
xv = x + Sv. (2)
For simplicity, we have implicitly assumed that the coordinates of x are sufficiently large to
consume the species required by the reactions in v in any order. For a study of order effects in reaction
networks we refer to [10].
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Definition 4. X is semi-self-maintaining with respect to a set of reactions R∗ if for each reactant s ∈ X of
a reaction r ∈ R∗, there is a reaction r̄ ∈ R∗ such that s is a product of r̄. We say X is semi-self-maintaining if
and only if X is semi-self-maintaining with respect toRX.
A set of species that is semi-self-maintaining can recreate the species consumed by its associated
set of reactions. However, such recreation might not be quantitatively balanced. For quantitatively
balanced processes of recreations, we introduce self-maintaining sets.
Definition 5. X is weak-self-maintaining with respect toR∗ if there exists v ∈ Π(R∗) such that xv[j] ≥ x[j],
j = 1, ..., m. We say X is self-maintaining if and only if X is weak-self-maintaining with respect toRX.
A set of species that is self-maintaining has processes such that all the reactions of a reaction
network into consideration have a positive rate and, when applied, all species of the set are
quantitatively recreated.
Definition 6. Let X ⊆M, X be an organization if and only if X is structurally closed and self-maintaining.
Remarkably, all stable dynamical regimes of a reaction network correspond to organizations [7,8].
This fact was used to propose the reaction network formalism as a language for modeling systems,
by noting that the set of organizations of a reaction network corresponds to the observable systems in
the reaction network universe [6].
From now on, we will assume that X is structurally closed and connected (both properties can
be verified at low computational cost). Note that, since the species in X are connected, for all species
sj ∈ X, there is at least one reaction ri ∈ RX such that either aij > 0 or bij > 0.
Definition 7. A species sj ∈ X is a catalyst w.r.t X if and only if ri ∈ RX implies aij = bij, for i = 1, ..., n.
The maximal set of catalysts w.r.t X will be denoted by E.
Definition 8. Let x be any initial state, R∗ ⊆ RX, and v ∈ Π(R∗) be a non-null process vector such that
xv in Equation (2) is a non-negative vector. If xv[j] > x[j], we say that sj is an overproduced species by v in
X, or simply that s is overproducible in X. Furthermore, if all the species of a set G ⊆ X are simultaneously
overproduced by a process vector vG, we say that G is overproduced by vG in X, or that G is overproducible
in X.
Lemma 2. Let s be overproducible in X. Then, s is overproducible in every X′ ⊃ X.
Proof. Direct consequence of Corollary 1.
Lemma 3. The maximal set of overproducible species F in X is unique.
Proof. Since for every species s ∈ X we have that s is either overproducible or not overproducible,
we can build the set {sj1 , ..., sjk} = G of all the overproducible species in X, and the set of processes
{v1, ..., vk} that overproduces the species in G. Note that each vi ∈ Π(R∗i ), with R∗i ⊆ RX. Thus,
the process vF = v1 + ... + vk ∈ Π(R∗), with R∗ = ∪kl=1R∗l , overproduces all the species in G
simultaneously. SinceR∗ ⊆ RX , we conclude G = F.
Species in F can be unlimitedly overproduced by the repeated application of the process vF.
Hence, for any process v, we can create a new process v + αvF, with sufficiently large α, such that
species in F (and thus in E ∪ F) are ensured to have non-negative production.
Definition 9. Let v be a process. We define v(F) = v + αvF by choosing sufficiently large α so that all species
in F are overproduced by v(F).
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The following Lemma shows that computing overproducible species can be very simple in
some cases.
Lemma 4. Let G ⊆ F. The products of the reactions inRE∪G are either catalysts or overproducible.
Proof. Let ri ∈ RE∪G and s be a product of ri. If s ∈ E ∪ G, the Lemma follows directly. If s /∈ E ∪ G,
let a process v such that v[i] = 1 and v[l] = 0 if l = i, and vG be a process that overproduces all
species in G. Since v consumes species in E ∪ G only, we have that for sufficiently large α, the process
v(G) = v + αvG overproduces all the species in G. Now, since v produces s, and consumes species in
E ∪ G only, we have that s is overproduced by v(G).
3. On the Types of Change
In dynamical systems, the evolution equation of a system being in state x is given by
0 = F(t, k, x, ẋ, ẍ, ...), (x, ẋ, ẍ, ...)t=0 = c0, (3)
where F is the evolution operator, t represents time, k is a vector of parameters describing the particular
dynamical process, and c0 are the initial conditions. A perturbation is a sudden change from x to
x̄ = x +ε whereε is a small vector. The goal of dynamical systems is to study how these perturbations
affect the dynamical evolution of the system. For various cases, the influence of k on such evolution
is also investigated, and more abstract approaches determine classes of evolution operators F where
analytic results concerning the dynamics of the system can be obtained [2].
In traditional dynamical systems theory, there is no clear way to represent a structural change.
Namely, such change would correspond to a change on F. However, there are two problems for
qualifying or quantifying a change on F. First, the algebraic structure of two such operators might be
completely different, so no algebraic comparison can be established in a sensible way. This problem
can be sorted out relying on abstract measures of such as distances induced by norms in abstract
operator spaces. However, a second problem emerges here. Namely, it is not clear how to relate such
abstract distance with a structural change in the system into consideration.
In the language of reaction networks, the analogous of Equation (3) lies at the kinetic level of
representation, and is described by the equation
ẋ = Sv,
where S is the stoichiometric matrix introduced in Section 2, and v usually is a function (whose
functional form depends on the kinetic law) of x, t, and a vector of parameters k. Unfortunately, the
analysis of the dynamics of a reaction network at the kinetic level is as complex as the analysis of
general dynamical systems. Therefore, at this level of representation, there are no major advantages in
using reaction networks over other languages for representing systems.
However, since COT allows for lift information gathered at the stoichiometric level to the
kinetic level (at a reasonable computational cost, see Theorem 1 in [6]), we can focus on exploiting
stoichiometric properties that provide a better understanding at the kinetic level.
At the stoichiometric level, we consider a state vector x and a process v that is simply a non-negative
vector that represents the occurrence of reactions within a certain time frame. Hence, the change to
a new state xv produced by the process v is given by Equation (2):
xv = x + Sv.
Remarkably, the right hand side of Equation (2) provides evidence of the different aspects of the
dynamics of the reaction network universe that can be modified. Namely, x, v, and S. In the first case,
x changes to a new state x̄ = x. Such a change can be quantified by the geometrical distance of the
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two vectors (as it is done in dynamical systems). In the second case, v is changed to another process
v̄ = v. This is similar to changing the parameters of a dynamical system’s equation. More generally,
we can extend this change by considering a change on the set of permitted (or forbidden) processes Λ.
The set Λ of permitted processes is the analogous of a kinetic law at the stoichiometric level. Indeed,
since the stoichiometric level lacks a kinetic law, we cannot determine what process will occur, but we
can constrain what processes might occur in the reaction network universe by, for example, limiting
the ratios between certain reactions, setting the permitted processes within a convex set, limiting the
minimum/maximum value of particular coordinates of the process vector, etc.
From here, since systems are structurally closed and self-maintaining sets (i.e., organizations),
we have that the set of observable systems depends on the set Λ. A change to the set of permitted
processes will be referred to as a process-structure perturbation. In the third case, S is changed to S̄ = S.
Therefore, at least one reaction has been modified, added to, or eliminated from the reaction network
universe. In case S̄ contains new (or eliminates certain) species, we must update the state vector
dimensionality, and thus such change induces a change of state, and in case new reactions are added
(or removed), such change induces a process-structure change. This change, so called topology-structure
perturbation, operationalizes the notion of qualitative change of a reaction network universe.
The process-structure and topology-structure perturbations are both non-trivial ways to change
the structure of a system and both go beyond the notion of perturbation in dynamical systems. In order
to characterize these new types of perturbation, we need to identify a theoretically convenient way to
quantify them so that dynamical concepts related to the notion of structural change (such as resilience,
robustness, adaptivity, etc.) can be put forward.
In what follows, we will advance the structural notions of COT presented in [6]. In particular, we
will develop a Theorem that allows for decomposing the inner structure of a system into a collection of
dynamically independent self-maintaining sets. From here, we can precisely identify the influence of a
structural change in a system.
4. Modularizing the Behavior of a Reaction Network
Let E be the set of catalysts in X, and F its maximal overproducible set. The latter assumption will
simplify the analysis of this section. However, the formal elaboration presented here can be done for a
set X without any prior knowledge about its inner structure. Recall from Definition 9 that, for every
process v applied to X, we can build a process v(F) such that the species in F (and thus in E ∪ F) have
non-negative production. Thus, in order to comprehend the structure of self-maintaining processes in
X, we must focus on the structure of X− (E ∪ F).
Definition 10. Let C = X− (E ∪ F). We call C the potential fragile-circuit of X.
The potential fragile-circuit C of X entails the most sensitive part in the dynamics of X. In fact, note
that, for a species s in C, we can infer that (i) its maximal overproduction is zero (s /∈ F); and (ii) it
cannot be equally consumed and produced in all of the reactions, it participates in (s /∈ E). Therefore,
s must be consumed more than produced by at least one reaction. Hence, if s is not produced more than
consumed by another reaction, then X is not semi-self-maintaining, and thus X is not self-maintaining.
Lemma 5. If C is not semi-self-maintaining with respect toRX, then X is not self-maintaining.
Analyzing the inner structure of potential fragile-circuits reveals interesting features that
contribute to the understanding of organizations.
Suppose that X is self-maintaining, and let s ∈ C, v a self-maintaining process, and r ∈ RX such
that s is a reactant of r. Since X is self-maintaining, s must be the product of another reaction r̄. Note,
however, that we can deduce that at least one reactant s̄ of r̄ is in C. Indeed, suppose no reactant of r̄ is
in C. Then, all the reactants of r̄ are in E ∪ F, and, by Lemma 4, we have that all the products of r̄ are in
E ∪ F. Thus, if no reactant of r̄ is in C, we have that all the products of r̄, and in particular s, would be
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in E ∪ F. This contradicts our assumption that s ∈ C. Therefore, there is at least one reactant s̄ of r̄ in
C. Subsequently, every reaction that produces s̄ has a reactant in C. Hence, we can deduce that every
reaction that is used to produce a species in C has a reactant in C. Since the set of species C is finite, we
have that for any two species s, s̄ ∈ C, we have that either both species are needed to produce each
other, or there are two disjoint sets of reactionsR∗s andR∗̄s such that self-maintainance of s and s̄ are
verified by process vectors triggering reactions inR∗s andR∗̄s , respectively.
The previous deduction entails a powerful structural property of self-maintaining reaction networks
that, to the knowledge of the authors, has not been widely acknowledged in the biochemical literature
(with the exception of [11]). In Figure 1, we illustrate the two most simple cases where such structural
property can be used to decompose a reaction network into dynamically-connected subnetworks.
Figure 1. Note that in (a), the self-maintainance of C1 = {x, y, e} and C2 = {z, w, e} are independent
because e is a catalyst; The same situation occurs in (b) with sets C1 = {x, y, o} and C2 = {z, w, o}
with o an overproducible species. Hence, although X is connected (see Definition 2), the potential
fragile-circuit C = {x, y, w, z} can be partitioned into two dynamically-independent sets {x, y} and {w, z}.
Definition 11. Two species s and s̄ in C are dynamically-connected in X if and only if there exists a sequence
of species s0, ..., sp ∈ C such that s0 = s, sp = s̄ and for all k = 0, ..., p− 1, we have that sk and sk+1 are
directly-connected in X (see Definition 2).
Dynamical-connection entails connection through reactions which have reactants in C. Note
that s, s′ ∈ C can be dynamically-connected in X but not connected in C. For example, consider
the reactions:
∅ → o,
s + o → s′. (4)
Note that s is dynamically-connected to s′ in {o, s, s′}, but s is not connected to s′ in {s, s′}.
For simplicity, when s and s′ are dynamically-connected in X, we will simply say that s and s′ are
dynamically-connected.
Definition 12. We define dyn(s) as the maximal set of species dynamically-connected to s.
Corollary 2. Let s, s̄ ∈ C. s̄ ∈ dyn(s) if and only if dyn(s) = dyn(s̄).
Corollary 3. Let s, s̄ ∈ C. If dyn(s) = dyn(s̄), then dyn(s) ∩ dyn(s̄) = ∅.
Definition 13. Any set C′ ⊆ C s.t C = ⋃
s∈C′
dyn(s) is called a generating set of C. Any minimal cardinality
generating set of C is called a base of C.
Since any generating set can be reduced up to a base, we will concentrate on the bases of C. Note that
C can have several bases. However, the following Lemma shows that such bases are all equivalent.
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Technically speaking, we will show that dyn(·) is an equivalence class of the dynamically-connected
equivalence relation over C. An equivalence relation is a reflexive, symmetric, and transitive binary
relation that allows to partition a set into equivalence classes and simplify the study of a set in terms of
its quotient space [12]. For simplicity, we will not elaborate on more mathematical details in this line.
Lemma 6. Let D1, D2 be two bases of C. Then, each species in D1 is dynamically-connected to one and only
one species of D2.
Proof. Let s ∈ D1 and suppose that s is not dynamically-connected to any species in D2. By Corollary 2,
we have that dyn(s) is not contained in
⋃
s̄∈D2
dyn(s̄) = C, which entails a contradiction. Then, s is
dynamically-connected to at least one species in D2. Now, suppose there are two species s1, s2 ∈ D2
dynamically-connected to s. Since s1 and s2 are dynamically-connected to s, we have that s1, s2 ∈
dyn(s). Then, by Corollary 2, we have dyn(s1) = dyn(s2). Thus, D2 is not a base of C, which entails
a contradiction.
From now on, let D = {s̄1, ..., s̄d} be a base of C
Definition 14. We define for j = 1, ..., d:
Dj = dyn(s̄j), and
R∗j = RDj∪E∪F −RE∪F.
The set Dj is called the j-th minimal fragile-circuit of C, andR∗j the path of Dj.
Note that minimal fragile-circuits decompose the fragile-circuit into dynamically-connected sets.
For example, in both networks in Figure 1, we have that the minimal fragile-circuits are D1 = {x, y},
and D2 = {w, z}, and the bases are {x, w}, {x, z}, {y, w}, and {y, z}.
Lemma 7. For all i, j ∈ {1, ..., d}, i = j impliesR∗i ∩R∗j = ∅
Proof. Suppose that R∗i ∩ R∗j = ∅. Thus, there is one reaction r ∈ R∗i ∩ R∗j such that one of
its reactants is in Di or Dj. Without loss of generality, assume a species s ∈ Di is a reactant of r.







Lemma 7 proves that the paths of the minimal fragile-circuits do not overlap. This implies that
a process v applied to X can be represented as a sum of non-overlapping processes (orthogonal
vectors) applied to the different minimal fragile-circuit Dj, i.e., containing only reactions in the path
R∗j , j = 1, ..., d, plus a process vE∪F (orthogonal to all other processes) applied to E ∪ F.
Corollary 5. Let v be a process applied to X. Then, there exist processes v1, ..., vd such that
v = vD + vE∪F, with
vD = v1 + ... + vd,
(5)
155
Systems 2017, 5, 30
where |vD · vE∪F| = 0, and for all k, l ∈ {1, ..., d}, it holds |vk · vl | = |vk|2δkl , where · is the component-wise
product and |v| is the Euclidean norm of v.
Proof. The proof works by simple construction. We build first vE∪F by setting vE∪F[i] = v[i] if
ri ∈ RE∪F, and vE∪F[i] = 0 otherwise, for i = 1, ..., n. Since we know by Lemma 7 that for species
s̄1, s̄2 ∈ D, we have that R∗1 ∩ R∗2 = ∅, we build vj by setting vj[i] = v[i] if ri ∈ R∗j , and vj[i] = 0
otherwise, for j = 1, ..., d, i = 1, ..., n.
We can now present a decomposition Theorem for reaction networks.
Theorem 1. The reaction network (X,RX) can be partitioned as follows:
X = (E ∪ F) ∪ D1 ∪ · · · ∪ Dd,
RX = RE∪F ∪R∗1 ∪ · · · ∪ R∗d .
(6)
Moreover, X is self-maintaining if and only if Dj is weakly-self-maintaining with respect toR∗j for j = 1, ..., d.
Proof. The first statement is a trivial consequence of Definitions 10 and 13 for partitioning X, and of
Corollary 4 for partitioningRX . For proving the second statement:
⇒: Let v be a vector which verifies the self-maintainance of X. By using Corollary 5, we decompose
the process v = v1 + ... + vd + vE∪F. Since vj contains all the reactions in R∗j , we have vj(F) as in
Definition 9 proves that Dj is weak-self-maintaining w.r.tR∗j , for j = 1, ..., d.
⇐: Let v1, ..., vd be the processes that verify the weak-self-maintainance of Di, for i = 1, ..., d. Then,
the vector v = v1 + ... + vd verifies the weak-self-maintainance of C w.r.t to ∪dj=1R∗j . Finally, we have
that v(F) as in Definition 9 proves the self-maintainance of X.
5. Revisiting the Types of Change of a System
Theorem 1 provides a way to identify independent dynamical modules in a system and decompose
the action of a process in the reaction network into independent actions in these modules. From here,
we can target the modules of the systems that become influenced by a structural change in the reaction
network. For the sake of simplicity, we will not present a fully-mathematically detailed formulation of
the types of change of a system, but show some interesting notions and results that advance in this
direction. From now on, we assume that X = E ∪ F ∪ D1 ∪ · · · ∪ Dd is self-maintaining.
In order to proceed with the analysis, we must formalize some notions.
Definition 15. Let v̂E∪F[i] = 1 if ri ∈ RE∪F, and v̂E∪F[i] = 0 otherwise. Similarly, for each j = 1, ..., d
we define v̂j[i] = 1 if ri ∈ R∗j , and v̂j[i] = 0 otherwise. We say v̂E∪F is the unitary process for E ∪ F, v̂i is the
unitary process for Di, and v̂X = v̂E∪F + v̂1 + ... + v̂d is the unitary process in X.
Definition 16. Let Λ ⊂ Rn≥0. We say that Λ is a set of allowed processes, or process-structure, of (X,RX) if
and only if v ∈ Λ implies v = v · v̂X. For each process-structure Λ, we define
ΛE∪F = {v̄ = v̂E∪F · v, with v ∈ Λ}, and
Λj = {v̄ = v̂j · v, with v ∈ Λ}.
(7)
We call ΛE∪F the process-structure restricted to E ∪ F, and Λi the process structure restricted to Di.
The process-structure Λ represents all the processes that can be applied to X. The restricted
process-structures represent the process-structure when we observe the application of the process in
the decomposition modules (obtained in Theorem 1) only.
Note that in the same way that the process represents the stiochiometric counterpart of the
time-evolution of the reaction network at the dynamical level of representation, the process-structure
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is the stiochiometric counterpart of the kinetic law, where a dynamical law is usually a function
K : Rm≥0 × Rn≥0 → Rn≥0 that maps a state x ∈ Rm≥0 of the reaction network and a set of kinetic
parameters k ∈ Rm≥0 to a set of possible processes K(x, k). In particular, if the set K(x, k) is a singleton
(point) for all pair (x, k), then K is a deterministic kinetic law at the dynamical level of representation.
Since in principle every process is possible, the largest possible process-structure is the set Rn≥0.
However, we might have to consider a more restricted process-structure in some cases. For example,
in order to verify that X is self-maintaining, we must focus on the smaller set of processes Π(RX).
Moreover, dynamical constraints of diverse nature might forbid certain process, where, for example,
some reactions occur too much with respect to others.
Therefore, the decomposition of the process, first noticed in Corollary 5 introduced in Definition 16
can be used to trace the influence of each of the behavioral modules in the dynamics of the reaction
network, and also to target the modules of the reaction network where a process-structure perturbation
produces an impact.
A perturbation to a process-structure Λ leads to a new process-structure Λ′ that is similar to Λ
according to some geometric criteria. We will not give details on how to formally define a perturbation
in the space of process-structures (a simple example of such criteria can be the distance function
induced by the sup norm). Applying Definition 16, we can also decompose the process-structure Λ′,
and study the influence of the perturbation in the decomposition modules. As an example, we discuss
two examples of process-structure perturbation and summarize them in Table 1.
Table 1. Table of properties associated with a reaction network analysis for a process-structure perturbation.
Λ′ Change Might Create Possible Consequence
Ex. 1 Λ′E∪F ⊂ ΛE∪F F′ ⊂ F Larger minimal fragile-circuits
Ex. 2 Λ′i ⊂ Λi Di is not weak-SM w.r.tR∗i X is not self-maintaining
In the first case, suppose Λ′ is such that Λ′E∪F ⊂ ΛE∪F. In this case, some species s ∈ F that
were overproducible within Λ might not be overproducible within Λ′ anymore. Therefore, the set of
overproducible species F might change to a smaller set F′ ⊂ F. This, in turn, will modify what species are
dynamically-connected. In particular, some pairs of species s1, s2 that were not dynamically-connected,
i.e., they were connected by species s ∈ (F− F′), would become dynamically-connected. Therefore,
some dynamically-connected sets will merge, and some other new dynamically-connected sets might
be created. Thus, the new decomposition of X will have larger minimal fragile-circuits.
In the second case, suppose Λ′ is such that Λ′i ⊂ Λi. Here, it can be that the self-maintaining
processes of Di become unavailable. Thus, Di becomes not weak-self-maintaining with respect toR∗i
anymore. By Theorem 1, we have that this implies that X is not self-maintaining.
For the case of a topology-structure perturbation, we identify four basic types of perturbation and
explain some of the possible consequences of such perturbations:
(i) Exclusion of a species s ∈ X: the new set X′ = X − {s} induces a new set of reactions
RX′ = RX−s, and the product s in the reactions RX′ is also eliminated. If s is a catalyst
or overproducible species in X, the decomposition of X′ might eventually have less minimal
fragile-circuits than the decomposition of X. However, it is also possible that some species that
were not catalysts or overproducible in X might become a catalyst or overproducible in X′,
creating more minimal fragile-circuits in the decomposition of X′. Furthermore, if s is in the
potential fragile-circuit of X, some species in C might dynamically-disconnect in X′, creating
more minimal fragile-circuits in the decomposition of X′.
(ii) Exclusion of a reaction r ∈ RX : note that, in this case, the set of overproducible species can only
become smaller or remain the same, while the set of catalysts can only become larger or remain
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the same. Moreover, it can also be that r is crucial for dynamically-connecting certain species.
In such a case, the decomposition can produce more minimal fragile-circuits.
(iii) Inclusion of a reaction with existing species: here, we include a new reaction r ∈ RX.
We identify three basic cases. First, if r becomes part ofRE∪F, then some species in the minimal
fragile-circuits might become overproducible (this, in turn, might produce more modules in the
decomposition of X). Second, it can be that r consumes (or produces) a catalyst. This will reduce
the set of catalysts. Third, r might dynamically-connect species from C that were in different
minimal fragile-circuits, which, in turn, will merge such minimal fragile-circuits.
(iv) Inclusion of a reaction r with a new species s: in this case, the perturbation leads to a new set of
species X ∪ {s} and a new set of reactionsRX∪{s} = RX ∪ {r}. We must first identify whether s
is a catalyst or an overproducible species. If s ∈ C, we must identify the minimal fragile-circuits
that are dynamically-connected. Then, the analysis of this case is equivalent to case (iii).
We summarize these changes and their possible influences in the decomposition of a reaction
network in Table 2. In the light of this analysis, we can see that these four basic types of topology-structure
perturbation provide an adequate but modest categorization with respect to the influence of
a perturbation in the overproducible species and catalyst sets. In order to fully understand the changes
in E and F, and to precisely understand the changes in C, and on the minimal fragile-circuits Di, a
much deeper categorization is needed. For example, we can deepen in the categorization of type (i), by
separating the cases where the species s excluded from the reaction network is either an overproducible
species, a catalyst, or a species from a particular fragile-circuit. Moreover, we can determine to what
minimal fragile-circuits s is connected and dynamically-connected. With this information. we can
understand precisely how such perturbation would affect the decomposition of the reaction network,
and thus its self-maintenance.
Table 2. Table of properties associated with reaction network analysis for a topology-structure
perturbation. The symbols ⊂ (⊆) and ⊃ (⊇) symbols means that the set referred by the column
will become smaller (or equal) and larger (or equal), respectively, after a perturbation. # Min Cyc.
stands for number of minimal cycles, and SM stands for self-maintainance.
Type X RX F E C # Min Cyc. SM
(i) ⊂ ⊂ ⊆ or ⊇ ⊆ or ⊇ ⊆ or ⊇ More/Less ?
(ii) = ⊂ ⊆ ⊇ ⊆ or ⊇ More/Less ?
(iii) = ⊃ ⊇ ⊆ ⊆ or ⊇ More/Less ?
(iv) ⊃ ⊃ ⊇ ⊆ or ⊇ ⊆ or ⊇ More/Less ?
Remarkably, the information necessary to provide a fine-grained analysis of the topology-structure
perturbation, and its relation with the process-structure perturbation, is already confined within the
formal notions introduced to develop the decomposition Theorem 1. Thus, we have a framework
to analyze modern systemic dynamical notions that depend on these types of perturbations such as
resilience, adaptivity, robustness, etc.
For simplicity, we do not elaborate on such fine-grained categorization of perturbations here,
but provide an example that illustrates various possible perturbations in what follows.
6. Example
In Figure 2, we show an example of a reaction network with speciesM = {s, e, f , s1, ..., s6} and
the reactions:
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r1 = s1 → s2,
r2 = s2 + e → e + s1,
r3 = e + s4 → e + s3,
r4 = f + s3 → s4,
r5 = ∅ → f ,
r6 = f + s6 → s5,
r7 = s5 → s6,
r8 = s → e,
r9 = e + s → 2s.
(8)
Figure 2. Example of a reaction network for showing notions of decomposition, process-structure and
topology-structure perturbation. Arrows are labelled by the number of the reaction that they represent,
and, at the end of the arrow, the number of produced species by the reaction is shown only when such
number is larger than one.
Let us first consider the set of species X = M− {s}. Note that E = {e} and F = { f } in X.
Moreover, we have C = D1 ∪ D2 ∪ D3 with D1 = {s1, s2}, D2 = {s3, s4}, and D3 = {s5, s6}. Hence,
we have that a process in v ∈ Λ is decomposed as v = v1 + v2 + v3 + vE∪F, where
The non-zero components of v1 ∈ Λ1 correspond to the reactionsR∗1 = {r1, r2},
The non-zero components of v2 ∈ Λ2 correspond to the reactionsR∗2 = {r3, r4},
The non-zero components of v3 ∈ Λ3 correspond to the reactionsR∗3 = {r6, r7},
The non-zero components of vE∪F ∈ ΛE∪F correspond to the reactionsRE∪F = {r5}.
(9)
For i = 1, 2, 3, the minimal fragile-circuit Di, is weak-self-maintaining if and only if there exists
a process vi such that its non-zero coordinates are all equal. Note that since f is consumed by
the weak-self-maintaining processes of the minimal fragile-circuits D2 and D3, the process v that
self-maintains X requires that vE∪F[5] ≥ v2 + v3. By Theorem 1, we have that if such processes
v1, v2, v3, and vE∪F exist in the respective restricted process structures Λi, i = 1, 2, 3, and ΛE∪F, then X
is self-maintaining.
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In summary, X is self-maintaining if and only if
v1[1] = v1[2] = v1, v1[i] = 0, otherwise, (10)
v2[3] = v2[4] = v2, v2[i] = 0, otherwise, (11)
v3[6] = v3[7] = v3, v3[i] = 0, otherwise, (12)
vE∪F[5] ≥ v2 + v3, vE∪F[i] = 0, otherwise, i = 1, ..., n. (13)
Consider a process-structure perturbation that leads to a new set of processes Λ′ = Λ, and the
possible cases:
• If Λ′ does not allow Equation (10), X is not self-maintaining, and the set X′1 = X− D1 becomes
the largest self-maintaining set.
• If Λ′ does not allow Equation (11), X is not self-maintaining, and the set X′2 = X− D2 becomes
the largest self-maintaining set. Also, note that X′2 is a disconnected set.
• If Λ′ does not allow Equation (12), X is not self-maintaining, and the set X′3 = X− D3 becomes
the largest self-maintaining set.
• If Λ′ does not allow Equation (13), X is not self-maintaining. Moreover, in case vE∪F[5] ≥ v2,
the set X′3 = X − D3 becomes the largest self-maintaining set, and in case vE∪F[5] < v2 X′4 =
X− (D3 ∪ D2) becomes the largest self-maintaining set inside X, respectively.
We now consider the inclusion of the species s and reactions r8 and r9 as a topology-structure
perturbation. Since r8 and r9 consumes and produces the species e, respectively, we have that e is
not a catalyst in M, and thus the minimal fragile-circuits D1 and D2 merge into a new minimal
fragile-circuit D4 = D1 ∪ D2 ∪ {s} in the decomposition ofM. Thus,M = F ∪ D3 ∪ D4.
The analysis of self-maintainance for M can be done in an analogous way to the analysis for
X by defining the restricted process structure Λ4 of the minimal fragile-circuit D4. Note, however,
that if Λ4 does not allow processes such that D4 is not weak-self-maintaining, e.g., when the process
vector v4 cannot have equal values for the coordinates representing r8 and r9, we have that the largest
self-maintaining set insideM is D3 ∪ F.
Therefore, we can propose thatM is more sensitive than X to a process-structure perturbation
because the decomposition of X has more minimal fragile-circuits than the decomposition ofM.
7. Conclusions
We have extended the application of reaction networks, and its COT implementation,
as a representational framework for systemic modeling [6]. In this framework, a system corresponds to
a sub-network that holds structural properties that ensure its qualitative identity (structurally closed)
and observability (self-maintaining), i.e., organizations in the COT sense. Technically speaking,
organizations characterize the global invariants of the local dynamics and can be computed at
a computationally tractable cost. In particular, we developed a formal framework to study structural
changes of a system. A structural change goes beyond the change of state, and encompasses changes
that modify the inner functioning rules of the system or the very entities defining the system.
We have introduced the notion of dynamical-connectivity, which explains when two species s1
and s2 are co-dependent for verifying the self-maintenance of a set X that contains them. This notion,
which strongly depends on the overproducible species and catalysts, can be applied to maximally
decompose the set X into a collection of minimal fragile-circuits, whose weak-self-maintenance implies
the self-maintenance of X (Theorem 1). The decomposition Theorem allows for formalizing two types of
structural perturbation that extend the notion of perturbation usually applied in the field of dynamical
systems: process-structure and topology-structure perturbation. A process-structure perturbation
represents a change of the possible processes in the reaction network universe. The topology-structure
perturbation represents a change in the reaction network universe itself, i.e., more/less species and/or
more/less reactions. We showed how the decomposition allows for precisely identifying the impact of
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a perturbation. In particular, a perturbation can either affect a minimal fragile-circuit Di and/or the set
of catalysts and overproducible species E ∪ F. When the perturbation affects a minimal fragile-circuit,
the analysis of its impact can be studied within the minimal fragile-circuit, while when the perturbation
affects E ∪ F, the overall decomposition structure becomes affected. A general perturbation combines
effects in some minimal fragile-circuits as well as in E∪ F. This, in turn, modifies the set of organizations
in the perturbed reaction network. Hence, by comparing the sets of organizations before and after
the perturbation, we obtain a picture of the effects of the perturbation in the long-term dynamical
properties of the system.
We propose that the structural perturbations introduced in this paper, and the analysis of such
perturbations under the light of the decomposition Theorem, can be used as a starting point for the
formal study of modern systemic dynamical notions such as resilience, adaptivity, robustness, etc.
For example, resilience is generally understood as the ability of a system to cope with change. However,
this statement is hard to formalize because, since the functioning of a system is understood as a complex
process, it is not clear what is a change, or how we identify the part of the system affected by a change,
and thus there is no formal framework for defining resilient response-mechanisms. In our framework,
we define the notion of structural perturbation that encompass the idea of ‘change’, vaguely defined
in resilience literature. Moreover, since we are able to precisely identify the impact of a structural
perturbation, we can characterize response mechanisms within the process-structure.
In order to fully develop the mathematical framework to study modern systemic notions, various
aspects must be considered. In particular, a deeper characterization of the process-structure and
topology-structure perturbations is needed. Such characterization requires combining geometrical
properties of the process-structure Λ with structural information of the reaction network. To do so,
not only are more theoretical notions needed, but also an algorithmic framework for computing these
theoretical notions for moderately large reaction networks.
As a final comment, we believe that the language of reaction networks could provide a powerful
formal framework to open up systemic modeling and systemic thinking to the scientific domain.
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Abstract: The basic processes that bring about living systems are conventionally represented in
the framework of chemical reaction networks. Recently, it has been proposed that this framework
can be exploited for studying various other phenomena. Reaction networks are specially suited
for representing situations where different types of entities interact in contextual ways leading to
the emergence of meta-structures. At an abstract level, a reaction network represents a universe
whose evolution corresponds to the transformation of collections of entities into other collections of
entities. Hence, we propose that systems correspond to the sub-networks that are stable enough to
be observed. In this article, we discuss how to use reaction networks for representing systems.
Namely, we introduce the different representational levels available (relational, stoichiometric,
and kinetic), we show how to identify observable systems in the reaction network, discuss some
relevant systemic notions such as context, emergence, and meta-system, and present some examples.
Keywords: Reaction Networks; System Theory; Chemical Organization Theory; emergence; context;
meta-structure
1. Introduction
Systems theory (ST) focuses on the properties, laws, principles and phenomena that different
kinds of systems share. Particularly, the founders of systems theory emphasized the importance
of studying the structural isomorphism between systems of different domains of reality, which are
studied by different scientific disciplines. Consistently, mathematical modeling was proposed as the
main interdisciplinary tool of systems theory due to its suitability to represent and handle the formal
structure of systems independently of the nature of their components [1,2].
The mathematical modeling of systems has considered a variety of frameworks, usually different
when changing from one area of knowledge to another. In general, there is a tradeoff between how
precise is the description of the system and its properties, and the number of entities and types
of interaction. For example, when an ecological system of only a few species is considered, differential
equations are used and exact knowledge of the system can be gathered. However, this approach is
not scalable to large ecological systems because the equations involved are too complex and thus the
dynamics cannot be computed. In such cases, alternative frameworks such as network or agent-based
models are used. These frameworks can simulate some aspects of the dynamics of large systems,
but important features that can be studied using differential equations such as the sensitivity to
perturbations and the dependence on the system’s parameters are lost [3].
Moreover, although well-grounded philosophical and structural principles have been developed
for systemic thinking, and although the importance of integrating different areas of knowledge
in the mathematical representations has been constantly stressed [4,5], interdisciplinary scientists
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have had a hard time trying to develop formal representations of systems that integrate diverse
areas of knowledge. As a consequence of this, we can conclude that systemic thinking lacks a formal
language to express the full scope of systemic thoughts [6].
In conclusion, one of the big challenges in ST is developing a language that allows for putting
multiple perspectives into play, but at the same time is mathematically well-grounded so large scale
interdisciplinary models can be developed and tested.
In various biochemistry-related areas such as systems biology, bioinformatics, and chemical
computing, reaction networks are the mainstream language of representation [7–9]. Interestingly, the
language of reaction networks allows for three levels of representation: relational, stoichiometric,
and kinetic, respectively. These three levels are increasingly richer in their mathematical structure.
On the relational level, one can represent simple structural properties such as connectivity and cycles,
and is mainly used for visualization purposes [10,11]. On the stoichiometric level, one can analyze
quantitative structural properties of the processes occurring in a reaction network such as elementary
flux-modes and self-maintainance [12], and, on the kinetic level, one can compute the time-evolution
of the reaction network and perform a detailed study of it [13].
A recent advance of the reaction network formalism is Chemical Organization Theory (COT) [14].
In COT, a reaction network can be associated with a set of organizations, which represent the sustainable
subnetworks of the reaction network, and can be computed relatively easily. In fact, the study of
biochemical reaction networks can hardly be developed using traditional system dynamical tools for
large reaction networks [15]. However, organizations have been proven to provide a landscape of the
long-term dynamics, and thus characterize the observable systems emerging from a reaction network.
Hence, COT is a language that helps to bridge the gap between precision of the representation and size
of the system. COT has been applied to study several metabolic and other biochemical systems [16–18],
and has been proposed as a framework for chemical computation [19] and model checking [20].
Formalisms mathematically equivalent to the language of reaction networks have emerged,
rather unexpectedly, in areas outside biology. Namely, formalisms in the early times of parallel
computation such as Vector Addition Systems [21] and Petri Nets [22], and, in Linguistics, a formalism
known as commutative grammars [23], have been proven to be mathematically equivalent to reaction
networks [24,25]. The discovery of these equivalences has led to important cross-fertilizations between
biology and computer science [26]. Moreover, since traditional networks are a special type of reaction
networks, where only one-to-one relations are allowed, the network-based models in areas such
as ecology and social science [27,28] can also be understood as mathematical representations using
a simplified version of the language of reaction networks.
Why have reaction networks emerged as a representational language in seemingly different areas
of knowledge? The reason is simple but profound. Reaction networks (or any language mathematically
equivalent to it) entail a natural way to represent universes where the interactions among entities are of
transformational nature.
Hence, thinking of reaction networks not as a framework for representing biochemical interactions,
but as a language for representing processes of transformation, proposes an interesting way to
understand and represent systems as processes that are self-maintaining, and thus stable enough
to be observed in time [29,30]. Representing systems by reaction networks not only permits the
incorporation of different perspectives into play but also the possibility to represent and study the
long-term dynamics of systems with a large number of entities and interactions. Attempts of modeling
systems using reaction networks beyond the biochemical domain have been developed in political,
decision-making, and economical systems [31–33]. Remarkably, these applications have been carried
out combining scholars in various fields including social science, bioinformatics, and mathematics.
Hence, these works entail a truly formal interdisciplinary dialogue.
In this paper, we discuss how reaction networks can serve as both a framework-for-thinking-about
and a language-for-modeling systems. In Section 2, we introduce the three levels of description available
to represent reaction networks and introduce some relevant properties. In Section 3, we present COT,
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in Section 4, we discuss how to model systems using reaction networks and present some systemic
relevant notions in our framework, in Section 5, we present examples of non biochemical systems
modeled using reaction networks, and we present our conclusions and future perspectives in Section 6.
2. Reaction Networks
We introduce the notions of the reaction network formalism that are necessary to understand the
relational, stiochiometric and dynamical levels of representation, and to introduce COT. Most of the
material of this section, with the exception of the identification of different layers of representation,
is standard material in the reaction networks literature. For a comprehensive treatment of the reaction
network formalism, we refer to [9,34]. From now on, let M = {s1, . . . , sm} be a set of m species that
can react with each other according to a set R = {r1, . . . , rn} of n reactions. Reactions describe how
certain collections of species transform into other collections of species. For a given reaction r ∈ R, the
species to be transformed, i.e., consumed by r, are called reactants of r, and the species to be created by
this transformation are called products. Together, the set of species and the set of reactions are called
reaction network (M,R).
In general, some reactions in R might occur more often than others. A particular specification
of the occurrence of reactions within the reaction network is called reaction process, or simply process
(In reaction network modeling, v is usually called flux vector. We are introducing a slightly more
general notion because our aim lies beyond the modeling of biochemical systems) and denoted by v.
Before proceeding with a more detailed description of how reaction networks and processes are
represented, note that, for any set of species X ⊆M, we find a unique maximal set of reactionsRX,
defined as the set of all reactions whose reactants are in X. Thus, each set X induces a sub-network
(X,RX). Hence, a process v applied to X can only contain reactions fromRX .
Note that X ⊂ X′ impliesRX ⊂ RX′ . Thus, a process v applied to X can always be applied to X′.
On the contrary, if v is a process applied to X′, v can be applied to X only if v considers reactions in
RX only.
In this section, we will be concerned with the structure of a set X ⊆ M. To do so, we will
introduce three (increasingly more complex) ways to represent a process, and define some properties
related to the consumption and production of species. Since we focus on a set X ⊆M, we assume that
v contain reactions inRX only.
2.1. Relational Descriptions
Relational descriptions are the simplest form of representation of reactions and processes. Reactions
r ∈ R is specified by a set rC of consumed species, and a set rP of produced species, and denoted by
r = (rC, rP), and a process v is simply a set of reactions.
Definition 1. X is closed w.r.t. v = {(r1C, r1P), · · · , (rkC, rkP)} iff ∪ki=1riP ⊆ X. If X closed w.r.t. the process
v = RX, we say that X is structurally closed.
The notion of closure formalizes the fact that no new species are created by a process.
For structurally closed sets, no process can create new species. Note that, although X can be closed
for certain processes, such as the (trivial) empty process, if X is not structurally closed, the processes
for which X is not closed might change its structure. Indeed, when X is not structurally closed,
some reactions (riC, r
i
P) ∈ RX are such that riP is not a subset of X. Therefore, at least one species
s ∈ riP is not in X. Hence, whenever such reactions occur in a process applied to X, new species
are added. As a consequence, reactions that are inRX∪{s} but not inRX might become available for
further processes that, in turn, might add new species. This mechanism can continue until no new
species can be added by any process, i.e., when a structurally closed set has been reached.
Lemma 1. For all X, the structurally closed set GCL(X) of minimal cardinality that contains X is unique [14].
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Definition 2. X is semi-self-maintaining w.r.t. v = {(r1C, r1P), · · · , (rkC, rkP)} if and only if ∪ki=1riC ⊆ ∪ki=1riP.
If X is semi-self-maintaining w.r.t. v = RX, we say that X is structurally semi-self-maintaining.
Similarly to structural closure, the evolution of a reaction network generally leads to a structural
semi-self-maintaining network. Indeed, if a set X is not structurally semi-self-maintaining, then, for
some processes, we have that the reactants consumed by the reactions in the process are not being
produced by any reaction in the process. Therefore, such species that are not produced are going to be
consumed by the processes occurring in the reaction network, until a structurally semi-self-maintaining
set is obtained.
Definition 3. Two species s, s′ ∈ X are directly-connected w.r.t. X if and only if there exist a reaction r ∈ RX
such that s, s′ ∈ rC ∪ rP. We say s, s′ ∈ X are connected w.r.t. X if and only if there is a sequence of species
{s1, ..., sk} such that s1 = s, si is directly-connected to si+1 and sk = s′.
The connected relation is a generalization of connectivity for traditional networks. In particular,
it allows for decomposing a reaction network into a collection of non-interacting subnetworks. In fact,
note that every reaction consumes/produces species that are directly-connected to the reactants,
and when two species s1 and s2 are not connected, we have that none of the species connected to s1 are
connected to any of the species connected to s2 and vice-versa. From here, it is easy to deduce that
any process applied to X can be partitioned into a list of disjoint sub-processes, and that each of these
sub-processes in turn correspond to disjoint subsets of species of X. From now on, we will assume that
all species in X are connected.
2.2. Stoichiometric Description
Note that, in a relational description, reactions provide information about the type of species
transformed only, but not about how many species of each type are transformed by the reaction.
A stoichiometric description provides a new level of information on how reactions and processes
are represented. A reaction ri is represented by
ri = ai1s1 + ...aimsm → bi1s1 + ...bimsm (1)
with aij, and bij ∈ N0, and i = 1, ..., n.
The number aij ∈ N0 denotes the number of reactants of type sj of the i-th reaction. Together,
these numbers form a reactant matrix A ∈ Nn×m0 . Analogously, the number bij denominates the number
of products of type sj of the i-th reaction. Together, these numbers form a product matrix B ∈ Nn×m0 .
From here, we can encode the way in which species are consumed and produced by the reactions in
the stoichiometric matrix S = B−A.
Since the stoichiometric description counts the amount of each type of species involved in the
reactions, processes can be extended to specify the number vi ∈ N0 of times that each reaction ri occurs.
Thus, a process corresponds to a vector v = (v[1], ..., v[n]).
We can also represent the state of a reaction network by a vector x of non-negative coordinates
such that x[j] corresponds to the number of species of type sj in the reaction network, j = 1, ..., m.
Moreover, we can compute the state xv of the reaction network associated to a state x and a process v
by the following equation:
xv = x + Sv. (2)
For simplicity, we have assumed that the coordinates of x are large enough for the reactions in
v to take place in any order (The study of processes where the number of species is small has been
profoundly studied in the context of Petri Nets using the notion of deadlock state [22]. See also [35].).
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From here, we can define some relevant quantitative roles for the species participating in a process.
For simplicity, we will assume that X is a closed set (When this condition is not satisfied, the definitions
below require minor modifications that are not relevant for the purposes of this article.), and that
a process v applied to X is such that if ri /∈ RX then v[i] = 0.
Definition 4. A species sj ∈ X is a catalizer w.r.t. X if and only if ri ∈ RX implies aij = bij.
A catalizer is not affected by the action of a process in the reaction network. There are
two interesting facts about catalizers. First, if s is a catalizer w.r.t. X, then s is a catalizer with
respect to all X′ ⊆ X, but not necessarily with respect to X′ ⊃ X. Second, catalizers w.r.t. X correspond
to a row of zeroes in the stoichiometric matrix associated toRX , and thus are easy to compute.
Lemma 2. A species sj ∈ X is a catalizer w.r.t. X if and only if for all process v applied to X, we have that
xv[j] = x[j].
Definition 5. Let v be a non-null process vector applied to X such that xv does not have negative coordinates.
If xv[j] > x[j], we say that sj is overproduced by v in X.
Overproduced species have the potential to unlimitedly increase their amount by repeating the
process v which overproduces them. Therefore, overproduced species can be considered as an unlimited
resource in the reaction network. Interestingly, an overproduced species by v in X is also overproduced
by v in any X′ ⊃ X. Moreover, if two species sj and sk in X are overproduced by the processes vj and
vk, respectively, it is trivial that vj + vk overproduces the set {sj, sk} in X.
Both overproduced species and catalizers can be used to refine the notion of connectivity
(see Definition 3), and thus help to provide a much more elegant decomposition of the reaction
network into dynamically independent sub-networks. For the sake of simplicity, we will not elaborate
on this issue here, but refer the reader to [36] for an elaborated exposition of these results.
Moreover, the notion of (structural) semi-self-maintaining networks can be extended in the
stoichiometric description, leading to a quantitative definition of sustainable reaction network.
Definition 6. Let v be a non-null process. X is weak-self-maintaining with respect to v if and only if
xv[j] ≥ x[j], j = 1, ..., m. If, additionally, such process satisfies v[i] > 0 if and only if ri ∈ RX, we say
X self-maintaining.
Lemma 3. If X is self-maintaining, then X is structurally semi-self-maintaining.
For a weak-self-maintaining set X, there are processes that lead to a non-negative production of
all the species involved in the process. These processes, however, might not use all the reactions inRX .
For self-maintaining sets, we can find processes such that every reaction inRX occurs, and the result
of the process does not lead to the consumption of any species. Therefore, self-maintaining sets entail
the parts of the reaction network where self-sustainable processes, at a quantitative level of description,
can occur.
2.3. Kinetic Description
In order to quantify the overall transformation of species derived from a process v occurring in
time, we represent the state vector as a function of time x(t) = (x1(t), ..., xm(t)), where xj(t) encodes
the number of species sj at time t.
Suppose that the process v occurs between times t0 and t1. Therefore, we can obtain x(t1) from
x(t0), S, and v as follows:
x(t1) = x(t0) + Sv. (3)
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This equation provides a formal description for the change of the number of species driven by
a process v [37].
By setting the diffenence between t1 and t2 infinitely small, Equation (3) becomes the
differential equation
ẋ = Sv, (4)
with initial conditions specified by x(t0).
In this case, the process vector is a function of time. Usually, v is conceived as a function of
time t, the state vector x(t), and a vector of parameters k associated to the reactions and given by the
dynamical rules of the system. The common case of continuous dynamics is the mass-action kinetic
law [13], where the state vector x(t) ∈ Rm≥0 represents the concentration of species in the reaction
network at time t, and the process vector function v is defined by:







for i = 1, . . . , n, and k = (k1, ..., kn) is a strictly positive vector whose coordinates are called reaction
rate constants.
For (discrete or continuous) probabilistic dynamics, the process vector v represents the probability
of occurrence of the reactions in the network.
A reaction network together with the discrete/continuous and deterministic/probabilistic kinetic
law is called a reaction system. A reaction system is the most refined description of a reaction network
because it describes how the local dynamics evolve.
3. Connecting the Description Levels: Chemical Organization Theory
The relational, stoichiometric and kinetic levels of representation present three increasingly
precise ways of representing a reaction network and its processes. However, the gain in precision is
compensated with an increase in the computational resources required to identify the properties of the
reaction network. In Table 1, we summarize some important structural features and the computational
resources required for identifying such structures at each level of representation.
Table 1. Table of scalability of properties depending on the level of representation. Each property is
either not computable, or a level or scalability is associated. A property is more scalable if it can be
computed for larger networks. Hence, Full, Moderate, and Hard scalability represent three levels of
increasingly more complex computation, respectively.
Property-Type/Level Relational Stoichiometric Kinetic
Topological Structure Full Full Full
Phase Space Analysis Uncomputable Moderate Hard
Time Evolution Uncomputable Moderate Hard
Namely, the relational description is capable of identifying connectivity-related properties
in the network by means of simple set-like operations, but is unable to describe properties of
quantitative nature. The stoichiometric description allows for describing properties of quantitative
nature by means of matrix algebra operations (which are computationally tractable for moderately large
networks), but it is unable to describe the influence of kinetic parameters and the precise time-evolution
of a reaction network. The kinetic description is able to fully represent the influence of parameters
and the time-evolution of a reaction network, but such description requires solving a highly coupled
and nonlinear system of (either discrete, stochastic, or differential) equations. These equations do not
have an analytic solution in most cases. Hence, the exploration of the dynamics of a reaction network
requires numerical solutions that become intractable for large reaction networks.
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Since a full-featured understanding of the dynamics of a reaction network is intractable at the
kinetic level, COT proposes that certain structural properties at the kinetic level can be traced at the
relational or stoichiometric levels, and thus at a computationally affordable cost. Such structural
traces are, technically speaking, necessary conditions for the desired properties of the reaction system.
In particular, COT focuses on the connection between structural properties at the relational and
stoichiometric levels with the long-term behavior of the reaction system.
To this end, COT introduces the crucial notion of organization:
Definition 7. X is a (semi-)organization if and only if X is closed and (semi-)self-maintaining.
An organization satisfies simultaneously the relational-level property of closure and the
stoichiometric-level property of self-maintaining. By combining these two requirements, COT identifies
the structural footprint of stable dynamics. Namely, a closed set of species entails a subnetwork whose
processes do not produce new species, and within these closed dynamics, there are processes that
allow self-maintenance of the quantity of species in the system. Therefore, as long as self-maintaining
processes occur, the subnetwork (X,RX) will be preserved in time.
In order to connect the notion of organization with the dynamical level, we introduce the
following notions.
Definition 8. Let P (M) be the power set ofM and
φ(t) : Rm≥0 → P (M) , x(t) 
→ φ (x(t)) ≡ {si ∈ M : xi(t) > 0} . (5)
For a state x(t) ∈ Rm≥0, the set φ (x(t)) is the abstraction of x(t). For a given set of species X ⊆M, a
state x(t) ∈ Rm≥0 is an instance of X if and only if its abstraction equals X.
The notions of abstraction and instance connect the representations of the reaction network with
the reaction system, and organizations represent the abstractions of all the possible stable instances:
Theorem 1. If x is a fixed-point of the ODE (4), i.e., Sv(x, k) = 0, then the abstraction φ(x) is an
organization [33].
Fixed points entail the simplest dynamically stable instances of a reaction system, and are crucial
for determining most important features of the dynamics of a system [38]. Thus, Theorem 1 provides
a link between the long-term behavior of a reaction system and its underlying reaction network.
In simple words, it proves that a necessary condition to be a fixed point at the kinetic level is to be
an organization at the stoichiometric level (and thus a a semi-organization at the relational level).
Moreover, in [39], Theorem 1 is extended to other stable asymptotic behaviors such as periodic orbits
and limit cycles. In addition to these results, necessary conditions for the existence of adequate flux
vectors are explored in [40], and algorithmic studies concerning the computation of the organizations
of a reaction network are presented in [41–43].
4. Discussion: Reaction Networks and the Modeling of Systems
We now discuss some general aspects about using reaction networks as a language for the
modeling of systems.
4.1. Reaction Networks as Universes and Organizations as Systems
In the reaction network formalism, we define species and reactions to specify how the entities we
consider interact and transform. Therefore, it is important to stress that we do not start from the idea of
a pre-existing system to be modeled. On the contrary, we start from a set of relevant entities, which can
be of any nature (physical, cognitive, economic, etc.), and we determine a set of rules that specify how
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combinations of these entities transform into new combinations. Since, for a system, it is generally
assumed that it is, to some extent, stable in time so it can be observed, and it holds certain properties
that entail its qualitative identity, we propose that the more adequate notion of system is a subnetwork
(X,RX) such that X is an organization. Therefore, systems are conceived as self-maintaining entities
that emerge from the universe of interactions [29,44]. This explains the notion of qualitative identity of
a system from a dynamic perspective. Namely, a system is continuously changing its inner components
and sub-processes, but the qualitative identity and unity are secured as long as the reaction network is
structurally closed and its inner processes are self-maintaining. Hence, the reaction network (M,R)
plays the role of universe of existence and interaction, and the organizations play the role of potentially
observable systems in this universe.
The latter view allows for a recursive representation of the systems in a universe [45]. In case
the whole reaction universe is an organization, we conceive it as the largest possible system, if not,
several largest systems might exist. By looking inside the largest systems, we find smaller systems
that are contained in the largest systems, and continue recursively until we arrive to the smallest
organizations, which play the role of minimal observable entities.
Since we are free to chose our basic entities and processes, a fundamental step when modeling with
reaction networks is to choose a basic representational ontology which includes the fundamental entities
in the transformational universe, and then define the transformation rules among these basic entities.
Next, we can extend the representation of such universe by incorporating either new entities and new
reactions, or by replacing existing entities and reactions by a deeper or fine-grained representation of
the replaced entities.
4.2. Inner and External Contexts
In the reaction network formalism, we identify two fundamentally different notions of context.
The first is the epistemic (or external) context that corresponds to the choice of the subnetwork to be
considered. The external context specifies what entities and interactions we consider. In this approach,
we start from our universe (M,R) and analyze specific external contexts represented by subnetworks
(X,RX). The choice of an external context constrains the entities to be found and the transformations
allowed to occur.
The second context operates within the external context. This behavioral (or inner) context
specifies what processes v are allowed to occur and how they occur. The inner context v determines
whether a subnetwork is self-maintaining, and thus an organization. If the inner context forbids the
occurrence of self-maintaining processes, we have that (X,RX) will not be stable in time, and thus
not observable.
The previous observation implies an interesting dichotomy between structure (external context)
and dynamics (inner context) in the study of systems. The importance of this dichotomy has not been
widely acknowledged by the biochemistry-related community working with reaction networks models.
It occurs for two main reasons. First, in most biochemical cases, the reaction network is meant to
model a predefined system, thus the notion of external context is of virtual nature only. Secondly,
biochemical processes are governed by deterministic physical laws. Hence, the inner context of the
reaction network is fixed by deterministic principles of the biochemical domain [13].
However, by considering reaction networks as a language for modeling systems, species might not
be biochemical or even physical entities. Hence, processes might not necessarily obey any determined
set of rules, and thus external and inner contexts might become relevant and influence each other.
4.3. The Emergence of Systems and Meta-Systems
In the reaction network approach, the emergence of a stable system is a natural consequence of the
dynamics. In fact, Theorem 1 states that stable dynamical regimes correspond to organizations in the
reaction network. This is equivalent to say that the systems we observe are observable because they are
stable enough in time to be observed, and that this stability is the consequence of a dynamical process.
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Therefore, systems are stable structures of processes emerging from the transformational interactions,
i.e., dynamics, occurring in the universe.
In COT, a reaction network is represented as a hierarchy of subnetworks. At the lowest level,
we have the empty reaction network (0 species), and each subsequent level has subnetworks having
more species. At the highest level, we find the set M. This representation is known as the Hasse
diagram (see Figure 1).
picture
Figure 1. Example of hierarchy of reaction networks and their properties in COT. Inspired from [14].
This setting is convenient for explaining not only the emergence of systems from the interaction
of species, but also the emergence of meta-systems from the interaction of systems. Since we conceive
organizations as systems, we note that when two or more organizations interact, a new reaction
network is formed. Since the new reaction network can have reactions that are not in any of the former
organizations, the union of two (or more) organizations may or may not be an organization. In the
example in Figure 1, we see that both {a, b} and {b, d} are organizations, but when they combine to
become {a, b, d}, the new reaction b + d → c becomes active. Therefore, {a, b, d} is not closed and thus
is not an organization, but its closure {a, b, c, d} is closed and self-maintaining, and thus an organization.
This simple example illustrates that organizations form a hierarchy, and that this hierarchy can be used
to explain how meta-systems can non-trivially emerge by the interaction of systems.
4.4. The Lack of Identity Problem and the Membrane Solution
One important drawback of the reaction network formalism is that the species do not have
individual identity. This means that given a certain species type s, we have that all the species of this
type are equivalent in the reaction network. This has proven to be problematic for modeling systems
where species represent entities having mechanisms of memory or recognition [32]. Moreover, there is
a way to construct virtual cells of interaction in an extended reaction network formalism known as
membrane or P-systems [46]. In the P-systems framework, we allow different reaction networks to
exist, and each of these reaction networks is enclosed in a membrane and thus is allowed to evolve
separately from the other reaction networks. However, each reaction network is also allowed to
exchange species with other reaction networks by means of a common space. Therefore, indirect
communication between reaction networks is possible.
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The use of membranes brings a new modeling dimension because we can attribute agency
properties to reaction networks, and since membranes can be recursively defined, we can assign
recursive layers of individual identity within an agent. Moreover, by properly labeling species according
to the compartment they belong to, we can model interactions where mechanisms of recognition and
even memory operate. Remarkably, it has been shown that when, for even the simplest cases where two
reaction networks interact, it is possible that both networks co-stabilize in an organization, even though
the two reaction networks are not stable on their own [40].
4.5. Resilience and Other Modern Systemic Notions
The reaction network approach provides a suitable landscape of concepts to formalize some
modern systemic notions. As an example, we will elaborate on the notion of resilience. Resilience has
been defined as the ability of a system to cope with change (There is a large number of definitions for the
concept of resilience [47]. We use this definition due to its simplicity and generality.). By ‘cope’, authors
generally mean ‘to be able to maintain its qualitative identity’, and ‘change’ means ‘a perturbation.’
However, the notion of qualitative identity, as well as the notion of perturbation, are generally applied
in a non-formal manner. This leads to multiple interpretations of the notion of resilience. In our
approach, the notions behind resilience can be properly defined. In fact, the qualitative identity of a
system in this setting corresponds to an organization together with a self-maintaining process occurring
in it, and the perturbation corresponds to three different types of change. The first is a change of state,
and this means increasing or decreasing the values of the coordinates of the vector x. The second is a
change of the inner context, and this means changing the set of possible processes v that can occur in
the system. The third is a change of the external context, and this means adding or eliminating species
and/or reactions in the system.
Since the notion of identity and change are properly defined, resilience can be formally studied
using reaction networks. In a similar way, we propose that other notions introduced in the system
theory literature such as robustness, adaptivity, etc. can be formalized using structural properties of
a reaction network. We will not elaborate on the details of these notions here, but refer to [36] for
a mathematical framework to formalize such notions.
5. Examples
We now overview three cases of non-biochemical systems that have been modeled using
reaction networks.
5.1. Social System: Political Structure
The use of reaction networks as a language for modeling political systems was inspired by
Luhmann’s approach to sociology [48]. Luhmann introduced the notion of communication as the
basis of societies’ structuring and ordering [49]. The concept of communication is defined as the
flow produced by the exchange of social-symbols. These symbols belong to different social structures.
For example, for simple economical, legal and political structures, the communication flow is done
through money, justice and power, respectively. In a general case, all of these structures overlap, and,
hence, communications in one system may affect the others. Therefore, a social system emerges from
these structures of communication.
In [31], Dittrich and Winter developed a reaction network that represents a toy-model of the
political system based on Luhmann’s concept of communication. They define 13 communication species,
e.g., social movement demands ‘SBFor’ (acronym from the German: Soziale Bewegung Forderung),
social movement members ‘SBMit’ (Soziale Bewegung Mitglieder), potential collective binding decisions
‘KVEPot’ (Potenzielle Kollectiv Verbindliche Entscheidungen), etc., and a set of 20 reactions to model
the interactions among these communications. For example, the reaction ‘SBMit + KVEPot → SBFor’
models that Demands from social movements can be stimulated by potential collectivly binding decisions.
The species ‘SBMit’ corresponds to a social movement demand decision (e.g., do not increase the tax),
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that may be expressed as a protest, or by other actions, ‘KVEPot’ might correspond to a potential law
such as increase the tax, and ‘SBFor’ corresponds to the communications that the social movement
members discuss or spread (for example within social networks). For simplicity, we will not present
the full set of species and reactions, but provide a diagram of the topology of the network and the
hierarchy of organizations in Figure 2.
Figure 2. (a) Topology of the reaction network model of the political system. Labelled boxes represent
species and arrows represent reactions. (b) The hierarchy of organizations.
In this network, the simplest organization represents a political system where there is formal
political power of high and low levels, public opinion, thematic conflicts, and public force. The dynamics
of self-maintaining networks is given by how public opinion influences thematic conflicts and how they
get resolved by the political power. It resembles a monarchy-like system. More complex organizations in
the hierarchy involve either social movements and social demands, political parties and their programs,
or collectively binding decisions and their implementation. Further levels combine these structures in
different ways, and the highest level at the hierarchy is the conjunction of all these cases together.
5.2. Decision System: Evolutionary Game Theory
In a game theoretical setting, an agent interacts with another agent by deciding a certain action
on the basis of a set of possible actions and the payoffs of these actions. The payoffs depend on
the decision of both agents, but no agent knows the decision of the other agent. For example, if we
consider cooperative C and defecting D decisions, we have that a cooperative interaction requires
two cooperative agents generating payoff for the cooperative payoff specified by PC by the reaction
C + C → C + C + 2PC, while the interaction of a cooperative decision with a defecting decision,
C + D → C + D + PD, generates payoff for the defecting decision PD only.
In the evolutionary game theory setting, agents are allowed to interact several times. They can
eventually recognize and remember other agents as well as their past actions. From here, each agent
develops a ‘strategy’ that sets how agents interact with each other depending on past interactions.
Since the interactions in evolutionary game theory are between agents, agent-based modeling is
the dominant paradigm to represent these systems [50]. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to develop
analytic results for agent-based models, and performing simulations to explore the parameter space
is computationally very expensive when several strategies are in play. As an alternative, in [32],
a reaction network model was developed to represent the evolutionary game theoretical setting of
the prisoner’s dilemma, and, in particular, the evolution of cooperation problem [51]. Species play
the role of decisions and payoffs, and a reaction network is built from the payoff matrix of decisions
(see Figure 3).
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Figure 3. Paradigm change from agent-based (bottom) to reaction network (top) modeling.
The interaction among agents corresponds to a vessel of decision species interacting, and the payoff
matrix corresponds to a set of reactions which consumes a pair of decisions to produce the payoff of
each decision and two new decisions determined by the strategies.
The reaction network model is able to fully reproduce the results obtained using agents for
the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma. Interestingly, a formula that explains when cooperation is
evolutionarily stable is obtained [32]. This formula is equivalent to the famous result obtained by
Nowak in [52].
5.3. Ecological Systems
Ecological interactions among biological species can be modeled using reaction networks.
As an example, Table 2 provides a simple model of a list of ecological interactions using reaction networks.
Table 2. Reactions associated to most common ecological interactions.
Reaction Ecological Interaction
prey + predator → 2predator Depredation
host + hosted → 2hosted Parasitism
host + hosted → host + 2hosted Comensalism
host + hosted → host Amensalism
Coop1 + Coop2 → 2Coop1 + 2Coop2 Mutualism
Since, in this setting, interactions are many-to-many directed relations, reaction networks
allow a more complex representation of ecological interactions than traditional network models.
Moreover, a more detailed account of the ecological concepts can be developed in certain ecosystems.
For example, consider the mutualistic interaction between mychorrizae and plants [53]. Namely, plants y
feed from mycelium xr to grow roots yr (r1 in Equation (6)), mycorrhizae x feeds from the roots yr
to produce mycelium (r2 in Equation (6)), and contributes to the production of mycelium xr (r3 in
Equation (6)), which, in turn, increments the absorption capacities of plants y (r4 in Equation (6)).
Therefore, the following set of reactions:
r1 = y + xr → y + yr (Plant grow roots),
r2 = x + yr → x + xr (Roots foster the growth of mychorrizea),
r3 = x → x + xr (Mychorrizea produces mycelium),
r4 = y + xr → 2y (Mycelium foster the growth of plants),
(6)
provides a more complex model of a mutualistic relation than the one shown in Figure 2.
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Therefore, reaction networks can be used to model the mechanisms of ecological interactions.
Remarkably, COT provides a suitable conceptual landscape to formalize ecological notions.
For example, organizations can be understood as sustainable ecosystems, and invasion of a particular
ecological species x in an eco-system E can be modeled by adding species and reactions that represent
the interaction mechanisms of the species x with the ecological species in the ecosystem E [30].
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed the language of reaction networks, and particularly its COT
implementation, as a representational framework for systemic modeling. In particular, we focused on
crucial notions in a system’s theory such as the notion of the system itself, context, meta-system, resilience,
etc., and presented a reaction network model for a political, agent-decision, and ecological systems.
Remarkably, this framework does not require the choice of a particular point of view, or field of
knowledge, that serves as a reference for representing a system. On the contrary, it is required to identify
a set of entities, that can be, in principle, of any nature (physical, biological, social, economical, etc.),
and define a set of interactions of transformational nature (reactions) among them. The set of interactions
is understood as a universe of basic processes, i.e., a reaction network. From here, a system corresponds to
a sub-network such that its structural properties ensure its qualitative identity (closed) and observability
(self-maintaining), i.e., organizations in the COT sense. Technically speaking, organizations characterize
the global invariants of the local dynamics, and can be computed at a computationally tractable cost.
Since reactions are allowed to combine entities of different nature (see, for example, the
interactions combining payoffs and decisions in Section 5.2), this approach is a priori interdisciplinary.
In order to advance the modeling of systems using COT, we envisage various challenges.
First, this perspective requires proving its usefulness beyond the toy-model studies. We believe
that a model of an ecological universe of interactions, extending the toy-model presented in Section 5.3,
is a good option. Second, COT is still at an early stage of mathematical development. Several advances
can be made applying lattice theoretical notions [54] to the hierarchy of organizations [14], and more
profound studies in the topology of reaction networks could provide a more rich structure that the
one presented in this paper. Such a richer structure could be used not only to better understand
how systems emerge and combine, but also for improving algorithms regarding the computation of
organizations [41]. In this vein, we present some advances in this issue [36].
Last but not least, we believe that it is fundamental to develop a semi-formal methodology that
ensures that interdisciplinary reaction networks can be designed by combining the expertise from
different fields. Indeed, previous reaction networks models of non-biochemical systems required
an extensive dialogue among the disciplines involved in the problem in question (e.g., sociologist,
economist, and biologist). The aim of such dialogue was to find an ontology (set of species) and
the interaction mechanisms (sets of reactions) that combine the different perspectives into play.
This exhaustive dialogue has been carried out due to the motivation of the members involved in
the respective studies. However, a methodology to advance on such a dialogue could foster the
application of this formalism at a wider scale.
We suggest two ways in which this potentially divergent process can be improved. The first is
to provide semantic tools to construct the ontology given by the set of species. Researchers can be
aided by current powerful language taxonomies and semantic tools that can help them to identify
misunderstandings and ambiguous meanings. The second is the possibility to visualize the output
of the COT analysis of a reaction network (e.g., see Figure 1b). In this way, researchers can modify
in real-time the structure of the reaction network and observe how the structural properties of the
reaction network depend on the local interactions.
The ultimate goal of using reaction networks as a language for modeling systems is to bring
systemic thinking closer to the real world. We aim at not only scholars, but also decision-makers
and the general public contributing with their knowledge and expertise, so multiple perspectives can
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be integrated in a single framework that brings forward a broader understanding of the emergent
consequences of our local actions.
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Abstract: Conditions under which compositions of component systems form a well-defined
system-of-systems are here formulated at a fundamental level. Statement of what defines a well-defined
composition and sufficient conditions guaranteeing such a result offers insight into exemplars that can
be found in special cases such as differential equation and discrete event systems. For any given global
state of a composition, two requirements can be stated informally as: (1) the system can leave this
state, i.e., there is at least one trajectory defined that starts from the state; and (2) the trajectory evolves
over time without getting stuck at a point in time. Considered for every global state, these conditions
determine whether the resultant is a well-defined system and, if so, whether it is non-deterministic
or deterministic. We formulate these questions within the framework of iterative specifications for
mathematical system models that are shown to be behaviorally equivalent to the Discrete Event
System Specification (DEVS) formalism. This formalization supports definitions and proofs of the
afore-mentioned conditions. Implications are drawn at the fundamental level of existence where the
emergence of a system from an assemblage of components can be characterized. We focus on systems
with feedback coupling where existence and uniqueness of solutions is problematic.
Keywords: emergence; uniqueness; existence of solutions; input/output system; system specifications;
Discrete Event System Specification
1. Introduction
Emergence has been characterized as taking place in strong and week forms. Mittal [1] pointed out
that strong emergent behavior results in generation of new knowledge about the system representing
previously unperceived complex interactions. This can occur in the form of one or more of new
abstraction levels and linguistic descriptions, new hierarchical structures and couplings, new component
behaviors, and new feedback loops. Once understood and curated, the behavior returns to the
weak form, as it is no longer intriguing, and then can begin to be treated in regularized fashion.
Emergent behavior is likely an inherent feature of any complex system model because abstracting
a continuous real-world system (e.g., any complex natural system) to a constructed system-model
must leave gaps of representation that may diverge in unanticipated directions. In [2] philosophically,
following Ashby [3] and Foo and Zeigler [4], the perceived global behavior (holism) of a model might
be characterized as: Components (reductionism) + interactions (computation) + higher-order effects
where the latter can be considered as the source of emergent behaviors [5,6].
The Discrete Event Systems Specification (DEVS) formalism has been advocated as an advantageous
vehicle for researching such structure–behavior relationships because it provides the components and
couplings for models of complex systems and supports dynamic structure for genuine adaption and
evolution. Furthermore, DEVS enables fundamental emergence modeling because it operationalizes the
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closure-under-coupling conditions that form the basis of well-defined resultants of system composition
especially where feedback coupling prevails [7,8].
In this paper, we formulate conditions under which a composition of component systems
form a well-defined system-of-systems at a fundamental level. Formal statement of what defines
a well-defined composition and sufficient conditions guaranteeing such a result offer insight into
exemplars that can be found in special cases such as differential equation and discrete event systems.
Informally stated, we show that for any given global state of a composition, two requirements can be
stated as: (1) the system can leave this state, i.e., there is at least one trajectory defined that starts from
the state; and (2) the trajectory evolves over time without getting stuck at a point in time. Considered for
every global state, these conditions determine whether the resultant is a well-defined system and if so,
whether it is non-deterministic or deterministic. We formulate these questions within the framework of
iterative specifications for mathematical system models that are shown to be behaviorally equivalent to
the Discrete Event System Specification (DEVS) formalism. This formalization supports definitions and
proofs of the afore-mentioned conditions and allows us to exhibit examples and counter-examples of
condition satisfaction. Drawing on Turing machine halting decidability, we investigate the probability
of legitimacy for randomly constructed DEVS models. We close with implications for further research
on the emergence of new classes of well-defined systems.
Let us start with a well-known concept, the Turing Machine (TM) (cf. [9]). Usually, it is presented
in a holistic, unitary manner but as shown in Figure 1b, we can decompose it into two stand-alone
independent systems: the TM Control (S1) and the Tape System, (S2). Foo and Zeigler [4] argued
that the re-composition of the two parts was an easily understood example of emergence wherein
each standalone system has very limited power but their composition has universal computation
capabilities. Examining this in more depth, the Tape system shown in Figure 1a is the dumber of the
two, serving a memory with a slave mentality, it gets a symbol (sym) and a move (mv) instruction as
input, writes the symbol to the tape square under the head, moves the head according to the instruction,
and outputs the symbol found at the new head location. The power of the Tape system derives from
its physicality—its ability to store and retrieve a potentially infinite amount of data—but this can only
be exploited by a device that can properly interface with it. The TM Control by contrast has only finite
memory but its capacity to make decisions (i.e., use its transition table to jump to a new state and
produce state-dependent output) makes it the smarter executive. The composition of the two exhibits
“weak emergence” in that the resultant system behavior is of a higher order of complexity than those
of the components (logically undecidable versus finitely decidable), the behavior that results can be
shown explicitly to be a direct consequence of the component behaviors and their essential feedback
coupling—cross-connecting their outputs to inputs as shown by the arrows of Figure 1b. We are going
to use this example to discuss the general issues in dealing with such compositions.
Figure 1. Turing Machine decomposition (a) and modular composition (b).
The interdependent form of the interaction between the TM control and the tape system illustrates
a pattern found in numerous information technology and process control systems and recognized early
on by simulation language developers [10] (though not necessarily in the modular form described
here). In this interaction, each component system alternates between two phases, active and passive.
When one system is active the other is passive—only one can be active at any time. The active system
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does two actions: (1) it sends an input to the passive system that activates it (puts it into the active
phase); and (2) it transits to the passive phase to await subsequent re-activation. For example, in the
re-composed Turing Machine, the TM control starts a cycle of interaction by sending a symbol and
move instruction to the tape system then waiting passively for a new scanned symbol to arrive.
The tape system waits passively for the sym, mv pair. When it arrives, it executes the instruction and
sends the symbol now under the head to the waiting control.
Such active–passive compositions provide a class of systems from which we can draw intuition
and examples for generalizations about system emergence at the fundamental level. We will employ
the modeling and simulation framework based on system theory formulated in [10] especially focusing
on its concepts of iterative specification and the Discrete Event Systems Specification (DEVS) formalism.
Special cases of memory-less systems and the pattern of active–passive compositions are discussed
to exemplify the conditions resulting ill-definition, deterministic, and non-deterministic as well as
probabilistic systems. We provide sufficient conditions, meaningful especially for feedback coupled
assemblages, under which iterative system specifications can be composed to create a well-defined
resultant and that moreover can be simulated in the DEVS formalism.
However, to address more fundamental issues, we need to start with a more primitive and perhaps
more intuitive notion of a system. As in Figure 2, consider a concept of system with states, transitions,
and times associated with transitions. For example, there are transitions from state S1 to state S3 and
from S3 to S4 which each takes 1 time unit and there is a cycle of transitions involving S4, . . . , S7 each
of which take zero time. There is a self-transition involving S2 which consumes an infinite amount
of time (signifying that it is passive, remaining in that state forever.) This is distinguished from the
absence of any transitions out of S8. A state trajectory is a sequence of states following along existing
transitions, e.g., S1, S3, S4 is such a trajectory.
Figure 2. System with tuned transitions.
This example gives us a quick understanding of the conditions for system existence at the
fundamental level.
We say that the system is:
• not defined at S8 because there is no trajectory emerging from it;
• non-deterministic at S1 because there are two distinct outbound transitions defined for it; and
• deterministic at S2 and S4 because there is only one outbound transition for each.
We say that the system is well-defined if it is defined at all its states. These conditions are relative to
static properties, i.e., they relate to states not how the states follow one another over time. In contrast,
state trajectories relate to dynamic and temporal properties. When moving along a trajectory, we keep
adding the time advances to get the total traversal time, e.g., the time taken to go from S2 to S4
is 2. Here, a trajectory is said to be progressive in time if time always advances as we extend the
trajectory. For example, the cycle of states S4 . . . S7 is not progressive because as we keep adding the
time advances the sum never increases. Conceptually, let us start a clock at 0 and, starting from a given
state, we let the system evolve following existing transitions and advancing the clock according to the
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time advances on the transitions. If we then ask what the state of the system will be at some time later,
we will always be able to answer if the system is well-defined and progressive. A well-defined system
that is not progressive signifies that the system gets stuck in time and after some time, it becomes
impossible to ask what the state of the system is in after that time. Zeno’s paradox offers a well-known
metaphor where the time advances diminish so that time accumulates to a point rather than continue
to progress and offers an example showing that the pathology does not necessarily involve a finite
cycle. Our concept of progressiveness generalizes the concept of legitimacy for DEVS [10] and deals
with the “zenoness” property which has been much studied in the literature [11]. We return to it in
more detail later.
Thus, we have laid the conceptual groundwork in which a system has to be well-defined
(static condition) and progressive (temporal dynamic condition) if it is to have achieved independent
existence when emerging from a composition of components.
2. Formal Background
Hereafter are presented basic and coupled specifications.
2.1. Basic Discrete Event System Specification
As presented in [12], a Discrete Event System Specification (DEVS) is a structure
M =< X, S, Y, δint, δext, λ, ta >
where X is the set of input values, S is a set of states, Y is the set of output values, δint : S → S is the
internal transition function, δext : Q× X → S is the external transition function, where Q = {(s, e)|s ∈ S,
0 ≤ e ≤ ta(s)} is the total state where e is the time elapsed since last transition, λ : S → Y is the
output function, ta : S → R+∞ is the time advance function.
In the Turing machine example of Figure 1, the tape system and control engine are each atomic
DEVS. For the tape system, a state is a triple (tape, pos, mv) where the tape is an infinite sequence
of zeros and ones (symbols), pos represents the position of the head, and mv is a specification for
moving left or right. An external transition accepts a symbol, move pair, writes the symbol in the
square of the current head position and stores the move for the subsequent internal transition that
executed the specified move. For the control engine, a state is a pair (st, sym) where st is a control
state and sym is a stored symbol. An external transition stores the received symbol for subsequent
use. An internal transition applies the TM transition table to the (st, sym) pair and transitions to the
specified control state.
The core of this concept simplifies when the system is input-free (or autonomous, i.e., not responding
to inputs) and outputs are not considered. Then, we have a transition system
M =< S, δ, ta >
where δ ⊆ S× S and ta : S× S → R+∞.
Here, we are allowing the transition system to be non-deterministic so that rather than δ and ta
being functions they are presented as relations.
For example, in Figure 2, we have S = {S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6, S7} , δ = {(S1, S3), (S3, S4), ...},
and ta(S1, S3) = 1, ta(S3, S4) = 1,...
In this formal version of the informal statements above, the transition system, M, is
• not defined at S8 because there is no transition pair with S8 as the left member in δ;
• non-deterministic at S1 because it is a left member of two transition pairs (S1, S2) and (S1, S3); and
• deterministic at S2 and S4 because there is only one transition pair involving each one as
a left member.
This gives concrete and formal expression to the earlier definition of these concepts.
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2.2. Coupled DEVS Models
DEVS models can be coupled to form coupled models that themselves are DEVS models
manifesting closure under coupling. To keep the presentation as straightforward as possible in this
paper we will limit the discussion to coupling of two components without external inputs or outputs.
This is illustrated in Figure 1b where the coupling recipe maps the output of the control engine
(symbol, move pair) to the input of the tape system and likewise, the output of the tape system (symbol)
to the input of the control engine. This mapping is assumed to take zero time (any delay in a real
manifestation can be modeled by inserting delay components). To sketch the way the resultant of
coupling is computed and show that it is expressed as a DEVS, let M =< X, S, Y, δint, δext, λ, ta > and




Then, the resultant is a DEVS:
Mcoup =< Qcoup, δcoup, tacoup >
where Qcoup = Q × Q′, tacoup : Qcoup → R+∞, δcoup : Qcoup → Qcoup and ta((s, e), (s′, e′)) =
min{ta(s)− e, ta′(s′)− e′}.
To explain, the next event will occur according the time advance and will be driven by the
imminent component (whose next event time is the minimum of the two—neglecting ties for simplicity
here). For illustration, let t∗ be the time advance and let the second component be imminent.
This component generates its output and sends it to the first via the coupling which reacts to it
using its external transition function establishing its next state δext(s, t∗, λ′(s′)); at the same time,
the imminent component applies its internal transition function to establish its next state δ′int(s
′). Thus,
we have δcoup((s, e), (s′, e′)) = (δext(s, t∗, λ′(s′)), δ′int(s
′)).
Having briefly reviewed the basics of DEVS, we are ready to consider the general case of iterative
specification of which DEVS is an example.
3. Iterative System Specifications
We briefly review an approach to Iterative Specification of Systems that was introduced in [12]
and provide more detail in Appendix B. I/O systems describe system behavior with a global transition
function that determines the final state given the initial state and the applied input segment. Since input
segments are left segmentable and closed under composition, we are able to generate the state and
output values along the entire input interval. However, such an approach is not very practical. What we
need is a way to generate state and output trajectories in an iterative way going from one state along
the trajectory to the next.
Iterative specification of systems is a general scheme for defining systems by iterative applications
of generator segments. These are elementary segments from which all input segments of a system can
be generated. Having such a concept we define a generator state transition function and iteratively
apply generator segments to the generator state transition function. The results produced by the
generator state transitions constitute the state trajectory for the input segment resulting from the
composition of the generator segments. The general scheme of iterative specification forms a basis
for more specialized types of specifications of systems. System specification formalisms are special
forms of iterative specifications with their special type of generator segments and generator state
transition functions.
Consider (Z, T) the set of all segments {ω :< 0, t1 >→ Z | t1 ∈ T}. Here, the notation,
ω :< 0, t1 >→ Z} means that ω is a mapping from an interval of time base, T to a set of
values Z. For a subset Γ of (Z, T), the concatenation closure of Γ is denoted Γ+. Example generators
are bounded continuous segments, and constant segments of variable length generating bounded
piecewise continuous segments piecewise constant segments, respectively. Unfortunately, if Γ generates
Ω, we cannot expect each ω ∈ Ω to have a unique decomposition by Γ. A single representative,
or canonical decomposition can be computed using a Maximal Length Segmentation (MLS). First we
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find ω1, the longest generator in Γ that is also a left segment of ω. This process is repeated with what
remains of ω after ω1 is removed, generating ω2, and so on. If the process stops after n repetitions,
then ω = ω1ω2 . . . ωn. We say that Γ is an admissible set of generators for Ω if Γ generates Ω and for
each ω ∈ Ω, a unique MLS decomposition of ω by Γ exists.
The following is the basis for further analysis in this paper:
Theorem 1. Sufficient Conditions for Admissibility. If Γ satisfies the following conditions, it admissibly
generates Γ+:
1. Existence of longest initial segments: ω ∈ Γ+ ⇒ max{t | ωt> ∈ Γ} exists
2. Closure under right segmentation: ω ∈ Γ ⇒ ω<τ ∈ Γ for all τ ∈ dom(ω)
An iterative specification of a system is a structure
G =< T, X, ΩG, Y, Q, δG, λ >
where T, X, Y, and Q have the same interpretation as for I/O systems, ΩG is an admissible set of input
segment generators, δG : Q×ΩG→Q is the single segment state transition function, and λ : Q× X→Y
is the output function.
An iterative specification G =< T, X, ΩG, Y, Q, δG, λ > specifies a time invariant system,
SG =< T, X, Ω+G , Y, Q, δ
+
G , λ >. The system is well-defined if δ
+
G , the extension of δG, has the
composition property, i.e., δ+G (q, ω1 •ω2) = δ+G (δ+G (q, ω1), ω2), for all ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω+G .
For more details, see Appendix B.
3.1. DEVS Simulation of Iterative Specification
As reviewed in Appendix B, the notion of iterative specification was introduced to characterize
diverse classes of systems such as differential equation systems and discrete time systems. With the
motivation of including discrete event systems under the same umbrella as more familiar systems,
DEVS was defined using iterative specification. Here we show that the converse is also true,
namely, that DEVS can directly represent iterative specifications. Given an iterative specification
G =< T, X, ΩG, Y, Q, δG, λ > , we construct a DEVS model M =< X, S, Y, δint, δext, λ, ta > that can
simulate it in a step-by-step manner moving from one input segment to the next. The basic idea is that
we build the construction around an encoding of the input segments of G into the event segments of
M as illustrated in Figure 3. This is based on the MLS which gives a unique decomposition of input
segments to G into generator subsegments. The encoding maps the generator subsegments. ωi in the
order they occur into corresponding events which contain all the information of the segment itself.
To do the simulation, the model M stores the state of G. It also uses its external transition function
to store its version of G’s input generator subsegment when it receives it. M then simulates G by
using its internal transition function to apply its version of G’s transition function to update its state
maintaining correspondence with the state of G.
Figure 3. DEVS Simulation of an Iterative Specification.
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Details of the construction are provided in Appendix C. We note that the key to the proof is that
iterative specifications can be expressed within the explicit event-like constraints of the DEVS formalism,
itself defined through an iterative specification. Thus DEVS can be viewed as the computational basis
for system classes that can be specified in iterative form satisfying all the requirements for admissibility.
3.2. Coupled Iterative Specification
Although closure of coupling holds for DEVS, the generalization to iterative specification does not
immediately follow. The problem is illustrated in Figure 4 where two iterative system specifications,
ISP1 and ISP2, are cross-coupled such as exemplified by the Turing machine example in Figure 1.
The cross-coupling introduces two constraints shown by the equalities in the figure, namely, the input
of ISP2, ω2 must equal the output of ISP1, ρ1, and the input of ISP1, ω1 must equal the output of ISP2,
ρ2. Here we are referring to input and output trajectories over time as suggested graphically in Figure 4.
Since each system imposes its own constraints on its input/output relation, the conjunction of the four
constraints (two coupling-imposed, two system-imposed) may have zero, one, or multiple solutions.
Figure 4. Input and output trajectories of coupled systems.
Definition 1. A Coupled Iterative Specification is a network specification of components and coupling where
the components are iterative specifications at the I/O System level.
As indicated, in the sequel, we deal with the simplified case of two coupled components. However,
the results can be readily generalized with use of more complex notation. We begin with a definition
of the relation of input and output segments that a system imposes on its interface. We need this
definition to describe the interaction of systems brought on through the coupling of outputs to inputs.
Definition 2. The I/O Relation of an iterative specification is inherited from the I/O Relation of the system that
it specifies. Likewise, the set of I/O Functions of an iterative specification is inherited from the system it specifies.
Formally, let SG =< T, X, Ω+G , Y, Q, δ
+
G , λ > be the system specified by G =< T, X, ΩG, Y, Q, δG, λ >.
Then the I/O Functions associated with G is β : Q × Ω+G → Ω+G where for q ∈ Q, ω ∈ Ω+G ,
β(q, ω) = λ(δ+G (q, ω)).
Let β1 and β2 represent the I/O functions of the iterative specifications, ISP1 and ISP2,
respectively. Applying the coupling constraints expressed in the equalities above, we make the definition:
Definition 3. A pair of output trajectories (ρ1,ρ2) is a consistent output trajectory for the state pair (q1,q2) if
ρ1 = β1(q1,ρ2) and ρ2 = β2(q2,ρ1).
Definition 4. A Coupled Iterative Specification has unique solutions if there is a function, F:Q1 × Q2→ Ω;
with F(q1,q2) = (ρ1,ρ2), where there is exactly one consistent pair (ρ1,ρ2) with infinite domain for every initial
state (q1,q2). Infinite domain is needed for convenience in applying segmentation.
Definition 5. A Coupled Iterative Specification is admissible if it has unique solutions.
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The following theorems are proved in Appendix D.
Theorem 2. An admissible Coupled Iterative Specification specifies a well-defined Iterative Specification at
the I/O System level.
Theorem 3. The set of Iterative Specifications is closed under admissible coupling.
Theorem 4. DEVS coupled model can component-wise simulate a coupled Iterative Specification.
Proof. The coupled model has components, which are DEVS representations of the individual Iterative
Specifications (according to Theorem D in Appendix D) and also a coordinator as shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5. DEVS Component-wise simulation of Coupled Iterative Specifications.
The coordinator receives the current states of the components and applies the F function to
compute unique consistent output segments. After segmentation using the MLS as in the proof of
Theorem D in Appendix D, it packages each as a single event in a DEVS segment as shown. Each DEVS
component computes the state of its Iterative Specification at the end of the segment as in Theorem D.
Then it sends this state to the coordinator and the cycle repeats. This completes an informal version of
the proof which would formally proceed by induction.
The solution function F represents an idealization of the fixed point solutions required for
Differential Equation System Specification (DESS) and the local solution approaches of Discrete
Time System Specification (DTSS) and Quantized DEVS [12]. Generalized Discrete Event System
Specification (GDEVS) [13] polynomial representation of trajectories is the closest realization but the
approach opens the door to realization by other trajectory prediction methods.
3.3. Special Case: Memoryless Systems
Consider the case where each component’s output does not depend on its state but only on
its input.
Let gr represent the ground state in which the device is always found (all states are represented
by this state since output does not depend on state.) In the following R1 and R2 are the I/O relations
of systems 1 and 2, respectively. In this case, they take special forms:
ρ1 = β1(gr, ω1)⇔ (ω1, ρ1) ∈ R1
ρ2 = β2(gr, ω2)⇔ (ω2, ρ2) ∈ R2
ω2 = ρ1
ω1 = ρ2
ρ2 = β2(q2, ω2)⇔ (ρ1, ω1) ∈ R2 ⇔ (ω1, ρ1) ∈ R2−1
i.e., (ρ2, ρ1) is consistent⇔ (ρ2, ρ1) ∈ R1∩ R2−1
Let f and g be defined in the following way:
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f (ρ2) = β1(gr, ρ2)
g(ρ1) = β2(gr, ρ1)
So for any ρ1, ρ1 = f (ρ2) = f (g(ρ1)) and g = f−1 (considered as a relation).
Finally, F(q1, q2) = (ρ1, f−1(ρ1)) has:
• no solutions if f−1 does not exist, yielding no resultant;
• a unique solution for every input if f−1 exists, yielding a deterministic resultant; and
• multiple solutions for a given segment ρ if f−1(ρ) is multivalued, yielding a non-deterministic resultant.
For examples, consider an adder that always adds 1 to its input, i.e.,
β(gr, ρ) = f (ρ) = ρ + 1
i.e., ∀t ∈ T, β(gr, ρ)(t) = ρ(t) + 1
Cross-coupling a pair of adders does not yield a well-defined resultant because f−1(ρ) = ρ− 1 = f .
However, coupling an adder to a subtracter, its inverse, β(gr, ρ) = ρ − 1, yields a well-defined
deterministic system.
For other examples, consider combinatorial elements whose output is a logic function of the input
and consider a pair of gates of the same type connected in a feedback loop:
• A NOT gate has an inverse 0 → 1, 1 → 0, so the composition has two solutions one for each of
two complementary assignments, i.e., F(gr, gr) = {(1, 0), (0, 1)} yielding a non-deterministic system.
• An AND gate with one of its input held to 0 always maps the other input into 0 so has a solution
only for inputs of 0 to each component, i.e., F(gr, gr) = (0, 0), yielding a deterministic system.
• An AND gate with a stuck-at input of 1 is the identity mapping and has multiple solutions i.e.,
F(gr, gr) = {(0, 0), (1, 1)}, yielding a non-deterministic system.
3.4. Active-Passive Systems
We now show that active–passive systems as described earlier offer a class of systems for which
the iterative specifications of components satisfy the admissibility conditions specified in Theorem 4.
As in Figure 6a, consider a pair of cross-coupled systems each having input generators that represent
null and non-null segments.
Figure 6. Active–Passive Example of Admissible Progressive Coupled Iterative Specifications.
A null generator represents the output of a passive system whereas a non-null generator represents
the output of an active system. For example in the TM case, a non-null generator is a segment that
represents transmission of a symbol by the tape unit and of a symbol, move pair for the TM control.
As in Figure 6b let S1 and S2 start as active and passive, respectively. Then, they output non-null
and null generators, respectively. Since the null generator has infinite extent, the end-time of the
non-null generator determines the time of next event, t* (as defined earlier) and we apply the transition
functions in Figure 6a to find that at t* the systems have reversed phases with S1 in passive and S2
in active.
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Definition 6. Define a triple < Q, δG, λ > by Q = {active, passive} × {active, passive} with
F(active, passive) = (non-null, null) δG(active, passive) = (δ(active, nullt∗>) = δ(passive, non-nullt∗>)) =
(passive, active) with t∗(active, passive)= endtime of the non-null generator segment λ(active, passive) =
(non-null, null)
Let the non-null and null generators stand for sets of concrete segments that are equivalent
with respect to state transitions and outputs. Then, such a scheme can define a deterministic or
non-deterministic resultant depending on the number of consistent pairs of (non-null, null) generator
segments are possible from the (active, passive) state. Furthermore, mutatis-mutandis for the state
(passive, active).
4. Temporal Progress: Legitimacy, Zenoness
Although we have shown how a DEVS coupled model can simulate a coupling of iterative
specifications, it does not guarantee that such a model is legitimate [12]. Indeed, backing up,
legitimacy of the simulating DEVS is reflective of the temporal progress character of the original
coupling of specifications. We see that the time advance has a value provided that the function F
is defined for current state. However, as in the case of zenoness, a sequence of such values may
accumulate at a finite point thus not allowing the system to progress beyond this point. Consequently,
we need to extend the requirements for coupled iterative specifications to include temporal progress in
order to fully characterize the resultant composition of systems. Thus, we can extend the definitions:
Definition 7. An Iterative Specification is progressive if every sequence of time advances diverges in sum.
Definition 8. A Coupled Iterative Specification is progressively admissible if its components are each
progressive and the resultant Iterative Specification at the I/O System level is progressive.
Definition 9. A progressive Iterative Specification can be simulated by a legitimate DEVS.
Definition 10. A progressively admissible Coupled Iterative Specification can be component-wise simulated
by a legitimate DEVS.
Zeigler et al. [12] showed that the question of whether a DEVS is legitimate is undecidable.
The approach was to express a Turing Machine as a DEVS and showing that solving the halting
problem is equivalent to establishing legitimacy for this DEVS. We can transfer this approach to the
formulation of the TM in Figure 1 by setting the time advances of both components to zero except
for a halt state which is a passive state (and has an infinite time advance). Then a TM DEVS is
legitimate just in case the TM it implements ever halts. Since there is no algorithm to decide whether
an arbitrary TM will halt or not the same is true for legitimacy. Since DEVS is an iterative specification,
the problem of determining whether an Iterative Specification is progressive is also undecidable.
Likewise, the question of whether a coupled iterative specification is progressive is undecidable.
Fundamental Systems Existence: Probabilistic Characterization of Halting
The existence of an iteratively specified system requires temporal progress and there is no
algorithm to guarantee in a finite time that such progress is true. The underlying point is that,
given an arbitrary TM, we have to simulate it step-by-step to determine if it will halt. Importantly,
if a TM has not halted after some time, however long, this gives us no further information on its
potential halting in the future. However, while this is true for individual TMs, the situation may be
different for the statistics of subclasses of TMs. In other words, for a given class of TMs, the probability
of an instance halting may be found to increase or decrease for the future given that it has not yet halted.
We performed an empirical study of randomly generated TMs described in Appendix E.
The results seem to show that TMs break into two classes—those that halt within a small number
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of steps (e.g., 16) and those that do not halt. Indeed, the data suggest that approximately one-third
of the sampled TMs halt, while two-thirds do not. For those that halt, the probability of halting at
the first step is greatest and then decreases exponentially and so is well-described by a geometric
distribution with probability of success approximately 1/6. In other words the probability of halting is
1/6 at each step given the TM has not halted earlier for the set that will eventually halt.
Summarizing, the existence of an iteratively specified system is not algorithmically decidable but
there may be useful probabilistic formulations that can be applied to sub-classes of such specifications.
For example, it seems to be that with high probability the halting of a two-symbol, three-state TM
can be decided within 16 simulation steps. Therefore, it might be tractable for an assemblage of
components to find a way to solve its composition problems in a finite time for certain classes of
components couplings.
5. Discussion: Future Research
The discussion presented here was limited to compositions having two components with
cross-coupled connections. However, this scope was sufficient to expose the essential effect of feedback
in creating the need for consistent assignments of input/output pairs and the additional—distinct—
requirement for time progression. Further development can extend the scope to arbitrary compositions
generalizing the statement of consistent assignments to finite and perhaps, infinite sets of components.
Further, when extending to arbitrary composition sizes, the analysis revealing fundamental
conditions for the emergent existence of systems from component systems suggests new classes
of systems that can be defined using iterative specifications. For example, we might consider the
active–passive systems in a more general setting. First allowing any finite number of them in a coupling
can satisfy the requirement for at most one active component at any time by restricting the coupling
to a single influencer for each component. In fixed coupling exhibiting feedback, this amounts to
a cyclic formation in which activity will travel around the cycle from one component to the next.
Another common pattern is a single component (root) influencing a set of components (branches) each
of which influences only the root. Several possibilities for interaction of the root with the branches
can result in admissible compositions. For example, the root might select a single branch to activate
to satisfy the single active component requirements. Alternatively, it might activate all branches and
count the number of branches as they successively go passive, becoming active when all the branches
have become passive. These alternative configuration require knowledge of the protocol underlying
the interaction but this only means that proofs of emergent well-defined resultants will be conditioned
to narrower sub-classes of systems rather than to broad classes such as all differential equation systems.
After much progress in understanding how dynamic structure can be managed in DEVS-based
simulations [14–16], a framework that incorporates several insights has recently been developed [17].
This framework, formulated in the DEVS formalism, can be extended to iterative specifications
and investigated for conditions of existence as done here. The extension will probably increase the
complexity required to state and establish the conditions but would, if successful, bring us closer to
understanding the emergence of systems from assemblages of components in the real world.
Appendix A. Turing Machine as a DEVS
Appendix A.1. Tape System
A state is a triple (tape, pos, mv) where tape : I → {0, 1}, pos ∈ I, mv ∈ {−1, 1} and I is the
integers; in other words, the tape is an infinite sequence of bits, where pos represents the position of
the head, and mv is a specification for moving left or right. An internal transition moves the head as
specified; an external transition accepts a symbol, move pair, stores the symbol in the current position
of the head and stores the move for subsequent execution. The slot for storing the move can also be
null, which indicates that a move has taken place.
Each function can be described as follows:
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δint(tape, pos, mv) = (tape, move(pos, mv), null)
δext((tape, pos, null), e, (sym, mv)) = (store(tape, pos, sym), pos, mv)
ta(tape, pos, mv) = 1
ta(tape, pos, null) = ∞
λ(tape, pos, mv) = getSymbol(tape, pos)
where
move(pos.mv) = pos + mv
store(tape, pos, sym) = tape′ where tape′(pos) = sym, tape′(i) = tape(i)
getSymbol(tape, pos) = tape(pos)
Appendix A.2. TM Control
A state is a pair (st, sym) where st is a control state and sym is a stored symbol. An internal
transition applies the TM transition table to the (st, sym) pair and transitions to the specified control
state. An external transition stores the received symbol for subsequent use.
Each function can be described as follows:
δint(st, sym) = (TMState(st, sym), null)
δext((st, null), e, sym) = (st, sym)
ta(st, sym) = 1
ta(st, null) = ∞
λ(st, sym) = TMOutput(st, sym)
where
TMState(st, sym) = st′
TMOutput(st, sym) = sym′
Appendix B. Iterative Specification of Systems
The following is extracted from [12] Chapter 5.
Appendix B.1. Generator Segments
Consider (Z,T) the set of all segments {ω :< 0, t1 >→ Z | t1 ∈ T}, which is a semigroup under
concatenation. For a subset Γ of (Z,T), we designate by Γ+ the concatenation closure of Γ (also called
the semigroup generated by Γ). Example generators are bounded continuous segments, and constant
segments of variable length generating bounded piecewise continuous segments piecewise constant
segments, respectively. Unfortunately, if Γ generates Ω (a subset of segments), we cannot expect
each ω ∈ Ω to have a unique decomposition by Γ; that is, there may be distinct decompositions
ω1, ω2, . . . , ωn and ω′1, ω
′
2, . . . , ω
′
n such that ω1 •ω2 • · · · •ωn = ω and ω1′ •ω′2 • · · · •ω′n = ω.
A single representative, or canonical decomposition can be computed using a maximal length
segmentation. First, we find ω1, the longest generator in Γ that is also a left segment of ω. This process
is repeated with what remains of ω after ω1is removed, generating ω2, and so on. If the process stops
after n repetitions, then ω = ω1ω2 . . . ωn.
It is not necessarily the case that MLS decompositions exist (i.e., that the just-mentioned processes
will stop after a finite number of repetitions). Thus, we are interested in checkable conditions on a set
of generators that will guarantee that each segment generated has an MLS decomposition. Fortunately,
a segment can have at most one MLS decomposition. We say that Γ is an admissible set of generators
for Ω if Γ generates Ω and for each ω∈Ω, a unique MLS decomposition of ω by Γ exists. (We also say
Γ admissibly generates Ω.) The following is proved in [12]:
Theorem B1. Sufficient Conditions for Admissibility. If Γ satisfies the following conditions, it admissibly
generates Γ+:
1. Existence of longest initial segments: ω ∈ Γ+ ⇒ max{t | ωt> ∈ Γ} exists
2. Closure under right segmentation: ω ∈ Γ ⇒ ω<t ∈ Γ for all τ ∈ dom(ω)
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Appendix B.2. Generator State Transition Systems
Having established a terminating process for obtaining MLS decompositions, we wish to use
these decompositions to help us generate a transition function given only that function’s action on the
generators. In other words, let ΩG be an admissible generating set for Ω and suppose we have defined
a function δG : Q×ΩG → Q, which we call a single segment transition function.
Let ω1, ω2, . . . , ωn be the MLS decomposition of ω. Having δ defined for each segment ωi, we wish
to piece together these parts to obtain compound transition associated with ω itself.
An iterative specification of a system is a structure
G =< T, X, ΩG, Y, Q, δ, λ >,
where T, X, Y, and Q have the same interpretation as for I/O systems; ΩG is the set of input segment
generators; δG : Q×ΩG → Q is the single segment state transition function; λ : Q× X → Y is the
output function, with the restriction that ΩG ⊆ (X, T); and, most important, ΩG is an admissible set of
generators and δ+G : Q×Ω+G → Q has the composition property.
An iterative specification G =< T, X, ΩG, Y, Q, δG, λ > specifies a time invariant system,
SG =< T,X, Ω+G , Y, Q, δ
+
G , λ > where δ
+
G is the extension of δG which is well-defined according to
the following:
Theorem B2. Sufficient Conditions for Iterative Specification. Let G =< T, X, ΩG, Y, Q, δG, λ > be
a structure as just defined. Then, if the following conditions hold, G is an iterative specification and
SG =< T, X, Ω+G , Y, Q, δ
+
G , λ > is a system.
1. Existence of longest prefix segments: ω ∈ Ω+G ⇒ max{t | omegat> ∈ ΩG} exists
2. Closure under right segmentation: ω ∈ ΩG ⇒ ω<t ∈ ΩG for t ∈ dom(ω)
3. Closure under left segmentation: ω ∈ ΩG ⇒ ωt> ∈ ΩG for t ∈ dom(ω)
4. Consistency of composition: δ+G (q, ω1 •ω2 • · · · •ωn) = δG(δG(. . . δG(δG(q, ω1), ω2), . . . ), ωn)
Appendix C. DEVS Atomic Model Simulation of an Iterative Specification
Theorem C1. A DEVS atomic model can simulate an Iterative Specification.
Proof. As shown in Figure 3 and in Figure 5, given an iterative specification G =< T, X, ΩG, Y, Q, δG, λ >,
we construct a DEVS model M =< X, S, Y, δint, δext, λ, ta >, such that
g : ΩG → ΩDEVS using mls
g(ω) = [ω]l(ω)> = [ω] φl(ω)>
h : Q → Q×ΩG
h(q) = (q, dummy)
According to the definition of the simulating DEVS:
S = Q×ΩG
δint(q, ω) = (δG(q, ω), dummy)
ta(q, ω) = l(ω)
δext((q, ω), e, ω′) = (δG(q, ωe>), ω′)
λ(q, dummy) = λG(q)
In the Iterative Specification:
δ+G (q, ωω
′) = δG(δG(q, ω), ω′)
In the DEVS, let δDEVS be the transition function of the system specified by the DEVS. We want to
show that h(δ+G (q, ωω
′)) = δDEVS(h(q), g(ωω′)), i.e.,
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δDEVS(h(q), g(ωω′))
= δDEVS((q, dummy), g(ω)g(ω′))
= δDEVS((q, dummy), [ω]l(ω)> , [ω
′]l(ω′)>)
= δDEVS(δext((q, dummy), [ω]), φl(ω)>), ω
′
l(ω′)>)
= δDEVS((q, [ω]), φl(ω)>), ω
′
l(ω′)>)
= δDEVS(δint(q, [ω]), φl(ω)>), ω
′
l(ω′)>)
= δDEVS((δG(q, ω), dummy), ω′l(ω′)>)




= h(δG(δG(q, ω), ω′))
= (δG(δG(q, ω), ω′), dummy)
= δDEVS(h(q), g(ωω′))
Appendix D. Coupled Iterative Specification at the I/O System level
Theorem D1. An admissible Coupled Iterative Specification specifies a well-defined Iterative Specification at
the I/O System level.
Proof. Given two iterative specifications, Gi and their state sets, Qi i = 1, 2, let Q = Q1×Q2, eventually
the state set of the iterative specification to be constructed. For any pair (q1,q2) in Q, let (ρ1, ρ2) be
a consistent output trajectory for (q1, q2), i.e., ρ1 = β(q1, ρ2) and ρ2 = β(q2, ρ1) and F(q1, q2) = (ρ1, ρ2).
Define an autonomous Iterative Specification < Q, δG, λ > by
δG(q1, q2) = (δ(q1, ρ2t∗(q1,q2)>), δ(q2, ρ1t∗(q1,q2)>))
where t∗(q1, q2) = min{t∗1, t∗2} and t∗1, t∗2 are the times of the MLS for ρ1 and ρ2.
In other words, since each of the component iterative specifications have maximum length
segmentations we take the time of next update of the constructed specification to be determined by
earliest of the times of these segmentations for the consistent pair of output trajectories. This allows us
to define a step-wise transition for the constructed transition function. Closure under composition for
this transition function can be established using induction on the number of generators in the segments
under consideration. Similarly, the output function is defined by: λ(q1, q2) = (λ(q1), λ(q2)).
Theorem D2. The set of Iterative Specifications is closed under admissible coupling.
Proof. This theorem is a corollary of the previous theorem.
Appendix E. A Statistical Experiment Sampling from 2-Symbol, 3-State TMs
We performed a statistical experiment sampling from two-symbol, three-state TMs. Each sampled
TM fills in the xs in Table E1 with values from the sets shown, where one of the rows is chosen at
random and its next state change to the halt state (e.g., the first row can be (A,−1,0) meaning jump to
state A, move back, and print 0). The number of TMs in this class is (2× 2× 3)2×3 = 126. We generated
1000 samples randomly and simulated them until they halted or for a maximum of 1000 time steps.
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Table E1. Template for two-symbol, three-state TMs.
State Symbol Next State {A, B, C} Move {1, −1} Print Symbol {0, 1}
A 0 x x x
A 1 x x x
B 0 x x x
B 1 x x x
C 0 x x x
C 1 x x x
The results are shown in the first two columns of Table E2. They seem to show that TMs break into
two classes—those that halt within a small number of steps (e.g., 16) and those that do not halt. Indeed,
the data in the table suggest that approximately one-third of the sampled TMs halt, while two-thirds
do not. For those that halt, the probability of halting at the first step is greatest and then decreases
exponentially (cf. Figure E1). The third row shows the probabilities computed from a geometric success
model using probability of success as 0.161. The agreement of the observed and predicted distributions
are in close agreement. This suggests that for the set that will eventually halt, the probability of a TM
halting at each step is approximately 1/6, given that it has not halted earlier.
Table E2. Empirical Frequency Distribution for halting step vs. Geometric Model.











Figure E1. Empirical frequency vs. geometric model.
Summarizing, the existence of an iteratively specified system is not algorithmically decidable but
there may be useful probabilistic formulations that can be applied to sub-classes of such specifications.
For example, it seems to be that with high probability the halting of a two-symbol, three-state TM
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can be decided within 16 simulation steps. Therefore, it might be tractable for an assemblage of
components to find a way to solve its composition problems in a finite time for certain classes of
components couplings.
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Abstract: In the context of the modeling and simulation of neural nets, we formulate definitions for
the behavioral realization of memoryless functions. The definitions of realization are substantively
different for deterministic and stochastic systems constructed of neuron-inspired components.
In contrast to earlier generations of neural net models, third generation spiking neural nets exhibit
important temporal and dynamic properties, and random neural nets provide alternative probabilistic
approaches. Our definitions of realization are based on the Discrete Event System Specification (DEVS)
formalism that fundamentally include temporal and probabilistic characteristics of neuron system
inputs, state, and outputs. The realizations that we construct—in particular for the Exclusive Or (XOR)
logic gate—provide insight into the temporal and probabilistic characteristics that real neural systems
might display. Our results provide a solid system-theoretical foundation and simulation modeling
framework for the high-performance computational support of such applications.
Keywords: neural nets; spiking neurons; xor problem; input/output system; system specifications;
Discrete Event System Specification
1. Introduction
Bridging the gap between neural circuits and overall behavior is facilitated by an intermediate
level of neural computations that occur in individual and populations of neurons [1]. The computations
performed by Artificial Neural Nets (ANN) can be viewed as a very special, but currently popular,
instantiation of such a concept [2]. However, such models map vectors to vectors without considering
the immediate history of recent inputs nor the time base on which such inputs occur in real
counterparts [3–5]. In reality, however, time matters because the interplay of the nervous system
and the environment occurs via time-varying signals. Recently, third-generation neural nets which
feature temporal behavior, including processing of individual spikes, have gained recognition [4].
Computing the XOR function has received special attention as a simple example of resisting
implementation by the simplest ANNs with direct input to output mappings [6], and requiring
ANNs having a hidden mediating layer [7,8]. From a systems perspective, the XOR function—and
indeed all functions computed by ANNs—are memoryless functions not requiring states for their
definition [2,9,10]. It is known that Spiking Neural Nets (SNN)—which employ spiking neurons
as computational units—account for the precise firing times of neurons for information coding,
and are computationally more powerful than earlier neural networks [11,12]. Discrete Event System
Specification (DEVS) models have been developed for formal representations of spiking neurons
in end-to-end nervous system architectures from a simulation perspective [10,13,14]. Therefore, it
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is of interest to examine the properties of DEVS realizations that employ dynamic features that are
distinctive to SNNs, in contrast to their static neuronal counterparts.
Although typically considered as deterministic systems, Gelenbe introduced a stochastic model of
ANN that provided a markedly different implementation [15]. With the advent of increasingly complex
simulations of brain systems [13] the time is ripe for reconsideration of the forms of behavior displayed
by neural nets. In this paper, we employ systems theory and a modeling and simulation framework [16]
to provide some formal definitions of neural input/output (I/O) realizations and how they are applied
in deterministic and probabilistic systems. We formulate definitions for the behavioral realization of
memoryless functions with particular reference to the XOR logic gate. The definitions of realization
are substantively different for deterministic and stochastic systems constructed from neuron-inspired
components. In contrast to ANNs that can compute functions such as XOR, our definitions of
realizations fundamentally include temporal and probabilistic characteristics of their inputs, state,
and outputs. The realizations of the XOR function that we describe provide insight into the temporal
and probabilistic characteristics that real neural systems might display.
In the following sections, we review system specifications and concepts for their input/output
(I/O) behaviors that allow us to provide definitions for systems implementation of memoryless
functions. This allows us to consider the temporal characteristics of neural nets in relation to the
functions they implement. In particular, we formulate a deterministic DEVS version of the neural net
model defined by Gelenbe [15], and show how this model implements the XOR function. In this context,
we discuss timing considerations related to the arrival of pulses, coincidence of pulses, end-to-end time
of computation, and time before new inputs can be submitted. We close this section by showing how
these concepts apply directly to characterize the I/O behaviors of Spiking Neural Networks (SNN).
We then derive a Markov Continuous Time model [17] from the deterministic version, and point
out the distinct characteristics of the probabilistic system implementation of XOR. We conclude with
implications about the characteristics of real-brain computational behaviors suggested by contrasting
the ANN perspective and the systems-based formulation developed here. We note that Gelenbe and
colleagues have generated a huge amount of literature on the extensions and applications of random
neural networks. As just described, the focus of this paper is not on DEVS modeling of such networks
in general. However, some aspects related to I/O behavior will be discussed in the conclusions as
potential for future research.
2. System Specification and I/O Behaviors
Inputs/outputs and their logical/temporal relationships represent the I/O behavior of a system.
A major subject of systems theory deals with a hierarchy of system specifications [16] which defines
levels at which a system may be known or specified. Among the most relevant is the Level 2
specification (i.e., the I/O Function level specification), which specifies the collection of input/output
pairs constituting the allowed behavior, partitioned according to the initial state the system is in when
the input is applied. We review the concepts of input/output behavior and their relation to the internal
system specification in greater depth.
For a more in-depth consideration of input/output behavior, we start with the top of Figure 1,
which illustrates an input/output (I/O) segment pair. The input segment represents messages with
content x and y arriving at times t1 and t2, respectively. Similarly, the output segment represents
messages with contents z and z′, at times t3 and t4, respectively.
Figure 1. Representing an input/output pair.
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To illustrate the specification of behavior at the I/O level, we consider a simple system—an adder—all
it does is add values received on its input ports and transmit their sum as output. However simple
this basic adding operation is, there are still many possibilities to consider to characterize its I/O
behavior, such as which input values (arriving at different times) are paired to produce an output
value, and the order in which the inputs must arrive to be placed in such a pairing. Figure 2 portrays
two possibilities, each described as a DEVS model at the I/O system level of the specification
hierarchy. In Figure 2a, after the first inputs of contents x and y have arrived, their values are saved,
and subsequent inputs refresh these saved values. The output message of content z is generated after
the arrival of an input, and its value is the sum of the saved values. In Figure 2b, starting from the initial
state, both contents of messages must arrive before an output is generated (from their most recent
values), and the system is reset to its initial state after the output is generated. This example shows that
even for a simple function, such as adding two values, there can be considerable complexity involved
in the specification of behavior when the temporal pattern of the messages bearing such values is
considered. Two implications are immediate. One is that there may be considerable incompleteness
and/or ambiguity in a semi-formal specification where explicit temporal considerations are often not
made. The second implication follows from the first: an approach is desirable to represent the effects
of timing in as unambiguous a manner as possible.
Figure 2. Variants of behavior and corresponding input/output (I/O) pairs, with (a) saving
input values when they arrived; or (b) resetting to initial state once the output is computed.
White circles indicate states, black circles initial states, and arrows transitions.
3. Systems Implementation of a Memoryless Function
Let f : X → Y be a memoryless function; i.e., it has no time or state dependence [16].
Still, as we have just seen, a system that implements this function may have dynamics and state
dependence. Thus, the relationship between a memoryless function and a system that somehow
displays that behavior needs to be clearly defined. From the perspective of the hierarchy of systems
specifications [16], the relationship involves (1) mapping the input/output behavior of the system to
the definition of the function; and (2) working at the state transition level correctly. Additional system
specification levels may be brought to bear as needed. Recognizing that the basic relationship is
that of simulation between two systems [16], we will keep the discussion quite restricted to limit
the complexities.
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The first thing we need to do is represent the injection of inputs to the function by events
arriving to the system. Let us say that the order of the arguments does not count. This is the case
for the XOR function. Therefore, we will consider segments of zero, one, or two pulses as input
segments, and expect segments of zero or one pulses as outputs. In other words, we are using a very
simple decoding of an event segment into the number of events in its time interval. While simplistic,
this concept still allows arbitrary event times for the arguments, and therefore consideration of
important timing issues. Such issues concern spacing between arguments and time for a computation
to be completed. Figure 3 sketches this approach and corresponding deterministic system for f with
two input ports P1 and P2 receiving contents P and an output port P3 sending a content P.
Figure 3. Deterministic system realization of memoryless function: (a) Input/Output Black Box;
(b) Input and Output Trajectories.
Appendix A gives the formal structure of a DEVS basic model, and Appendix B gives our
working definition of the simulation relation to be used in the sequel. Having a somewhat formal
definition of what it means for a discrete event model to display a behavior equivalent to computing
a memoryless function, we turn toward discussing DEVS models that can exhibit such behaviors for
the XOR function.
4. DEVS Deterministic Representation of Gelenbe Neuron
Figure 4a shows a DEVS model that captures the spirit of the Gelenbe stochastic neuron (as shown
in [15]) in deterministic form. We first introduce the deterministic model to prepare the ground
for discussion of the stochastic neuron in Section 7. Positive pulse arrivals increment the state
up to the maximum, while negative pulses decrement the state, stopping at zero. Non-zero states
down-transition in a time tfire, a parameter. The DEVS model is given as:
DEVS = (X, Y, S, δext, δint, λ, ta)
where,
X = {P+, P−} is the set of positive and negative input pulses,
Y = {P} is the set of plain pulse outputs,
S = {0, 1, 2} is the set of non-negative integer states,
δext(s, e, P+) = s + 1 is the external transition increasing the state by 1 when receiving a positive pulse,
δext(s, e, P+, P+) = s + 2 is the external transition increasing the state by 2 when simultaneously
receiving two positive pulses,
δext(s, e, P−) = max(s− 1, 0) is the external transition decreasing the state by 1 (except at zero) when
receiving a negative pulse,
δint(s > 0) = max(s− 1, 0) is the non-zero states internal transition function decreasing the state by
one (except at zero),
λ(s > 0) = P is the non-zero states output a pulse,
λ(s) = φ is the output sending non-event for states below threshold,
ta(s) = t f ire is the time advance, t f ire, for states above 0, and
ta(0) = +∞ is the infinity time advance for zero passive state.
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See Appendix A for definitions symbols.
Figure 4b shows an input/state/output trajectory in which two successive positive pulses cause
successive increases in the state to 2, which transitions to 1 after tfire, and outputs a pulse. Note that
the second positive pulse arrives before the elapsed time has reached tfire, and increases the state.
This effectively cancels and reschedules the internal transition back to 0. Figure 4c shows the case
where the second pulse comes after firing has happened. Thus, here we have an explicit example of
the temporal effects discussed above. Two pulses arriving close enough to each other (within tfire) will
effectively be considered as coincident. In contrast, if the second pulse arrives too late (outside the tfire
window), it will not be considered as coincident, but will establish its own firing window.
Figure 4. Two-state deterministic Discrete Event System Specification (DEVS) model of
Gelenbe neuron, with (a) DEVS state graph; (b) Closely Spaced Inputs; and (c) Widely
Spaced Inputs. The time elapsed since the last transition is indicated as e ∈ R+,∞0 .
To implement the two logic functions Or and And, we introduce a second parameter into
the model—the threshold. Now, states greater or equal to the threshold will transition to zero state
in a time tfire and output a pulse. The threshold is set to 1 for the Or, and to 2 for the And function.
Thus, any pulse arriving alone is enough to output a pulse for Or, while 2 pulses must arrive to enable
a pulse for the And. However, there is an issue with the time advance needed for state 1 in the And case
(due to an arrival of a first positive pulse). If this time advance is 0, then there is no time for a second
pulse to arrive after a first. If it is infinity, then the model waits forever for a second pulse to arrive. We
introduce a third parameter, tdecay, to establish a finite non-zero window after receiving the first pulse
for a second one to arrive and be counted as coincident with the first. The revised DEVS model is:
DEVS = (X, Y, S, δext, δint, λ, ta)
where,
X = {P+, P−} is the set of positive and negative input pulses,
Y = {P} is the set of plain pulse outputs,
S = {0, 1, 2} is the set of non-negative integer states,
δext(s, e, P+) = s + 1 is the external transition increasing the state by 1 when receiving a positive pulse,
δext(s, e, P+, P+) = s + 2 is the external transition increasing the state by 2 when simultaneously
receiving two positive pulses,
δext(s, e, P−) = f loor(s− 1, 0) is the external transition decreasing the state by 1 (except at zero) when
receiving a negative pulse,
δint(s > 0) = f loor(s− 1, 0) is the non-zero states internal transition function decreasing the state by
one (except at zero),
λ(s ≥ Thresh) = P is the output sending a pulse for states above or equal threshold,
λ(s) = φ is the output sending non-event for states below threshold,
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ta(s ≥ Thresh) = t f ire is the time advance, t f ire, for states above or equal threshold, and
ta(s < Thresh) = tdecay is the time advance, t f ire, for states below threshold.
5. Realization of the XOR Function
We can use the And and Or models as components in a coupled model, as shown in Figure 5a to
implement the XOR function. However as we will see in a moment, we need the response of the And
to be slower than that of the Or to enable the correct response to a pair of pulses. So, we let tfireOr
and tfireAnd be the time advances of the Or and And response in the above threshold states. As in
Figure 5b,c, pulses arriving at the input ports P1 and P2 are mapped in positive pulses by the external
coupling that sends them as inputs to both components. When a single pulse arrives within the tdecay
window, only the Or responds and outputs a pulse. When a pair of pulses arrive within tdecay window,
the And detects them and produces a pulse after tfireAnd. The internal coupling from And to Or maps
this pulse into a double negative pulse at the input of the Or. Meanwhile, the Or is holding in State 2
from the pair of positive pulses it has received from the input. So long as the tfireOr is greater than
tfireAnd, the double negative pulse will arrive quickly enough to the Or model to reduce its state to
zero, thereby suppressing its response. In this way, XOR behavior is correctly realized.
Figure 5. Coupled Model for XOR Implementation, with (a) XOR Network Description; (b) Single
Input Pulse; and (c) Double Input Pulse. Note that t1 in (c) is the same time in (b), representing the
time an inhibited pulse would have arrived.
Assertion: The coupled model of Figure 5 with tfireAnd<tfireOr<tdecay realizes the XOR function
in the following sense:
1. When there are no input pulses, there are no output pulses,
2. When a single input pulse arrives and is not followed within tfireAnd by a second pulse,
then an output pulse is produced after tfireOr of the input pulse arrival time.
3. When the pair of input pulses arrive within tfireAnd of each other, then no output pulse
is produced.
Thus, the computation time is tfireOr, since that is the longest time after the arrival of the input
arguments (first pulse or second pulse in the pair of pulses case) that we have to wait to see if there
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is an output pulse. Another metric could also be considered which starts the clock when the first
argument arrives, rather than when all arguments arrive.
On the other hand, the time for the system to return to its initial state—and we can send in new
arguments for computation—may be longer than the computation time. Indeed, the Or component
returns to the zero state after outputting a pulse at tfireOr in both single and double pulse input cases.
However, in the first case, the And component—having been put into a non-zero state—only relaxes
back to zero after tdecay. Since tdecay is greater than tfireOr, the initial state return time is tdecay.
6. Characterization of SNN I/O Behaviors and Computations
Reference [5] provides a comprehensive review of SNNs, concluding that they have significant
potential for solving complicated time-dependent pattern recognition problems because of their
inclusion of temporal and dynamic behavior. Maass [11,18,19] and Schmitt [12] characterized third
generation SNNs which employ spiking neurons as computational units, accounting for the precise
firing times of neurons for information coding, and showed that such networks are computationally
more powerful than earlier neural networks. Among other results, they showed that a spiking
neuron cannot be simulated by a Boolean network (in particular, a disjunctive composition of
conjunctive components with fixed degree). Furthermore, SNNs have the ability to approximate any
continuous function [4]. As far as realization of SNN’s in DEVS, the reader may refer to reference [20]
for a generic model of a discrete event neuron in an end-to-end nervous system architecture,
and to [21] for a complete formal representation of Maass’ SNN from a DEVS simulation perspective.
Thus, while there is no question concerning the general ability of SNNs to compute the XOR function,
it is of interest to examine the properties of a particular realization—especially one that employs
dynamic features that are distinctive to SNNs vice their static neuronal counterparts. Here we draw
on the approach of Booij [22], who exhibited an architecture for SNN computation of XOR directly,
as opposed to one that relies on the training of a generic net. Like Booij, we change the input and output
argument coding to restrict inputs and outputs to particular locations on the timeline. Employing
earlier convention, Booij requires inputs to occur at fixed positions, such as either at 0 or 6, and outputs
to occur at 10 or 16. Such tight specifications enable a device to be designed that employs synaptic
delays and weights to be manipulated to rise above or stay below a threshold, as required. However,
the result is highly sensitive to noise, in that any slight change in input position can upset the delicate
balancing of delay and weight effects. In contrast, we employ a coding that enables the inputs to
have much greater freedom of location while fundamentally employing synaptic delays (although we
reduce the essential computation to a static Boolean computation).
As before, we consider the XOR function,
f : X → X
where X = {0, 1, 2}, f (x) = x + 1(mod2).
However, we slightly distinguish the decoding of domain and range. Let g1 : DEVS(ρ)→ {0, 1, 2}
specify the decoding of segments to domain of f . Let g2 : DEVS(ρ)→ {0, 1, 2} specify decoding
of segments to range of f . With βq : DEVS(ρ)→ DEVS(ρ), the I/O function of state q, we require,
∀ω ∈ Ωx, g2(βq(ω)) = f (g1(ω)). In this example, for L > 0, we define g1(ω) = number of pulses in
ω that arrive earlier than L, and g2(ω)= number of pulses in ω that arrive earlier than 2L; i.e., we require
f (number of pulses in ω that arrive earlier thanL) = number of pulses in βq(ω) that arrive earlier than 2L.
The basic SNN component is shown in Figure 6a, which has two delay elements feeding an OR
gate with weights shown. The delay element is behaviorally equivalent to a synaptic delay in an SNN,
and is described as DEVS:
Delay(d) =< {p}, {passive,active}, δext, δint, ta, λ >
where δext(passive, p, e) = active, δint(active) = passive, ta(passive) = +∞, ta(active) = d, λ(active) = p.
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The device rests passively until becoming active when receiving a pulse. It remains active for
a time d (the delay parameter), and then outputs a pulse and reverts to passive. The top delay element
in Figure 6a has delay, L, and is activated by a bias pulse at time 0 to start the computation. If an input
pulse arrives any time before time L, it inhibits the output of the OR; otherwise, a pulse is emitted at
time L. Thus, the net of Figure 6a can be called an L-arrival detector, since it detects whether a pulse
arrives before L and outputs its decision at L. Two such sub-nets are employed in Figure 6b to construct
the XOR solution employing SNN equivalent components. After the initial bias, the incoming pulses,
P1 and P2, each arrive early or late relative to L, as detected by the L-detectors. Moreover, any pulses
output at the L-arrival detectors are synchronized so that they can be processed by a straightforward
XOR gate of the kind constructed earlier (i.e., without concern for timing of arrival). We feed the result
into an L-arrival detector in order to report the output back in the form of a pulse that will appear
earlier than 2L if we start the output bias at L. Thus, the computation time for this implementation is
2L, and as is its time to resubmission. Indeed, it can function like a computer logic circuit with clock
cycle L. Note that unlike Booij’s solution, the solution is not sensitive to exact placement of the pulses,
and realistic delays in the gates can be accommodated by delaying the onset of the second bias and
reducing the output L-detector’s delay.
Figure 6. Implementation of the XOR using Spiking Neural Net (SNN) equivalent components
described in DEVS: (a) L-Arrival Component; (b) XOR Coupled Model.
7. Probabilistic System Implementation of XOR
Gelenbe’s implementation of the XOR [15] differs quite radically from the deterministic one just
given. The concept of what it means for a probabilistic system to realize a memoryless function differs
from that given above for a deterministic one.
Figure 7. Stochastic system realization of a memoryless function.
As illustrated in Figure 7, each argument of the function is represented by an infinite stream of
pulses. A stream is modeled as a Poisson stochastic process with a specified rate. An argument value
of zero is represented by a null stream (i.e., a rate of zero). We will set the rate equal 1 for a stream
representing an argument value of 1. The output of the function is represented similarly as a stream of
pulses with a rate representing the value. However, rather than a point, we use an interval on the real
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line to represent the output value. In the XOR, Gelenbe’s implementation uses an interval [0, α) to
represent 0, with [α, 1] representing 1.
Furthermore, the approach to distinguishing the presence of a single input stream from a pair
of such streams—the essence of the problem—is also radically different. The approach formulates
the DEVS neuron of Figure 4 as a Continuous Time Markov model (CTM) [17] shown in Figure 8,
and exploits its steady state properties in response to different levels of positive and negative input
rates. In Figure 8, the CTM on the left has input ports P+ and P− and output port P. In non-zero
states, it transitions to the next lower state with rate FireRate, which is set to the inverse of tfire,
interpreted as the mean time advance for such transitions in Figure 4. The Markov Matrix model [17]
on the right is obtained by replacing the P+, P− and P ports by rates posInputRate and negInputRate,
resp. Further, the output port P is replaced by the OutpuRate, which is computed as the FireRate
multiplied by the probability of firing (i.e., being in a non-zero state.)
Figure 8. Mapping DEVS Neuron Continuous Time Markov (CTM) model to Markov Matrix model.
As in Figure 9, each input stream splits into two equal streams of positive and negative pulses
by external coupling to two components, each of which is a copy of the CTM model of Figure 8.
The difference between the components is that the first component receives only positive pulses,
while the second component receives both positive and negative streams. Note that whenever two equal
streams with the same polarity converge at a component, they effectively act as a single stream of
twice the rate. However, when streams of opposite polarity converge at a component, the result is
a little more complex, as we now show.
Figure 9. Stochastic coupled model implementation of XOR.
Now let us consider the two input argument cases. Case 1: one null stream, one non-null stream
(representing arguments (0, 1) or (1, 0)); Case 2: two non-null streams (representing (1, 1)). In this
set-up, Appendix C describes how the first component saturates (fires at its maximum rate) when it
receives the stream of positive pulses at either the basic or combined intensities. Therefore, it transmits
a stream of positive pulses at the same rate in both Cases 1 and 2. Now, the second component differs
from the first in that it receives the (constant) output of the first one. Therefore, it reacts differently in
the two cases – its output rate is smaller when the negative pulse input rate is larger (i.e., it is inhibited
in inverse relation to the strength of the negative stream). Thus, the output rate is lower in Case 2,
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when there are two input streams of pulses, than in Case 1, when only one is present. However, since
the output rates are not exactly 0 and 1, there needs to be a dividing point (viz., α as above), to make
the decision about which case holds. Appendix C shows how α can be chosen so that the output rate
of the overall model is below α when two input streams are present, and above α when only one (or
none) is present, as required to implement XOR.
8. Discussion
Discussing the proposition of deep neural nets (DNN) as the primary focus of artificial general
intelligence, Smith asserts that largely as used, DNNs map vectors to vectors without considering the
immediate history of recent inputs nor the time base on which such inputs occur in real counterparts [2].
Note that this is not to minimize the potentially increased ability of relatively simple ANN models to
support efficient learning methods [5]. We do not address learnability in this paper. In reality however,
time matters because the interplay of the nervous system and the environment occurs via time-varying
signals. To be considered seriously as Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), a neural net application
will have to work with time-varying inputs to produce time-varying outputs: the world exists in time,
and the reaction of a system exhibiting AGI also has to include time [2,23]. Third-generation SNNs
have been shown to employ temporal and dynamic properties in new forms of applications that point
to such future AGI applications [4,5]. Our results provide a solid system-theoretical foundation and
simulation modeling framework for high-performance computational support of such applications.
Although typically considered as deterministic systems, Gelenbe introduced a stochastic model
of ANN that provided a markedly different implementation [15]. Based on his use of the XOR logic
gate, we formulated definitions for the behavioral realization of memoryless functions, with particular
reference to the XOR gate. The definitions of realization turned out to be substantively different for
deterministic and stochastic systems constructed of neuron-inspired components. Our definitions of
realizations fundamentally include temporal and probabilistic characteristics of their inputs, state,
and outputs. Moreover, the realizations of the XOR function that we constructed provide insight into
the temporal and probabilistic characteristics that real neural systems might display.
Considering the temporal characteristics of neural nets in relation to functions they implement,
we formulated a deterministic DEVS version of Gelenbe’s neural net model, and showed how
this model implements the XOR function. Here, we considered timing related to the arrival of
pulses, coincidence of pulses, end-to-end time of computation, and time before new inputs can
be submitted. We went on to apply the same framework to the realization of memoryless functions
by SNNs, illustrating how the formulation allowed for different input/output coding conventions
that enabled the computation to exploit the synaptic delay features of SNNs. We then derived
a Markov Continuous Time model [17] from the deterministic version, and pointed out the distinct
characteristics of the probabilistic system implementation of XOR. We conclude with implications
about the characteristics of real-brain computational behaviors suggested by contrasting the ANN
perspective and systems-based formulation developed here.
System state and timing considerations we discussed include:
1. Time dispersion of pulses—the input arguments are encoded in pulses over a time base,
where inter-arrival times make a difference in the output.
2. Coincidence of pulses—in particular, whether pulses represent arguments from the same submitted
input or subsequent submission depends on their spacing in time.
3. End-to-end computation time—the total processing time in a multi-component concurrent system
depends on relative phasing as well as component timings, and may be poorly estimated by
summing up of individual execution cycles.
4. Time for return to ground state—the time that must elapse before a system that has performed
a computation is ready to receive new inputs may be longer than its computation time, as it
requires all components to return to their ground states.
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Although present in third-generation models, system state and timing considerations are
abstracted away by neural networks typified by DNNs that are idealizations of intelligent computation;
consequently, they may miss the mark in two aspects:
1. As static recognizers of memoryless patterns, DNNs may become ultra-capable (analogous to
AlphaGo progress [24]), but as representative of human cognition, they may vastly overemphasize
that one dimension and correspondingly underestimate intelligent computational capabilities in
humans and animals in other respects.
2. As models of real neural processing, DNNs do not operate within the system temporal framework
discussed here, and therefore may prove impractical in real-time applications which impose time
and energy consumption constraints such as those just discussed [25].
It is instructive to compare the computation-relevant characteristics of the deterministic and
stochastic versions of the DEVS neuron models we discussed. The deterministic version delivers
directly interpretable outputs within a specific processing time. The Gelenbe stochastic version
formulates inputs and outputs as indefinitely extending streams modelled by Poisson processes.
Practically speaking, obtaining results requires measurement over a sufficiently extended period to
obtain statistical validity and/or to enable a Bayesian or Maximum Likelihood detector to make
a confidence-dependent decision. On the other hand, a probabilistic version of the DEVS neuron can
be formulated that retains the direct input/output encoding, but can also give probability estimates for
erroneous output. Some of these models have been explored [9,21], while others explicitly connecting
to leaky integrate-and-fire neurons are under active investigation [26]. Possible applications of DEVS
modeling to the extensive literature on Gelenbe networks are considered in Appendix D. Along these
lines, we note that both the deterministic and probabilistic implementations of XOR use the negative
inputs in an essential (although different) manner to identify the (1, 1) input argument and inhibit
the output produced when it occurs (note that the use of negative synaptic weights is also essential in
the SSN implementation, although in a somewhat different form). This suggests research to show that
XOR cannot be computed without use of negative inputs, which would establish a theoretical reason
for why inhibition is fundamentally needed for leaky integrate-and-fire neuron models—a reason that
is distinct from the hidden layer requirement uncovered by Rumelhart [7].
Although not within the scope of this paper, the DEVS framework for I/O behavior realization
would seem to be applicable to the issue of spike coding by neurons. A reviewer pointed to the recent
work of Yoon [27], which provides new insights by considering neurons as analog-to-digital converters.
Indeed, encoding continuous-time signals into spikes using a form of sigma-delta modulation
would fit the DEVS framework which accommodates both continuous and discrete event segments.
Future research could seek to characterize properties of I/O functions that map continuous segments
to discrete event segments [16,20].
Author Contributions: B.P. Zeigler developed the different models in interaction with Alexandre Muzy who
provided his expertise in mathematical system-theory and neural net modeling.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
Appendix A. Discrete Event System Specification (DEVS) Basic Model
A basic Discrete Event System Specification (DEVS) is a mathematical structure
DEVS = (X, Y, S, δext, δint, λ, ta),
where X is the set of input events, Y is the set of output events, S is the set of partial states, δext : Q× X → S
is the external transition function with Q = {(s, e) | s ∈ S, 0 ≤ e ≤ ta(s)} the set of total states with e
the elapsed time since the last transition, δint : S → S is the internal transition function, λ : S → Y is
the output function, and ta : S → R0,+∞ is the time advance function.
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Figure A1 depicts simple trajectories of a DEVS. The latter starts in initial state s0 at time t0,
and schedules an internal event occurring after time advance ta(s0), where value y0 is output, and state
changes to s1 = δint(s0). At time t2, an external event of value x0 occurs, changing the state to
s2 = δext(s1, e1, x0) with e1 the elapsed time since the last transition. Then, an internal event is





















e1 ta(s2) ta(s4) ta(s5)
x1x0
e2
Figure A1. Simple DEVS trajectories.
Appendix B. Simulation Relation
Consider a function having the same domain and range,
f : X → X
For example, an XOR function where X = {0, 1, 2}, f (x) = x + 1(mod2). Let,
g : ΩX → X
That is, specify decoding of segments to domain and range of f . Let
βq : ΩX → ΩX
be the I/O Function of state q mapping input segments to output segments.
If βq(ω) = ρ, we require g(ρ) = f (g(ω)); i.e., input segment ω mapped to output segment ρ
when decoded is required to satisfy f . That is, g(βq(ω)) = f (g(ω)). Applying the requirement to
DEVS segments of pulses, let g : DEVS(p) → {0, 1, 2}; i.e., g(ω) = number of pulses in ω requiring
βq : DEVS(p)→ DEVS(p). That is, number of pulses in βq(ω) = f (number of pulses in ω).
Appendix C. Behavior of the Markov Model
We first reduce the infinite state Matrix model to a two-state version that is equivalent with respect
to the output pulse rate in steady state. As in Figure C1, all the non-zero states are lumped into a single
firing state, sFire, and we will interpret each of the probabilities in terms of the original rates as follows:
1. There is only one way to transition from s0 to sFire, and that is by going from s0 to s1 in the original
model, which happens with posInputRate. Therefore, P01 = posInputRate.
2. Similarly, there is only one way to transition from sFire to s0, and this happens with negInputRate+
FireRate. Therefore, P10 = negInputRate + FireRate.
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3. The probability of remaining in the sFire, P11 = 1− P10 (these must sum to 1).
4. Similarly, P00 = 1− P01.
Figure C1. Reduction to two-state Markov Matrix model.
Now, in the reduced model, the steady state probabilities are easy to compute in terms of
the transition probabilities. Indeed, the probability of being in the firing state, PFire = P01P01+P10 = 1 for
P01 ≈ 1.
Additionally, the rate of producing output pulses
OutputRate = PFire × FireRate = posInputRateposInputRate + negInputRate + FireRate × FireRate
The case of saturation occurs when the positive input rate is “very large" compared to
the rates that lower the state, especially when the negative input rate is 0, so that PFire = 1 and
OutputRate = FireRate.
Thus, the output of the first component saturates at the maximum, FireRate. This is input to
the second component so that we have for it:
OutputRate = PFire × FireRate
=
FireRate







So, we see that the output rate is inversely related to the negative pulse input which, by design,
the second component receives, but not the first.
Appendix D. Possible Applications of DEVS Modeling to Random Neural Networks
Random neural network (RNN)—a probabilistic model inspired by neuronal stochastic spiking
behavior—have received much examination. Here we focus on two main extensions: synchronous
interaction and spike classes. Gelenbe developed an extension of the RNN [28–33] to the case
when synchronous interactions can occur, modeling synchronous firing by large ensembles of cells.
Included are recurrent networks having both conventional excitatory–inhibitory interactions and
synchronous interactions. Although modeling the ability to propagate information very quickly over
relatively large distances in neuronal networks, the work focuses on developing a related learning
algorithm. Synchronous interactions take the form of a joint excitation by a pair of cells on a third
cell. One can assign Q(i, j, m) as the probability that when cell i fires, then if cell j is excited, it will
also fire immediately, with an excitatory spike being sent to cell m. This synchronous behavior can
be extended to an arbitrary number of cells that can simultaneously fire. DEVS modeling includes
zero time advance possibility to capture such behavior, as was illustrated in application to physical
action-at-a-distance by Zeigler [14]. The standard RNN approach has been concerned with equilibrium
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analysis, and it may be interesting to see how the DEVS equivalent modeling can throw light on
the plausibility of such zero time advances and any difference they would make in the temporal I/O
behavior of interest to us here.
RNNs with multiple spike classes of signals were introduced to represent interconnected neurons
which simultaneously process multiple streams of data, such as the color information of images or
networks which simultaneously process streams of data from multiple sensors. One network was used
to generate a synthetic texture that imitates the original image. To exchange spikes of different types,
neurons have potentials that generate corresponding excitatory spikes in a manner similar to the single
potential case. Inhibitory spikes are of only one type, and affect class potential in proportion to their
levels. DEVS models can represent such neurons, but there seems to be no evidence for biological
plausibility of such a structure. It would be interesting to see if the structure and behavior manifested
by multi-class RNNs can be realized by groups of ordinary neurons in the roles of spike processing
classes; e.g., interacting cell assemblies specifically tuned to red, green, and blue color wavelengths.
References
1. Carandini, M. From circuits to behavior: A bridge too far? Nat. Neurosci. 2012, 15, 507–509.
2. Smith, L.S. Deep neural networks: The only show in town? In Proceeedings of the Workshop on Can Deep
Neural Networks (DNNs) Provide the Basis for Articial General Intelligence (AGI) at AGI 2016, New York,
NY, USA, 16–19 July 2016.
3. Goertzel, B. Are There Deep Reasons Underlying the Pathologies of Today’s Deep Learning Algorithms?
In Artificial General Intelligence; Springer International Publishing: Cham, Switzerland, 2015; pp. 70–79.
4. Paugam-Moisy, H.; Bohte, S. Computing with Spiking Neuron Networks. In Handbook of Natural Computing;
Kok, J., Heskes, T., Eds.; Springer: Berlin/Heidelberg, Germany, 2009.
5. Ghosh-Dastidar, S.; Hojjat, A. Spiking neural networks. Int. J. Neural Syst. 2009, 19, 295–308.
6. Minsky, M.; Papert, S. Perceptrons; MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, USA, 1969.
7. Rumelhart, D.E.; Hinton, G.E.; Williams, R.J. Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure
of Cognition. Vol. 1: Foundations; Rumelhart, D.E., McClelland, J.L., Eds.; MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, USA,
1986; pp. 318–362.
8. Bland, R. Learning XOR: Exploring the Space of a Classic Problem; Computing Science Technical Report;
Department of Computing Science and Mathematics, University of Stirling: Stirling, Scotland, June 1998.
9. Toma, S.; Capocchi, L.; Federici, D. A New DEVS-Based Generic Artificial Neural Network Modeling
Approach. In Proceedings of the EMSS 2011, Rome, Italy, 12 September 2011.
10. Pessa, E. Neural Network Models: Usefulness and Limitations. In Nature-Inspired Computing: Concepts,
Methodologies, Tools, and Applications; IGI Global: Hershey, PA, USA, 2017; pp. 368–395.
11. Maass, W. Lower bounds for the computational power of spiking neural networks. Neural Comput. 1996,
8, 1–40.
12. Schmitt, M. On computing Boolean functions by a spiking neuron. Ann. Math. Artif. Intell. 1998, 24, 181–191.
13. Brette, R.; Rudolph, M.; Carnevale, T.; Hines, M.; Beeman, D.; Bower, J.M.; Diesmann, M.; Morrison, A.;
Goodman, P.H.; Harris, F.C., Jr.; et al. Simulation of networks of spiking neurons: A review of tools and
strategies. J. Comput. Neurosci. 2007, 23, 349–398.
14. Zeigler, B.P. Cellular Space Models: New Formalism for Simulation and Science. In The Philosophy of Logical
Mechanism: Essays in Honor of Arthur W. Burks; Salmon, M.H., Ed.; Springer: Dordrecht, The Netherlands,
1990; pp. 41–64.
15. Gelenbe, E. Random Neural Networks with Negative and Positive Signals and Product Form Solution.
Neural Comput. 1989, 1, 502–510.
16. Zeigler, B.P.; Kim, T.G.; Praehofer, H. Theory of Modeling and Simulation: Integrating Discrete Event and
Continuous Complex Dynamic Systems, 2nd ed.; Academic Press: Boston, MA, USA, 2000.
17. Zeigler, B.P.; Nutaro, J.; Seo, C. Combining DEVS and Model-Checking: Concepts and Tools for Integrating
Simulation and Analysis. Int. J. Process Model. Simul. 2016, in press.
18. Maass, W. Fast sigmoidal networks via spiking neurons. Neural Comput. 1997, 9, 279–304.
208
Systems 2017, 5, 7
19. Maass, W. Networks of Spiking Neurons: The Third Generation of Neural Network Models. Neural Netw.
1996, 10, 1659–1671.
20. Zeigler, B.P. Discrete Event Abstraction: An Emerging Paradigm For Modeling Complex Adaptive Systems.
In Perspectives on Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems; Booker, L., Forrest, S., Mitchell, M., Riolo, R., Eds.;
Oxford University Press: New York, NY, USA, 2005; pp. 119–141.
21. Mayerhofer, R.; Affenzeller, M.; Fried A.; Praehofer, H. DEVS Simulation of Spiking Neural
Networks. In Proceedings of the Euro-Pean Meeting on Cybernetics and Systems, Vienna, Austria,
30 March–1 April 2002.
22. Booij, O. Temporal Pattern Classification using Spiking Neural Networks. Master’s Thesis, Universiteit van
Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, August 2004.
23. Maass, W.; Natschlager, T.; Markram, H. Real-time computing without stable states: A new framework for
neural computation based on perturbations. Neural Comput. 2002, 14, 2531–2560.
24. Koch, C. How the Computer Beat the Go Master, Scientific American. 2016. Available online:
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-the-computer-beat-the-go-master/ (accessed on
14 January 2017).
25. Hu, X.; Zeigler, B.P. Linking Information and Energy—Activity-based Energy-Aware Information Processing.
Simul. Trans. Soc. Model. Simul. Int. 2013, 89, 435–450.
26. Muzy, A.; Zeigler, B.P.; Grammont, F. Iterative Specification of Input-Output Dynamic Systems
and Implications for Spiky Neuronal Networks. IEEE Syst. J. 2016. Available online:
http://www.i3s.unice.fr/ muzy/Publications/neuron.pdf (accessed on 14 January 2017).
27. Yoon, Y.C. LIF and Simplified SRM Neurons Encode Signals Into Spikes via a Form of Asynchronous Pulse
Sigma-Delta Modulation. IEEE Trans. Neural Netw. Learn. Syst. 2016, PP, 1–14.
28. Gelenbe, E. G-networks: A unifying model for neural and queueing networks. Ann. Oper. Res. 1994, 48,
433–461.
29. Gelenbe, E.; Fourneau, J.M. Random Neural Networks with Multiple Classes of Signals. Neural Comput.
1999, 11, 953–963.
30. Gelenbe, E. The first decade of G-networks. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 2000, 126, 231–232.
31. Gelenbe, E. G-networks: Multiple classes of positive customers, signals, and product form results.
In IFIP International Symposium on Computer Performance Modeling, Measurement and Evaluation; Springer:
Berlin/Heidelberg, Germany, 2002.
32. Gelenbe, E.; Timotheou, S. Random Neural Networks with Synchronized Interactions. Neural Comput. 2008,
20, 2308–2324.
33. Gelenbe, E.; Timotheou, S. Synchronized Interactions in Spiked Neuronal Networks. Comput. J. 2008 , 51,
723–730.
c© 2017 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution




















St. Alban-Anlage 66  
4052 Basel, Switzerland 
Tel. +41 61 683 77 34 
Fax +41 61 302 89 18 
http://www.mdpi.com 








St. Alban-Anlage 66 
4052 Basel 
Switzerland
Tel: +41 61 683 77 34 
Fax: +41 61 302 89 18
www.mdpi.com ISBN 978-3-03842-441-3
